公共健康领域权利与善的和解

公共健康领域中个人权利与共同善的冲突往往难以避免,如何调解二者之间的冲突成为公共健康领域的一个核心伦理问题。个人权利与共同善冲突的实质是个人与社会的权利冲突。但是,没有无权利的义务,也没有无义务的权利。如果能够从“义务”的视角思考公共健康问题,个人权利与共同善的冲突或许就可迎刃而解。个人要确保自己的权利,就必须对所处的社会承担义务。同时,社会也要承担保护个人权利的义务。个人与社会之间在履行相互的健康义务中实现了权利与善的和解。     

Physician-Assisted Suicide and Public Policy

Philosophical Studies -     

Career Development and Public Policy

The rationale for policy interest in career development services and the way in which this rationale is being strengthened by the current transformations in work and career are discussed. The potential roles of public policy in relation to career development services are explored, along with ways in which such services can influence the policy‐making process. A range of policy issues related to making career development services available to all throughout life are identified. Stronger structures and processes are needed to bring together career development practitioners with policy makers and other stakeholder interests in order to address tasks of common concern.     

公共物品、公平税负与乡村组织建设

本文从乡村公共物品的供给、定价和乡村组织结构方面讨论公平税负问题。改变乡村公共物品的供给机制 ,通过竞标发现公共物品的适当价格 ,进而成为居民选择生产商的依据 ,是实现公平税负的根本途径。另外 ,在组织建设上 ,削减行政机构及其冗员 ,强化乡村居民自治组织 ,形成公共物品的外部治理机制 ,是发现公共物品价格和公平税负的根本保证     

什么是公共产品:一个文献评述

公共产品是一个学界尚未达成共识的术语.萨缪尔森之前的研究对"什么是公共产品"这一论题毫不考虑,自萨缪尔森以来的研究则分别从非竞争性和非排他性、共用性、非排他性以及非竞争性四个维度设定了公共产品的概念与属性,并依凭公共产品的属性、消费的空间范围以及消费需求属性等迥异的分类标准对其做出了不同的类型划分.     

信任及其对公共财物两难博弈中合作行为影响

社会两难的行为动机研究认为,害怕和贪婪是人们选择不合作的原因。信任的心理学研究为社会两难的合作行为提供了另一种观点,即害怕被利用的背后实际上体现了博弈者对对方的信任的缺失。鉴于传统社会两难范式存在难以区分信任和合作两个因素的问题,本研究设计了“信任一合作”二阶段模拟实验,通过操作重复信托博弈中的信息反馈,研究虚拟多人信托博弈中初始信任和基于经验的信任对随后的公共财物两难博弈中合作行为的影响,结果发现：（1）初始信任对基于经验的信任的建立具有一定的积极影响,但是它对合作行为的作用远不如随后的基于经验的信任;（2）基于经验的信任水平高的被试在随后的公共财物两难博弈中也表现出较高的合作行为。     

The Future of Public Policy

This article reports the results of research that uses policy network theory and advocacy coalition theory to deduce the implications for the future of public policy in EU Member States of king trends: all those technological, economic, environmental, and social trends that can be empirically verified, affect the lives of large numbers of people and are expected by relevant experts to continue for at least the next 20 years. The resulting policy implications can be summarized as more assertive security policies, more business-friendly economic policies, more liberal social policies, and increased public spending.     

On Identifying Plausibility and Deliberative Public Policy

The identification of plausible epistemic approaches in science as well as the social problem definitions with which scientists implicitly work is essential for the quality of a deliberative public policy. While responding to the Nanofutures project, I will reflect on the essential elements of such a policy.     

Incremental Contribution in Step-Level Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players

We consider public good games with asymmetric players in which players are assigned different endowments and must then decide privately how much to contribute to the group′s benefit. Each member receives a fixed reward-regardless of the magnitude of his/her contribution-if the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than an exogenously determined provision threshold and zero otherwise. The results show that (1) heterogeneous groups are less successful in providing public goods than homogeneous groups; (2) group members contribute the same proportion of their endowment regardless of its magnitude; (3) the distribution of endowments and the provision threshold interact; and (4) some subjects adhere to an equity principle, others maximize expected utility, and yet others do not subscribe to either of these two models.     

论农村公共物品的民间提供

在我国农村,农民对公共物品具有强烈的依赖性,农村公共物品的供给对农业生产、农民生活具有重要意义.然而,目前农村公共物品的供给大多是由政府承担,特别是乡镇政府提供的公共物品在总体上并不能满足农村发展的需要,农民迫切需要的公共物品供给不足,农民不需要的公共物品却供给过剩.这种现状在一定程度上影响了"三农"问题的解决.单一的政府供给体制不能满足农村社会发展的需要,那么应当探寻其他方式解决农村公共物品的供给.由此,笔者提出农村公共物品的民间提供,分析其可行的模式,并就如何激励农村公共物品的民间提供提出几点建议.     

Delay, Probability, and Social Discounting in A Public Goods Game

A human social discount function measures the value to a person of a reward to another person at a given social distance. Just as delay discounting is a hyperbolic function of delay, and probability discounting is a hyperbolic function of odds-against, social discounting is a hyperbolic function of social distance. Experiment 1 obtained individual social, delay, and probability discount functions for a hypothetical $75 reward; participants also indicated how much of an initial $100 endowment they would contribute to a common investment in a public good. Steepness of discounting correlated, across participants, among all three discount dimensions. However, only social and probability discounting were correlated with the public-good contribution; high public-good contributors were more altruistic and also less risk averse than low contributors. Experiment 2 obtained social discount functions with hypothetical $75 rewards and delay discount functions with hypothetical $1,000 rewards, as well as public-good contributions. The results replicated those of Experiment 1; steepness of the two forms of discounting correlated with each other across participants but only social discounting correlated with the public-good contribution. Most participants in Experiment 2 predicted that the average contribution would be lower than their own contribution.     

Vigilant Self‐regulation and Costly Punishment in Public Goods Situations

Applying regulatory focus theory to the context of social dilemma situations, the present research demonstrates that individual differences in vigilant, prevention‐focused self‐regulation predict the tendency to invest private resources to punish uncooperative interaction partners (costly punishment), a behaviour that typically has strong positive effects on the collective level of cooperation. Analyses further support the distinctiveness of the vigilance system proposed in regulatory focus theory (prevention focus) in comparison with general defensive inhibitory tendencies (measured with Carver and White's Behavioral Inhibition System scale). Results document that individual differences in prevention‐focused self‐regulation but not differences in general defensive inhibitory tendencies are positively related to costly punishment. In sum, the findings indicate that vigilant, prevention‐focused self‐regulation plays a crucial role in the context of sanctions that enforce cooperation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Communication and Commitment in a Public Goods Social Dilemma

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between maximizing personal interests and maximizing collective interests. Communication among the members of a group has been shown to enhance cooperation (maximize groups interests); it was hypothesized that if members are allowed to make a pledge prior to their actual decision, they can communicate their intentions and hence increase the cooperation rate. Two experiments were conducted in which several types of pledge conditions were contrasted with a "no-pledge" (control) condition. As hypothesized, the results indicate that a pledge enhanced cooperation. However, the degree of commitment required in the pledge differentially affected the cooperation rate. The results are interpreted in terms of a two-stage dilemma in which members can coordinate their expectations only if some degree of commitment is required in their pledge.