Group Dynamics in Janis's Theory of Groupthink: Backward and Forward

Janis's groupthink theory is an appealing explanation of how group process can get in the way of optimal decision making. Unfortunately, Janis was selective and not always consistent in his application of research in group dynamics. This paper traces groupthink to its theoretical roots in order to suggest how a broader and more consistent use of research in group dynamics can advance understanding of decision-making problems. In particular, the paper explores and reinterprets the groupthink prediction that poor decision making is most likely when group cohesion is based on the personal attractiveness of group members.     

“Bipolar groupthink”: Assessing groupthink tendencies in authentic work groups

Research on regressive group processes such as Janis’ (1982) “groupthink” phenomenon has rarely focused on work groups in authentic settings. In this study, teams from six different organisations (n=308) were studied by using a groupthink questionnaire constructed in accordance with the symptoms of groupthink described by Janis. It was hypothesised that groupthink could be described as a bipolar construct identifying either an omnipotent or a depressive variant of a group’s delusions about its own and other groups’ features. The questionnaire showed reasonably good reliability as a whole and a factor analysis identified three factors in line with the proposed theoretical model in which the two different types of groupthink can be distinguished. We propose that any group might have a tendency or predisposition to react in either of the two directions during provocative circumstances. The six different organisations exhibited different types of groupthink to a varying degree. A religious sect was the one most characterised by omnipotent groupthink, while a technological company and a psychiatric team seemed to be the ones with most features of depressive groupthink.     

Recasting Janis's Groupthink Model: The Key Role of Collective Efficacy in Decision Fiascoes

This paper advances an explanation for decision fiascoes that reflects recent theoretical trends and was developed in response to a growing body of research that has failed to substantiate the groupthink model (Janis, 1982). In this new framework, the lack of vigilance and preference for risk that characterizes groups contaminated by groupthink are attributed in large part to perceptions of collective efficacy that unduly exceed capability. High collective efficacy may also contribute to the negative framing of decisions and to certain administrative and structural organizational faults. In the making of critical decisions, these factors induce a preference for risk and a powerful concurrence seeking tendency that, facilitated by group polarization, crystallize around a decision option that is likely to fail. Implications for research and some evidence in support of this approach to the groupthink phenomenon are also discussed.     

Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam Decisions 25 Years Later: How Well Has the Groupthink Hypothesis Stood the Test of Time?

Even after a quarter of a century, the groupthink hypothesis remains an influential framework for understanding the origins of group decision making fiascoes. Much of the original empirical evidence for this hypothesis was derived from a series of incisive qualitative studies of major policy fiascoes, including the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion and U.S. military escalation of the Vietnam War. In the 25 years since the groupthink hypothesis was first formulated, new evidence, including recently declassified documents, rich oral histories, and informative memoirs by key participants in these decisions have become available to scholars, casting new light on the decision making process behind both the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam. Much of this new evidence does not support Janis's original characterization of these processes. In particular, it suggests that dysfunctional group dynamics stemming from group members' strivings to maintain group cohesiveness were not as prominent a causal factor in the deliberation process as Janis argued. Instead, the evidence suggests that the decision making process was heavily influenced by how Presidents Kennedy and Johnson construed their options. Both Kennedy and Johnson tended to evaluate their alternatives primarily in terms of their political consequences, especially the desire to avoid what they construed as unacceptable political losses and potential damage to their reputations. Viewed in aggregate, this new evidence suggests that the groupthink hypothesis overstates the influence of small group dynamics, while understating the role political considerations played in these decisions. Thus, although both decisions may have been seriously flawed, the logic of this failure should be attributed to political psychological rather than social psychological processes.     

