Do you see what I see? Affect and visual information processing

Individuals in sad moods process information in a less global and more local manner than do those in happier moods. This experiment investigates whether processing speed is associated with these mood effects, whether task ambiguity moderates these mood effects, and whether making feelings appear irrelevant to the task can eliminate these mood effects. Participants in happy, sad, and neutral moods were lead to experience their feelings as being either relevant or irrelevant to a global/local processing task. As predicted, sad moods decreased global processing relative to happier moods when feelings seemed relevant to the task and when the criteria for responding were ambiguous, but not when feelings seemed irrelevant or when the criteria were unambiguous. Consistent with the idea that mood guides processing, increases in affect intensity were associated with faster reaction times. Overall, the results suggest that mood and processing effects share some core similarities with mood and judgement effects.     

When what you have is who you are: self-uncertainty leads individualists to see themselves in their possessions

Four studies tested whether uncertainty about the self-concept can motivate people, particularly individualists who define themselves in terms of their personal traits and characteristics, to perceive their material possessions as extensions of themselves (i.e., as self-expressive). In Study 1, European American participants rated their favorite pair of blue jeans as more self-expressive after being induced to feel self-uncertain, whereas Asian American participants did not. In Study 2, participants who scored high on a measure of individualism rated their cars as more self-expressive following a self-uncertainty manipulation. In Study 3, individualists (but not collectivists) rated their favorite possessions as more self-expressive after being subject to self-uncertainty; a manipulation of self-irrelevant uncertainty did not produce these results. In Study 4, thinking about a self-expressive (relative to utilitarian) possession bolstered self-certainty among individualists, but not collectivists. Implications for research on culture, the self-concept, and possessions are discussed.     

You’ll see what you mean: Students encode equations based on their knowledge of arithmetic

This study investigated the roles of problem structure and strategy use in problem encoding. Fourth-grade students solved and explained a set of typical addition problems (e.g., ) and mathematical equivalence problems (e.g., or ). Next, they completed an encoding task in which they reconstructed addition and equivalence problems after viewing each for 5 s. Equivalence problems of the form overlap with a perceptual pattern found in traditional arithmetic problems (i.e., answer blank in final position), and students’ encoding was poorest on problems of this type. Individual differences in encoding the equivalence problems were related to variations in strategy use. Some students solved blank-final equivalence problems using the standard arithmetic strategy of performing all given operations on all given numbers. These students made more errors in encoding problem structure, but fewer errors in encoding the numbers, than did students who solved the problems using correct or other incorrect strategies. Moreover, students who expressed many strategies for solving the blank-final equivalence problems made fewer errors in encoding problem structure, but more errors in encoding the numbers, than did students who expressed only a single strategy. Results highlight that encoding is intended to guide action and that prior experience can simultaneously facilitate and interfere with accurate encoding.     

Dealing with conflicting information: young children's reliance on what they see versus what they are told

Children often learn about the world through direct observation. However, much of children's knowledge is acquired through the testimony of others. This research investigates how preschoolers weigh these two sources of information when they are in conflict. Children watched as an adult hid a toy in one location. Then the adult told children that the toy was in a different location (i.e. false testimony). When retrieving the toy, 4- and 5-year-olds relied on what they had seen and disregarded the adult's false testimony. However, most 3-year-olds deferred to the false testimony, despite what they had directly observed. Importantly, with a positive searching experience based on what they saw, or with a single prior experience with an adult as unreliable, 3-year-olds subsequently relied on their first-hand observation and disregarded the adult's false testimony. Thus, young children may initially be credulous toward others' false testimony that contradicts their direct observation, but skepticism can develop quickly through experience.     

