When good evidence goes bad: the weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making

An indispensable principle of rational thought is that positive evidence should increase belief. In this paper, we demonstrate that people routinely violate this principle when predicting an outcome from a weak cause. In Experiment 1 participants given weak positive evidence judged outcomes of public policy initiatives to be less likely than participants given no evidence, even though the evidence was separately judged to be supportive. Experiment 2 ruled out a pragmatic explanation of the result, that the weak evidence implies the absence of stronger evidence. In Experiment 3, weak positive evidence made people less likely to gamble on the outcome of the 2010 United States mid-term Congressional election. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated these findings with everyday causal scenarios. We argue that this “weak evidence effect” arises because people focus disproportionately on the mentioned weak cause and fail to think about alternative causes.     

When groups do not cure: Group esteem moderates the social cure effect

Group membership enhances well-being. In two preregistered studies, we tested the assumption that only positively viewed groups yield this “social cure” effect and explored the impact of membership in negatively viewed groups, proposing that the social cure effect is qualified by group esteem (the degree to which ingroups are valued and liked). In Study 1 (N = 396), we manipulated social identity gain (vs. loss) and measured group esteem, and found that gaining (vs. losing) a group membership more strongly increased psychological need satisfaction when group esteem was higher. In Study 2 (N = 494), we manipulated identity gain (vs. loss) and group esteem, and found that gaining (vs. losing) a high-esteem group membership enhanced well-being via increased need satisfaction, whereas gaining (vs. losing) a low-esteem group membership undermined well-being via decreased need satisfaction. Our results contribute to conceptual models of how group membership influences individuals and suggest that membership in low-esteem groups can harm well-being.     

When groups are more competitive than individuals: the domain of the discontinuity effect

The related goals of the research were to delineate the domain of discontinuity, 1st by demonstrating its occurrence in a nonmatrix situation and, 2nd, by establishing the antecedent outcome conditions necessary for producing a discontinuity effect. The 1st goal was met by designing a mixed motive situation involving the production of origami products. Under these conditions, the magnitude of the discontinuity effect did not significantly differ from that in a matrix-only condition. The 2nd goal was met by a separate experiment that used H. H. Kelley and J. W. Thibaut's (1978) analysis of degree of noncorrespondence of outcomes. This experiment demonstrated that as noncorrespondence increased, so did the rate of competitive responding by groups but not by individuals. This pattern was qualified by an interaction with gender such that competitiveness was more markedly affected by noncorrespondence for groups of women than for groups of men.     

The effect of perspective-taking on reasoning about strong and weak belief-relevant arguments

This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.     

Feeling right or being right: When strong assessment yields strong correction

Negotiators in regulatory fit report feeling right about an upcoming negotiation more than those in non-fit, and this intensifies their responses to negotiation preparation (Appelt et al. in Soc Cogn 27(3), 365–384, 2009). High assessors emphasize critical evaluation and being right (Higgins et al. in Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol 35, pp 293–344, 2003). This emphasis should motivate them to engage in correction processes when they only feel right—so strongly as to produce elimination, and perhaps even overcorrection, of the fit effects found previously. We found that low assessors replicated regulatory fit effects on negotiation preparation measures of anticipated performance and perceived assessment competence. For high assessors, however, these fit effects were eliminated and even reversed to some extent. This is consistent with the prediction that high assessors correct because they want to be right, and not just feel right, and correcting can result in overcorrection. Implications for understanding the trade-offs of a strong assessment orientation are discussed.     

Rule transgressions in groups: The conditional nature of newcomers' willingness to confront deviance

We provide evidence that, compared to old‐timers, newcomers' intentions to confront deviants are more sensitive to the social context when confronted with rule‐violations. Female rugby players (N = 71) were asked for their disapproval of, and willingness to sanction, ingroup and outgroup members who broke important rules in rugby. We also manipulated the status of the audience and found that newcomers were more likely to confront deviants when the audience was high status, and when there was little risk of alienating other ingroup members. In contrast, old‐timers expressed relatively high intentions to confront deviants regardless of the context. Discussion focuses on the idea that newcomers resiled from confronting deviants when an ingroup rule‐breaker had to be directly confronted, presumably because the perceived costs of doing so exceeded the potential benefits of ingratiating oneself to the high‐status audience. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Culture: the missing piece in theories of weak and strong reciprocity

Guala does not go far enough in his critique of the assumption that human decisions about sharing made in the context of experimental game conditions accurately reflect decision-making under real conditions. Sharing of hunted animals is constrained by cultural rules and is not "spontaneous cooperation" as assumed in models of weak and strong reciprocity. Missing in these models is the cultural basis of sharing that makes it a group property rather than an individual one.     

When rejection stings: how self-esteem constrains relationship-enhancement processes

Three experiments examined how needs for acceptance might constrain low versus high self-esteem people's capacity to protect their relationships in the face of difficulties. The authors led participants to believe that their partner perceived a problem in their relationship. They then measured perceptions of the partner's acceptance, partner enhancement, and closeness. Low but not high self-esteem participants read too much into problems, seeing them as a sign that their partner's affections and commitment might be waning. They then derogated their partner and reduced closeness. Being less sensitive to rejection, however, high self-esteem participants affirmed their partner in the face of threat. Ironically, chronic needs for acceptance may result in low self-esteem people seeing signs of rejection where none exist, needlessly weakening attachments.     

