Sisyphus,happiness and transcendence

What is the relation between transcendence and happiness? What type of transcendence can still be part of the concept happiness in our modern age? To answer these questions, I analyse the myth of Sisyphus from the existentialist perspective of Albert Camus, and investigate whether Sisyphus is (or can be) ‘truly’ happy and what role transcendence plays in this kind of happiness. This prompts a question about the relation between the concepts transcendence, meaning of life, and happiness. Taking Sisyphus as an exemplar, I argue that, although our contemporary culture has a flattening tendency regarding transcendence, various types of transcendence remain inextricably related to happiness.     

Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's Ethics

This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle.     

Albert Ellis: Unsung hero of positive psychology

The contributions of Albert Ellis to the understanding of human happiness including his suggestions for living a happier life have not been represented in the field of positive psychology. This article presents Ellis’ theoretical constructs associated with his conception of happiness (dual nature of human psyche, self-actualization, purpose and goals of life and short- and long-term happiness). Eleven of Ellis’ rational principles of living (e.g. self-interest, self-direction, self-acceptance, commitment to absorbing activities, hedonism) are presented. When consistently applied in practice, they may help people to experience frequent positive affect, less frequent and intense negative emotions and high life satisfaction. It will show how Ellis’ ABC-DE scientific method can be used with individuals to lessen unhappiness. Suggestions are provided for research into associations between rationality and happiness as well as the impact of different rationality-based interventions on happiness.     

Views On Happiness In The Television Series <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ally Mcbeal</Emphasis>: The Philosophy Of David E Kelley

This article contributes to our understanding of popular thinking about happiness by exploring the work of David E Kelley, the creator of the television program Ally McBeal and an important philosopher of happiness. Kelley's major points are as follows. He is more ambivalent than is generally the case in popular philosophy about many of the traditional sources of happiness. In regard to the maxim that money can't buy happiness he gives space to characters who assert that there is a relationship between material comfort and happiness, as well as to those that claim the opposite position. He is similarly ambivalent about the relationship between loving relationships and happiness; and friendships and happiness. In relation to these points Kelley is surprisingly principled in citing the sources that he draws upon in his thinking (through intertextual references to genres and texts that have explored these points before him). His most original and interesting contributions to popular discussions of the nature of happiness are twofold. The first is his suggestion that there is a lot to be said for false consciousness. He presents situations where characters choose wilfully to ignore reality and instead to live in fantasy worlds where they are happy. Rather than condemning such behaviour, Kelley presents it as understandable, attractive and perhaps even heroic. The second is his proposal that happiness should be seen as an effect of bodily performance rather than an expression of the authentic inner self -- if one forces oneself to smile, happiness may follow. Ultimately Ally McBeal presents a multifaceted popular account of the nature of happiness, where the various positions explored cannot all be reconciled; and where ironic ambivalence is the key tone.     

论亚里士多德的善

善是存在的本体。它是幸福。最完美的幸福是沉思。对于这种活动,人们不能够言说（称赞）。善是好。好是主体的私意的表达。这意味着善依据于主体的自愿、私意,并能够带来欢乐。善是真它陈述了现象的关系。真仅仅关注现象而不是作为存在的真正的善因此,真的善其实并不真。     

Credulism

Conclusion The credulity principle approach to the issue of the rationality of religious belief is a clear advance over the proof approach. For the proof approach, in the end, is simply too wedded to an infallibilist conception of rational belief; and initially, at least, the credulity principle approach seems to avoid this conception. In the end, however, it affirms that same viewpoint; for if it does not embody an infallibilist conception of epistemic principles, its critical property of intersubjectivity is beyond defense. Thus, in recognizing the inadequacy of infallibilist conceptions of rationality, we can see the inadequacy of both the proof approach and the credulity principle approach to the existence of God. It is simply false that the experiences of others is efficacious in conferring rationality on our beliefs.But if neither of these approaches is adequate, how is one to approach the issue of the rationality of religious belief? The subjective nature of rational belief provides the answer - if one wishes to argue that God exists, one will have to provide as many arguments as there are divergent sets of acceptable epistemic principles. There still is a place for such arguments; but only given the assumption that we share views about what sorts of inferences are proper, or that other arguments can be constructed for the superiority of certain epistemic principles. The view that must be given up, however, is that the discussions philosophers have of these issues need bear any relation to whether or not the normal religious believer has a reasonable belief or not - he does not need there to be a good philosophical argument that God exists in order to reasonably believe that God exists. Nor is any non-believer necessarily irrational just because there is such a good argument.Thus, once the nature of rational belief is properly appreciated, it appears that the question of the rationality of religious belief is not a central question any longer. Whether such beliefs are rational is a quite subjective question not capable of being answered by any sort of universal generalization about all religious believers and/or non-believers.     

