Computational modeling/cognitive robotics complements functional modeling/experimental psychology

This position paper explores the possible contributions to the science of psychology from insights obtained by building and experimenting with cognitive robots. First, the functional modeling characteristic of experimental psychology is discussed. Second, the computational modeling required for cognitive robotics is described, and possible experiments with them are illustrated. Next, we argue that cognitive developmental robots, robots that “live” through a development phase where they learn about their environments in several different modes, can provide additional benefits to the science of psychology. Finally, the reciprocal interactions between computational modeling/cognitive robotics and functional modeling/experimental psychology are explored. We conclude that each can contribute significantly to the other.     

The methodological role of mechanistic-computational models in cognitive science

This paper discusses the relevance of models for cognitive science that integrate mechanistic and computational aspects. Its main hypothesis is that a model of a cognitive system is satisfactory and explanatory to the extent that it bridges phenomena at multiple mechanistic levels, such that at least several of these mechanistic levels are shown to implement computational processes. The relevant parts of the computation must be mapped onto distinguishable entities and activities of the mechanism. The ideal is contrasted with two other accounts of modeling in cognitive science. The first has been presented by David Marr in combination with a distinction of “levels of computation”. The second builds on a hierarchy of “mechanistic levels” in the sense of Carl Craver. It is argued that neither of the two accounts secures satisfactory explanations of cognitive systems. The mechanistic-computational ideal can be thought of as resulting from a fusion of Marr’s and Craver’s ideals. It is defended as adequate and plausible in light of scientific practice, and certain metaphysical background assumptions are discussed.

     

Multidisciplinarity and cognitive science

The aim of Schunn, Crowley and Okada's (1998) study is to address the question of whether the current state of cognitive science, as represented by Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Science Society, “reflects the multidisciplinary ideals of its foundation.” To properly interpret and respond to their results, we need to ask a prior question: What is cognitive science's multidisciplinary ideal? There are at least two conceptions—a “localist” conception, which seems to be implicit in Schunn, Crowley and Okada's discussion, and a “holist” conception. I argue that while both have been endorsed by some cognitive scientists, there are reasons for preferring the holist conception. I then consider what Schunn, Crowley and Okada's findings tell us about the state of cognitive science in light of a holist approach and report on an analysis of the journal's contents which looks at the domain, subdomain, and cognitive capacity investigated.     

The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science

According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true.     

Turing's Analysis of Computation and Theories of Cognitive Architecture

Turing's analysis of computation is a fundamental part of the background of cognitive science. In this paper it is argued that a re-interpretation of Turing's work is required to underpin theorizing about cognitive architecture. It is claimed that the symbol systems view of the mind, which is the conventional way of understanding how Turing's work impacts on cognitive science, is deeply flawed. There is an alternative interpretation that is more faithful to Turing's original insights, avoids the criticisms made of the symbol systems approach and is compatible with the growing interest in agent-environment interaction. It is argued that this interpretation should form the basis for theories of cognitive architecture.     

具身-生成的认知科学：走出“战国时代”

具身-生成取向正在引领当代认知科学加速发展,然而学术界在理解“具身-生成”的内涵上却正陷入“战国时代”,这严重影响了该取向的理论效力.通过分析来自交叉学科的相关证据,发现“具身”与“生成”既有联系,又有区别,两者相互支撑.具身认知主要考察嵌入在社会情境中的身体结构、活动、内容与形式对认知活动的影响.“生成”强调认知结构在大脑、身体与环境的结构性耦合中涌现出来的动态机制,尤其是知觉-行动环路的作用.未来,具身-生成的认知科学只有在应对来自经典认知科学的挑战过程中才有可能走出“战国时代”.     

