再论海德格尔与新康德主义

"理解康德就意味着超越康德",这句话对于德国观念论、新康德主义以及海德格尔来说都是适用的,但德国观念论是在康德的思想道路上超越康德,新康德主义与海德格尔则可能是在重建康德。海德格尔对新康德主义的批评以及与卡西尔在达沃斯的交锋都是源于他们各自对康德哲学核心问题的不同理解,本质上还是由彼此不同的哲学立场所决定的。具体而言,是新康德主义的知识论立场与海德格尔的存在论立场,以及由此而来的对康德哲学知性与逻辑的强调,或者是对康德哲学感性、有限性以及先验想象力的重视。不过,在卡西尔与海德格尔之间,我们还是可以找到他们思想对话的交汇点,而这恰恰是他们在达沃斯之后可以继续对话的基础。     

李泽厚美学思想的发展历程:以海德格尔为参照

海德格尔的存在论美学对李泽厚思想转变影响重大。20世纪50年代,囿于各种原因,李泽厚对海德格尔的思想尚未重视。六、七十年代,李泽厚通过对康德的研究吸收海德格尔的存在哲学,为其思想的转折作了铺垫。作为重要的转折期,80年代,李泽厚逐渐显露出对海德格尔存在论思想的兴趣,并且吸收了他的存在哲学来补充自己的美学理论。90年代,李泽厚对海德格尔态度的摇摆,是基于他对当下社会的反思。20世纪至今,李泽厚更加重视伦理学,并更加活用海德格尔的存在论来探索人生问题和哲学发展的前路。李泽厚美学思想的转向并非是颠覆性的,事实上,李泽厚美学思想的发展和他对海德格尔的吸收和反思体现了他对存在主义批判、发展的历史过程。     

基础存在论之此在的有限性根基——基于《康德书》的分析

海德格尔在《康德书》中对康德的《纯粹理性批判》进行了存在论的解读。在他看来,康德从人类知识的有限性本质出发,在追问先天综合判断如何可能的存在论之奠基的进程中,达到了这一奠基的"根柢"亦即作为源始时间性的超越论想象力。海德格尔在《存在与时间》中进一步将超越论想象力生存论化为此在的时间性结构。这表明基础存在论或者说作为此在的形而上学乃是出于此在之有限性的必然。     

作为因果性的自由——海德格尔对康德自由概念的误读与辨正

康德的批判哲学试图捍卫人的自由,将之建基于人的主体自发性与自主性.在对康德自由概念的解读中,海德格尔认为,康德将自由理解为一种因果否定了人类的自由.依据康德文本,重构康德的因果自由理论,可以澄清海德格尔对康德的误读.剖析海德格尔在批评康德时所持的立场,将会看到海德格尔的自由概念的存在论—现象学维度.将双方关于自由的基本...     

人类自由作为自我建构、自我实现的存在论结构——对康德自由概念的存在论解读

黄裕生教授一方面采纳了海德格尔的存在论视角,另一方面接受了康德道德哲学的基本观点,他以自由意志概念为核心,展开了对西方哲学史具有高度原创性的诠释和批判。本文试图进一步发展黄裕生教授的思想,以由他启发的新方法,深入分析康德自由概念的诸层次,从整体上把人类自由理解为一个自我建构、自我实现的存在论结构,把绝对自发性、自由决断和自律——与康德道德哲学相关的三个最重要的自由概念——解释为这一结构的三个本质构成环节,从而建立起一种对康德自由理论的存在论解读。     

海德格尔对亚里士多德实践智慧(Phronesis)的存在论诠释

海德格尔在早期对亚里士多德的实践哲学进行了独特的存在论的诠释.他的基础存在论是这一诠释的重要成果.其中,海德格尔对亚里士多德伦理学中的实践智慧的诠释居于中心地位.海德格尔把实践智慧诠释为此在揭示真理的根本方式.实践智慧是促使人进行本真的决断的"良知",因此它是人本真的个体化存在的前提.而在决断中,体现出一种特别的时机性.正是从亚里士多德描述的人的行动的时机性概念中,海德格尔揭示出了源始的时间性--融将来、过去和现在于一体的绽出的当下.     