Satisfied Pigs and Dissatisfied Philosophers: Schlesinger on the Problem of Evil

I argue that George Schlesinger's proposed solution to the problem of evil fails because: (1) the degree of desirability of state of a being is not properly regarded as a trade-off between happiness on the one hand and potential on the other; (2) degree of desirability of state is not capable of infinite increase; (3) there is no hierarchy of possible beings, but at most an ordering of such beings in terms of preferences; (4) the idea of such a hierarchy is anyway morally repulsive. Schlesinger is right that the problem of evil disappears, but what makes it vanish is a recognition of the limits of our concepts of satisfaction and happiness, not the incoherent claim that satisfaction or happiness is capable of unlimited increase.     

The enduring significance of Christos Yannaras: some further works in translation

The Greek philosopher and theologian Christos Yannaras is becoming better known in the English-speaking world with the publication of an increasing number of his works in English translation. With the help of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, Yannaras articulates an ontological (as opposed to an ontic) version of Being based on relation. Beings exist not as ontic entities but only with reference to the person. Relation actually constitutes existents. Our fulfilment as human beings lies in our ascending from the mode of nature, which is bound by necessity, to a mode of existence characterised by self-transcending referentiality or love. Two obstacles are considered: the problem of evil and the ‘religionisation’ of Christianity. The fundamental problem of evil is that it renders human life without meaning. There are, however, no rational explanations of evil. The only reply lies beyond language, in faith/trust, self-transcendence and self-offering. A religionised version of Christianity transforms faith into an ideology which holds out salvation as a reward for the individual. The Church – the ecclesial event – is not a collection of individuals seeking their own salvation but a community of people called to struggle together to attain true existence, to pass from the finite mode of nature to that mode which knows no limitations of decay and death. An intellectualist approach to philosophy does not help us to achieve this goal. For philosophy is not simply an exercise in thinking but the struggle to attain existential freedom. Such freedom is transformatory, referential and ek-static.     

RATIONALITY AND MORAL REALISM

What can a moral realist say about why we should take morality seriously and about the relation between morality and rationality? I take off from Christine Korsgaard's criticism of moral realism on this score. The aim is to achieve an understanding of the relation between moral and rational properties and of the role of practical deliberation on a realist view. I argue that the justification for being concerned with rational and moral normative properties may not be an aspect of our minds to which we have access. I argue against a view that gives automatic pride of place to the rational properties of our mind by drawing attention to valuable non‐rational modes of thought such as creative, imaginative and instinctive thought. Thus the value of taking account of rationality is contingent on its benefits. But this is not why we should be taking account of morality.     

Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.     

Freedom and Rationality as Predictors of Cross-National Happiness Patterns: The Role of Income as a Mediating Variable

Freedom and rationality have traditionally been viewed as essential ingredients to the 'pursuit of happiness'. Previous research has found that the way in which happiness is linked to freedom and other attributes of individualistic society is affected by the income level. This paper formulates a structural model of the linkage between political freedom, rationality, and happiness which takes explicit account of income as a mediating variable. Since income is hypothesized to be linked to the degree of freedom and rationality prevailing in a society, this approach permits to distinguish between direct and indirect linkages of happiness to freedom and rationality. Estimating the model with cross-national data yields the following key findings: (1) Happiness is positively related to freedom as well as to rationality at high freedom/rationality levels and negatively at low levels. (2) Whereas freedom affects happiness only indirectly (through its impact on income), rationality has both direct and indirect effects on happiness.     

New Grounds for a Re-Union Between Science and Spirituality

Science is recovering its basic mission of making sense of the world. As a search for meaning it is similar to spirituality. The difference between science and spirituality is not in the end they seek, but in the way they seek it. Science uses rational thinking in analyzing and interpreting what experience and experiment discloses, whereas spirituality combines experience with the immediacy of an intuition that speaks to a reality that underlies the world conveyed by the senses. In our day science and spirituality, the great streams of human endeavor, are on a converging course. They share the realization that the cosmos is not a domain of unconscious matter moving about in passive space; it is a dynamic, self-evolving whole, integral at all scales and in all domains. This convergence is important in itself, and it is also important in regard to its consequences. On the one hand it tells us that our intuitive insights about the nature of life and reality are not illusory: they are confirmed in their essence by cutting-edge science. On the other, it offers motivation for entering on a positive path to our common future because wholeness is a defining characteristic of the kind of civilization that could overcome the problems created by the mechanistic manipulative rationality of today's dominant civilization.

