Evolutionary psychology is compatible with equity feminism, but not with gender feminism: A reply to Eagly and Wood (2011)

I comment on Eagly and Wood's biosocial constructionist evolutionary theory (2011; DOI: 10.1007/s11199-011-9949-9). Although this gender feminist theory allows for evolved physical differences between men and women and evolved psychological similarities for men and women, it fails to consider evolutionary accounts of psychological sex differences. I hypothesize that gender feminists' reluctance to acknowledge that evolution has left different fingerprints on men's and women's bodies and brains stems from two common misunderstandings of evolutionary psychology: the myth of immutability and the naturalistic fallacy. I conclude that although evolutionary psychology is eminently compatible with equity feminism, evolutionary psychology and feminist psychology will conflict as long as the latter adheres to gender feminism and its unwillingness to acknowledge the evidence for evolved psychological sex differences. Gender feminism's dualistic view of evolution hinders the search for and understanding of the proximate and ultimate causes of inequality. Feminist psychology needs to evolve by embracing equity feminism, which has no a priori stance on the origin or existence of differences between the sexes.     

Reply to: Roberts

In his critique of my views on supererogation, Rodney Roberts (Philosophia, 2014) claims that I treat care ethics as having a more general moral validity than other care ethicists do. He also claims that the kind of sentimentalism I espouse doesn’t sufficiently emphasize sentiment and then goes on to question what I say about supererogation. But in fact other care ethicists also think care ethics can cover the whole of morality, and my sentimentalism emphasizes sentiment just as much and as little as that paradigm sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson does. Further, the critique Roberts makes of my view on supererogation doesn’t allow for the full range of possible cases of supererogation.     

Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science

Paul Hoyningen-Huene argues that what makes scientific knowledge special is its systematic character, and that this can be used to solve the demarcation problem. He labels this STDC: “Systematicity Theory’s Demarcation Criterion.” This paper argues that STDC fails, because there are areas of intellectual activity that are highly systematic, but that the great majority of scientists and historians and philosophers of science do not accept as scientific. These include homepathy, creationism, and climate change denial. I designate these activities “facsimile sciences” because they mimic the appearance of science but are not, by the standards of philosophers and scientists, scientific. This suggests that we need additional criteria to demarcate science from non-science and/ or nonsense.

     

Freud and feminism: a critical appraisal

This paper traces the contributions made by women to Freud's ideas about women. Freud paid back the gifts he received from women with encouragement and support for their careers and with a theory that was instrumental in freeing women from both domestic bondage and fantasies of inferiority, but which was used by later "Freudians" as justification for returning women to an exclusively domestic life. Paying particular attention to Sabina Spielrein, Lou Andreas-Salomé, and H.D., the paper illustrates some of the contributions of women to early psychoanalysis, and speculates on ways in which Freud's thinking was guided by his belief that women are, and should be considered, equal to men.     

The effects of attitudes toward feminism and perceived feminism on physical attractiveness ratings

The effects of perceived feminism of females and attitudes toward feminism of males on physical attractiveness ratings of female stimulus persons (SPs) were investigated, using two alternative hypotheses: first, SPs who are perceived as feminists would be rated as less attractive than SPs not perceived as feminists; second, profeminist males would rate profeminist women as more attractive than nonfeminist women, and vice versa for nonfeminist males. Seventy-six male college students responded to the Smith-Ferree-Miller questionnaire on attitudes toward feminism and then rated on an 8-point scale of attractiveness 6 photographs of female SPs which had been selected from a pretested sample of 18 photographs. Perceived feminism of the SPs in the photographs was manipulated by presenting the raters with four attitude statements, two of which related to feminism. Although there were no main effects for the two variables, significant interaction did occur, confirming the second (attitude similarity) hypothesis. A negative halo effect, as opposed to a belief in the unattractiveness of feminists, was offered as an explanation of the difference in results between this study and the Goldberg, Gottesdiener, and Abramson (1975) study.     

Relational Trouble: Reply to Commentaries

This reply to the commentaries by Corbett, Hansell, and Stern explores whether Lacan's concept of the real can—or should—be translated into more readily recognizable terms. It extends our previous discussion of impossibility by arguing that not all ideas and experiences can be brought within the realm of the known and familiar. We suggest that impossibilities of meaning should not be understood primarily in phenomenological terms, and we demur from the assessment that our concept of impossibility offers nothing for clinical work. Claiming that what resists meaning also impedes relationality, we encourage relational theorists to address the nonrelational processes that subtend relationality, including the relation between analyst and patient. We acknowledge that the theory of impossibility—or what we now call “negative mediation”—raises a fundamental challenge to relational theory, but we insist that disruptions of relationality need not be considered pathological. Taking into account the nonrelational may enhance rather than impoverish relational psychoanalysis.     

Ontology relativized: Reply to Moulines

Ontology is taken by Moulines as supervenient on science: what kinds of things there are is determined by our well-confirmed theories. But the fact is that today, science provides us with a multiplicity of well-confirmed theories, each having its own ontological commitments. The modest, ontological form of reduction advocated by Moulines (this volume) restores hope of putting some ontological order in the “huge chaotic supermarket of science”. In this paper I show that any claim on the amount of order obtained by reduction does not only always remain “temporally qualified” but, worse for the reductionist with a taste for ontological order, that the very notion of orderliness must be relativized to the capacities and interests of knowers.     

Dialectics Forever: Reply to Commentaries

The dialectic between repetition and transformation, an inherent aspect of the therapeutic dialogue, is elaborated. Dialectic refers to an ever-present tension within a process, a pull by opposite tendencies in contradictory directions. Checks and balances between repetition and transformation are crucial. Too great a tilt toward transformation can bring the system into disorganization and instability. Too great a tilt toward repetition and the system can stagnate. The term “dialectic” is also used to refer to the tension between an emphasis on process and an emphasis on content or outcome. The massive challenges to traditional psychoanalytic treatment that stem from the empirical infant research, self psychology, general systems theory, and motivational systems are discussed. Their contributions are of particular relevance to the nonverbal dimension of the analyst-patient interaction.     

Realismbei Frege: Reply to Burge

Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments and our thoughts; that there is a third realm containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings — interpretations on which these claims receive a very different reading. In Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge attempts to undermine this trend. Burge argues that Frege is the very Platonist most have thought him — that revisionist interpretations of Frege's Platonism, mine among them, run afoul of the words on Frege's pages. This paper is a response to Burge's criticisms. I argue that my interpretation is more faithful than Burge's to Frege's texts.     

Sensitive but not sentimental: Emotionally intelligent people can put their emotions aside when necessary

Are emotionally intelligent people sentimental? Does their greater sensitivity handicap them or are they able, as theory would expect, to experience and regulate emotions flexibly, depending on their goals? We examined this issue in organizational settings. Good managers are indeed expected to be both attuned to feelings (theirs as well as their subordinates’) and able to put them aside when needed to take tough (but necessary) decisions. Our results show that emotionally intelligent managers do make better managers, as reflected by greater managerial competencies, higher team efficiency and less stressed subordinates. Moreover, and most importantly, emotionally intelligent managers are not just nicer managers. As our results show, emotional intelligence has nothing to do with sentimentality. Actually, it is managers with low EI who have the greatest difficulties to put their emotions aside and not let them interfere when inappropriate.