Individual differences in need for cognition and decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task

Differences in decision making between individuals differing in Need for Cognition (NFC) are examined using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Previous work using normative one time decisions suggests that individual low in NFC process gains and losses differently than those high in NFC and are more susceptible to decision biases. The IGT is a popular laboratory task that involves making risky decisions from experience involving both gains and losses. In the first experiment, low NFC participants performed significantly worse than the high NFC participants. A second experiment designed to examine the nature of these differences provides evidence that low NFC participants place more importance on gains as opposed to losses when performing the IGT. Results are discussed in light of previous work suggesting that low NFC participants place more importance on losses in mixed outcome decisions.     

Implicit emotional biases in decision making: the case of the Iowa Gambling Task

Many authors have endorsed the hypothesis that previous emotional experiences may exert a covert influence on behavior, but some findings and replications of the original studies challenged this view. We investigated this topic by carrying out an experiment with the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), where a dissociation procedure was adopted to successfully isolate possible implicit components. After a typical interaction with the IGT, participants performed a "blind" card selection phase without receiving any feedback. Half of them were instructed to continue choosing as they did before, the other half was told that good card decks turned bad, and vice versa, so that explicit knowledge was necessary to overcome the previously learned deck-outcome associations. The results confirmed the existence of early acquired implicit biases, confirming that previously experienced emotional events may covertly affect subsequent behavior.     

Adolescents' performance on the Iowa Gambling Task: implications for the development of decision making and ventromedial prefrontal cortex

Healthy adolescents (79 girls, 66 boys), ages 9-17, completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; A. Bechara, A. R. Damasio, H. Damasio, & S. W. Anderson, 1994) as well as working memory (digit span) and behavioral inhibition (go/no-go) tasks. Cross-sectional age-related changes were seen on all 3 tasks. Gender differences were seen in IGT deck preference and attentional variables (i.e., go/no-go hit rate and forward digit span). After age, gender, and general intellectual abilities were controlled for, IGT performance was not predicted by working memory or behavioral inhibition scores. Findings suggest that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex or its connections are functionally maturing during adolescence in a manner that can be distinguished from maturation of other prefrontal regions. Development of these functions may continue into young adulthood.     

Construct Validity of the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was created to assess real-world decision making in a laboratory setting and has been applied to various clinical populations (i.e., substance abuse, schizophrenia, pathological gamblers) outside those with orbitofrontal cortex damage, for whom it was originally developed. The current review provides a critical examination of lesion, functional neuroimaging, developmental, and clinical studies in order to examine the construct validity of the IGT. The preponderance of evidence provides support for the use of the IGT to detect decision making deficits in clinical populations, in the context of a more comprehensive evaluation. The review includes a discussion of three critical issues affecting the validity of the IGT, as it has recently become available as a clinical instrument: the lack of a concise definition as to what aspect of decision making the IGT measures, the lack of data regarding reliability of the IGT, and the influence of personality and state mood on IGT performance.     

Older adults as adaptive decision makers: evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Older adults process emotional information differently than younger adults and may demonstrate less of a negativity bias on cognitive tasks. The Iowa Gambling Task designed by A. Bechara, H. Damasio, D. Tranel, and A. R. Damasio (1997) has been used to examine the integration of emotion and cognition in a risky-choice decision task and may give insight into differences in the decision-making strategies in younger and older adults. Eighty-eight younger adults (18-34 years) and 67 older adults (65-88 years) completed the Iowa Gambling Task. Using a theoretical decomposition of the task designed by J. R. Busemeyer and J. C. Stout (2002), the authors found that both groups were successful at solving the task but used very different strategies that reflected each group's strength. For younger adults, that strength was learning and memory. For older adults, that strength was an accurate representation of wins and losses (valence).     