What you see is what you set: sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness

This article reports a theoretical and experimental attempt to relate and contrast 2 traditionally separate research programs: inattentional blindness and attention capture. Inattentional blindness refers to failures to notice unexpected objects and events when attention is otherwise engaged. Attention capture research has traditionally used implicit indices (e.g., response times) to investigate automatic shifts of attention. Because attention capture usually measures performance whereas inattentional blindness measures awareness, the 2 fields have existed side by side with no shared theoretical framework. Here, the authors propose a theoretical unification, adapting several important effects from the attention capture literature to the context of sustained inattentional blindness. Although some stimulus properties can influence noticing of unexpected objects, the most influential factor affecting noticing is a person's own attentional goals. The authors conclude that many--but not all--aspects of attention capture apply to inattentional blindness but that these 2 classes of phenomena remain importantly distinct.     

The role of semantic information in episodic retrieval

In two experiments, subjects studied lists of categorized words and then were tested for recognition of those words. Response time for a test word was speeded whenever the immediately preceding test word was from the same category. This was true even for test words (lures) from categories never studied. Thus it is argued that semantic information not present at the time of study affected retrieval. This finding is discussed with respect to the distinction between episodic and semantic memories.     

Show me what threatens you,and I can tell who you are: Perception of threat and the self

Abstract

This article proposes a methodical way to understand the self from the angle of psychologically meaningful threat. On the basis of systematic cross-cultural examination of threats to core self-motives, this comprises the notion of self as being most reliably described by instances in which a person shows a motivated response to information from the social environment. Building on accounts of cultural differences in self- construal, this approach allows insight into self-related processes, because motivated responses to self-threat should depend on how the self is defined in the social space. The research conducted from this approach has examined cultural differences to threats to freedom, belonging and consistency. For people with a collectivistic cultural background, as well as for those with a more interdependent self-construal within a given culture, responses to freedom, belonging and consistency threats were less intense, particularly when threats were directed at the individual sense of self. Looking at the self from this perspective further allows for insight into underlying mechanisms into self-related processes, as well as for more direct information on the influence of context on what constitutes the self.     

The interaction of word frequency and stimulus quality in the lexical decision task: Now you see it, now you don't

Two experiments are reported that examined the joint effects of word frequency and stimulus quality in the context of a lexical decision task. In the first experiment the interval between response to a stimulus and onset of the next stimulus was 0.8 sec, and the effect of the two factors was additive. In the second this interval was 3.3 sec, and the effect of reducing stimulus quality was greater for infrequent words than for frequent words. This is similar to the result of Norris (1984). The inability of current models of word recognition to explain this finding is discussed.     

Look here but ignore what you see: effects of distractors at fixation

Distractor interference effects were compared between distractors in the periphery and those placed at fixation. In 6 experiments, the authors show that fixation distractors produce larger interference effects than peripheral distractors. However, the fixation distractor effects are modulated by perceptual load to the same extent as are peripheral distractor effects (Experiments 1 and 2). Experiment 3 showed that fixation distractors are harder to filter out than peripheral distractors. The larger distractor effects at fixation are not due to the cortical magnification of foveal stimuli (Experiments 4 and 5), nor can they be attributed to cuing by the fixation point (Experiment 2), the lower predictability or greater location certainty of fixation distractors (Experiment 5), or their being in a central position (Experiment 6). The authors suggest that preferential access to attention renders fixation distractors harder to ignore than peripheral distractors.     

Getting what you want: Power increases the accessibility of active goals

Power facilitates goal-directed behavior. Two studies, using different types of goals, examined the cognitive mechanisms that underlie this tendency. Participants, primed with power or powerlessness, performed lexical decision tasks that assessed the relative facilitation of goal-relevant constructs during goal striving and after goal attainment. Results showed that during goal striving powerful participants manifested an increased facilitation of goal-relevant constructs compared to other constructs, and this facilitation decreased immediately after goal completion. In contrast, their powerless counterparts showed less facilitation of goal constructs during goal striving and maintained goal accessibility after completion. These results are consistent with the effects of power on goal-directed behavior found in past research.     

Knowing what you are doing: Action-demonstratives in unreflective action

Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully-fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action-demonstrative’ representation, I show that the sceptic's arguments do not go through.     

