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1.
Jiaxiang Hu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(1):41-56
Mencius’ aesthetics unfolded around the ideal personality in his mind. Such an ideal personality belonged to a great man who
was sublime, practical and honorable, and it was presented as the beauty of magnificence or the beauty of masculinity. Mencius
put forward many propositions such as “the completed goodness that is brightly displayed is called greatness,” nourishing
“one’s grand qi 气 (the great morale personality),” “only after a man is a sage can he completely suits himself to his own form,” “the saints
only apprehended before me that of which my mind approves along with other men,” being “conscious of sincerity on self-examination,”
and flowing “abroad, above and beneath, like that of Heaven and Earth,” all of which described an ideal personality through
the course of its formation and its psychological experience. As a prominent school before the Qin dynasty, Mencius’ aesthetics
greatly developed the Confucian teaching of “internal sage.” It shared many similarities with Zhuangzi’s thought and was also
an aesthetic mode opposed to the latter. Both kinds of aesthetics were prominent: Mencius’ teaching was like imposingly towering
and muscularly overflowing majestic mountains; Zhuangzi’s thought was like gracefully flowing water with an air of femininity.
In real life though, Mencius’ teaching has greater practical significance in addressing the unbearable lightness of being,
a disease of modernity. 相似文献
2.
I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity, and show how the metaphor
of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties. Perspectivism's claim that every
view is only one view, applied to itself, is often supposed to preclude the perspectivist's ability to offer reasons for her
epistemology. Nietzsche's arguments for perspectivism depend on “internal reasons”, which have force not only in their own
perspective, but also within the standards of alternative perspectives. Internal reasons allow a perspectivist argument against
dogmatism without presupposing aperspectival criteria for theory choice. Nietzsche also offers “internal” conceptions of truth
and objectivity which reduce them to a matter of meeting our epistemic standards. This view has pluralistic implications,
which conflict with common sense, but it is nevertheless consistent and plausible. Nietzsche's position is similar to Putnam's
recent internalism, and this is due to their common Kantian heritage.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
3.
Xiaoqiang Han 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):157-167
Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream story can be read as a skeptical response to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum solution, for it presents I exist as fundamentally unprovable, on the grounds that the notion about “I” that it is guaranteed
to refer to something existing, which Descartes seems to assume, is unwarranted. The modern anti-skepticism of Hilary Putnam
employs a different strategy, which seeks to derive the existence of the world not from some “indubitable” truth such as the
existence of myself, but from the meaning of some particular assertion I make. In this paper, I argue, however, that Putnam’s argument fails to deliver on the promise of showing the self-refuting
nature of the skeptical hypothesis, as it relies on a double use of “I”, a fallacy of equivocation, reflecting an unsolved
tension between the argument’s general premise, which is rather Zhuangzian in spirit, and his unwitting adoption of that unwarranted
notion about “I”. I try to show further that the skepticism in Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream not only can be used to refute the
proofs of the existence of the empirical I, but also is effective against accounts concerning the existence of the transcendental I. 相似文献
4.
Keith Ansell-Pearson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2011,44(2):179-204
In this essay I seek to show that a philosophy of modesty informs core aspects of both Nietzsche’s critique of morality and
what he intends to replace morality with, namely, an ethics of self-cultivation. To demonstrate this I focus on Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, a largely neglected text in his corpus where Nietzsche carries out a quite wide-ranging critique of morality, including
Mitleid. It is one of Nietzsche’s most experimental works and is best read, I claim, as an Epicurean-inspired critique of the present
and an exercise in moral therapy. In the opening sections I draw attention to the wider social dimension of the text and its
concern with a morality of compassion, which is rarely done in the literature. I then turn to highlighting Nietzsche’s “Epicurean
moment,” followed by two sections on Nietzsche on the self in which I aim to bring to light his ethics of self-cultivation
and show in what ways his revaluation makes central to ethics a modest egoism and care of self. In the conclusion to the essay
I provide a contrast between Nietzsche and Kant and deal with reservations readers might have about his ethics. Overall, the
essay seeks to make a contribution to an appreciation of Dawn as a work of moral therapy. 相似文献
5.