Paradoxical effects of education on the Iowa Gambling Task

Suitable normative information on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is not currently available, though it is clear that there is great individual variability in performance on this assessment tool. Given that the task is presumed to measure the emotion-based learning systems that are thought to form the biological basis of 'intuition,' there is some reason to think that education (especially tertiary education) might explicitly de-emphasise the role of emotion-based learning in decision-making. This suggests the paradoxical finding that better-educated participants should show poorer performance on the IGT. We recruited 30 participants (all female, all aged 18-25) to participate in a 'real money' version of the IGT. There was no significant difference in performance in blocks 1-3 of the task (trials 1-60). However, there was a substantial effect of education on the final two blocks (trials 61-100), such that the less-well-educated participants produced twice as much of an improvement over baseline as did their university-educated colleagues. A range of possible explanations for this remarkable finding are discussed. The most likely appears to be that tertiary education specifically discourages the use of emotion-based learning systems in decision-making. These findings bear on the extent to which education has a role to play in our reliance on cognition and emotion in decision-making, including the likely role of education in the generation and maintenance of false beliefs.     

Real versus facsimile reinforcers on the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (([Bechara et al., 1994]) is an effective neuropsychological tool for the assessment of 'real-life' decision-making in a laboratory environment. It has been employed in a wide range of circumstances, though researchers have sometimes employed real money reinforcers instead of the facsimile (or 'monopoly'-type) money used by. The present study investigated whether the type of reinforcer produced any differences in performance. There were no significant differences between the two conditions, though the Facsimile Money condition produced a greater range (and a higher standard deviation) than the Real Money condition. This finding is especially important when considering the Gambling Task as a tool in clinical neuropsychology--where there are risks, at the individual subject level, of both false positive and false negative classification errors.     

Instructional cues modify performance on the Iowa Gambling Task

The current study investigated whether acute alcohol intoxication produces impaired decision-making on tasks assessing ventromedial prefrontal (VMF) cortex functioning and impulsive responding. Participants completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a decision-making test targeting the VMF, and the Newman Perseveration Task (NT), a measure of impulsivity. Personality measures of impulsivity were assessed using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). To encourage natural responding on both tasks, participants were falsely informed that the study was examining the effects of alcohol on memory; the impulsivity tasks were presented as 'distractor' tasks. Advantageous performance on the IGT was related to specific instructional cues as well as to knowledge about the experimental purpose. Performance of intoxicated and sober participants did not differ. A subsequent study in which the true purpose of the experiment was revealed confirmed that alcohol does not affect IGT performance. Most importantly, the instruction-sensitivity of the IGT emphasizes the importance of salient cues for decision-making.     

Decision making in children and adolescents: impaired Iowa Gambling Task performance in early adolescence

Disadvantageous decision making is cited as one of the premier problems in childhood development, underlying risky behavior and causing adolescents to make poor choices that could prove detrimental later in life. However, there are relatively few studies looking at the development of decision making in children and adolescents, and fewer still comparing it with the performance trajectories of more typically developing cognitive functions. In the current study, we measured the affective decision-making abilities of children and adolescents 8- to 17-years-old using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, 2007) in conjunction with a battery of established cognitive neuropsychological assessments. In contrast to the typical linear development of executive functions, affective decision-making abilities progressed in a J-shaped curve. Younger, more developmentally naive children performed better on the IGT than older, early-adolescent individuals, with performance becoming advantageous again toward the end of the teenage years. This trajectory is thought to coincide with asymmetric neural development in early adolescents, with relatively overactive striatal regions creating impulsive reward-driven responses that may go unchecked by the slower developing inhibitive frontal cortex. This trajectory is in stark contrast with the linear development of memory, speed of processing, and other cognitive abilities over the ages.     

Direct versus indirect emotional consequences on the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task has been widely used in the assessment of neurological patients with ventro-mesial frontal lesions. The Iowa Group has claimed that the Gambling Task is too complex for participants to follow using cognition alone, so that participants must rely on emotion-based learning systems (somatic markers). The present study investigates whether similar tasks can be performed without direct somatic markers. In a 'Firefighter' task closely matched to the classic Gambling Task, participants evaluate the performance of others--so that they experience reward and punishment indirectly. In contrast to the gradual improvement in performance seen on the classic Iowa Gambling Task, participants on the Firefighter Task showed no learning effect, mirroring the performance of patients with ventro-mesial frontal lesions, and suggesting that the task is very difficult to perform without direct somatic marker information. The use of this task as empirical measure of 'empathy' are discussed.     