When fit matters more: The effect of regulatory fit on adaptation to change

Regulatory fit theory predicts that motivation and performance are enhanced when individuals pursue goals framed in a way that fits their regulatory orientation (promotion vs. prevention focus). Our aim was to test the predictions of the theory when individuals deal with change. We expected and found in three studies that regulatory fit is beneficial only when a prevention focus is involved. In Study 1, an experiment among students, prevention- but not promotion-focused participants performed better in a changed task when it was framed in fit with their regulatory orientation. In Study 2, a survey among employees experiencing organizational changes, only the fit between individual prevention (and not promotion) focus and prevention framing of the changes by the manager was associated with higher employee adaptation to changes. In Study 3, a weekly survey among employees undergoing organizational change, again only prevention regulatory fit was associated with lower employee exhaustion and higher employee work engagement. Theoretical and practical implications of applying regulatory focus theory to organizational change are discussed.     

When the strong punish: why net costs of punishment are often negligible

In small-scale societies, punishment of adults is infrequent and employed when the anticipated cost-to-benefit ratio is low, such as when punishment is collectively justified and administered. In addition, benefits may exceed costs when punishers have relatively greater physical and social capital and gain more from cooperation. We provide examples from the Tsimane horticulturalists of Bolivia to support our claims.     

When change in the self is mistaken for change in the world

The authors examined whether and when changes in the self lead to mistaken assessments that the world has changed. Survey data revealed that: personal changes in respondents (e.g., parenthood, financial change) were positively correlated with their assessments of various social changes (e.g., crime rates, freedom). Experimental data provided converging evidence. Experimentally induced change in knowledge influenced participants' perceptions of change in an author's writing style from one decade to the next (Study 3). Bringing self-change to participants' attention attenuated their judgments of change in the world when they had sufficient cognitive resources to consider how such self-changes might affect their perceptions (Studies 4-6). Discussion highlights how such misattributions of change contribute to the pervasive belief in societal decline.     

When questions change behavior: the role of ease of representation

In three experiments, we examined the mere-measurement effect, wherein simply asking people about their intent to engage in a certain behavior increases the probability of their subsequently engaging in that behavior. The experiments demonstrate that manipulations that should affect the ease of mentally representing or simulating the behavior in question influence the extent of the mere-measurement phenomenon. Participants who were asked about their intention to engage in various behaviors were more likely to engage in those behaviors than participants not asked about their intentions in situations in which mentally simulating the behavior in the intention question was relatively easy. We tested this ease-of-representation hypothesis using both socially desirable and socially undesirable behaviors, and our dependent variables comprised both self-reports and actual behaviors. Our findings have implications for survey research in various social contexts, including assessments of risky behaviors by public health organizations.     

On the nature of attitude–behavior relations: the strong guide,the weak follow

This study investigated the role of attitude strength as a moderator variable with regard to the direction of the relation between attitudes and behavior. The hypothesis was tested that strong attitudes guide behavior, whereas weak attitudes follow behavior in accordance with self‐perception principles. The study (N = 106) consisted of two sessions. In session 1, attitudes and attitude strength (certainty, importance, centrality) towards Greenpeace were measured. One week later, participants returned to the laboratory (session 2) and were given the opportunity to donate money to Greenpeace. After the participants' decision to donate money or not, attitudes towards Greenpeace were measured again. The results were consistent with the predictions. First, strong attitudes were more predictive of donation behavior than weak attitudes. Moreover, session 2 attitudes of weak attitude participants were influenced by their donation behavior, whereas no such effect was found among strong attitude participants. Finally, strong attitudes were also found to be more stable over time than weak attitudes. The results provide a complete overview of the moderating role of attitude strength with regard to the bi‐directional attitude‐behavior relationship. Results are discussed in the light of attitude retrieval versus attitude‐construction processes. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When and how less is more: reply to Tharp and Pickering

In DeCaro et al. [DeCaro, M. S., Thomas, R. D., & Beilock, S. L. (2008). Individual differences in category learning: Sometimes less working memory capacity is better than more. Cognition, 107, 284-294] we demonstrated that sometimes less working memory (WM) has its advantages. The lower individuals’ WM, the faster they achieved success on an information-integration (II) category learning task adopted from Waldron and Ashby [Waldron, E. M., & Ashby, F. G. (2001). The effects of concurrent task interference on category learning: Evidence for multiple category learning systems. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 168-176]. We attributed this success to the inability of lower WM individuals to employ explicit learning strategies heavily reliant on executive control. This in turn, we hypothesized, might push lower WM individuals to readily adopt procedural-based strategies thought to lead to success on the II task. Tharp and Pickering [Tharp, I. J., & Pickering, A. D. (2009). A note on DeCaro, Thomas, and Beilock (2008): Further data demonstrate complexities in the assessment of information-integration category learning. Cognition] recently questioned whether the II category learning task DeCaro et al. used really reflects procedural learning. In an effort to investigate Tharp and Pickering’s assertions with respect to individual differences in WM, we replicate and extend our previous work, in part by modeling participants’ response strategies during learning. We once again reveal that lower WM individuals demonstrate earlier II learning than their higher WM counterparts. However, we also show that low WM individuals’ initial success is not because of procedural-based responding. Instead, individuals lower in WM capacity perseverate in using simple rule-based strategies that circumvent heavy demands on WM while producing above-chance accuracy.     