Friendship and group identification: a new look at the role of cohesiveness in groupthink

This article proposes that research has failed to clarify the causal role of group cohesiveness in groupthink because of a failure to distinguish cohesiveness from friendship. To remedy this, a conceptual distinction, based on social identity theory, is drawn between positive regard grounded in interpersonal relations (personal attraction, friendship), and solidarity grounded in group identification (depersonalized social attraction, true group cohesiveness)—Hogg (1992). An experiment compared the roles of friendship and social attraction in groupthink. Four-person discussion groups of friends, or socially attractive or random groups of strangers, made decisions (N=472). Background conditions for groupthink were established, and a wide range of subjective and behavioural measures of friendship, identification/social attraction, and the decision-making process were taken. Analyses isolated effects associated with friendship/personal attraction, from those associated with identification/social attraction. Friendship was found to be weakly and negatively related to symptoms of groupthink, while group identification and social attraction were strongly and, with some exceptions, positively related to symptoms of groupthink. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Groupthink, Bay of Pigs, and Watergate Reconsidered

Irving Janis's concept of groupthink can be seen in the context of our on-again-off-again love affair with groups. Group decisions have often been seen as offering the benefits of collective wisdom, but may also lead to disastrous consequences. Groupthink then focuses on the negative effects of erroneous group decisions. Two major examples of groupthink are reexamined and compared: the disastrous Bay of Pigs decision by the elite advisory group of President Kennedy, and the advisory groups of President Nixon, which led to the Watergate disaster and at unsuccessful attempts to cover up. In both, it is suggested there was a “runaway norm,” escalation and polarization with the norm being to exceed other members of the group in taking more extreme and unrestrained actions against an “enemy.” While Janis seems to suggest that groupthink will ultimately lead the group to fail in its ultimate endeavors, we need to consider the frightening possibility that in the case of the Nixon group, the group actions came close to being successful.     

Groupthink and the space shuttle challenger accident: Toward a quantitative case analysis

Research on historical cases of policy decisions thought to involve groupthink nearly always has been qualitative, rather than quantitative. We propose that observable antecedents and consequences can be used to code incidents in a group's decision process, thereby providing the basis for more rigorous, quantitative analyses. As a first step toward such a quantitative case analysis, we coded statements from the investigative report on the space shuttle Challenger accident as positive or negative instances of the observable antecedents and consequences of groupthink. Positive instances of groupthink were twice as frequent as negative instances. More importantly, during the 24 hours prior to launch the ratio of positive to negative instances increased, then remained high. These results are consistent with the notion that the decision to launch the Challenger involved groupthink and provide a first step toward more rigorous quantitative analysis of historical or current decision processes.     

Decisions from experience: How groups and individuals adapt to change

Whether groups make better judgments and decisions than individuals has been studied extensively, but most of this research has focused on static tasks. How do groups and individuals compare in settings where the decision environment changes unexpectedly and without notification? This article examines group and individual behavior in decisions from experience where the underlying probabilities change after some trials. Consistent with the previous literature, the results showed that groups performed better than the average individual while the decision task was stable. However, group performance was no longer superior after a change in the decision environment. Group performance was closer to the benchmark of Bayesian updating, which assumed perfect memory. Findings suggest that groups did not adopt decision routines that might have delayed their adaption to change in the environment. Rather, they seem to have coordinated their responses, which led them to behave as if they had better memory and subsequently delayed adaptation.     

Quality of decision making and group norms.

Two studies investigated the impact of group norms for maintaining consensus versus norms for critical thought on group decisions in a modification of the biased sampling paradigm (G. Stasser & W. Titus, 1985). Both studies showed that critical norms improved the quality of decisions, whereas consensus norms did not. This effect appeared to be mediated by the perceived value of shared and unshared information: Consensus norm groups valued shared information more highly than critical groups did, and valence was a good predictor of decision outcome. In addition, the 2nd study showed that the group norm manipulation has no impact on individual decisions, consistent with the assumption that this is a group effect. Results suggest that the content of group norms is an important factor influencing the quality of group decision-making processes and that the content of group norms may be related to the group's proneness for groupthink.     

Goal Setting by Groups Performing an Additive Task: A Comparison With Individual Goal Setting1

This article compares goal levels and task performance of groups and individuals that are assigned or self-set goals. Groups performed an additive task that allowed for direct comparison with individuals' i]ndependent performance of the task. Consistent with predictions, groups and individuals selected goals that were less difficult than assigned goals which required only a modest increase in performance. Group members and individuals who were assigned goals attained higher levels of performance than self-set or no goal condition subjects. The prediction that group members and individuals who self-set their goals would have more positive affective reactions to the goal-setting situation than participants in assigned condition was supported. The results of this study are consistent with the existing literature on groups and individuals regarding effects of goals, performance, and affective reactions. Analyses also indicate that the group goal decision process involves a compensatory strategy in which an average of group member preferences for the goal was used to reach a group goal decision. Discussion focuses on the similarities and differences between the findings of self-set and assigned goal-setting situations for groups and individuals, with particular reference to goal choice strategies, goal expectancies, and efficacy.     

