Non-representationalist cognitive science and realism

Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that one can develop a form of realism that reflects rather than just accommodates the core principles of non-representationalist embodied cognitive science.     

Color terms and color concepts

In their lead articles, both Kowalski and Zimiles (2006) and O'Hanlon and Roberson (2006) declare a general relation between color term knowledge and the ability to conceptually represent color. Kowalski and Zimiles, in particular, argue for a priority for the conceptual representation in color term acquisition. The complexities of the interaction are taken up in the current commentary, especially with regard to the neuropsychological evidence. Data from aphasic patients also argue for a priority for abstract thought, but nevertheless it may still be that the use of color terms is the only way in which to form color categories even if both linguistic and attentional factors play an important role.     

Color categories and color appearance

We examined categorical effects in color appearance in two tasks, which in part differed in the extent to which color naming was explicitly required for the response. In one, we measured the effects of color differences on perceptual grouping for hues that spanned the blue-green boundary, to test whether chromatic differences across the boundary were perceptually exaggerated. This task did not require overt judgments of the perceived colors, and the tendency to group showed only a weak and inconsistent categorical bias. In a second case, we analyzed results from two prior studies of hue scaling of chromatic stimuli (De Valois, De Valois, Switkes, & Mahon, 1997; Malkoc, Kay, & Webster, 2005), to test whether color appearance changed more rapidly around the blue-green boundary. In this task observers directly judge the perceived color of the stimuli and these judgments tended to show much stronger categorical effects. The differences between these tasks could arise either because different signals mediate color grouping and color appearance, or because linguistic categories might differentially intrude on the response to color and/or on the perception of color. Our results suggest that the interaction between language and color processing may be highly dependent on the specific task and cognitive demands and strategies of the observer, and also highlight pronounced individual differences in the tendency to exhibit categorical responses.     

Philosophy and meta-philosophy of science: Empiricism,popperianism and realism

An explicit philosophy and meta-philosophy of positivism, empiricism and popperianism is provided. Early popperianism is argued to be essentially a form of empiricism, the deviations from empiricism are traced. In contrast, the meta-philosophy and philosophy of an evolutionary naturalistic realism is developed and it is shown how the maximal conflict of this doctrine with all forms of empiricism at the meta-philosophical level both accounts for the form of its development at the philosophical level and its defense against attack from nonrealist quarters. Following an earlier article on realism of similar theme (Synthese 26 (1974), 409) this paper then further explores the ramifications of a thoroughgoing realist position.     

Color blindness and Rorschach color responsivity

Color vision deficits occur in 10% of the American white male population. Thus, color blindness may invalidate diagnostic hypotheses generated from Rorschach data. The Rorschach protocols of 43 white, college male color-blind subjects were compared to the protocols of normally sighted controls. The color-blind group manifested fewer pure "C" responses. No significant between group differences emerged for any of the other primary Rorschach color variables. Pure "C" responses rarely figure prominently in Rorschach evaluations, and the apparent lowered frequency of these responses by the color-blind is insufficient to warrant modification of current Rorschach practice. The data suggest that color blindness is unlikely to confound Rorschach assessment.     

Knowers talking about the known: Ecological realism as a philosophy of science

This Paper is Dedicated to Marjorie Grene, in Honor of her 80th Birthday     

American legal realism and sociological jurisprudence: The methodological roots of a science of law

There remains a good deal of confusion concerning the respective roles legal realism and sociological jurisprudence played in the movement to demythologize the study of law in the United States. It is asserted that this confusion is the result of a failure to recognize that American legal realism was part of the intellectual tradition of the thennew behavioral sciences–in particular, adopting as its methodological premise the ideal of a divorce between the study of fact and value. In contrast, sociological jurisprudence under the influence of Roscoe Pound, relied upon the tradition of pragmatic philosophy, ultimately denying that the realist's separation was either possible or desirable. As such, American legal realism should be seen as the true precursor of more modern attempts to engage in the study of judicial behavioralism and to attempt more scientific studies of the judicial process.     

Color measurement and color theory: II. Opponent-colors theory

Quantitative opponent-colors theory is based on cancellation of redness by admixture of a standard green, of greenness by admixture of a standard red, of yellowness by blue, and of blueness by yellow. The fundamental data are therefore the equilibrium colors: the set A₁ of lights that are in red/green equilibrium and the set A₂ of lights that are in yellow/blue equilibrium. The result that a cancellation function is linearly related to the color-matching functions can be proved from more basic axioms, particularly, the closure of the set of equilibrium colors under linear operations. Measurement analysis treats this as a representation theorem, in which the closure properties are axioms and in which the colorimetric homomorphism has the cancellation functions as two of its coordinates.Consideration of equivalence relations based on opponent cancellation leads to a further step: analysis of equivalence relations based on direct matching of hue attributes. For additive whiteness matching, this yields a simple extension of the representation theorem, in which the third coordinate is luminance. For other attributes, precise representation theorems must await a better qualitative characterization of various nonlinear phenomena, especially the veiling of one hue attribute by another and the various hue shifts.