A comparison of recognition memory to numerical decision: How prior probabilities affect cutoff location

In two experiments, a recognition memory task, in which subjects judged whether a given five-digit number had been shown previously, was compared to a numerical decision task, in which subjects judged whether a given five-digit number represented the height of a man or a woman. Subjects were found to shift β (the cutoff point along the decision axis) with changes in prior probabilities in the direction specified by signal detection theory in the numerical decision task but not in the recognition memory task. An explanation of the results, in terms of a difference in ? (discriminability) between the two tasks, was ruled out. In contrast, explanations which cannot be ruled out involve differences between the tasks in the amount of practice required for the subject to learn the manner in which the stimuli are distributed along the decision continuum, and differences in the availability of an alternative basis for response other than the decision continuum.     

Decision rules in the perception and categorization of multidimensional stimuli

This article examines decision processes in the perception and categorization of stimuli constructed from one or more components. First, a general perceptual theory is used to formally characterize large classes of existing decision models according to the type of decision boundary they predict in a multidimensional perceptual space. A new experimental paradigm is developed that makes it possible to accurately estimate a subject's decision boundary in a categorization task. Three experiments using this paradigm are reported. Three conclusions stand out: (a) Subjects adopted deterministic decision rules, that is, for a given location in the perceptual space, most subjects always gave the same response; (b) subjects used decision rules that were nearly optimal; and (c) the only constraint on the type of decision bound that subjects used was the amount of cognitive capacity it required to implement. Subjects were not constrained to make independent decisions on each component or to attend to the distance to each prototype.     

Influence of emotional state on irrelevant thoughts

The fan effect paradigm was used to investigate the influence of emotional mood state on longterm memory retrieval (Anderson, 1983). Subjects learned target facts embedded in unrelated sentences to a specified criterion and were then given a happy, sad, or neutral mood induction. Mean response times (RTs) and error rates were analyzed in a speeded recognition test in which subjects distinguished between the learned facts and foil facts (foil facts were constructed by recombining the same concepts). A follow-up lexical decision task indicated that mean RT was positively correlated with an increase in the weighted proportion of irrelevant thoughts produced by subjects in an induced sad mood. Results suggest that irrelevant thoughts associated with the sad mood state interfered with more relevant, task-oriented, thoughts and support the notion that sad mood is related to a failure to inhibit irrelevant information.     

Plausibility assessments in hypothesis generation

Our principle goal was to examine one aspect of predicisional behavior: how decision makers evaluate their feelings of certainty toward specified and unspecified hypotheses. Our experimental task permitted a comparison of subjective to veridical values. Subjects generally were overconfident for specified hypotheses and conservative for unspecified hypotheses. Subjects also expressed more confidence with specified hypotheses when evaluating them individually than as an aggregate. An explanation for our results may be that subjects underestimated the importance of unspecified hypotheses because they had difficulty recalling them.     

Understanding the effects of sample size on the variability of the mean

In the first three experiments, we attempted to learn more about subjects' understanding of the importance of sample size by systematically changing aspects of the problems we gave to subjects. In a fourth study, understanding of the effects of sample size was tested as subjects went through a computerassisted training procedure that dealt with random sampling and the sampling distribution of the mean. Subjects used sample size information more appropriately for problems that were stated in terms of the accuracy of the sample average or the center of the sampling distribution than for problems stated in terms of the tails of the sampling distribution. Apparently, people understand that the means of larger samples are more likely to resemble the population mean but not the implications of this fact for the variability of the mean. The fourth experiment showed that although instruction about the sampling distribution of the mean led to better understanding of the effects of sample size, subjects were still unable to make correct inferences about the variability of the mean. The appreciation that people have for some aspects of the law of large numbers does not seem to result from an in-depth understanding of the relation between sample size and variability.     