论海德格尔的知觉现象学

本文通过对海德格尔的《现象学的基本问题》一书的解读和分析,阐述了海德格尔知觉现象学的意义和特征。在这本书中,海德格尔借助对康德存在论题（“存在不是一个实在的谓词”）的现象学阐释,表明了对知觉行为进行现象学探究的必要性和可能性,并从两个层面具体阐述了他自己的知觉现象学：一方面,是对知觉行为的现象学描述,指出了知觉行为的意向性特征;另一方面,是阐明了知觉行为的存在论基础,进而突显了知觉现象在此在存在论建制中的地位和功能。     

《存在与时间》的“缺爱现象”——兼论《黑皮本》的“直白称谓”

海德格尔反对把《存在与时间》解读为生存哲学,但人们的这种所谓"误读"事出有因:该书提供了生活现象学作为一般存在论的基础与出发点。一般存在论几经尝试,以失败告终。他实际呈现给我们的就是生活现象学,而存在论只停留为理论雄心。该书有意规避了"爱与友情"这一人生现象学上的重要环节,为他后续思想,比如反映在《黑皮本》中的"纳粹"问题的政治失误,开了方便之门。这警示后人,哲学家勿妄以自己的基础理论直接参政。     

论海德格尔对“康德的存在论题”之解析

海德格尔对康德的"存在论题"——"存在(是)不是一个实在的谓词"作了极其细致和深入的分析,试图从康德的这一论题中引出他自己的有关存在本身的追问。但他犯了三个根本性的错误,第一,康德的"存在(是)本身"只是逻辑系词,从中不可能引出存在者之所以存在,而他的存在者之所以存在又只是主体性的"我思",也不符合海德格尔的要求;第二,康德的三个模态范畴虽然形式上着眼于系词"是",但本身仍然是一些"实在的谓词",除了描述经验性的存在者之外别无用处,无法指示海德格尔的"作为存在的存在";第三,康德的"反思概念的歧义"是批评莱布尼茨和洛克的独断论的,而不是要通过对模态范畴的反思而建立起海德格尔式的存在学说,海德格尔的解读完全脱离了康德的文本。海德格尔想通过引申和发挥康德的存在论题而推出自己的存在论,这是一个失败的尝试。     

海德格尔与实践哲学

尽管海德格尔从来不谈实践哲学,但他的基础存在论思想却给实践哲学的发展指引了一个新的方向.海德格尔晚年在给理查森的信中说他通过研读亚里士多德的<形而上学>第9卷和<尼各马可伦理学>第6卷洞悉了他一生的一个基本思想,即aletheia(真理)是一个揭示的过程,真理的特征是无蔽,一切存在者的自我显现都属于无蔽.[1]生产(poiesis)和实践(praxis)的区分在对海德格尔产生如此重要影响的亚里士多德的这两部著作的上述两部分中起了关键的作用.[2]它们同样对海德格尔的基础存在论产生了重要影响.     

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.     

On Wittgenstein's Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy

In 1931 Wittgenstein wrote: ‘the limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence’. Here, Wittgenstein claims, ‘we are involved?…?with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy’. This paper shows how this remark fits with Wittgenstein's early account of the substance of the world, his account of logic, and ultimately his view of philosophy. By contrast to the currently influential resolute reading of the Tractatus, the paper argues that the early Wittgenstein did not aim at destroying the idea of a limit of language, but that the notion lies at the very heart of Wittgenstein's early view. In doing so, the paper employs and defends the Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy.     

Kantian Themes in Contemporary Philosophy: Michael Friedman

This paper considers the extent to which Kant's vision of a distinctively 'transcendental' task for philosophy is essentially tied to his views on the foundations of the mathematical and physical sciences. Contemporary philosophers with broadly Kantian sympathies have attempted to reinterpret his project so as to isolate a more general philosophical core not so closely tied to the details of now outmoded mathematical-physical theories (Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics). I consider two such attempts, those of Strawson and McDowell, and argue that they fundamentally distort the original Kantian impulse. I then consider Buchdahl's attempt to preserve the link between Kantian philosophy and the sciences while simultaneously generalizing Kant's doctrines in light of later scientific developments. I argue that Buchdahl's view, while not adequate as in interpretation of Kant in his own eighteenth century context, is nonetheless suggestive of an historicized and relativized revision of Kantianism that can do justice to both Kant's original philosophical impulse and the radical changes in the sciences that have occurred since Kant's day.     

