The Consistency of The Naïve Theory of Properties

If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the naïve theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. I employ a semantics which is infinite-valued, with the values only partially ordered. Can the solution be adapted to naïve set theory? Probably not, but limiting naïve comprehension in set theory is perfectly satisfactory, whereas this is not so in a property theory used for semantics.     

Naïve Diversification in the Swedish Premium Pension Scheme: Experimental Evidence

In the Swedish Premium Pension Scheme (PPS) all citizens in paid employment allocate part of their public pension savings to mutual funds. In so doing they tend to distribute their choices maximally across different stock fund categories. It is hypothesised that this reflects the naïve application of a variety‐inducing diversification heuristic. The results of two experiments simulating choices of fund categories in the PPS support this hypothesis by showing that participating undergraduates chose stock funds investing in overlapping and non‐overlapping markets or industries in a way demonstrating failure to take into account covariation among fund returns. Administrators of the PPS and similar defined‐contribution pension plans should provide participants with comprehensive advice on how to diversify their investment. Dans le régime de retraite suédois (PPS), tous les citoyens ayant un emploi salarié allouent une part de l'épargne de leur retraite publique à des fonds d'investissements. Ce faisant, ils tendent majoritairement à répartir leurs choix dans différentes catégories de fonds. On a fait l'hypothèse que cela reflète l'application naïve d'une heuristique de la diversification. Les résultats de deux expérimentations simulant des choix entre différentes catégories de fonds pour le PPS confirment cette hypothèse : les sujets (étudiants) ont choisi des fonds en actions et devaient investir sur des marchés ou dans des branches industrielles relevant ou non du même secteur économique et cela d'une façon qui mettait en évidence leur incapacitéà prendre en considération le fait que le retour sur investissement de différents fonds pouvait être lié. Les administrateurs du PPS et de plans de pensions avec versements programmés devraient fournir aux participants des conseils avisés sur la façon de diversifier leur investissement.     

Naïve Realism,Privileged Access,and Epistemic Safety

Working from a naïve‐realist perspective, I examine first‐person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive‐realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first‐person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.     

Naïve Realism,Seeing Stars,and Perceiving the Past

It seems possible to see a star that no longer exists. Yet it also seems right to say that what no longer exists cannot be seen. We therefore face a puzzle, the traditional answer to which involves abandoning naïve realism in favour of a sense datum view. In this article, however, I offer a novel exploration of the puzzle within a naïve realist framework. As will emerge, the best option for naïve realists is to embrace an eternalist view of time, and claim that in the relevant case, one sees a still existent star‐stage located somewhere in the distant past.     

Reading and Character: Weil and McDowell on Naïve Realism and Second Nature

Both Simone Weil and John McDowell analogize value or meaning to sensations such as colour or heat, and this analogy is a strategy for resisting anti‐realism. However, McDowell's analogy tacitly accepts the very dualism which he is criticizing, while Weil's analogy is both more naïve and more radical than his. Like McDowell, Weil argues that virtuous character is the actualization of a second nature, but she emphasizes the role of the body in this process. Fully trained, the agent's body is a transparent medium through which she reads circumstances – and through which the circumstances, clearly perceived, express themselves in action.     

Naïve predictions of motion and orientation in mirrors: From what we see to what we expect reflections to do

The study aimed to investigate naïve beliefs regarding the dynamic and static behavior of reflections. In the first three experiments, participants in the study made predictions about the correspondence between real and reflected movements or about the orientation of the reflection of a static object placed in front of a mirror. In Experiments 1 and 2, paper-and-pencil tasks were used and in Experiment 3 participants were asked to make their predictions while imagining that they were facing a mirror. Results revealed that a percentage of undergraduates (ranging from 25% to 35%) were unable to make correct predictions. We classified the errors into types and found that responses either conform to the belief that reflections do the same or that they do the opposite. This suggests an oversimplification of the geometry of mirror reflections in two directions: participants either generalize what they see when movements are parallel to the mirror or what they see when movements are orthogonal to the mirror. Findings from Experiment 4 confirmed that these two expectations fit in with what people perceive in mirrors. Findings from Experiment 5 confirmed that this is also in agreement with the relationship perceived when looking at similar movements and orientations “outside” mirrors.     

