Appearance questions can be misleading: a discourse-based account of the appearance-reality problem

Preschoolers' success on the appearance-reality task is a milestone in theory-of-mind development. On the standard task children see a deceptive object, such as a sponge that looks like a rock, and are asked, "What is this really?" and "What does this look like?" Children below 412 years of age fail saying that the object not only is a sponge but also looks like a sponge. We propose that young children's difficulty stems from ambiguity in the meaning of "looks like." This locution can refer to outward appearance ("Peter looks like Paul") but in fact often refers to likely reality ("That looks like Jim"). We propose that "looks like" is taken to refer to likely reality unless the reality is already part of the common ground of the conversation. Because this joint knowledge is unclear to young children on the appearance-reality task, they mistakenly think the appearance question is about likely reality. Study 1 analyzed everyday conversations from the CHILDES database and documented that 2 and 3-year-olds are familiar with these two different uses of the locution. To disambiguate the meaning of "looks like," Study 2 clarified that reality was shared knowledge as part of the appearance question, e.g., "What does the sponge look like?" Study 3 used a non-linguistic measure to emphasize the shared knowledge of the reality in the appearance question. Study 4 asked children on their own to articulate the contrast between appearance and reality. At 91%, 85%, and 81% correct responses, children were at near ceiling levels in each of our manipulations while they failed the standard versions of the tasks. Moreover, we show how this discourse-based explanation accounts for findings in the literature. Thus children master the appearance-reality distinction by the age of 3 but the standard task masks this understanding because of the discourse structure involved in talking about appearances.     

Words: what are they, and do animals have them?

Since the word is not a well-defined entity like the sentence, one looks for findings that may help to clarify it. The effect of nonsense words on the young child's sorting of taxonomic versus thematic alternatives is said to be such a finding. A young child given, say, duck as a sample, goose and nest as alternatives, picks nest (thematic alternative), whereas the older child picks goose (taxonomic). However, if told the duck is called "ZLT" in Croatian, and asked to "find another ZLT", the young child shifts to goose. Markman and Hutchinson (1984) claim this demonstrates that young children know that words are "names of object categories" (and that this knowledge protects them against false hypotheses, facilitating their acquisition of words). In the present study, we applied the Markman et al. procedure to young "language-trained" chimpanzees. The animals were at an early stage of training, having used "words" solely in the function "X goes with Y", or "if shown X, get Y". Although these functions are notably weaker than "X is the name of a category", the animals showed a thematic-taxonomic shift, thus behaving like young children. The Markman-Hutchinson interpretation of the shift effect is unsatisfactory in two respects: (1) the shift effect can be explained without attributing any knowledge of what a word is to either creature, child or ape; more important (2), the interpretation does not address the main question: what is a "name" and what does a child think it is? We conclude with a discussion of what a word is, appealing to information retrieval on the one hand, and intention to refer on the other.     

Three-year-olds' difficulty with the appearance--reality distinction: is it real or is it apparent?

Four experiments investigated 3-year-olds' understanding of the appearance-reality distinction using both J. Flavell, F. Green, and J. Flavell's (1986) typical verbal response paradigm and a new, nonverbal response paradigm. Both paradigms require verbal questioning, but the former involves a verbal response and the latter a nonverbal one. In the nonverbal paradigm, children were shown a deceptive object and asked to respond, nonverbally, to 2 different functional requests, 1 concerning the object's apparent property and 1 its real property. In the verbal paradigm, children were asked to state what the object looked like and what it really was. In the verbal paradigm, children were about 30% correct (a rate matching that in the literature), whereas over 90% of the same children were correct in the nonverbal paradigm. Participating in the verbal paradigm first had a detrimental effect on the children's performance in the nonverbal paradigm, but the reverse order had no effect. These results suggest that 3-year-olds can represent two conflicting properties of a deceptive object and thus understand the appearance-reality distinction in the nonverbal domain.     