Why you do what you do: The power in knowing and naming pedagogies

This article is for those educators who want to become more intentional in their craft of teaching. The authors introduce eight different pedagogies through their historical lineage, intending for readers to gain an appreciation for, and understanding of, the broader trajectory of educational philosophies, and illustrate how common teaching techniques can be shaped by the pedagogies. By familiarizing themselves with a specific educational philosophy or philosophies, educators begin to identify and name the ways they teach, how students best learn, what counts as knowledge, and the desired outcomes. In doing so, educators increase their opportunities to provide more meaningful and impactful education. This article also includes quick‐reference guides to the pedagogies for readers to return to frequently.     

I see how you feel: How the dark triad recognizes emotions

Current Psychology - The present study (N = 212; 150 females) examined the relationships between the Dark Triad, empathy, and emotion recognition in a cross-cultural sample. The Dark...     

I know how you feel: Task-irrelevant facial expressions are spontaneously processed at a semantic level

Previous studies have demonstrated that emotions are automatically processed. Even with subliminal presentations, subjects involuntarily mimic specific facial expressions, are influenced by the valence of a preceding emotion during judgments, and exhibit slowed responses to personally meaningful emotions; these effects are due to reflexive mimicry, unconscious carryover of valence, and attentional capture, respectively. However, perception-action effects indicate that rapid processing should involve deep, semantic-level representations of emotion (e.g., “fear”), even in the absence of a clinical emotion disorder. To test this hypothesis, we developed an emotional Stroop task (Emostroop) in which subjects responded nonverbally to emotion words superimposed over task-irrelevant images of faces displaying congruent or incongruent emotional expressions. Subjects reliably responded more slowly to incongruent than to congruent stimuli, and this interference was related to trait measures of emotionality. Rapid processing of facial emotions spontaneously activates semantic, content-rich representations at the level of the specific emotion.     

What I think you see is what you get: Influence of prejudice on assimilation to negative meta‐stereotypes among Dutch Moroccan teenagers

This research examined how Dutch Moroccan teenagers in the Netherlands deal with the negative stereotype that they believe the Dutch have about their group. We hypothesize that Moroccans act in line with this negative image when they are prejudiced against the Dutch and feel personally meta‐stereotyped. A survey study among 88 Dutch Moroccan teenagers revealed that Moroccan teenagers who felt negative about the Dutch and thought that they were personally negatively stereotyped, expressed attitudes in line with this negative “meta‐stereotype.” That is, they act in line with the outgroup's negative image by legitimizing criminality, aggression, loitering teenagers, and Muslim extremism. These findings suggest that being confronted with a negative stereotype about one's group might sometimes lead to a reaction that is both harmful for the stereotyped group as well as society in general. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The retrieval of syntactic and semantic information in the production of verbs

In Italian, there are two aspectual auxiliaries: essere (to be) and avere (to have). According to the syntactic hypothesis, aspectual auxiliary assignment in Italian is a syntactic phenomenon. Using the picture-word interference paradigm, Experiment 1 tested the predictions of this view. Results failed to support the syntactic hypothesis but could be explained within a semantic framework: A verb's thematic grid is involved in aspectual auxiliary assignment. Experiment 2 tested this hypothesis. The findings corroborated the predictions. The evidence is interpreted as suggesting the involvement of thematic information in the assignment of the aspectual auxiliary during the production of Italian verbs.     

It's not what you are,it's what you know: experience,beliefs, and the detection of deception in employment interviews

This study investigated the ability of more or less experienced employment interviewers and laypersons to detect deception in employment interviews. Although correct beliefs about indicators of deception led to higher deception detection accuracy, more experienced employment interviewers did not show more accurate beliefs about indicators of deception and did not perform better at detecting deception than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. Furthermore, more experienced interviewers showed a less‐pronounced tendency of judging messages as true irrespective of their actual truthfulness (truth bias) than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. It is suggested that experience in employment interviewing does not automatically lead to higher deception detection abilities in employment interviews, but that correcting people's beliefs about indicators of deception can do so.