On the cognitive effects of learning computer programming

This paper critically examines current thinking about whether learning computer programming promotes the development of general higher mental functions. We show how the available evidence, and the underlying assumptions about the process of learning to program, fail to address this issue adequately. Our analysis is based on a developmental cognitive science perspective on learning to program, incorporating developmental and cognitive science considerations of the mental activities involved in programming. It highlights the importance for future research of investigating students' interactions with instructional and programming contexts, developmental transformations of their programming skills, and their background knowledge and reasoning abilities.     

Dispelling the "mystery" of computational cognitive science

H. Crowther-Heyck (1999) argued that early advocates of computational cognitive science, especially George Miller, aimed to bring about a revival of traditional mentalism, including the issues of consciousness and free will. He therefore found it inexplicable, and even "ironic," that they selected the computer as their main research tool because computers seem no more conscious and no more free than, for instance, the telephone switchboard that was one of the behaviorists' key metaphors. I argue, by contrast, that this misunderstands the main thrust of cognitive science, which was not to bring back all of traditional mentalism, but was rather only to give a rigorous account of intentionality. Once this is recognized, Crowther-Heyck's "mystery" of cognitive science is dispelled because, as is well known, computers use symbolic representations, and thus were seen by the early cognitive scientists as being prime mechanical models of intentional processes.     

On the mathematical representation of phenomena of emergence

This paper is a philosophical enquiry into the role that mathematics play in the articulation of science. It is conducted, in its essentials, in the spirit of Wittgenstein's views on the nature and function of philosophy, which are to lay bare, as it were, the manner in which we do whatever it is that we do, and then to examine the claims that we make for the deed. My conclusions should be easily accessible to those familiar with his thinking on the subject of science.

The case that has inspired the writing of this paper is not that of biology, nor is it the biological theory of evolution; rather, the case I have kept in mind while writing this paper is that of cognitive science, sometimes presented as a “science of mind” by its practitioners. It is primarily a computational theory characterized by two distinct approaches, one internal, the gist of which is that the brain/mind distinction is definitely passé; the other external, based on the view that the mark of human mentation is to be found in the ordinary use of old expressions to convey new meanings, i.e. in the Cartesian test for the existence of other minds, and its simpler computational version, the Turing test. Two intuitions underlie the paper: one, that language is obviously an adaptive characteristic of human organisms: one learns one's own mother's tongue, and feral children cannot conceptualize if first exposed to language after reaching puberty; two, empirical evidence supports the view that the “knowing brain” is different architecturally from the “untutored” one. These intuitions warrant regarding man's cognitive apparatus as an evolutionary system, and the “mind” as an emergent property.     

Steps to a “Properly Embodied” cognitive science

Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive science. This paper argues that cognitive systems research is now beginning to integrate these aspects of natural cognitive systems into cognitive science proper, not in virtue of traditional “embodied cognitive science”, which focuses predominantly on the body’s gross morphology, but rather in virtue of research into the interoceptive, organismic basis of natural cognitive systems.     

Perspectives on multisensory experience and cognitive development in infants with cochlear implants

Infants learn about their environment through sensory exploration, acquiring knowledge that is important for cognitive development. However, little is known about the sensory exploration of infants with profound hearing loss before or after they receive cochlear implants. This paper reviews aspects of sensory perception and cognitive development in hearing infants, discusses the implications of delayed access to auditory information for multisensory perception and cognitive development in infants who use cochlear implants, and suggests several new directions for research addressing multisensory exploration and cognitive development in infants with cochlear implants.     