爱荷华博弈任务在临床领域的应用

爱荷华博弈任务作为一种经典的模糊决策范式,常被用来模拟现实生活中,人们面对不确定情境下的决策行为。随着研究的深入,该任务范式作为一种临床诊断工具,逐渐在临床领域得到广泛应用。以爱荷华博弈任务为出发点,介绍其在精神分裂症、帕金森综合征、物质依赖、进食障碍等领域的应用,以期对其他临床领域有借鉴作用,并指出了该任务范式的局限及未来发展前景,使研究者对此予以积极关注。     

不同类型罪犯在爱荷华赌博任务中的决策功能缺陷

采用爱荷华赌博任务(Behcara等人1994年版本)测量了8类共222名在监男性罪犯以及32名普通男性的决策功能, 并运用前景效用学习模型分析了不同类型罪犯在情感决策中的心理功能缺陷。罪犯组选择牌1的比例与控制组没有显著差异, 选择牌2的比例显著高于控制组, 选择牌3和牌4的比例显著低于控制组。暴力犯和涉黑犯对收益和损失都不敏感, 对过去的预期效用折扣很快; 吸毒犯(已戒除)、涉毒犯、盗窃犯和抢劫犯对奖赏加工正常, 对惩罚不敏感; 经济犯选择一致性最低; 性罪犯选择一致性最高。结果表明不同类型罪犯在爱荷华赌博任务中都具有决策功能缺陷, 但他们的决策功能缺陷由不同的心理功能缺陷所致。     

Gambling primates: reactions to a modified Iowa Gambling Task in humans,chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys

Humans will, at times, act against their own economic self-interest, for example, in gambling situations. To explore the evolutionary roots of this behavior, we modified a traditional human gambling task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), for use with chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and humans. We expanded the traditional task to include two additional payoff structures to fully elucidate the ways in which these primate species respond to differing reward distributions versus overall quantities of rewards, a component often missing in the existing literature. We found that while all three species respond as typical humans do in the standard IGT payoff structure, species and individual differences emerge in our new payoff structures. Specifically, when variance avoidance and reward maximization conflicted, roughly equivalent numbers of apes maximized their rewards and avoided variance, indicating that the traditional payoff structure of the IGT is insufficient to disentangle these competing strategies. Capuchin monkeys showed little consistency in their choices. To determine whether this was a true species difference or an effect of task presentation, we replicated the experiment but increased the intertrial interval. In this case, several capuchin monkeys followed a reward maximization strategy, while chimpanzees retained the same strategy they had used previously. This suggests that individual differences in strategies for interacting with variance and reward maximization are present in apes, but not in capuchin monkeys. The primate gambling task presented here is a useful methodology for disentangling strategies of variance avoidance and reward maximization.     

Effects of decision-phase time constraints on emotion-based learning in the Iowa Gambling Task

Research employing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has frequently shown that learning is impaired in various clinical populations. However, precisely what constitutes "unimpaired" control group learning remains unclear. In order to understand some of the possible factors underlying variability in control group IGT performance, the present study sought to manipulate features of the task to intentionally disrupt learning. Specifically, the present study investigated the effects of time constraints on emotion-based learning during automated administration of the IGT. For two groups of participants, a time-constraint of either 2-s or 4-s was implemented during the critical decision making period, while a control group received no time constraint. We also evaluated participants' subjective experience after every block of 20 trials. Results demonstrated that the 2-s group differed significantly from the control group. Subjective experience measures revealed rapid development of awareness of the advantageous and disadvantageous decks among all three groups. Overall, our findings demonstrate, for the first time, the effects of decision-phase time constraints on emotion-based learning and indicate that the IGT reward/punishment schedules are to some extent cognitively penetrable.     

