A critique of Thad Metz’s African theory of moral status

Thad Metz defends what he considers to be a novel theory of moral status, i.e. an account about what beings are owed direct duties in virtue of their moral significance. Metz claims that his account is African, it is plausible and that it is worth taking seriously like other competing accounts in the Western philosophical tradition. In this article, I give four reasons why we should doubt, if not reject, these claims of plausibility. Firstly, I show how a theory that accounts for moral status by relying solely on some facet of human nature ultimately fails to grant intrinsic value to non-human components, and as such it will always prefer human interests over those of nonhuman components, and further it won’t have a moral-theoretical basis to assign intrinsic value to non-human components. Secondly, I hope to demonstrate that this theory will not be able to account for the moral status of Martians and in turn show that it does not secure the standing of animals from such beings. I also argue that his account does not give credible evidence for the intuition that severely injured human persons have greater moral status than animals with similar internal properties. Finally, I briefly indicate that this theory does not have the corpus to explain our duties to people who have died, or at least, their bodies.     

A Direct Kantian Duty to Animals

Kant's view that we have only indirect duties to animals fails to capture the intuitive notion that wronging animals transgresses duties we owe to those animals. Here I argue that a suitably modified Kantianism can allow for direct duties to animals and, in particular, an imperfect duty to promote animal welfare without unduly compromising its core theoretical commitments, especially its commitments concerning the source and nature of our duties toward rational beings. The basis for such duties is that animal welfare, on my revised Kantian view, is neither a conditioned nor unconditioned good, but a final and nonderivative good that ought to be treated as an end‐in‐itself. However, this duty to promote animal welfare operates according to a broadly consequentialist logic that both accords well with our considered judgments about our duties to animals and explains differences between these duties and duties owed to rational agents.     

Introduction: Egoism,Altruism and Impartiality

The distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation is firmly embedded in contemporary moral discourse, but harks back too to early modern attempts to found morality on an egoistic basis. Rejecting that latter premise means accepting that others’ interests have intrinsic value, but it remains far from clear what altruism demands of us and what its relationship is with the rest of morality. While informing our duties, altruism seems also to urge us to transcend them and embrace the other-regarding values and virtues constitutive of a good life. This rather wide conception of morality may strike us today as too demanding. At the same time, however, currently popular impartialist accounts of morality can disrupt much everyday altruism in their insistence that each person’s interests are weighed precisely equally. Having sketched this problematic of altruism, the second half of this Introduction outlines the arguments of the four papers and review essay in this collection, each of which, in a different way, negotiates the difficult relationships between egoism, altruism, morality and impartiality. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Child Abuse: parental rights and the interests of the child

ABSTRACT I criticise the 'liberal'view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be 'licensed'but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve.     

Liberal internationalism and global social justice

Theories of global justice have moved from issues relating to crimes against humanity and war crimes or, furthermore, ‘negative duties’ with respect to non-citizens, towards problems of distributive justice and global inequality. Thomas Nagel's Storrs Lectures from 2005, exemplifying Rawlsian internationalism, argue that liberal requirements concerning duties of distributive justice apply exclusively within a single nation-state, and do not extend to duties of this nature between rich and poor countries. Nagel even argues that the demand for global equality is not a demand of justice at all. In the present article I will try to offer a normative basis for the criticism of such a view. Following Kant and more recently Philip Pettit, I locate this normative basis on political freedom conceived as non-domination. Such a conception opens up the possibility of a political cosmopolitanism, which is based not on an empirical interdependence among people at a global level, but on a normative interdependence. Subsequent cosmopolitan duties extend both to the elimination of domination everywhere in the world and to the equal enjoyment of non-dominated choice. Thus, it will be argued that modern republicanism is falsely identified with a particular, bounded community, but supports a political, not simply a moral, cosmopolitanism. This kind of cosmopolitanism conceives of sovereign states neither as useless constructions, nor as mere instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is what gives the value of justice its application. Cosmopolitanism is not after all about the abolishment of all boundaries, but about the essential capacity to draw and redraw them infinitely under conditions of global justice.     

Cutting Motherhood in Two: Some Suspicions Concerning Surrogacy

Surrogate motherhood—at least if carefully structured to protect the interests of the women involved—seems defensible along standard liberal lines which place great stress on free agreements as moral bedrocks. But feminist theories have tended to be suspicious about the importance assigned to this notion by mainstream ethics, and in this paper, we develop implications of those suspicions for surrogacy. We argue that the practice is inconsistent with duties parents owe to children and that it compromises the freedom of surrogates to perform their share of those duties. Standard liberal perspectives tend to be insensitive to such considerations; we propose a view which takes more seriously the moral importance of the causal relationship between parents and children, and which therefore illuminates rather than obscures the stake that women and children have in surrogacy.     

Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots

Ethical theories normally make room both for global duties to human beings everywhere and special duties to those we are attached to in some way. Such a split-level view requires us to specify the kind of attachment that can ground special duties, and to explain the comparative force of the two kinds of duties in cases of conflict. Special duties are generated within groups that are intrinsically valuable and not inherently unjust, where the duties can be shown to be integral to relationships within the group. Since nations can be shown to meet these conditions, acknowledging special obligations towards compatriots is justified. However for such partiality to be reasonable, it must be balanced against recognition of duties of global justice. These duties include duties to respect human rights and duties of fairness towards non-nationals. Weighing such duties against domestic duties of social justice is not a simple task, and the outcome should depend on the precise specification of the duty at stake. In particular, the duty to respect human rights fragments into four sub-duties whose force when set against local duties is markedly different.     

SPECIESISM AND MORAL STATUS

Abstract: Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a problem for this set of beliefs, because their cognitive capacities are not superior to those of many animals. I argue that we should drop the belief in the equal value of human life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to animals as well as to humans.     

A Liberal Defence of (Some) Duties to Compatriots

This paper asks whether we can defend associative duties to our compatriots that are grounded solely in the relationship of liberal co‐citizenship. The sort of duties that are especially salient to this relationship are duties of justice, duties to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship, and a duty to favour the interests of compatriots over those of foreigners. Critics have argued that the liberal conception of citizenship is too insubstantial to sustain these duties — indeed, that it gives us little reason to treat compatriots any differently from how we treat foreigners, with all the practical consequences that this would entail. I suggest that on a specific conception of liberal citizenship we can, in fact, defend associative duties, but that these extend only to the duty to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship. Duties of justice and favouritism, I maintain, cannot be particularised to one's compatriots.     

With infinite utility,more needn't be better

Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally desirable action and no collective exists. But, I argue, we are not at a loss. This article outlines a new way of assigning duties over collective acts when there is no collective. Specifically, we should assign collectivization duties to individuals. These are individual duties to take steps towards forming a collective, which then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers.     

Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature: Allen W. Wood

Kant's moral philosophy is grounded on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value, and involves the claim that human beings are to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. It might be thought that a theory of this kind would be incapable of grounding any conception of our relation to other living things or to the natural world which would value nonhuman creatures or respect humanity's natural environment. This paper criticizes Kant's argumentative strategy for dealing with our duties in regard to animals, but defends both his theory and most of his conclusions on these topics.     

Medical ethics in times of war and insurrection: Rights and duties

In this paper I shall take the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols as my point of departure and link these with the International Declaration of Human Rights as a statement of faith and of aspirations.... The second part of my paper will focus on medical morality with brief reference to various languages of moral discourse and to differences in conceptual logic which underpin debates on duties and rights with particular reference to the circumstances of conflict. While acknowledging the value of talking of rights as primary I shall also suggest that the shift away from discourse on duties and obligations as primary undermines the likelihood of super-erogatory moral action. I shall conclude by emphasizing the centrality of acceptance by the State and the military of their duty to the injured and to medical personnel caring for them, if man's inhumanity to man, particularly evident during times of war, is to be kept out of our concern for each other as human beings even when nations are pitted against each other in the ongoing, but hopefully not eternal, struggle for material and ideological power.     

WHY AREN'T DUTIES RIGHTS?

The best analyses of the concept 'rights' maintain that Hohfeldian claims, privileges, powers, immunities, liabilities, and clusters of these positions, all qualify as rights when they satisfy some further condition, such as serving their holder's interests, or fulfilling some alternative function. But duties, disabilities and no-rights can also satisfy this further condition. For example, many duties, disabilities and no-rights serve their holder's interests, and fulfil 'right-like' functions. Why, then, do we disallow such duties, disabilities and no-rights from qualifying as rights?     

Modal Personhood and Moral Status: A Reply to Kagan's Proposal

Kagan argues that human beings who are neither persons nor even potential persons — if their impairment is independent of genetic constitution — are modal persons: individuals who might have been persons. Moreover, he proposes a view according to which both (actual) personhood and modal personhood are sufficient for counting more, morally, than nonhuman animals. In response to this proposal, I raise one relatively minor concern about Kagan's reasoning — that he judges too quickly that insentient beings can have interests — before engaging the appeal to modal personhood. I challenge the thesis that modal personhood is relevant to one's moral status, first, by way of analogy to a kicker who misses a field goal though he might have made it; second, by casting doubt on implications for two impaired infants (only one of whom might have been a person); and, finally, by examining implications for dogs who would count as modal persons when genetic enhancements are capable of transforming them into persons.     