Informational intra‐group influence: the effects of time pressure and group size

The judgments of groups have immense impact on our daily lives. This paper theorizes that three families of intra‐group influence affect the collective estimation process. These different forms of influence map to different levels of task demonstrability, or the extent to which correct answers are transparent to problem‐solvers. When demonstrability is low, group estimates are disproportionately influenced by proposals closer to the intra‐group mean (centrality). When demonstrability is high and groups are small, group decisions are disproportionately influenced by proposals closer to the correct answer (accuracy). Finally, when demonstrability is high and groups are larger, group decisions are disproportionately influenced by proposals offered by generally more accurate individuals across a set of judgments (expertise). Three laboratory studies support our predictions with regard to informational influence in cooperative groups. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Group vs individual information processing: The effects of outcome feedback on decision making

Recent theories of individual decision making have emphasized the role of environmental feedback on decision performance and confidence. However, in relation to group decision making, feedback has received only minor attention. This study compared individual and group decision performance and confidence on a multicue personnel decision task under three different feedback conditions. Individuals and five-person groups decided whether to promote 48 different job candidates, and rated how confident they were in each of their decisions. Feedback as to the correctness of their decisions was provided after (a) every decision (Total Feedback), (b) only those decisions to promote the candidate (Partial Feedback), or (c) after none of the decisions (No Feedback). Results indicated that groups performed best under total feedback, while individuals performed best under partial feedback. In addition, greater amounts of feedback reduced individuals' confidence but had little effect on group member confidence. Implications for both current theory in decision making and group vs individual information processing are discussed.     

Electronic Meetings and Established Decision Groups: Audioconferencing Effects on Performance and Structural Stability

Two studies used 90 small, well-established decision teams to examine the effects of a one-time use of audioconferencing on group decision performance and status structure across two different problem-solving tasks - one intellective, the other value-laden. Audio did not affect performance or structural stability in either study. Audioconferencing groups were no more or less likely to produce high-quality solutions or to support their groups′ decisions than were face-to-face groups. Status differentiation and leader influence remained relatively stable regardless of medium. The results contradict popular wisdoms (mainly derived from studies of ad hoc groups) and provide a needed baseline for further research on EMS in established groups. The lack of disruption by audio has important practical implications.     

Reconsidering the Impact of Gender Stereotypes on the Advancement of Women in Organizations

Over the last 30 years, gender issues in the workplace have received much attention. A review of this literature, however, reveals limited investigation of the impact of gender stereotypes on personnel decisions and the demographic differences present in upper management. In fact, this issue has rarely received serious attention. A misinterpretation of the small effect size typically reported when describing the relationship between stereotypes and evaluations of performance is a likely reason, and a hypothetical demonstration elucidates the more severe impact of stereotypes on women's advancement. Considered cumulatively, stereotypes are a certain and meaningful contributor to the limited presence of women in high-level positions. Renewed consideration of the role of stereotypes in organizational decision making is required, and recommendations for researchers are presented. Other applied issues for which the misinterpretation of gender-based effect sizes has hindered research are discussed.     

The Adaptive Use of Recognition in Group Decision Making

Applying the framework of ecological rationality, the authors studied the adaptivity of group decision making. In detail, they investigated whether groups apply decision strategies conditional on their composition in terms of task‐relevant features. The authors focused on the recognition heuristic, so the task‐relevant features were the validity of the group members' recognition and knowledge, which influenced the potential performance of group strategies. Forty‐three three‐member groups performed an inference task in which they had to infer which of two German companies had the higher market capitalization. Results based on the choice data support the hypothesis that groups adaptively apply the strategy that leads to the highest theoretically achievable performance. Time constraints had no effect on strategy use but did have an effect on the proportions of different types of arguments. Possible mechanisms underlying the adaptive use of recognition in group decision making are discussed.     