外表真实区别、表征变化和错误信念的任务分析

自20世纪80年代以来,“心理理论”已成为发展心理学的研究热点和最活跃、最多产的领域。为了分析和比较“心理理论”的实验任务,该研究以济南市3所幼儿园中的233名3—6岁儿童为有效被试。进行了“意外转移。和“欺骗外表”两种心理理论实验任务。得出如下主要结论：(1)意外转移任务中内隐错误信念显著难于标准错误信念,易化错误信念与标准错误信念的难度不存在显著差异。(2)欺骗外表任务中外表真实区别难度显著低于表征变化和错误信念。(3)意外转移任务的错误信念显著难于欺骗外表任务的错误信念。     

Young children's understanding of multiple object identity: appearance, pretense and function

Evidence from theory-of-mind tasks suggests that young children have substantial difficulty thinking about multiple object identity and multiple versions of reality. On the other hand, evidence from children's understanding of pretense indicates that children have little trouble understanding dual object identity and counterfactual scenarios that are involved in pretend play. Two studies reported here show that this competence is not limited to pretend play. Three-year-olds also understand the dual identity involved in unusual functional use (X is being used as Y), even though they have difficulty understanding deceptive appearance (X looks like Y). We suggest that children are able to distinguish extrinsic object properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones (appearance vs. category-membership).     

学前儿童欺骗及欺骗策略发展的研究

选取130名学前儿童,采用“找钱币”欺骗任务和标准误信念任务,研究学前儿童欺骗及欺骗策略的发生、发展。结果发现:随年龄增长,采用“破坏证据”和“说谎”欺骗策略的人数呈下降趋势,采用四种联合策略的人数则呈上升趋势;即使3岁儿童也能出示“破坏证据”和“说谎”这两种行为主义的欺骗策略,但“制造虚假痕迹”的心理主义欺骗策略在4岁以后才开始出现;3岁、6岁儿童的误信念理解与欺骗策略不相关,而4岁和5岁儿童的则相关。     

Preschool children's use of trait labels to make inductive inferences

One hundred one preschool children (ages 3 years 5 months to 4 years 10 months) participated in 3 studies examining the tendency to use verbal labels versus appearance information in making novel inductive inferences. A triad task analogous to that of S. A. Gelman and E. M. Markman (1986) was devised. Participants learned a different property for each of 2 children, and were asked which of the properties was true of a third child. One of the first 2 children was identified with the same label as the third child (e.g., both were labeled as shy) but looked different, and the other was identified with a different label than the third child but looked very similar. Results of Study 1 revealed that participants tended to use the trait labels, rather than superficial resemblance, in making psychological inferences. Studies 2 and 3 suggest that these results cannot be attributed to biases on the task. Study 4 provided a replication of the results of Study 1 in a context in which appearance information was explicitly pointed out and in which different trait labels were used.     

Hormonal sensitivity of preterm versus full-term infants to the effects of maternal depression

Comparisons were made of differences in the hormonal sensitivity of preterm versus full-term infants to maternal depression, as reflected in children's cortisol levels. In Study 1 (N=25), a comparison was made between preterm versus healthy full-term children. In Study 2 (N=80), a comparison was made between preterm infants and full-term infants with mild or moderate medical problems. Preterm infants were found to be highly reactive to maternal depression (as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory). That is, they demonstrated higher cortisol levels when paired with depressed mothers and lower cortisol levels when paired with non-depressed mothers. No equivalent effects were found for children who were full-term, even when they had experienced other medical problems at birth. It was concluded that premature infants are exceptionally sensitive to the "emotional climate" in their home environment. As a result, they may manifest very different hormonal outcomes--with implications for their later development.     

Sex, lies, and strategic interference: the psychology of deception between the sexes

The desires of one sex can lead to deceptive exploitation by the other sex. Strategic Interference Theory proposes that certain "negative" emotions evolved or have been co-opted by selection, in part, to defend against deception and reduce its negative consequences. In Study 1 (N = 217) Americans reported emotional distress in response to specific forms of deception. Study 2 (N = 200) replicated the results in a German sample. Study 3 (N = 479) assessed Americans' past experiences with deception and conducted additional hypothesis tests using a procedure to control for overall sex differences in upset. Each study supported the hypothesis that emotions track sex-linked forms of strategic interference. Three clusters of sex differences proved robust across studies-emotional upset about resource deception, commitment deception, and sexual deception. We discuss implications for theories of mating and emotion and directions for research based on models of antagonistic coevolution between the sexes.     