Expert performance in solving word puzzles: From retrieval cues to crossword clues

Crossword enthusiasts were first clasified as expert or intermediate on the basis of their performance with a previously unseen set of clues, and then participated in five laboratory experiments designed to capture different aspects of their skilled performance: experiment 1 required the generation of words from a fixed set of letters; experiment 2 monitored the solution of anagrams; experiment 3 required the comipletion of a word of given meaning with only three letters presented; experiment 4 was a lexical decision task with suffixed and pseudosuffixed words and non-words; and experiment 5 was a synonym judgement task with prefixed and suffixed words Subjects also completed psychometric tests of reasoning and vocabulary. A discriminant function analysis sucessfully predicted the crossword ability of all subjects on the basis of measures of the generation of words from given letters, the number of anagrams solved, sensitivity to a suffix in a non-word (lexical decision task), sensitivity to a pseudosuffix in a word (synonym judgement task), and vocabulary score. Cryptic crossword puzles are solved by a combination of component subskills, including lexical retrieval, clue recognition, and the manipulation of components of words.     

Intuitive statistical inferences about normally distributed data

Several experiments are reported in which subjects are asked to make intuitive judgements about normally distributed samples. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated judgements about population means as a function of the mean, size and variability of the samples. Trends to take account of all three factors, in the normative direction, were shown, but sample size was significant only when numerical displays were used (experiment 1) and variability only when graphical displays were used (experiment 2).In experiment 3a, subjects were asked to estimate variability of samples directly, and were found equally able to do so with either form of data display. Experiment 3b used a simplified procedure and clarified question, and also presented both numerical and graphical displays in the same experiment. Overall, subjects took significant (normative) account of all the relevant sample features. Interactions with form of presentation showed trends consistent with the findings of experiments 1 and 2 but failed to reach significance. A further presentation effect was shown in experiments 2 and 3b, in that subjects' inferences about graphically displayed data appeared to differ somewhat between left and right centered distributions.Overall, subjects performed quite well as intuitive statisticians, though their probability estimates were typically very conservative. The evidence of trends for different modes of presentation of data to induce differential attention to sample features was sufficient to encourage further research on this problem.     

The form of analog size information in memory

The information used to choose the larger of two objects from memory was investigated in two experiments that compared the effects of a number of variables on the performance of subjects who either were instructed to use imagery in the comparison task or were not so instructed. Subjects instructed to use imagery could perform the task more quickly if they prepared themselves with an image of one of the objects at its normal size, rather than with an image that was abnormally big or small, or no image at all. Such subjects were also subject to substantial selective interference when asked to simultaneously maintain irrelevant images of digits. In contrast, when subjects were not specifically instructed to use imagery to reach their decisions, an initial image at normal size did not produce significantly faster decisions than no image, or a large or small image congruent with the correct decision. The selective interference created by simultaneously imaging digits was reduced for subjects not told to base their size comparisons on imagery. The difficulty of the size discrimination did not interact significantly with any other variable. The results suggest that subjects, unless specifically instructed to use imagery, can compare the size of objects in memory using information more abstract than visual imagery.     

The influence of cue unreliability on judgment in a multiple cue probability learning task

The effect of cue reliability was tested in a two-cue multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL) task. Subjects were 42 undergraduates. The cue validities were.78 and.37. Unreliability in a cue was defined as variability in multiple observations of that cue on a given trial. That variability was provided by adding random errors to the true value of the cue. One group was given consistent cues (i.e., the more valid cue was the more reliable cue), one group was given inconsistent cues, and the control group was given true scores. Cue reliability did not affect subjects' consistency or achievement, but did interact with the presence of outcome feedback. The subjective weights showed that subjects thought they weighted the more reliable cue more heavily regardless of the cue validities or their actual cue weightings. There were wide individual differences in performance, illustrating the need for an idiographic-statistical approach in studying decision making.     

