Meaning structures and mental representations

This paper argues for a distinction between meaning structure and mental representation, and presents the outlines of a theoretical model of their interrelationship. Meaning structures are defined as structures in the human mind/brain which develop as the combined result of genetic predispositions and individual experience, and lead to relatively stable patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling, behaving, etc. Mental representation is defined as the aspect of mental processes which involves imagining and thinking of things that are not perceptually present. It is suggested that the mind includes a central network of meaning structures (CNMS) for the storage of information, and a number of other subsystems (e.g., perceptual systems, behavioral systems, and a verbal system) for the processing of externally and internally generated information. Against the dual-coding theory, it is argued that there is one code for the long-term storage of information, but several codes for the processing of information. Mental representations are seen as products of activation that is spread from the CNMS to more peripheral systems. The spread of activation from the CNMS to perceptual systems results in mental imagery; when activation spreads to the verbal system the result is conceptual thinking; and when activation spreads to behavioral systems it produces intentions. It is argued that this conceptual model can help to solve some basic theoretical problems that have plagued cognitive psychology.     

The link between mental rotation ability and basic numerical representations

Mental rotation and number representation have both been studied widely, but although mental rotation has been linked to higher-level mathematical skills, to date it has not been shown whether mental rotation ability is linked to the most basic mental representation and processing of numbers. To investigate the possible connection between mental rotation abilities and numerical representation, 43 participants completed four tasks: 1) a standard pen-and-paper mental rotation task; 2) a multi-digit number magnitude comparison task assessing the compatibility effect, which indicates separate processing of decade and unit digits; 3) a number-line mapping task, which measures precision of number magnitude representation; and 4) a random number generation task, which yields measures both of executive control and of spatial number representations. Results show that mental rotation ability correlated significantly with both size of the compatibility effect and with number mapping accuracy, but not with any measures from the random number generation task. Together, these results suggest that higher mental rotation abilities are linked to more developed number representation, and also provide further evidence for the connection between spatial and numerical abilities.     

Magnitude comparisons distort mental representations of magnitude

Many cognitive processes rely on representations of magnitude, yet these representations are often malleable (H. Helson, 1964; J. Huttenlocher, L. V. Hedges, & J. L. Vevea, 2000; A. Parducci, 1965). It is likely that factors that affect these representations in turn affect the psychological processes that rely on them. The authors conducted 4 experiments to investigate whether language-expressible magnitude comparisons distort mental representations of compared magnitudes. Participants compared magnitudes and estimated those magnitudes in a variety of tasks. Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrated systematic comparison-induced distortions. Experiment 4 demonstrated that comparison-induced distortions might account for the asymmetric dominance effect discussed in the decision-making literature. Potential effects of comparison-induced distortions on other psychological processes (e.g., density effects, order effects, body-size estimation, pain estimation, and consumer decision making) are discussed.     

Orienting attention to locations in mental representations

Many cognitive processes depend on our ability to hold information in mind, often well beyond the offset of the original sensory input. The capacity of this visual short-term memory (VSTM) is limited to around three to four items. Recent research has demonstrated that the content of VSTM can be modulated by top-down attentional biases. This has been demonstrated using retrodictive spatial cues, termed "retro-cues," which orient subjects' attention to spatial locations within VSTM. In the present article, we tested whether the use of these cues is modulated by memory load and cue delay. There are a number of important conclusions: (1) Top-down biases can operate on very brief iconic traces as well as on older VSTM representations (Exp. 1). (2) When operating within capacity, subjects use the cue to prioritise where they initiate their memory search, rather than to discard uncued items (Exps. 2 and 3). (3) When capacity is exceeded, there is little benefit to top-down biasing relative to a neutral condition; however, unattended items are lost, with there being a substantial cost of invalid spatial cueing (Exp. 3). (4) These costs and benefits of orienting spatial attention differ across iconic memory and VSTM representations when VSTM capacity is exceeded (Exp. 4).     

Orientation dependent mental representations following real-world navigation

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the mental representations acquired from real-world navigation are encoded in a single, specific orientation. Previous research has revealed an inconsistent pattern of results. In the present study, participants explored a university campus. In two reaction-time tasks, spatial judgments were then made relative to four imagined headings within the explored environment. The main result was that one of the headings was encoded in a distinct manner: When making left-right judgments performance on this heading was generally superior by comparison with the other orientations, and when making front-back judgments the same heading was the only one in which an advantage of front over back responses was observed. The finding that the headings were not encoded equally indicates that real-world navigation can lead to orientation specific representations.     