Comments on Guyer

Paul Guyer's paper “Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant's Moral Philosophy” raises a set of issues about how Kantian ethics should be understood in relation to present day “philosophical naturalism” that are very much in need of discussion. The paper itself is challenging, even in some respects iconoclastic, and provides a highly welcome provocation to raise in new ways some basic questions about what Kantian ethics is and what it ought to be. Guyer offers us an admirably informed and complex argument, both historical and philosophical, that tangles with some of the most difficult problems in Kant's moral philosophy. It begins with some ambitious and controversial claims about Kant's moral philosophy prior to the Groundwork of 1785. It then offers an interpretation, and also a fundamental criticism, of the Groundwork's attempt to establish the moral law based on the idea of freedom of the will. And finally, it raises – and expresses some opinions on – the large and vexed questions of the relationship between transcendental philosophy and philosophical naturalism, and whether Kantian ethics can be made consistent with a naturalistic philosophical outlook. In these comments I will have something to say on each of these three topics, without pretending (any more than Guyer does) to have exhausted what might be said about them.     

Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kan's Moral Philosophy

Kant has long been taxed with an inability to explain the detailed normative content of our lives by making universalizability the sole arbiter of our values. Korsgaard addresses one form of this critique by defending a Kantian theory amended by a seemingly attractive conception of practical identities. Identities are dependent on the contingent circumstances of each person's world. Hence, obligations issuing from them differ from Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all persons. Still, Korsgaard takes Kantian autonomy to mean the normativity of all obligations is rooted in universalizability. The wealth of values informing our lives is thus said to be accommodated within a Kantian framework.
After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person's practical identities derive their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be developed to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to "constructivism" and I argue that the epistemic commitments of people's actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it.     

Realizing the Good: Hegel's Critique of Kantian Morality

Although the best‐known Hegelian objection against Kant's moral philosophy is the charge that the categorical imperative is an ‘empty formalism’, Hegel's criticisms also include what we might call the realizability objection. Tentatively stated, the realizability objection says that within the sphere of Kantian morality, the good remains an unrealizable ‘ought’ – in other words, the Kantian moral ‘ought’ can never become an ‘is’. In this paper, I attempt to come to grips with this objection in two steps. In the first section of the paper, I provide an initial reading of the objection, according to which Hegel agrees with Kant's formulation of the realizability problem but disagrees with the specific Kantian solution, namely, with the Kantian idea of the highest good and the doctrine of the postulates. In the second section, I go on to argue that this reading is potentially too superficial and offer a more far‐reaching interpretation whereby Hegel is ultimately targeting fundamental distinctions (between, for instance, reason and sensibility) of Kant's moral theory. I end by employing these more far‐reaching results of Hegel's objection to sketch some features of Hegel's alternative ethical view.     

艺术作品中的世界与作为世界精神的河流--论海德格尔思想的转折

1936年左右是海德格尔思想发展的关键时期,也即是其思想转折完成的时机,于是弄清楚这一转折(跨越30年代前期)的过程就相当重要了。随着《存在与时间》之后的一系列演讲的出版,其中尤其是海氏对荷尔德林诗歌的解释,可以使我们准确地理解他如何借助艺术与诗歌把存在的真理与美的显像关联来实现这一转折。本文主要通过重新阅读《艺术作品的本源》,并把它置于与荷尔德林的诗歌的关系中来讨论这一转折,从而使海德格尔这一阶段的世界理论更为明确,并为理解后期海德格尔以及第65卷对Ereignis的阐发提供了指引与路标。     

预见性的本体论指归

囿于认识论或价值论范围,把有关预见性的一切解释置于本体论解释的视野之外,预见性的本体论根据之追究就会被无端地“搁置”起来,从而处在被“荒漠化”的境地,本体论意义之显现也就会被严实地“遮蔽”起来,即使偶有论及也只处在被“边缘化”的地带。本文由自我认识的诠解引发关于自我认识的预见性研究的本体论和方法论意义,进而集中解说自我认识何以具有预见性,自我认识的预见性有什么特点和表现形式,其存在变化是否具有客观基础暨本体论指归。     

The Neo‐Hegelian Theory of Freedom and the Limits of Emancipation

This paper critically evaluates what it identifies as ‘the institutional theory of freedom’ developed within recent neo‐Hegelian philosophy (by Robert Pippin and, in a different way, Axel Honneth). While acknowledging the gains made against the Kantian theory of autonomy as detachment it is argued that the institutional theory ultimately undermines the very meaning of practical agency. By tying agency to institutionally sustained recognition it effectively excludes the exercise of practical reason geared toward emancipation from a settled normative order. Adorno's notion of autonomy as resistance is enlisted to develop an account of practical reason that is neither institutionally constrained nor without appropriate consideration of the historical location of the practical agent.