Propensity for risk taking and trait impulsivity in the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is sensitive to decision making impairments in several clinical groups with frontal impairment. However the complexity of the IGT, particularly in terms of its learning requirements, makes it difficult to know whether disadvantageous (risky) selections in this task reflect deliberate risk taking or a failure to recognise risk. To determine whether propensity for risk taking contributes to IGT performance, we correlated IGT selections with a measure of propensity for risk taking from the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), taking into account potential moderating effects of IGT learning requirements, and trait impulsivity, which is associated with learning difficulties. We found that IGT and BART performance were related, but only in the later stages of the IGT, and only in participants with low trait impulsivity. This finding suggests that IGT performance may reflect different underlying processes in individuals with low and high trait impulsivity. In individuals with low trait impulsivity, it appears that risky selections in the IGT reflect in part, propensity for risk seeking, but only after the development of explicit knowledge of IGT risks after a period of learning.     

海洛因戒除者的行为冲动性： 基于DDT和IGT任务反应模式的探讨

以61名男性海洛因戒除者和32名正常成年男性为被试,探讨了海洛因戒除者在延迟折扣任务和Iowa赌博任务两种决策条件下的冲动性反应模式及其关系。结果发现,海洛因戒除者的决策行为受其对即时强化的超敏感性或“即时收益优先”模式控制,其高冲动性特质既表现为对强化物长远价值的非敏感性,又表现为对强化物潜在风险的耐受性;该类人群上述两方面的特征虽有一定关联,但二者分别反应了其行为冲动性的两个相对独立的维度,且具有跨戒除时相的相对稳定性     

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: Evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased → biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased → logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.     

Personality characteristics and state mood influence individual deck selections on the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is commonly used to assess risky decision making in clinical and non-clinical populations, and negative mood and various personality characteristics have been shown to affect the number of advantageous and disadvantageous selections on this task. Recent research has suggested that IGT data should be analyzed at the individual deck level due to differences in frequency and magnitude of losses, and the present study examined how personality characteristics and state mood may affect deck level selections on this task. Participants were 91 undergraduate students (38 male) who completed measures of impulsivity and sensation seeking, behavioral activation and inhibition, state mood, and the computerized IGT. Results indicated that negative mood, drive, impulsivity, and sensation seeking were all positively correlated with Deck B selections, but negatively correlated with Deck D selections. No differences emerged in correlations between Decks A and B or Decks A and D. Results indicate that mood and personality characteristics differentially relate to selections from the individual decks on the IGT. Results have implications for the assessment of decision making, as personality and fluctuations in state-dependent mood could mimic pathological risk-taking if analysis is conducted on the combined decks.     

Alexithymia, Cumulative Feedback, and Differential Response Patterns on the Iowa Gambling Task

ABSTRACT Although the role of emotional processing is central to contemporary models of risky decision making, to date the role of trait emotional understanding has not been explored experimentally in this context. The current experiment ( N =326) explores the role of alexithymia with respect to performance on the standard Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and a version where cumulative financial feedback is obscured. Standard learning on the IGT was observed for those low in alexithymia. Those high in alexithymia learned to avoid disadvantageous decks over the first half of the task. However, over the later trials they showed a change in performance, shifting from advantageous to disadvantageous and back to advantageous decks again (termed an "explore-learn-change-return" strategy). It is argued that this is due to an inability to fully consolidate earlier learning and reduced sensitivity to losses. The absence of cumulative feedback independently resulted in reduced performance.     

IGT-Open: An open-source,computerized version of the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is commonly used to understand the processes involved in decision-making. Though the task was originally run without a computer, using a computerized version of the task has become typical. These computerized versions of the IGT are useful, because they can make the task more standardized across studies and allow for the task to be used in environments where a physical version of the task may be difficult or impossible to use (e.g., while collecting brain imaging data). Though these computerized versions of the IGT have been useful for experimentation, having multiple software implementations of the task could present reliability issues. We present an open-source software version of the Iowa Gambling Task (called IGT-Open) that allows for millisecond visual presentation accuracy and is freely available to be used and modified. This software has been used to collect data from human subjects and also has been used to run model-based simulations with computational process models developed to run in the ACT-R architecture.