When growth mindset backfires: The effect of the perceived malleability of groups and utilitarian motives on support for collective punishment

Collective punishment (CP) is deemed unfair because it sanctions group members who are not responsible for the wrongdoing. However, CP may be driven by utilitarian motives, aiming to deter other group members from committing offenses. This research investigated whether individuals’ inclination to support CP for utilitarian reasons is influenced by their belief in the malleability of groups (their belief that groups can change; a growth mindset). In Studies 1 and 2, we assessed utilitarian motives and manipulated participants’ perception of group malleability. In Study 3 , we assessed perceived group malleability and manipulated motives for justice (utilitarianism vs. retribution). Across these studies, the dependent variable was participants’ support for CP. Results consistently showed that utilitarian (more than retributive) motives increased support for CP, specifically among participants who believed in the growth mindset of groups. We discuss the relevance of these findings for social justice and growth mindset literature.     

Arguing about the likelihood of consequences: Laypeople's criteria to distinguish strong arguments from weak ones

High-quality arguments have strong and lasting persuasive effects, suggesting that people can distinguish high- from low-quality arguments. However, we know little of what norms people employ to make that distinction. Some studies have shown that, in evaluating arguments from consequences, people are more sensitive to differences with respect to the desirability of these consequences than to differences in the likelihood that these consequences will occur. This raises the question of whether people lack the criteria to distinguish high-quality from low-quality arguments in support of such claims. In an experiment, 196 participants without any training in argument theory rated their acceptance of 30 claims about the likelihood that a certain outcome would result from a certain action. These claims were supported by an argument from authority, or from cause to effect, or from example. Arguments were systematically manipulated to violate nine specific criteria. For seven out of the nine criteria violation decreased acceptance of the claim supported. These findings show that people can use argument type specific criteria to distinguish high- from low-quality arguments.     

The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteem moderates attitude change in dissonance processes

An experiment was conducted to examine the conditions under which self-esteem operates as an expectancy, as a resource, or does not influence cognitive dissonance processes. Based on the self-standards model of dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2001), it was predicted that following a high-choice counter-attitudinal behavior: (a) priming positive self-attributes that were relevant to the discrepant behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report more attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, (b) priming positive self-attributes that were irrelevant to the behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report less attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, and (c) priming neutral self-attributes would eliminate self-esteem moderation of attitude change. The results of the attitude change measure supported the predictions. The discussion explores different processes by which the accessibility of cognitions about the self mediate dissonance arousal and reduction.     

Hemispheric differences in strong versus weak semantic priming: evidence from event-related brain potentials

GOALS: Research with lateralized word presentation has suggested that strong ("close") and weak ("remote") semantic associates are processed differently in the left and right cerebral hemispheres [e.g., Beeman, M. j., & Chiarello, C. (1998). Complementary right- and left-hemisphere language comprehension. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 7(1), 2-8]. Recently, this hypothesis has been challenged [Coney, J. (2002). The effect of associative strength on priming in the cerebral hemispheres. Brain and Cognition, 50(2), 234-241]. We predicted that foveal presentation of strong and weak associates would elicit different patterns of hemispheric activity, as indexed by high-density event-related brain potentials (ERPs), and that source localization of the scalp potentials would help clarify the nature of hemispheric contributions to semantic organization. METHODS: 128-channel ERPs were recorded in two experiments as subjects performed a lexical decision task. Word trials were equally divided into strongly related, weakly related, and unrelated word pairs. All words were foveally presented. SOA was 800 ms in Experiment 1, and 200 ms in Experiment 2. RESULTS: Topographic analyses revealed medial frontal (MFN) and parietal (N400/LPC) effects for both strong and weak associates. Between approximately 450 and 550 ms, the magnitude of the N400/LPC effect indicated priming for both strong and weak associates over left parietal sites, while priming over right parietal sites was restricted to strongly related word pairs. During this interval, spatiotemporal source modeling showed that these scalp effects were best accounted for by ipsilateral sources in the medial temporal lobe. The observed pattern of asymmetries for strong versus weak associates is not consistent with certain proposals regarding the complementarity of right- and left-hemisphere contributions to semantics. It is, however, consistent with findings from visual half-field studies (Hasbrooke and Chiarello, 1998). We discuss the relevance of these results for theories of hemispheric asymmetry and meta-control in lexical semantic access.     

Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: punishing for reputation rather than cooperation

Strong reciprocity is not the only account that can explain costly punishment in the lab; it can also be explained by reputation-based accounts. We discuss these two accounts and suggest what kinds of evidence would support the two different alternatives. We conclude that the current evidence favors a reputation-based account of costly punishment.