The value of action and inference in dynamic decision making

The use of action- versus judgment-oriented decision strategies in a dynamic decision task is investigated. Subjects engaged in a simulated medical decision-making task, where the goal is to select treatments in order to cure patients suffering from an unknown disease. The experiment manipulated two task factors that were predicted to influence the effectiveness and efficiency of action- and judgment-oriented strategies: (1) the availability of a decision aid that promotes the interpretability of outcome feedback in the task and (2) the level of risk associated with treatment choices, which influences the opportunity for corrective actions to compensate for earlier decision errors. Results indicated that these manipulations did in fact influence performance. However, most subjects did not use action-oriented strategies even when they would have led to superior performance. Possible explanations for this finding are discussed and the implications for theoretical accounts of strategy acquisition and selection are considered.     

Understanding variability in binary and continuous choice

Excessive variability in binary choice (categorical judgment) can take the form of probability matching rather than the normatively correct behavior of deterministically choosing the more likely alternative. Excessive variability in continuous choice (judgment rating) can take the form of underconfidence, understating the probability of highly likely events and overstating the probability of very unlikely events. We investigated the origins of choice variability in terms of noise prior to decision (at the evidence stage) and at the decision stage. A version of the well-known medical diagnosis task was conducted with binary and continuous choice on each trial. Noise at evidence stage was reduced by allowing the subjects to view historical summaries of prior relevant trials, and noise at the decision stage was reduced by giving the subjects a numerical score on the basis of their continuous choice and the actual outcome. Both treatments greatly reduced variability. Cash payments based on the numerical score had a less reliable incremental effect in our experiment. The overall results are more consistent with a Logit model of decision than with a simple criterion (or maximization) rule or a simple probabilitymatching rule.     

Effect of various discriminative stimuli on choice behavior in male siamese fighting fish (Betta splendens)

The current experiment was an exploratory study empirically comparing three discrimination methodologies proposed for use in choice preparations with food rewards. Subjects were thirty-five, healthy, adult male Siamese fighting fish (Betta splendens). Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three discrimination groups: a Direction group (using left or right as discriminative stimuli), a Color group (using red or green as discriminative stimuli), and a Bubble group (using the presence or absence of air bubbles as discriminative stimuli). For all three discrimination groups, subjects chose between one or three food pellets in a submerged T-maze. The results from the experiment indicated a statistically significant preference for the three pellets of food over one pellet of food only for the Bubble group. Of particular note is the effect size and observed power obtained for the Bubble group, which was the only group which supported a reasonably powerful test for discrimination, given a sample size of 12 subjects and 0.94 effect size.     

Illusions of familiarity caused by cohort activation

Subjects took part in an auditory lexical decision task followed by an auditory test of recognition memory for words presented in this task. Subjects categorized their recognition judgments as based on either recollection (“remember” responses) or familiarity (“know” responses). Distractor items in the recognition test included the base words from which the nonwords used in the lexical decision task were derived. Consistent with the findings of Wallace, Stewart, Sherman, and Mellor (1995), more false alarms were made to “late” base words (where the corresponding nonwords were created by changing a phoneme near the end of the word) than to “early” base words (corresponding nonwords were created by changing a phoneme at the beginning of the word). However, this effect was found in “know” responses but not in “remember” responses. The findings are attributed to enhanced fluency with which the base words are processed following their implicit activation at encoding.     

Performance of an unpleasant task: Effects of over- vs under-payment on perception of adequacy of rewards and task attractiveness

Subjects who came to an experiment expecting to receive a moderate amount of money for performing a task were then told, either before or after performing it, that their pay would be higher than, equal to, or less than they had expected. When the actual payment was announced after the task was performed, subjects' evaluations of the task increased with the amount they were paid; however, they estimated a higher rate of pay to be appropriate if they received either more or less than they expected than if they received what they expected. When the actual payment was announced before the task was performed (and before subjects made their decision to perform it), a different pattern emerged. Subjects rated the task more attractive when they were offered either more or less than the expected amount, while their judgments of the appropriateness of the pay offered increased with the amount of the offer. Implications of the results for incentive and dissonance theories as well as self-perception and equity theories are discussed.     