Stephan Leuenberger 《Philosophical Studies》2010,149(3):327-354
In “Ramseyan Humility,” David Lewis argues that we cannot know what the fundamental properties in our world are. His arguments
invoke the possibility of permutations and replacements of fundamental properties. Most responses focus on Lewis’s view on
the relationship between properties and roles, and on the assumptions about knowledge that he makes. I argue that no matter
how the debates about knowledge and about the metaphysics of properties turn out, Lewis’s arguments are unconvincing since
they rely on a highly implausible assumption about the expressive power of our language. 相似文献
6.
James BehuniakJr. 《Dao》2010,9(2):249-252
Certain discussions about “relativism” in the philosophy of Zhuangzi turn on the question of the morality of his dao 道. Some commentators, most notably Robert Eno, maintain that there is no ethical value whatsoever to Zhuangzi’s dao as presented in the Cook Ding episode and other “knack passages.” In this essay, it is argued that there is indeed a moral
dimension to Cook Ding’s dao. One way to recognize it is to explore the similarity between that dao and John Dewey’s notion of educational method. There are moral traits that Dewey can appeal to in recommending his method.
It is argued here that these traits represent the moral features of Cook Ding’s dao as well. 相似文献
7.
This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks’ paper “A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following”. Hindriks claims to find
room for what he calls a modest solution to the Kripkensteinian problem of rule-following, different from both straight and sceptical solutions. Hindriks
criticises Philip Pettit’s “ethocentric” solution and goes on to provide his own, “modest” one. My paper is in two parts.
In the first part, I argue that there is no room for a “modest” solution to sceptical problems: depending on how one reads
Kripke, Hindriks’ “modest” solution is always going to turn out either straight or sceptical. In the second part, I defend
the ethocentric solution against Hindriks’ arguments. In particular, I argue that the topic-neutral specifications of favourable
conditions which Pettit uses are superior to Hindriks’ topic-specific ones.
*I want to thank Frank Hindriks for comments on an earlier version, but I take full responsibility for any remaining errors
or misunderstandings. This work has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland (project 202513). 相似文献
8.
Felix Mühlh?lzer 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):265-292
Charles Parsons’ book “Mathematical Thought and Its Objects” of 2008 (Cambridge University Press, New York) is critically
discussed by concentrating on one of Parsons’ main themes: the role of intuition in our understanding of arithmetic (“intuition”
in the specific sense of Kant and Hilbert). Parsons argues for a version of structuralism which is restricted by the condition
that some paradigmatic structure should be presented that makes clear the actual existence of structures of the necessary
sort. Parsons’ paradigmatic structure is the so-called ‘intuitive model’ of arithmetic realized by Hilbert’s strings of strokes.
This paper argues that Hilbert’s strings, considered as given in intuition, cannot play the role Parsons assigns to them:
the criteria of identity of these strings do not have the sharpness that Parsons wants to see in them, and Parsons inadvertently
projects abstract structures into his ‘intuitive model’. This diagnosis is exemplified with respect to (a) Parsons’ distinction
between addition and multiplication on the one hand and exponentiation on the other and (b) his analysis of arithmetical knowledge
in simple cases like “7 + 5 = 12”. All in all, it is claimed that Parsons book contains many important insights with respect
to, for example, different versions structuralism, the notion of “natural number” and its uniqueness, induction, predicativity
and other things, for which he is rightly famous, but that his way of drawing on the notion of intuition leaves too many questions
unanswered. 相似文献
9.
Sven Bernecker 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(1):81-104
This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in
a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective”
or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism
and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning
externalism and internalism to different levels. 相似文献
10.
James H. Fetzer 《Synthese》2011,178(2):381-396
The distinguished theologian, David Ray Griffin, has advanced a set of thirteen theses intended to characterize (what he calls)
“Neo-Darwinism” and which he contrasts with “Intelligent Design”. Griffin maintains that Neo-Darwinism is “atheistic” in forgoing
a creator but suggests that, by adopting a more modest scientific naturalism and embracing a more naturalistic theology, it
is possible to find “a third way” that reconciles religion and science. The considerations adduced here suggest that Griffin
has promised more than he can deliver. On his account, God is in laws of nature; therefore, any influence He exerts is natural
rather than supernatural. But if the differences God makes are not empirically detectable, then Griffin’s account is just
as objectionable as a theory of supernatural intervention. And Griffin has not shown that evolution as distinct from his idiosyncratic
sense of Neo-Darwinism is incompatible with theism. 相似文献
11.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献
12.
Eric Schwitzgebel 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(1-2):107-113
Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can
or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms.