     

WHAT IF THE HUMAN MIND EVOLVED FOR NONRATIONAL THOUGHT? AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Our knowledge of the evolution of human thought is limited not only by the nature of the evidence, but also by the values we bring to the authoritative scientific study of our ancestors. The tendency to see human thought as linear progress in rational (i.e., problem‐solving) capacities has been popular since the Enlightenment, and in the wake of Darwinism has been extended to other species as well. Human communication (language) can be used to transmit useful information, but is rooted in symbolic processes that are nonrational—that is, they involve choosing among functionally equivalent alternatives, any of which is as good an option as any other. The evolution of human thought cannot be realistically isolated from the evolution of human society or human communication, neither of which is rooted in obvious rationality.     

Conciliation,Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity1

Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality (those that deny uniqueness). It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This occurs when the motivation for conciliationism does not come (as is sometimes supposed) from taking disagreement as evidence of one's own rational failings. However, divorcing the motive for conciliating from worries about rationality does not remove a feature of conciliationism that some find troubling: that conciliationism can lead to cases of “rational toxicity,” in which the most rational response to one's evidence involves violating some rational ideal.     

Visual Awareness of Properties

I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness.     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.     

How “rational” is “rationality”?

Abstract

By taking serious a remark once made by Paul Bernays, namely that an account of the nature of rationality should begin with concept-formation, this article sets out to uncover both the restrictive and the expansive boundaries of rationality. In order to do this some implications of the perennial philosophical problem of the “coherence of irreducibles” will be related to the acknowledgement of primitive terms and of their indefinability. Some critical remarks will be articulated in connection with an over-estimation of rationality - concerning the influence of Kant’s view of human understanding as the formal law-giver of nature (the supposedly “rational structure of the world”), and the apparently innocent (subjectivist) habit to refer to experiential entities as ‘objects’. The other side of the coin will be highlighted with reference to those kinds of knowledge transcending the limits of concept-formation - culminating in formulating the four most basic idea-statements philosophy can articulate about the universe. What is found “in-between” these (restrictive) and (expansive) boundaries of rationality will then briefly be placed within the contours of a threefold perspective on the self-insufficiency of logicality - as merely one amongst many more dimensions conditioning human life. Although the meaning of the most basic logical principles - such as the logical principles of identity, non-contradiction and sufficient reason - will surface in our analysis, exploring some of the complex issues in this respect, such as the relationship between thought and language, will not be analysed. The important role of solidarity - as the basis of critique - will be explained and related both to the role of immanent criticism in rational conversation and the importance of acknowledging what is designated as the principle of the excluded antinomy (which in an ontic sense underlies the logical principle of non-contradiction). The last section of our discussion will succinctly illuminate the proper place of the inevitable trust we ought to have in rationality - while implicitly warning against the rationalistic over-estimation of it (its degeneration into a rationalist “faith in reason”). Our intention is to enhance an awareness of the reality that rationality is embedded in and borders on givens which are not open to further “rational” exploration - givens that both condition (in a constitutive sense) and transcend the limits of conceptual knowledge. Some of the distinctions and insights operative in our analysis are explained in Strauss 2000 and 2003. Yet, most of the systematic perspectives found in this analysis of rationality are only developed in this article for the first time. Since a different study is required to discuss related problems and results found within cognitive science, it cannot be discussed within one article.     

Sacredness and Aesthetics: Kearney and Desmond on Prayer

Heidegger famously asserted that one cannot pray to the God of onto‐theo‐logic. God is here made into a determinate concept, the highest idea of reason, and thereby loses its constitutive transcendence and personhood. To think of God appropriately after Heidegger means to think of God in a way amenable to prayer. It is widely recognized that deconstruction does not fare well on this score as it turns prayer into some form of meditation/contemplation. In response, one ought to look for something between onto‐theo‐logic and deconstruction. In this article, I explore and assess two attempts to do so, by Richard Kearney and William Desmond respectively. I argue that Kearney does not manage to escape the trap of deconstruction because he does not allow for an intimation of God in prayer. This is achieved in a more metaphysical register by Desmond.     

RETHINKING THE IMAGE OF GOD

Abstract The present ecological crisis imposes a rethinking of the relation between the human being and the rest of nature. Traditional theological articulations of this relation have proven problematic where they foster separatism and anthropocentrism, which give a false report on the relation and have a negative impact on thinking and acting in relation to nature. One place to begin rethinking is through an exploration of the affirmation that the human being is “made in the image of God,”imago dei. Some ways of construing the theological meaning of this designation are more helpful than others. Science has recognized the extent to which the human being is not only dependent upon but even emergent from nature. We are made of the same “stuff” that makes up the rest of the universe. We are nature. The place of the human being is much more modest, recent, and precarious than usually acknowledged in theological reflection. New ways of interpreting our role within nature must evolve out of this new understanding. Philip Hefner has proposed that we think of the human being as created co‐creator. His is a distinctive and promising contribution. This essay responds with both affirmations and friendly questions.