When the expectations from a message will not be realized: Naïve theories can eliminate expectation-congruent judgments via correction

Research typically reveals that individuals like an object more when a persuasive message convinces them that this object is pleasant. In this paper, two experiments were conducted to understand the influence of such message-induced affective-expectations on judgments of experienced affect following direct encounter with an alcohol type of drink. As predicted, before trying the drink, recipients of the positive-expectation message had more positive expectations than recipients of the negative-expectation message. After drinking, participants judged the beverage to elicit affect congruent with message-induced expectations to the extent they did not endorse a naïve theory that their affective expectations congruently influence their experienced affect. In contrast, after drinking, the effect of the message disappeared when participants did endorse this naïve theory. Moderation of these effects, as well as theoretical and practical implications, are addressed.     

The preference for symmetry in flower-naïve and not-so-naïve bumblebees

Truly flower-naïve bumblebees, with no prior rewarded experience for visits on any visual patterns outside the colony, were tested for their choice of bilaterally symmetric over asymmetric patterns in a radial-arm maze. No preference for symmetry was found. Prior training with rewarded black and white disks did, however, lead to a significant preference for symmetry. The preference was not specific to symmetry along the vertical axis: a preference for horizontal symmetry was found as well. The results challenge the notion that a preference for bilateral symmetry is unlearned. The preference for symmetry was the product of non-differential conditioning.     

Linguistic Distributional Knowledge and Sensorimotor Grounding both Contribute to Semantic Category Production

The human conceptual system comprises simulated information of sensorimotor experience and linguistic distributional information of how words are used in language. Moreover, the linguistic shortcut hypothesis predicts that people will use computationally cheaper linguistic distributional information where it is sufficient to inform a task response. In a pre-registered category production study, we asked participants to verbally name members of concrete and abstract categories and tested whether performance could be predicted by a novel measure of sensorimotor similarity (based on an 11-dimensional representation of sensorimotor strength) and linguistic proximity (based on word co-occurrence derived from a large corpus). As predicted, both measures predicted the order and frequency of category production but, critically, linguistic proximity had an effect above and beyond sensorimotor similarity. A follow-up study using typicality ratings as an additional predictor found that typicality was often the strongest predictor of category production variables, but it did not subsume sensorimotor and linguistic effects. Finally, we created a novel, fully grounded computational model of conceptual activation during category production, which best approximated typical human performance when conceptual activation was allowed to spread indirectly between concepts, and when candidate category members came from both sensorimotor and linguistic distributional representations. Critically, model performance was indistinguishable from typical human performance. Results support the linguistic shortcut hypothesis in semantic processing and provide strong evidence that both linguistic and grounded representations are inherent to the functioning of the conceptual system. All materials, data, and code are available at https://osf.io/vaq56/ .     

Belief-Ful Realism and Scientific Realism

Despite tensions between Tillich's category of belief-ful realism and a view of science that embraces metaphysical and epistemological realism, a constructive relationship can be developed between the two. Both are based on common understandings about reality. Belief-ful or theonomous realism thus affirms scientific realism. On the other hand, scientific realism is open to the ecstatic, self-transcending elements of belief-ful realism. Finally, Tillich's formulation of the relationship between culture and religion can be reformulated specifically to include scientific and technological culture.     

V—Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence

I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs.     

Proper‐Function Moral Realism

A common line of thought in contemporary metaethics is that certain facts about the evolutionary history of humans make moral realism implausible. Two of the most developed evolutionary cases against realism are found in the works of Richard Joyce and Sharon Street. In what follows, I argue that a form of moral realism that I call proper‐function moral realism can meet Joyce and Street's challenges. I begin by sketching the basics of proper‐function moral realism. I then present what I take to be the essence of Street's and Joyce's objections, and I show how proper‐function realism answers them.     