Does valence matter? Effects of negativity on children’s early understanding of the truth and lies

Early deceptive behavior often involves acts of wrongdoings on the part of children. As a result, it has often been assumed, although not tested directly, that children are better at identifying lies about wrongdoing than lies about other activities. We tested this assumption in two studies. In Study 1, 67 3- to 5-year-olds viewed vignettes in which a character truthfully or falsely claimed to have committed a good or bad act. Children were biased to label claims that the character had committed a good act as the truth and claims that the character had committed a bad act as lies. In Study 2, 51 4- to 6-year-olds viewed vignettes in which characters either admitted or denied committing a good or bad act. Children were better at identifying truth-tellers and liars when the acts were good. Results suggest that young children initially overgeneralize the concept of lie to include all negative acts and the concept of the truth to include all good acts and only gradually make a distinction between act valence and honesty. As a result, including wrongdoing in scenarios to test children's early understanding of the meaning of lying is likely to underestimate children's abilities.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

Predictors of Gender-Typed Toy Purchases by Prospective Parents and Mothers: The Roles of Childhood Experiences and Gender Attitudes

Gender differences in children’s toy interests are among the largest in the psychological literature. Parents are often the primary purchasers of children’s toys. In these studies, we investigated the factors that predict whether parents and prospective parents will purchase gender-typed toys for their children or future children. Prospective parents (Study 1, n?=?238, 151 women, 87 men) and mothers (Study 2, n?=?96) reported their retrospective childhood interests, likelihood of purchasing gender-typed toys, stereotypes about toys, and environmental versus essentialist attributions for perceived gender differences in children’s toys. Across both studies, participants reported playing with gender-typed toys more than cross-gender toys as children. They also planned to purchase gender-typed toys for their prospective children (Study 1) or their own children (Study 2). Participants endorsed more stereotypes for feminine toys than for masculine toys and indicated that they believe that gender differences in children’s interests are mostly environmentally influenced, with some biological influence. In addition, gender-typed toy interests as a child predicted the likelihood of purchasing gender-typed toys for their own children. Among women, having nontraditional interests as a child predicted the likelihood they would purchase nontraditional toys for their own children. This relationship was mediated by the endorsement of gender stereotypes among prospective parents (Study 1), but not among mothers (Study 2).     

Individual differences in children's performance during an emotional Stroop task: a behavioral and electrophysiological study

Two studies using the emotional Stroop with 11-year-old children were completed. In Study 1, children were assigned to either the "interference group" or the "facilitation group" based on their performance on the task. The interference group was slower to respond to emotion words (positive and negative) versus control words. The facilitation group was faster to respond to the emotion words. The groups were then compared on a set of cognitive, emotional, and social measures collected at ages 4, 7, and 11. The interference group showed greater signs of emotional and social, but not cognitive, maladjustment across time. Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1. In addition, event-related potentials (ERPs) were collected in Study 2. The ERP data replicated earlier traditional Stroop studies. In addition, positive and negative words showed differences in processing across components. In particular, negative words appeared to tax attentional and processing resources more than positive words.     

Word order and information status in child language

In expressing rich, multi-dimensional thought in language, speakers are influenced by a range of factors that influence the ordering of utterance constituents. A fundamental principle that guides constituent ordering in adults has to do with information status, the accessibility of referents in discourse. Typically, adults order previously mentioned referents ("old" or accessible information) first, before they introduce referents that have not yet been mentioned in the discourse ("new" or inaccessible information) at both sentential and phrasal levels. Here we ask whether a similar principle influences ordering patterns at the phrasal level in children who are in the early stages of combining words productively. Prior research shows that when conveying semantic relations, children reproduce language-specific ordering patterns in the input, suggesting that they do not have a bias for any particular order to describe "who did what to whom". But our findings show that when they label "old" versus "new" referents, 3- to 5-year-old children prefer an ordering pattern opposite to that of adults (Study 1). Children's ordering preference is not derived from input patterns, as "old-before-new" is also the preferred order in caregivers' speech directed to young children (Study 2). Our findings demonstrate that a key principle governing ordering preferences in adults does not originate in early childhood, but develops: from new-to-old to old-to-new.     

How children use drawing to regulate their emotions

We examined two ways in which drawing may function to elevate mood in children—venting (expressing negative feelings) and distraction (expressing something unrelated to the negative feelings). We examined the effectiveness of drawing as an emotion regulator when drawing is used to vent versus distract (Study 1) and tested whether the effects found are specific to the activity of creating one's own drawing or generalisable to a drawing activity in which children had to copy another's drawing (Study 2). To induce a negative mood, we asked children to think of a disappointing event. Mood was assessed before and after the assigned activity. In both studies, mood improved significantly more in the distract than in the vent or copy condition. Study 1 demonstrates that drawing improves mood in children via distraction and not via venting. Study 2 demonstrates that this effect is specific to a drawing task in which an image is freely constructed. When a copying task is used, the effect disappears.     

