Against the New Evidentialists

Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons for action. Since the existence of genuine pragmatic reasons for action is common ground between the Evidentialist and the Pragmatist, this problem for the New Evidentialist arguments is fatal. The upshot is that the deadlock between these two positions is restored: neither side can claim to be in possession of an argument that could convince the other. As it happens, I myself favor Pragmatism about reasons for belief, and although I don't claim to be able to convince a committed Evidentialist, I do make a prima facie case for Pragmatism by describing particular scenarios in which it seems to be true. I then go on to develop my own preferred version of the view: Robust Pragmatism, according to which a consideration never constitutes a reason for believing a proposition purely in virtue of being evidence for it.     

中国综合评介世界文明理论的开山之作--评许启贤主编的<世界文明论研究>

<世界文明论研究>(山东人民出版社2001年版)是北京市哲学社会科学"九五"规划研究的重点课题.从改革开放初期的70年代末到90年代上半期,中国兴起了文化研究的热潮.     

怀疑论者的展望--第四届世界怀疑论大会

2002年6月19至26日,由中国科协批准的10人代表团,参加了“第四届世界怀疑论者大会”。通过这一国际学术会议,展示了中国怀疑论者的研究与工作,与各国有关专家学者交流了经验,引起了会议发起者和主办方CSICOP组织及各国相关组织的进一步重视,为中国在世界学术论坛上赢得了良好的声誉。     

Francis Collins,the Skeptics,and Evidence for God

Skeptical Inquirer magazine has published an attempted refutation of Francis Collins' book, The Language of God. The refutation argues that Collins lacks scientific evidence for God and that Collins actually appeals not to evidence, but to personal belief. In refutation of this refutation, Ted Peters argues that Collins plays completely within the rules of scientific discourse while providing rational evidence—though not conclusive proof—for the existence of God as creator and moral lawgiver.     

Moore on Twin Earth

In a series of articles, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have argued that Richard Boyd’s defence of moral realism, utilizing a causal theory of reference, fails. Horgan and Timmons construct a twin Earth-style thought experiment which, they claim, generates intuitions inconsistent with the realist account. In their thought experiment, the use of (allegedly) moral terms at a world is causally regulated by some property distinct from that regulating their use here on Earth; nevertheless, Horgan and Timmons claim, it is intuitive that the inhabitants of this world disagree with us in their moral claims. Since any disagreement would be merely verbal were the alleged moral facts identical to or constituted by different natural facts, the identity or constitution claim must be false. I argue that their argument fails. Horgan and Timmons’ thought experiment is underdescribed; when we fill out the details, I claim, we shall see that the challenge to moral realism fades away. I sketch two possible interpretations of the (apparently) moral claims of the inhabitants of moral Twin Earth. On one interpretation, they fail to disagree with us because they actually agree with us; on the other, they fail to disagree with us because they are not moralizers at all. Which interpretation is true, I argue, will depend on the facts that explain the differences between us and the inhabitants of moral twin Earth.     

Moore on beauty and goodness

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Moore and Schaffer on the Ontology of Omissions

In this paper, I discuss Michael Moore’s and Jonathan Schaffer’s views on the ontology of omissions in context of their stances on the problem of omissive causation. First, I consider, from a general point of view, the question of the ontology of omissions, and how it relates to the problem of omissive causation. Then I describe Moore’s and Schaffer’s particular views on omissions and how they combine with their stances on the problem of omissive causation. I charge Moore and Schaffer with inconsistencies and insufficiencies within their overall theories, and consider their replies. Finally, I propose my own view on the ontology of omissions and solution to the problem of omissive causation.     

孔子评管仲新解

子路与子贡根据管仲"桓公杀公子纠,不能死,又相之",断定他为"非仁"。孔子根据"不以兵车,九合诸侯"和"霸诸侯,一匡天下,民到于今受其赐"以及"微管仲,吾其披发左衽矣",断定他"如其仁,如其仁",为"大人"。孔子善于透过现象抓住和平、发展、人民受惠的本质;正确处理"经"与"权"的关系;提倡"宽猛相济"的政治,这些仍具有一定的现实意义。     

《社会道德与个体道德》评介

社会道德与个体道德是依据社会和个体的关系作出的一种道德分类。社会道德也称群体道德 ,指社会实际的道德状况。个体道德也称个人道德 ,指个人实际所具有的道德或品行。社会道德与个体道德既相互区别 ,又相互联系 ;既相互对立 ,又相互统一 ;同时还相互渗透和相互转化。社会道德是由每个人的个体道德有机结合的统一体 ,没有不包含个人、与个人道德不相关联的社会道德。个体道德是社会道德有机体中的一分子 ,没有脱离社会、与社会道德毫不相关的个体道德。现实生活中 ,社会道德与个体道德的许多问题 ,既有历史留给我们需要进一步解读的问题 ,…     

A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism

We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims. They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though, that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.

Believers and Skeptics: Where Social Worker Situate Themselves Regarding the Code of Ethics

Based on individual and focus-group interviews, this article describes how social workers in a variety of settings and geographical areas within Ontario approached ethical issues in their daily practices. Two primary approaches to professional ethics emerge from the data: principle based and virtue based, reflecting the orientation of groups we label believers and skeptics, respectively. The code of ethics appears to be the fulcrum from which our participants swing. The believers show faith in the code of ethics and the skeptics are dubious that codes are necessarily in the best interests of clients. The article describes the thinking behind the actions of the believers and skeptics and explores possibilities for future practice and research with respect to decision-making regarding ethical issues in the social work profession.