Zen Buddhism and the intrinsic value of nature

Part IIt is a perennial theme in the literature on environmental ethics that the exploitation of the environment is the result of a blindness to (or perhaps a refusal to recognize) the intrinsic value of natural beings. The general story here is that Western traditions of thought have tended to accord natural beings value only to the extent that they prove useful to humans, that they have tended to see nature as only instrumentally valuable. By contrast, it is said that a new, environmentally friendly understanding of the world would value nature ‘for its own sake’, would conceive natural beings as having intrinsic value. In the light of such an understanding, the oak tree, for instance, would be seen not merely as a source of timber or shade or as a decoration for the front lawn, but as valuable ‘in itself’, as having an intrinsic value that ought to be respected (see further, O'Neill 1993, chapter 2).     

The patient-physician relationship and the allocation of scarce resources: a law and economics approach

Patients with insufficient financial resources place physicians in a conflict of interest between the patients' needs and the financial interests of the physician, other patients, and society. Not only must physicians act ethically, but they must avoid liability for violating their legal duties to their patients. The traditional rules of contract and malpractice law that govern the patient-physician relationship do not provide satisfactory guidelines. Better answers are found in the rules of fiduciary law, but only with regard to direct conflicts between patients and physicians and only at the risk of reducing patient access to care. Certain types of legislative action can resolve these conflicts by altering the traditional legal rules, but care must be taken to preserve patient-physician trust, which the legal rules were designed to enhance.     

An ethics of suffering: does it solve the problems we want to solve?: commentary

Erich H. Loewy proposes to elevate the moral obligation to prevent and relieve suffering to the level of a prima facie moral duty by delineating which beings are of primary moral worth and which are of secondary moral worth. Sentient beings have a capacity to suffer and are therefore of primary moral worth. Beings that are insentient cannot suffer; therefore such beings are only of secondary moral worth. Objects of secondary moral worth include patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) and brain-dead patients. This proposal, he says, would solve a number of problems in clinical bioethics. First, it would help to clarify our moral duties at the bedside. And secondly, by creating a hierarchy of moral values, it helps to differentiate which patients are owed our primary allegiance and resources. Despite his extensive and painstaking proof, I believe several questions remain about the use of the "capacity of sentient beings to suffer" as a basis for a universal grounding in ethics.     

The implications of value conflict: how disagreement on values affects self-involvement and perceived common ground

This article presents two studies demonstrating the implications of having different values (vs. interests) in a situation where people take opposite positions. Study 1 examined how people respond to a range of conflict issues that were framed either as referring to conflicting values or as referring to conflicting interests. Study 2 used a more immersive methodology, in which participants were led to consider either their values or interests in taking up a particular position, after which they were presented with a confederate who took up the opposite position. Results of both studies converge to demonstrate that framing a particular conflict issue in terms of values causes people to experience more self-involvement and to perceive less common ground. This result can be seen as a potential explanation of why value conflicts tend to escalate more easily than conflicts of interests and also offers scope for interventions directed at value conflict resolution.     

The Development of Traditional Chinese View of Rule of Law and Its Modern Transformation

In the traditional order of the “rule of rites,” social status and relationships always held priority positions, which apparently went against the realization of social justice; Legalists thought highly of objectivity and avoided subjective randomness, and were more reasonable in this regard. However, following the integration of rites and law in the Han Dynasty, the technical aspect of Legalism emphasizing control of society and of the populace was strengthened, and in the meanwhile, their “true spirit” became concealed before long. The main signs of this are follows: (1) In the order of the “rule of rites,” the objectivity of law was gradually devoured by the subjectivity of human beings, thus the tradition where “human relationships replace law” came into being; (2) The law, which had shown the spirit of equality to a certain extent in the guise of Legalism, now degraded into a tool to maintain a hierarchy; (3) Rights were separated from duties, that is, some people enjoyed “rights without duties” as much as they wanted, while the rest were forced to carry out “duties without rights.” As history has warned us, in ruling a country, one cannot stake even the least bit of fortune upon human nature, and there can be only one bottom line and criterion, that is, common strict observance of and respect to “rules.” That should be the great value of the lesson that the pre-Qin Legalism has left for future generations.     

Doing one's duty: chronological age,felt autonomy,and subjective well‐being

Existential, psychosocial, and organismic theories propose that human beings tend towards greater autonomy over the lifespan, and that greater autonomy is associated with greater happiness. We tested these two ideas in the under‐studied domain of social duties by examining the associations between chronological age, felt autonomy while engaging in various social duties, and subjective well‐being (SWB). Study 1 found that older Americans felt more autonomous while voting, tipping, and paying taxes, Study 2 showed that American parents felt more autonomous in their work and citizenship roles compared with their own children, and Study 3 found that older Singaporeans felt more autonomous while obeying authorities, helping distant relatives, and staying politically informed. In all three studies, felt autonomy was also associated with higher SWB. It appears that older persons better internalize their social duties, to their own and societies' benefit. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.