Linking self and ingroup: Self‐anchoring as distinctive cognitive route to social identification

The present paper investigates how cognitive projection processes instigate social identification. We complement the classical self‐stereotyping approach (i.e., conforming to prototypical group norms) by investigating self‐anchoring (i.e., projection from self to group) as a distinct cognitive route to social identification. Self‐anchoring has mainly been investigated as predictor of intergroup differentiation. Surprisingly, no reliable link has been provided yet between self‐anchoring and social identification. In Study 1, we provide first evidence for this positive link. In Study 2, we add self‐stereotyping to our model and show that self‐anchoring is still positively related to social identification when controlling for self‐stereotyping. Additionally, we show that self‐anchoring is positively related to affective components of identification, while self‐stereotyping is positively related to cognitive components. Moreover, we examined the impact of self‐concept stability on self‐anchoring. Self‐concept stability was positively related to self‐anchoring, and hence to social identification (Study 1), independently from self‐stereotyping (Study 2). In the discussion, we argue that disentangling self‐anchoring from self‐stereotyping is important as it increases our insight in how people identify, and how this may vary depending on self‐concept and group context. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is paranoia a defence against or an expression of low self‐esteem?

Paranoia has been hypothesized to be negatively correlated with self‐esteem. However, hypotheses differ about how low self‐esteem might produce paranoia. The paranoia as defense model views paranoia as a defensive reaction against low self‐esteem. In contrast, the paranoia as expression model views paranoia in part as a reflection of low self‐esteem. In the current study, paranoia was negatively associated with global explicit self‐esteem, self‐competence, self‐liking and self‐serving attributional style, but unassociated with implicit self‐esteem as measured with the Implicit Association Test. In contrast, facets of narcissism, which also have been hypothesized to be associated with defensive self‐processing, were associated with defensiveness. Overall, these results suggest that paranoia is better represented by the expression model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Awareness Revisited: Reconsidering a Core Value of the Counseling Profession

The construct of self‐awareness is highly valued by the counseling profession. However, the foundational assumptions that support this construct have not been systemically examined and critiqued. The author provides an overview of self‐awareness in light of humanistic, psychoanalytic, and postmodernist ideologies. The author concludes that the construct of self‐awareness should be replaced by self‐storying. Implications of self‐storying for counseling practice are discussed.     

The dynamic self in psychoanalytic psychology a formulation

Following Hartmann's theoretical formulations, the self has been explored primarily as a body of self‐representations coordinate to object representations; the dynamic organizations of the mind (the id‐egosuperego systems) have been seen as impersonal (nonself) functions.

This paper attempts a conception of the id‐ego‐superego structures as self‐functions in intimate relation to self‐representations. Building on an integration of Piagetian and psychoanalytic object relations frameworks (event theory), it proposes that the earliest self‐experience occurs in dynamic schemes of personally motivated interaction between self and nonself. These I‐schemes lay the groundwork for both the dynamic and the representational aspects of the self: Their structure results in experience characteristic of the dynamic id and in their character as undifferentiated interactions provides the base for the development of self‐ and object representations. Development occurs by integration and differentiation in processes of conflict resolution. The paper traces these developments in outline as they lead to the transition in the dynamic self from id to ego organizations, and in the self‐representations from part‐selves and part‐objects to a whole and individuated self in relation to whole objects.     

Personal Values,Autonomy, and Self‐efficacy: Evidence from frontline service employees

Employee's self‐efficacy has been related with important outcomes for organizations, such as service quality and job performance. Thus, understanding the antecedents of self‐efficacy can have important payoffs. Accordingly, this paper investigates how personal values interact with autonomy to affect employee's self‐efficacy. The hypotheses are tested with a sample of bank employees. The results reveal that conservation is negatively related to self‐efficacy and that both openness to change and self‐enhancement values have a positive impact on self‐efficacy. Autonomy is also positively associated with self‐efficacy. Finally, autonomy mitigates the negative effects of conservation on self‐efficacy, and strengthens the positive effects of self‐enhancement on self‐efficacy.     

自我同一性与相关概念的辨析

自我同一性是一个多层次、多维度的心理学概念．这一概念自提出后就面临着概念澄清的问题．尤其是与相关概念的边界划分问题。因此．要把握自我同一性的概念就需要对与自我同一性相关联的概念进行辨析。这主要涉及到(1)自我与同一性;(2)自我同一性与自我概念;(3)自我同一性与个人同一性、角色同一性和社会同一性。     

Self‐esteem and self‐certainty: a mediational analysis

Self‐esteem has been found to be related to the certainty with which specific self‐conceptions are held. This study tested a number of competing accounts for this relationship, using a more rigorous idiographic approach. Specifically, it was thought that the relationship between self‐esteem and self‐certainty might be mediated by self‐concept clarity, the positivity of specific self‐conceptions, and impression management concerns. However, none of these fully mediated the relationship between self‐esteem and self‐certainty. Participants with higher self‐esteem were more certain of their central self‐conceptions than were those with lower self‐esteem. This was true even though participants were allowed to generate their most relevant and central self‐conceptions themselves. Discussion focuses on the role of social information in the possibly direct relationship between self‐esteem and self‐certainty. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐control depletion impairs goal maintenance: A meta‐analysis