Hidden consequences of the group-serving bias: Causal attributions and the quality of group decision making

A long stream of research in attribution theory suggests that groups are biased toward attributing their success to factors that are internal to their group. However, the existing research has confounded two types of attributions that are both internal to the group, but theoretically distinct: (1) attributions that differentiate between the contributions made by each individual group member and (2) attributions that focus on the group as a whole. This dichotomy is important because, drawing on theories of social influence, we predict that different types of attributions will have different consequences for the quality of group decision making. In Experiment 1, individually focused attributions for past success caused groups to consider more divergent alternatives prior to making a shared decision. In Experiment 2, individually focused attributions for past success facilitated the sharing of unique information and improved decision accuracy. These findings suggest that the group-serving tendency to internalize success may have important consequences for group performance that have not yet been considered in current research.     

The Federal Face of Voting: Are Elected Officials Held Accountable for the Functions Relevant to Their Office?

Federalism is designed to enhance democratic representation because it gives citizens the opportunity to shape policymaking at multiple levels of government. This design feature is premised on the assumption that individuals make distinctions in the responsibilities that pertain to different levels of government and link these distinctions to their voting decisions. Citizens are expected to sanction politicians for those policy decisions over which their level of government has responsibility. This paper draws on work in both political and social psychology to develop a theoretical framework consistent with the federalist view of democratic representation to explain how people make voting decisions. Individuals who were able to vote in elections at all three levels of government (national, state, and local) in 2002 were surveyed, allowing a full test of the federalist voting model. Findings show that while citizens do make distinctions among levels of government when evaluating issues, they only link these distinctions to their voting decisions if those issue attitudes are highly accessible. Implications for democratic representation and future research are discussed.     

Towards a ‘Non‐Ideal’ Non‐Ideal Theory

This article explores the role that considerations about the feasibility of a political proposal should play at the levels of both ideal and non‐ideal theory. Drawing on recent work in the literature on political feasibility, I begin by describing a ‘constraint‐based’ view of ideal and non‐ideal theory, with feasibility considerations serving different functions depending on whether they are operating at the ideal or non‐ideal level. Taking feasibility seriously at either level presents us with at least two important challenges. Firstly, we need principles which enable us to weigh the value of a proposal's feasibility against its other normatively significant properties, and against those of alternative proposals. Secondly, we need the capacity to gauge the nature of the epistemic constraints which apply to our feasibility assessments themselves. In response to these problems, I propose a ‘narrowing‐down’ approach, focused on developing our capacities to make accurate and reliable judgements about the feasibility of political proposals.     

Group Productivity and Telematic Communication

Abstract

Evidence offered by Bottger and Yetton has suggested that group performance is a function of member abilities and strategies to use them. This model completed previous ones offered by Steiner and Davis which were developed under the assumption that group communication occurs in a face-to-face situation. However, since the 1980s, a considerable amount of research has focused upon new ways of communication through new technologies. Findings from psychosocial studies suggest that the use of computers for communication changes group processes and outcomes. In this context, a new research question emerges, which is concerned with group performance as a function of the communication channel. New models should be developed for a better understanding of group performance in mediated communication context. This study presents results from a laboratory experiment comparing three communication media: face-to-face, electronic mail, and video-conference, in a multi-decision task (“moon survival”). Its main objective has been to replicate Bottger and Yetton's model but to incorporate the communication channel mentioned above as a moderator variable of group performance. Variables considered have been input variables (members' resources for achieving task); process variables (group composition according to consensus reached, adequate use of resources, and quality of conflict management), and group performance. Our results show the existence of different patterns for predicting group performance according to the communication channel employed. In this sense, in a face-to-face situation groups perform mainly on the basis of their members' knowledge of the task, as in Steiner's model. The performance of video-conference groups was due to the decision schemes, that is, how groups use their resources (the Davis model). Bottger and Yetton's model has been partially replicated in electronic mail situations. The management of the process is crucial for explaining group performance, but it may be necessary to code it in a different way. Therefore, the positive conflict management will be different from face-to-face and video-conference.