Beyond the Polemics: Freedom and Necessity in Plotinus and St Maximus Confessor

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to challenge the prevailing polemic between ‘necessary’ emanation and ‘free’ creation. I begin by arguing for the presence of freedom and volition in the emanationism of Plotinus. I then move on to explore the role of necessity in the creationism of Maximus. In both cases, I rely upon a twofold schematisation of freedom and necessity to dissolve the dichotomy between them effectively. Having levelled the playing field, so to speak, I conclude that, all things being equal, one does find in Maximus (and Christian thinkers generally) a heightened sense of divine volition and relationality beyond that of the pagan Neoplatonists. This greater emphasis upon the freedom of the divine will, however, has little bearing on whether Maximus's doctrine of creation is ‘emanationist’ or ‘creationist’. Instead, it stems from a biblically inspired sense of the One God as intimately involved in His creation which, though derived from God, is crucially other than God.     

Maximus the Confessor and the Problem of Participation

In defining the theological problem of participation as the question of how created beings, namely human beings, can participate (μ?θεξι?) in the transcendent Uncreated God towards deification (θ?ωσι?) without a pantheistic blurring of essences, this article examines the Christologically intuitive way in which Maximus the Confessor (580–662) would have responded. Specifically, Maximus’ Cyrilline Chalcednonianism, featuring an unconfused perichoretic union between Christ's two natures in his hypostatic union, serves directly as an apologetic and hermeneutic for humanity's and creation's participation in God. In addition, taking into account the scholarly debate over Maximus’ understanding of the relationship between the Logos and the logoi, it is argued that this indirectly provides a second Christological way forward to resolve the problem at hand, particularly when the two types of logoi (that ‘of being’ and that ‘of virtue’) are correctly distinguished. Insofar as the Logos and the logoi, not to mention the notions of participation and deification, were viewed by Maximus through his Cyrilline Chalcedonian lens, his Cyrilline Chalcednonian Christology was ultimately his answer to the theological problem of participation.     

Creation is Incarnation: The Metaphysical Peculiarity of the Logoi in Maximus Confessor

Maximian logoi or the “principles” of created being are often virtually identified with Platonic ideas or forms. This assumption obscures what is distinctive about Maximus's concept of the logoi. I first note two metaphysical peculiarities of his doctrine, and then propose that these only make sense if we follow Maximus's own directive to read the logoi through Christology proper – that is, as describing creation as the Word's cosmic Incarnation. This suggests, in creative tension with a good deal of twentieth‐century philosophical theology, that the God‐world relation is not fully exhausted by the analogia entis: Maximus divines a still deeper hypostatic (not natural) identity between Word and world that actually generates natural difference – for perhaps the first and only time in the history of Christian thought. Here I assay a first step toward retrieving that relation.     

Contemplating the Monad Who Saves Us: Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on Divine Simplicity

Daley explores divine simplicity according to Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus, grounding his account in their classical philosophical antecedents. He notes that often we think of the sixth and seventh centuries as devoted to questions about Jesus Christ, not about God per se. Admittedly, the aftermath of the Council of Chalcedon produced ongoing controversy in the East regarding the unity of the two natures of Christ, for example, whether Christ had one operation or two. Maximus, a follower of Patriarch Sophronius of Jerusalem, became embroiled in controversy through his firm rejection of the effort by Emperor Heraclius and Patriarch Sergius of Constantinople to unite the churches in the East by holding solely to a single activity and a single will in Christ. Maximus’s position won out at the Third Council of Constantinople (680‐1). Daley draws attention here, however, to the relationship of these Christological debates to the understanding of God, and especially what it means to speak of the “divine nature” and the “divine will.” This topic required of Christian thinkers not merely philosophical reflection but also Trinitarian reflection. Daley’s point is that it well behooves us to look closely into what Maximus and John of Damascus have to say about divine simplicity, in light of the more central controversies in which these Church Fathers were engaged.     

The Christology of St Anthony of Padua: content and method

In 1946 St Anthony of Padua (1195–1231) was declared a Doctor of the Church, recognised for his profound learning. Whereas much has been written about St Anthony, very little of it concerns his profound learning – and so it is not inappropriate to ask wherein this learning lies. Reading St Anthony reveals Christological concerns to be at the heart of his work and in this paper the author explores and clarifies his position. However, anyone looking for new and exciting Christological insights is likely to be disappointed, for St Anthony is entirely orthodox and traditional, although we should not only consider the content of his work, but his ‘method’ too. The way that the saint presents doctrine, and the inferences he draws from it, has much to be commended. Indeed, St Anthony may well be contrasted with those modern theologians who, it has been suggested, have rather lost track of what it is they are really doing.     

The Person and work of Christ in the theology of Heinrich Bullinger

In christology, as elsewhere, Bullinger's approach is both biblical and patristic. Although the starting point is biblical, the emphasis is often patristic, especially when he is engaged in controversy. He begins with the Person of Christ — stressing the divinity. This is the basis for what he says on the work of Christ, not least as mediator. This determined his use of traditional language (one Person, two natures), but the emphasis, especially in debates on the Eucharist, is on the distinction of the two natures. The fundamental importance of christology is evident in the way his 1534 work on the two natures of Christ, described as an orthodox and Catholic confession refuting various heresies, prefaces the collected edition of his commentaries on the epistles. It is shown how Bullinger defends the use of non-biblical terms in the classic definition as consonant with Scripture and necessary because of the cunning of heretics. In his biblical approach he uses first testimony, and then argument.     

Schopenhauer on Christ,Suffering and the Negation of the Will

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to illuminate Schopenhauer’s notion of the negation or denial of the will by investigating the figure of the saint within his philosophy. We argue that various discussions in Schopenhauer’s works of the possible role of Christ as exemplar reveals an underlying Christological understanding of self-denial as a model for the saint. The connection between Schopenhauer’s approach to Christ and Kant’s Christology in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason is also explored. We note how Schopenhauer builds on the Kantian demythologization of the Incarnated Christ in order to uncover the moral and existential spirit that underlies Christianity. In addition, we outline how a recognition of the symbolic importance of Christ for Schopenhauer suggests features of the denial of the will that have been overlooked in the literature, involving the intellectual transcendence of suffering through the cultivation of a state of emotional unresponsiveness. It is argued that this reflects a deeper connection between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Christian thought than is often recognised.