Prospect Theory Predictions When Escalation Is Not the Only Chance to Recover Sunk Costs

Two experiments tested the effect of risk of alternative investment opportunities on decision behavior in an escalation context. In the first experiment (n = 170), the risk of the reinvestment option, which had been unsuccessful and incurred a sunk cost, was held equal to that of an alternative investment project. Responsibility for the previous decision was manipulated between these subjects. Subjects were required to choose between the reinvestment option and the alternative. Responsible subjects demonstrated classic reinvestment (escalation) tendencies, and nonresponsible subjects exhibited a significant tendency to avoid reinvestment. Subjects in the second experiment (n = 195) completed the same decision task and were also assigned to high and low responsibility conditions. In this experiment the risk of investing further in a previously chosen project, relative to the risk of the alternative project, was manipulated. Those subjects who were responsible for the first decision (a) demonstrated no preference for or against continued pursuit of the initial project (i.e., there was no escalation tendency) and (b) preferred the less risky of the second investments, regardless of whether it was or was not the initially chosen project. Nonresponsible subjects showed no risk preference or proclivity for reinvestment. The results of these experiments suggest that salient information concerning relative risk dominates the effect of prior performance information when alternative investments are considered. We discuss the implications of these findings for decision theory and for methodology in commitment escalation research.     

决策者角色及相关变量对风险偏好的影响

采用IAT技术测查被试的内隐自尊, 并引入收益和损失两种任务框架, 综合探讨了内隐自尊水平、任务得失框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果发现：(1)在收益框架下, 被试为他人决策时更冒险, 而在损失框架下, 为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (2)与为自我决策相比, 低内隐自尊者为他人决策时更冒险, 而高内隐自尊者为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (3)内隐自尊水平与任务框架的交互作用及内隐自尊水平、任务框架和决策者角色之间的三级交互作用均不显著。依据相关的理论和发现对这种结果进行了分析和讨论。     

Reactivity and personal control over stimulation supply

The experiment was designed to study the effect of personal control, operationalized in terms of choice between a more demanding and a less demanding task, on persons with different levels of reactivity. Subjects were randomly assigned and individually tested in a 2 (High reactivity/Low reactivity) × 2 (Low rate of stimulus presentation/ High rate of stimulus presentation) × 2 (Choice/No Choice) factorial experiment with 15 subjects per condition. The two principal dependent measures were the total number of correct responses in a serial RT task and the post-task levels of anxiety, anger, and curiosity. The major finding was that while the availability of control had a positive effect on both task performance and affect, its role was situation-specific, i.e. limited to the difficult task. Most probably the availability of control masks the variability of reaction due to individual differences in reactivity. However, high-reactives are still left with the residual stress of unresolved emotions.     

Detection and Selection Decisions with Conditional Feedback: Interaction of Task Uncertainty and Base Rate

Effects of task uncertainty on decision thresholds in a multiple cue decision task were examined under two types of feedback and three base rate conditions. In most such decision experiments, participants receive feedback after every trial (full feedback) with a single (usually .5) base rate. Our experiment explored conditional (decision‐contingent) feedback, in a task representing a detection problem (passenger screening) in which the decision maker receives no feedback unless the decision is positive (search the passenger). Increased uncertainty made all dependent measures worse. Task uncertainty had detrimental effects on both judgment and decision making, and interacted with effects of feedback and base rate. Decision performance was better with full feedback than with conditional feedback, but not by much. There may be no single unifying explanation for results of our base rate manipulation. Conditional feedback generally resulted in fewer positive decisions than full feedback, but not in the low (.1) base rate condition. Results provide partial support for constructivist encoding and for accuracy maximization with moderate and high base rates, but not with a low base rate. Our results indicated lower selection rates with conditional feedback compared with full feedback in moderate and high base rate conditions, and a more exploratory strategy with higher selection rates with conditional feedback compared with full feedback when base rate was low. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.