Birth,kind and naïve biology

Much recent debate concerning the acquisition of naïve theories of biology and of race has turned on the claim that even preschoolers understand biological inheritance. At issue is what is implied by the belief that offspring will have the characteristic features of their kind. The present paper argues that such an essentialist belief in innate potential need not indicate a domain‐specific understanding of the biological inheritance of human kinds (or race). In Study 1, preschoolers in a Switched‐at‐birth task were found to be as likely to judge an adopted girl to resemble her birth parents on the color of their shirts as on their race. In Study 2, a variant on the task, 4‐year‐olds were found to be more likely to judge the girl to resemble her adoptive parents, suggesting that the concept of birth origin was not central to their reasoning. Though the results are consistent with the claim that preschoolers reason about human kinds in an essentialist manner, they undermine the broader claim that such reasoning is anchored by a naïve theory of biology. The finding is of cultural as well as cognitive consequence.     

Considering the Knowledge You Have: Effects on Realism in Confidence Judgements

In three experiments, the hypothesis was tested that the realism of subjects' item-specific confidence judgements of their own answers to general knowledge questions would be improved by making the subjects heed content which might be expected to lower their confidence ratings. In each experiment, all subjects answered knowledge questions and then rated their confidence in their chosen answer. Before each question, the subjects in the experimental condition assessed the extent of their knowledge in a knowledge-area encompassing the knowledge question. Experiments 1 and 2 differed only in the design of the knowledge-area assessment scale. In Experiment 3, when making knowledge-area assessments, the subjects were asked to find examples of knowledge they lacked in the knowledge-area. Both Experiments 2 and 3 showed significantly improved realism in the subjects' confidence judgements. An aggregate assessment of the total number of questions believed to be answered correctly, given by the subjects at the end of Experiments 2 and 3, showed underconfidence in the experimental condition, particularly in Experiment 3. The results support the idea that the content active in subjects' memory at the time when confidence judgements are made affects their realism. Furthermore, our results show that the realism of subjects' item-specific confidence judgements can be improved without giving feedback.     

感觉运动模拟隐喻理论的形成与发展

感觉运动模拟理论属于概念隐喻理论范畴,是经典概念隐喻理论的最新发展。感觉运动模拟隐喻理论认为概念隐喻的具身效应并不一定要建立在以往的经验之上,与感觉运动信息无关的抽象概念通过快速学习建立的隐喻也具有了具身效应,没有以往经验为基础的抽象概念也能引起感觉运动的模拟。除了感觉运动模拟隐喻理论的主要观点之外,文章还介绍了该理论的形成与发展的过程。并通过与经典概念隐喻理论的对比,提出感觉运动模拟隐喻理论存在的优势与局限性     

From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism

I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories—on the ground that it provides the best explanation of their success and the success of their falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and the structural realism (SR). I show that PR and SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories possessed truthful components. PR is undone by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims about unobservables are false. SR backpeddles to argue that the realist is only committed to the truth about the structure of relations implied by the outdated theory, in order to explain its success. I argue that the structural component of theories is too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these objections to PR and SR, and also overcome the pessimistic meta-induction.     

The Naïve Conception of Properties

The semantic rules that govern ordinary property discourse appear to give rise to a version of Russell's antinomy. Do we therefore have an inconsistent conception of properties? This paper firstly develops a consistent conception of properties and secondly argues that we may indeed interpret ordinary property discourse as expressing the consistent conception rather than an inconsistent one.     

V—Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought

The problem of vagueness and the sorites paradox arise because we try to treat natural language as if it were a unitary formal system. In fact, natural language contains a large variety of representational ontologies that serve different purposes and which cannot be united formally, but which can intuitively be taken as ways of seeing a common basic ontology. Using this framework, we can save classical logic from vagueness and avoid the sorites.