Initial exertion of self‐control has been suggested to impair subsequent self‐regulatory performance. The specific cognitive processes that underlie this ego depletion effect have rarely been examined. Drawing on the dual‐process theory of executive control (Engle & Kane, 2004 ; Kane & Engle, 2003 ), the current meta‐analysis revealed that initial self‐control exertion impairs participants’ capacities of maintaining the task goal but its effect on capacities of resolving response competition is in need of further investigation. Our results are more consistent with recent theoretical views that consider ego depletion as a switch cost and a result arising from reduced motivation to engage in further self‐control.     

Self–other awareness and peer relationships in toddlers: gender comparisons

Toddlers' growing self–other awareness has been linked with their ability to interact with peers, but there is reason to think that self–other awareness may relate to different aspects of peer relationships for boys and girls. We hypothesized that boys would express self–other awareness by separating self from other through claiming toys, while girls would express self–other awareness by creating similarities between self and other through use of the duplicate of a partner's toy. For 52 22–26 month olds, self–other awareness was assessed through four tasks: mirror self recognition, perceptual role taking, pronoun recognition and pronoun use. Each child subsequently interacted with a same‐sex peer for 30 min. Girls high in self–other awareness, and their partners were more likely to engage in duplicate toy use than girls low in self–other awareness. No differences in toy claiming were found. Future longitudinal research would clarify how the onset of self–other awareness relates to developments in peer interaction for girls and boys. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stability and Change in Domain‐specific Self‐esteem and Global Self‐esteem

A notable uptick of interest in the stability of self‐esteem has been observed over the past few years. Most researchers, however, have focused on unidimensional rather than multidimensional conceptualizations of self‐esteem. The paucity of empirical research is surprising given conflicting theoretical perspectives on the stability of self‐esteem. The goal of the present study was to thoroughly disentangle different conceptualizations of self‐esteem and test opposing classical theories on (i) the stability and (ii) the direction of mutual influence of these different forms of self‐esteem. We analysed two‐year longitudinal data from participants (N = 644 at T1, N = 241 at T2) with an average age of 47.0 years (SD = 12.4). Analyses using a latent variable approach revealed that the domains of self‐esteem were relatively stable in terms of rank order and mean levels. In fact, the size of the stability coefficients was comparable to that of other trait measures that have been reported in the literature and paralleled the stability observed for global self‐esteem. Results did not provide support for either top‐down or bottom‐up effects between domain‐specific and global self‐esteem. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications regarding the stability and development of self‐esteem in adulthood and advance the understanding of self‐esteem in personality theory. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Self–Observer Rating Discrepancies of Managers in Asia: A study of derailment characteristics and behaviors in Southern and Confucian Asia

Antecedents to self–observer rating discrepancies in multisource instruments have been established at the individual and organizational level. However, research examining cultural antecedents is limited, which is particularly relevant as multisource instruments gain popularity around the world. We investigated multisource ratings of 860 Asian managers from the regions of Southern Asia (n=261) and Confucian Asia (n=599) and analyzed cultural differences in self–observer rating discrepancies. Multivariate regression procedures revealed that the self–observer rating discrepancy was wider for managers from Southern Asia as compared with Confucian Asia. The reason for the discrepancy was driven by managers' self‐ratings being different across cultures than by observer ratings from managers' bosses, direct reports, or peers; the predictor is related to self‐ratings not observer ratings, producing differential self–observer ratings due to self‐ratings. We discuss cultural differences in self‐ and observer ratings within Asia and provide implications for the practice of multisource assessments.     

On paradoxes and the experience of duality

Abstract

Opposing attitudes, emotions, or perceptions of self and other that set the stage for experiences of duality influence our interactions and self–other schemas. The experience of duality that has been conceptualised as “conflict,” “self state,” and “paradox" in psychoanalytic theory has been extensively considered, particularly in terms of its manifestation in transference–countertransference relations and in the analytic material from patients' experiences. They have not, however, been compared and contrasted as entities that lead to similar kinds of experience. Scant attention has been paid, moreover, to paradox as a mental organisation that underlies certain experiences of duality. The concept of paradox has thus been emphasised and developed in this paper.     

Exploring early self‐referential memory effects through ownership

The self‐reference effect (SRE) is the reliable memory advantage for information encoded about self over material encoded about other people. The developmental pathway of the SRE has proved difficult to chart, because the standard SRE task is unsuitable for young children. The current inquiry was designed to address this issue using an ownership paradigm, as encoding objects in the context of self‐ownership have been shown to elicit self‐referential memory advantages in adults. Pairs of 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children (n = 64) sorted toy pictures into self‐ and other‐owned sets. A surprise recognition memory test revealed a significant advantage for toys owned by self, which decreased with age. Neither verbal ability nor theory of mind attainment predicted the size of the memory advantage for self‐owned items. This finding suggests that contrary to some previous reports, memory in early childhood can be shaped by the same self‐referential biases that pervade adult cognition.     