First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears
to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett
sometimes seems to say that even though we may be mistaken about what our conscious experience is, our reports about “what
it’s like to be us” must be correct. That view unfortunately requires a nonstandard and unremarked distinction between facts
about consciousness and facts about “what it’s like.” Third, Dennett says that reports about experience may be “incorrigible.”
However, that claim stands in tension with evidence, highlighted by Dennett himself, that seems to suggest that people can
be demonstrably mistaken about their own experience. Dennett needlessly muddies his case against infallibilism with these
unsatisfactory compromises. 相似文献
13.
14.
Mark E. Jonas 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(2):153-169
In this paper, I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming has been largely misinterpreted in the philosophy
of education journals. The misinterpretation partially stems from a misconstruction of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and leads
to a conception of self-overcoming that is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s educational ideals. To show this, I examine some
of the prominent features of the so-called “debate” of the 1980s surrounding Nietzsche’s conception of self-overcoming. I
then offer an alternative conception that is more consistent with Nietzsche’s thought, and provides a more nuanced understanding
of Nietzsche’s “anti-democratic” pedagogy. Ultimately, I argue that while Nietzsche’s educational philosophy is not egalitarian,
it can be effectively utilized in “democratic” classrooms, assuming his concept of self-overcoming is properly construed.
相似文献
Mark E. JonasEmail: |
15.
William Edward Morris 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):441-454
Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,”
which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an
analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism”
reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his
naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program
for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses
the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or
positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas. 相似文献
16.
Patricia Hanna 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):343-355
In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue,
pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes
an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account
succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving
the “delivery problem”. 相似文献
17.
In a paper entitled “Revolution in Permanence”, published in the collection “Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems”, John Worrall
(1995) severely criticised several aspects of Karl Popper’s work before commenting that “I have no doubt that, given suffi-cient
motivation, a case could be constructed on the basis of such remarks that Popper had a more sophisticated version of theory
production......” (p. 102). Part of Worrall’s criticism is directed at a “strawpopper”: in his “Darwinian Model” emphasising
the similarities and differences between genetic mutation, variation in animal behaviour and the gestation of scientific theories,
Popper (1975, 1981, 1994) never stated that tentative scientific conjec-tures “while more or less random, are not completely
blind.” He was referring to variation in animal species behaviour, and about tentative scientific conjectures he said nothing,
although common sense would indicate that presumably he regarded them as being less blind and less random. In Popper (1977,
1983), giving a summary of his “Darwinian Model”, he repaired this omission about tentative scientific conjectures by inserting
the sentence “On a level of World 3 theory formation they are of the character of planned gropings into the unknown.” Recent
developments in the field of genetics (see for example Raff (1996), Lewis (1999), Korn (2002)) indicate that Popper’s intuitions
were along the modern lines while Worrall’s intuitions are old fashioned. Therefore Popper’s “Darwinian Model” remains both
viable and fruitful. 相似文献
18.
19.
Lian Xinda 《Dao》2009,8(3):233-254
The image of the Peng bird, which opens the Zhuangzi text, is not the product of metaphysical reasoning. An inspiring example of soaring up and going beyond, the image is used
to broaden the outlook of the small mind; its function is thus more therapeutic than instructional. With its rich poetic and
experiential content, the image of the Peng refuses to be reduced to an abstract concept, or a mere signifier of certain philosophical
position. Misreading of the image results from any attempt to accurately “size up” its philosophical implication by measuring
it quantitatively against a spectrum of positions and values. To see only the superficial “inconsistencies” in Zhuangzi’s
argument and to read the wind under the Peng’s wings as a handicap that it needs to overcome in order to embark on its “free
and easy wandering” is, in the name of logic and “consistency,” to ignore the big picture Zhuangzi presents. 相似文献
20.
Avi I. Mintz 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(3):287-299
The proverb “chalepa ta kala” (“fine things are difficult”) is invoked in three dialogues in the Platonic corpus: Hippias Major, Cratylus and Republic. In this paper, I argue that the context in which the proverb arises reveals Socrates’ considerable pedagogical dexterity
as he uses the proverb to rebuke his interlocutor in one dialogue but to encourage his interlocutors in another. In the third,
he gauges his interlocutors’ mention of the proverb to be indicative of their preparedness for a more difficult philosophical
trial. What emerges in the study of these three Platonic dialogues is that Socrates believes that how he and others describe learning makes a tangible difference in philosophical investigation. 相似文献