An integrated theory of the mind

Adaptive control of thought-rational (ACT-R; J. R. Anderson & C. Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explains how these modules are integrated to produce coherent cognition. The perceptual-motor modules, the goal module, and the declarative memory module are presented as examples of specialized systems in ACT-R. These modules are associated with distinct cortical regions. These modules place chunks in buffers where they can be detected by a production system that responds to patterns of information in the buffers. At any point in time, a single production rule is selected to respond to the current pattern. Subsymbolic processes serve to guide the selection of rules to fire as well as the internal operations of some modules. Much of learning involves tuning of these subsymbolic processes. A number of simple and complex empirical examples are described to illustrate how these modules function singly and in concert.     

刘一明丹道论中的道心、人心辩析

本文从刘一明丹道理论的内在结构出发,分两组含义对令人混淆不清的道心、人心范畴进行了辩析,以此作为解读丹经术语的一个案例.     

The flow of narrative in the mind unmoored: An account of narrative processing

Verbal narratives provide incomplete information and can be very long, yet readers and hearers often effortlessly fill in the gaps and make connections across long stretches of text, sometimes even finding this immersive. How is this done? In the last few decades, event-indexing situation modeling and complementary accounts of narrative emotion have suggested answers. Despite this progress, comparisons between real-life perception and narrative experience might underplay the way narrative processing modifies our world model, as well as the role of the emotions that do not relate to characters. I reframe narrative experience in predictive processing and neural networks, capturing continuity between fiction, perception, and states like dreaming and imagination, enabled by the flexible instantiation of concepts. In this framework, narrative experience is more clearly revealed as a creative experience that can share some of the phenomenology of dreams.     

How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds.     

The Metaphysics of Meaning: Hopkins on Wittgenstein

Abstract

Jim Hopkins (2012 Hopkins, Jim (2012) ‘Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism’, in Jonathan Ellis and Daniel Guevara (eds) Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) defends a ‘straight’ (non-skeptical) response to Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, a response he ascribes to Wittgenstein himself. According to this response, what makes it the case that A means that P is that it is possible for another to (correctly) interpret A as meaning that P. Hopkins thus advances a form of interpretivist judgment-dependence about meaning. I argue that this response, as well as a variant, does not succeed.     

Illness,the mind,and the body: Cancer and immunology: An introduction

From the sixties on it has become clear how the human physical condition could be influenced by human behavior. Although hypothesis were lacking to understand these connections, nursing research especially proved how systematically introduced patient behavior during illness and hospitalization could induce better recovery results and better prognosis for the patient.Information andattitude proved to be crucial elements in these processes of improved patient expectations. It took less than two decades to get to the insights we have in 1994. Recent research shows the interlocking mechanisms of nervous and endocrine systems with the immune system as significantly being influenced by behavior and especially psychic and or psychosocial stress. This special issue of Theoretical Medicine briefly describes the historical development with contributions on the most recent state of the scientific art. These developments are emphasized by discussion on the clinical reality of the (breast) cancer patient and recent findings on the complexity of the prevalence of cancer in epidemiology. An attempt is made to consider practical consequences of the actual knowledge if applied to patient care.     

An automated behavioral measure of mind wandering during computerized reading

Mind wandering is a ubiquitous phenomenon in which attention shifts from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. The last decade has witnessed an explosion of interest in mind wandering, but research has been stymied by a lack of objective measures, leading to a near-exclusive reliance on self-reports. We addressed this issue by developing an eye-gaze-based, machine-learned model of mind wandering during computerized reading. Data were collected in a study in which 132 participants reported self-caught mind wandering while reading excerpts from a book on a computer screen. A remote Tobii TX300 or T60 eyetracker recorded their gaze during reading. The data were used to train supervised classification models to discriminate between mind wandering and normal reading in a manner that would generalize to new participants. We found that at the point of maximal agreement between the model-based and self-reported mind-wandering means (smallest difference between the group-level means: M _model = .310, M _self = .319), the participant-level mind-wandering proportional distributions were similar and were significantly correlated (r = .400). The model-based estimates were internally consistent (r = .751) and predicted text comprehension more strongly than did self-reported mind wandering (r _model = ?.374, r _self = ?.208). Our results also indicate that a robust strategy of probabilistically predicting mind wandering in cases with poor or missing gaze data led to improved performance on all metrics, as compared to simply discarding these data. Our findings demonstrate that an automated objective measure might be available for laboratory studies of mind wandering during reading, providing an appealing alternative or complement to self-reports.     

Keeping the reader's mind in mind: Development of perspective-taking in children's dictations

This study investigated when children can take the perspective of their reader if the information-processing demands of writing are removed by means of dictation to a scribe. Participants (N = 96) aged 5, 6 and 7 years dictated letters to an addressee who possessed requisite content knowledge, and then revised the letter or dictated a new letter to an addressee who lacked this knowledge (counterbalanced). Results showed that 19% of 5-year-olds, 41% of 6-year-olds, and 72% of 7-year-olds considered their reader's missing knowledge. Children's awareness of their reader's knowledge was neither related to performance on higher-order theory of mind tasks, nor to measures of executive function. Significantly greater perspective-taking was demonstrated in children's new letters than revised letters. However, although revision is considered a late-developing skill, half of even the 5-year-olds were able to make revisions (albeit few revisions demonstrated actual perspective-taking). Findings have significant implications for the emergent-literacy curriculum.     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multiple routes to mind wandering: Predicting mind wandering with resource theories

Three experiments examine individual (attentional capacity) and task-related characteristics leading to mind wandering, and the effect of mind wandering on task performance. Drawing on resource theories, we tested interactive nonlinear effects of these predictors, manipulating task demand using math tests of varying difficulty (Exp 1: N = 143, three levels between-subjects; Exp 2: N = 59, three levels within-subjects; Exp 3: N = 133, four levels within-subjects). Results confirmed that mind wandering was most frequent during extreme task demand levels, although the effect varied somewhat between experiments. Additionally, results from Experiment 3 and an integrated analysis demonstrated that people with relatively higher attentional capacity were less likely to mind wander as task demand increased. Moreover, mind wandering was more detrimental to performance as task demand increased across all experiments. Our findings build on past research by demonstrating the importance of accounting for interactions and nonlinear effects of task demand and attentional capacity in mind wandering research.     

The group-member mind trade-off: attributing mind to groups versus group members

People attribute minds to other individuals and make inferences about those individuals' mental states to explain and predict their behavior. Little is known, however, about whether people also attribute minds to groups and believe that collectives, companies, and corporations can think, have intentions, and make plans. Even less is known about the consequences of these attributions for both groups and group members. We investigated the attribution of mind and responsibility to groups and group members, and we demonstrated that people make a trade-off: The more a group is attributed a group mind, the less members of that group are attributed individual minds. Groups that are judged to have more group mind are also judged to be more cohesive and responsible for their collective actions. These findings have important implications for how people perceive the minds of groups and group members, and for how attributions of mind influence attributions of responsibility to groups and group members.