The self in prejudice

The self as a psychological construct, and the self in relation to the other has been discussed in psychological and sociological literature for decades, but not much attention has been given to the psychological development of the self in relation to the social construction of prejudice. The primary aim of this article is to explore the self in prejudice and thus the psychological processes involved in the development of self within the social context. Consequently, the aim is to explore the self in the construction and expression of prejudice from both a social and psychological approach, and to explain selfhood influences at the individual, group and community levels. I use the conceptual framework of Kohut's self psychology as a lens to present the development of the self and thus the idea of the development of the self in relation to the other. In such exploration of self in prejudice, I present some of my ideas which include prejudice as an outcome of self-definition in the context of the other, as well as linking self in prejudice and group dynamics to attachment theory and the notion of “selfgroup’ in terms of overidentification with the in-group. While the social and the psychological in terms of the development of the self cannot be separated, I have therefore attempted to merge at some point the two bodies of thought in relation to the self in prejudice.     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Common mechanisms of executive attention underlie executive function and effortful control in children

Executive Function (EF) and Effortful Control (EC) have traditionally been viewed as distinct constructs related to cognition and temperament during development. More recently, EF and EC have been implicated in top‐down self‐regulation ‐ the goal‐directed control of cognition, emotion, and behavior. We propose that executive attention, a limited‐capacity attentional resource subserving goal‐directed cognition and behavior, is the common cognitive mechanism underlying the self‐regulatory capacities captured by EF and EC. We addressed three related questions: (a) Do behavioral ratings of EF and EC represent the same self‐regulation construct? (b) Is this self‐regulation construct explained by a common executive attention factor as measured by performance on cognitive tasks? and (c) Does the executive attention factor explain additional variance in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) problems to behavioral ratings of self‐regulation? Measures of performance on complex span, general intelligence, and response inhibition tasks were obtained from 136 preadolescent children (M = 11 years, 10 months, SD = 8 months), along with self‐ and parent‐reported EC, and parent‐reported EF, and ADHD problems. Results from structural equation modeling demonstrated that behavioral ratings of EF and EC measured the same self‐regulation construct. Cognitive tasks measured a common executive attention factor that significantly explained 30% of the variance in behavioral ratings of self‐regulation. Executive attention failed to significantly explain additional variance in ADHD problems beyond that explained by behavioral ratings of self‐regulation. These findings raise questions about the utility of task‐based cognitive measures in research and clinical assessment of self‐regulation and psychopathology in developmental samples.     

Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity.     

Self-centered memories: The reminiscence bump and the self

The self-memory relationship is thought to be bidirectional, in such a way that memories provide context for the self, and equally, the self exercises control over retrieval (Conway, 2005). Autobiographical memories are not distributed equally across the life span; instead, memories peak between ages 10 and 30. This reminiscence bump has been suggested to support the emergence of a stable and enduring self. In the present study, the relationship between memory accessibility and self was explored with a novel methodology that used generation of self images in the form of I am statements. Memories generated from I am cues clustered around the time of emergence for that particular self image. We argue that, when a new self-image is formed, it is associated with the encoding of memories that are relevant to that self and that remain highly accessible to the rememberer later in life. This study offers a new methodology for academics and clinicians interested in the relationship between memory and identity.     

Positive intelligence illusions: on the relation between intellectual self-enhancement and psychological adjustment

The relation between self‐enhancement and psychological adjustment has been debated for over 2 decades. This controversy is partly due to the variety of approaches implicated in the assessment of mainly self‐enhancement but also psychological adjustment. We adopted a face‐valid approach by statistically removing actual intellectual ability variance from self‐rated intellectual ability variance. Study 1 (N = 2,048), a concurrent Internet investigation, provided initial insight into the relation between intellectual self‐enhancement and psychological adjustment. Study 2 (N = 238), a longitudinal round‐robin investigation, allowed a closer examination of the dynamic processes underlying this relation. Self‐enhancement was positively linked to multiple indicators of intrapersonal and interpersonal adjustment, and predicted rank‐order increases in adjustment over time. The links between intellectual self‐enhancement and intrapersonal adjustment were mediated by self‐esteem. Finally, the interpersonal costs and benefits of self‐enhancement systematically varied depending on methodology.     

Covert and overt expressions of self‐criticism and perfectionism and their relation to depression

Multiple measures of both the covert and overt expressions of self‐criticism and perfectionism have been developed. The present study examined the relation between a measure of overt self‐criticism and several measures of covert self‐criticism and perfectionism, using 59 male and 152 female university students. The study also examined the relation between these constructs and depression. The results replicated previous reports that two factors, self‐critical perfectionism and high personal standards, underlie existing measures of covert expressions. Self‐critical perfectionism and overt self‐criticism were shown to be independent predictors of depression, suggesting the importance of assessing the overt interpersonal, as well as the covert, manifestations of self‐criticism. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.