“具身”涵义的理论辨析

“具身”是当代心理学和认知科学领域的热门话题, 其基本涵义是指认知对身体的依赖性。经典认知科学主张“非具身”, 认为认知是一种信息的表征与加工, 从本质上讲与承载它的身体无关。“弱具身”强调了认知对身体的依赖性, 但是却保留了认知的计算和表征功能。“强具身”则极力主张认知是被身体作用于世界的活动塑造出来的, 身体的特殊细节造就了认知的特殊性。在怎样理解“具身”方面, 存在着不同的解释。从本文作者的观点来看, 具身的性质和特征表现在4个方面：(1)身体参与了认知, 影响了思维、判断、态度和情绪等心智过程。(2)我们对于客观世界的知觉依赖于身体作用于世界的活动, 身体的活动影响着关于客观世界表象的形成。(3)意义源于身体, 抽象的意义有着身体感觉—运动系统的基础。(4)身体的不同倾向于造就不同的思维和认识方式。有关具身的研究将从理论和实践两个层面对心理学产生冲击。     

Contributions of dynamic systems theory to cognitive development

We examine the contributions of dynamic systems theory to the field of cognitive development, focusing on modeling using dynamic neural fields. After introducing central concepts of dynamic field theory (DFT), we probe empirical predictions and findings around two examples—the DFT of infant perseverative reaching that explains Piaget's A-not-B error and the DFT of spatial memory that explain changes in spatial cognition in early development. Review of the literature around these examples reveals that computational modeling is having an impact on empirical research in cognitive development; however, this impact does not extend to neural and clinical research. Moreover, there is a tendency for researchers to interpret models narrowly, anchoring them to specific tasks. We conclude on an optimistic note, encouraging both theoreticians and experimentalists to work toward a more theory-driven future.     

On the properties of cognitive modules

Summary This paper evaluates the properties of cognitive modules and central systems as defined by Fodor (1983) against a set of empirical data from the domain of language processing. On the basis of results from normal and pathological language behavior the Fodorian dichotomy between domain-specific input systems and general central systems is rejected. Instead a model of cognitive processes is proposed which assumes three qualitative different types of system: a general system similar to that defined by Fodor, a domain-specific system that represents knowledge in procedural form, called input system, and a domain-specific system that respresents knowledge in declarative form and serves as an interface between the input system and the central system. These interface systems represent the same knowledge domain as their corresponding input systems, but in a different format. As the representational format of these interface systems is declarative, it allows for direct communication with the central system whose representational format is propositional by definition.     

Social and cognitive aspects of the development of aggression in infancy

This article addresses theoretical and methodological problems in the study of aggression in infants and toddlers. It is argued that the occurrence of aggressive behavior in very young children must be considered against the background of their developing social competence. As a result, evidence for the infants' capacities to act with specific intentions and the infants' knowledge of the other as a distinctive individual having his own plans and goals are reviewed. Studies of early social interactions in humans are then examined with special emphasis on cognitive development and social cognition. Finally, the problem of dominance in very young children's groups is considered.     

The convergence of Kuhn and cognitive psychology

Although psychology has been criticized for adhering to outmoded conceptions of knowledge (e.g. logical positivism), the assertion is made that at least one branch of psychology, namely cognitive psychology, is in the position to corroborate and extend contemporary philosophy of science. Kuhn's “learned perception of similarity” and the related notion of exemplar, which serve to exemplify more adequate conceptions of knowledge within the philosophy of science, are shown to converge with cognitive psychology's schema theory. In this way, the schema theory's empirical offspring provide a validation mechanism for Kuhn's notions and thus provide a richer understanding of the scientific enterprise. This convergence is seen as instantiating an epistemological trend towards understanding of limitations and validity of scientific evidence through an understanding of the limitations and validity of the scientist.     

Knowledge and cognitive integration

Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of subjective justification: so long as the agent’s belief-forming process has been integrated in his cognitive character, the agent can be justified in holding the resulting beliefs merely by lacking any doubts there was something wrong in the way he arrived at them. Moreover, since both externalist philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology treat the process of cognitive integration in the same way, we can claim that epistemic cognitive characters may extend beyond our organismic cognitive capacities to the artifacts we employ or even to other agents we interact with. This move is not only necessary for accounting for advanced cases of knowledge that is the product of the operation of epistemic artifacts or the interactive activity of research teams, but it can further lead to interesting ramifications both for social epistemology and philosophy of science.