Mathematics learning disability in girls with Turner syndrome or fragile X syndrome

Two studies were carried out to examine the persistence (Study 1) and characteristics (Study 2) of mathematics learning disability (MLD) in girls with Turner syndrome or fragile X during the primary school years (ages 5-9 years). In Study 1, the rate of MLD for each syndrome group exceeded the rate observed in a grade-matched comparison group, although the likelihood of MLD persisting through the primary school years was comparable for all three groups. In Study 2, formal and informal math skills were compared across the syndrome groups, a normative group, and children from the normative group who had MLD. Few differences were observed between the Turner syndrome and normative groups. Despite having rote counting and number representation skills comparable to those in the normative group, girls with fragile X had difficulty with counting rules (e.g., cardinality, number constancy). However, this difficulty did not distingush them from the MLD group. Overall, counting skills appear to distinguish the Turner syndrome and fragile X groups, suggesting that the specificity of math deficits emerges earlier for fragile X than Turner syndrome.     

How children view pictures: Children's responses to pictures as things in themselves and as representations of something else

In four experiments we examined under what conditions children around 4 years of age could overcome their normal tendency to treat a picture as transparent and attend to it also as a thing in itself. In Experiment 1, many children chose a picture of food as something “you can really eat” even after having identified it as “just a picture.” In Experiment 2, however, children were able to respond appropriately to implicit requests for a picture as distinct from a real exemplar of the thing represented when the context indicated the correct response. In these tasks, children could succeed by treating picture status simply as an attribute. In Experiments 3 and 4, children were asked to comment on the appearance and reality of pictures, deceptive (trick) objects and real things. Significantly poorer performance on pictures and tricks than on real things suggested that some children have difficulty holding two interpretations of the same input; that is, understanding that a picture has two identities.     

Transfer of specific contextual functions to novel conditional discriminations

Three adolescents and 4 children participated in studies designed to examine contextually controlled conditional discrimination performance. In Study 1, participants selected Comparison B1 in the presence one stimulus (A1) and Comparison B2 in the presence of another stimulus (A2) using a matching-to-sample procedure. Next, contextual stimuli X1 or X2 were presented, such that in the presence of X1, selection of B1 given A1 and selection of B2 given A2 were reinforced; and in the presence of X2, selection of B2 given A1 and selection of B1 given A2 were reinforced. Then, new conditional discriminations were taught with Stimuli E and F. When the contextual Stimuli X1 and X2 were presented, participants selected the same comparisons as previously established in the EF relations in the presence of X1, but the opposite comparison as in the EF relations in the presence of X2. The results then were replicated with new Stimuli G and H. In Study 2, a new conditional discrimination, CD, was taught. Then, four combinations of two-element samples--C1 and D1, C2 and D2, C1 and D2, or C2 and D1--were presented with X1 and X2 as comparisons. Five of 6 participants selected X1 in the presence of C1 and D1 or C2 and D2, and selected X2 in the presence of C1 and D2 or C2 and D1. Finally, in Study 3, two new discriminations IJ and JK were taught. Then, the transitive IK relations were tested with X1 and X2 as contextual stimuli. The 4 participants selected K1 in the presence of I1 and K2 in the presence of I2 when the contextual stimulus was X1--demonstrating class formation--and selected the other comparisons when the contextual stimulus was X2. These results suggest that the contextual control functions of X1 and X2 transferred even to relations that had not been directly taught. These results extend those demonstrating generalized contextual control by showing transfer of functions of the contextual stimuli in transitivity tests and when the former contextual stimuli were presented as comparisons.     

Do children really confuse appearance and reality?

Our understanding of many mental, social and physical phenomena hinges on a general understanding that appearances can differ from reality. Yet young children sometimes seem unable to understand appearance-reality dissociations. In a standard test, children are shown a deceptive object and asked what it really is and what it looks like. Many preschool children give the same answer to both questions. This error has been attributed to children's inflexible conceptual representations or inflexibility in representing their own changing beliefs. However, evidence fails to support either hypothesis: new tests show that young children generally understand appearance-reality discrepancies as well as fantasy-reality distinctions. These tests instead implicate children's failure to understand the unfamiliar discourse format of the standard test. This misunderstanding might reveal a subtler difficulty in making logical inferences about questions.