Media presentation of the mental health bill and representations of mental health problems

This paper discusses the findings of a study that examined the way in which the Mental Health Bill of June 2002 was presented in the British national and local media over a 3‐year period. A Lexis Nexis search yielded 256 articles, which were then analysed qualitatively and quantitatively. Overall, and perhaps contrary to what might have been expected given previous studies' conclusions regarding the media's negative portrayal of mental ill health, most articles tended to present a negative view of the Bill as unnecessarily repressive, and consequently were more sympathetic towards mental heath service clients, although this was not the case for tabloid articles. However, this paper then considers the more implicit representations found within the articles. It focuses particularly on the continued linking of mental ill health and violence, and also on the way in which the mental health service user might be portrayed as passive and rather pitiful as an alternative to violent and dangerous. It is suggested that the continued use of such images may stem from the fact that mental health problems have long been constructed as ‘Other’, and are therefore deeply engrained in our society. The implications of this for anti‐stigma campaigns are briefly discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spatial representations elicit dual-coding effects in mental imagery

Spatial aspects of words are associated with their canonical locations in the real world. Yet little research has tested whether spatial associations denoted in language comprehension generalize to their corresponding images. We directly tested the spatial aspects of mental imagery in picture and word processing (Experiment 1). We also tested whether spatial representations of motion words produce similar perceptual-interference effects as demonstrated by object words (Experiment 2). Findings revealed that words denoting an upward spatial location produced slower responses to targets appearing at the top of the display, whereas words denoting a downward spatial location produced slower responses to targets appearing at the bottom of the display. Perceptual-interference effects did not obtain for pictures or for words lacking a spatial relation. These findings provide greater empirical support for the perceptual-symbols system theory ( Barsalou, 1999, 2008 ).     

Differences in mental representations spontaneously adopted for reasoning

Retrospective reporting was used to show that people spontaneously adopt different mental representations for reasoning. In two experiments, subjects solved a large number of threeterm series reasoning problems and then gave retrospective reports (verbal protocols, drawings, and forced-choice strategy selections) about their solutions. A majority of subjects’ reports could be classified reliably into two groups. One group (abstract directional thinkers) claimed to construct a mental ordering of the three geometric figures used as the terms in the problems. A second group (concrete properties thinkers) claimed to attribute physical properties to mental geometric objects. In both experiments, abstract directional thinkers made few errors and were sensitive to the number of pivot-first premises in a problem. Concrete properties thinkers made more errors and were sensitive to the use of inverse relations and the number of alternations between a relation and its inverse as a problem was read. Quantitative models of the two kinds of reasoning are presented. Implications are discussed concerning theories of reasoning, tests of reasoning, and the usefulness of retrospective reporting as a general method.     

Uncovering mental representations with Markov chain Monte Carlo

A key challenge for cognitive psychology is the investigation of mental representations, such as object categories, subjective probabilities, choice utilities, and memory traces. In many cases, these representations can be expressed as a non-negative function defined over a set of objects. We present a behavioral method for estimating these functions. Our approach uses people as components of a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm, a sophisticated sampling method originally developed in statistical physics. Experiments 1 and 2 verified the MCMC method by training participants on various category structures and then recovering those structures. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the MCMC method can be used estimate the structures of the real-world animal shape categories of giraffes, horses, dogs, and cats. Experiment 4 combined the MCMC method with multidimensional scaling to demonstrate how different accounts of the structure of categories, such as prototype and exemplar models, can be tested, producing samples from the categories of apples, oranges, and grapes.     

Different mental representations for place recognition and goal localization

Determining one’s current location and locating a goal relative to one’s position are important components of successful human navigation in familiar environments. Several prominent cognitive theories of human spatial memory (e.g., McNamara, 2003; Sholl, 2001; Wang & Spelke, 2002) assume that both behaviors access the same enduring mental representations of the environment. Participants in the present experiment learned the locations of seven objects within a room from two views, and were then tested in a separate room using scene recognition and judgments of relative direction (JRD). Scene recognition results indicated that two viewer-centered representations of the layout of objects were preserved in long-term memory, whereas JRD showed evidence of a single orientation-dependent long-term mental representation. The challenges of incorporating the present findings into existing theories of human spatial memory are discussed.     

Working memory period: the endurance of mental representations.

Working memory span assesses the maximum number of items that can be remembered in the face of concurrent processing. Models of working memory differ on several dimensions, yet many rely exclusively on this span procedure for their evidence. Three experiments consider an alternative paradigm that attempts to capture the endurance limits for remembering a fixed number of items during concurrent processing. Eight-year-old children performed two versions of this working memory period measure--operation period and reading period. Period scores show healthy test-retest reliability and external validity for scholastic attainment, comparing well with span scores in these respects. In addition, period is highly correlated with span and shows similar effects of varying the order in which stimuli are presented. We conclude that the durability of representations is an important factor in both span and period.     

Interactive dimensions in the construction of mental representations for text

To detail the structure and format of memory for texts, researchers have examined whether readers monitor separate text dimensions for space, time, and characters. The authors proposed that the interactivity between these individual dimensions may be as critical to the construction of complex mental models as the discrete dimensions themselves. In the present experiments, participants read stories in which characters were described as traveling from a start to a final location. During movement between locations, characters engaged in activities that could take either a long or short amount of time to complete. Results indicate that accessibility for the spatial locations was a function of the passage of time. The authors interpret this as evidence that the interactive nature of text dimensions affects the structure of representations in memory.     

Stimulus structures and mental representations in expert comprehension of computer programs

Comprehension of computer programs involves detecting or inferring different kinds of relations between program parts. Different kinds of programming knowledge facilitate detection and representation of the different textual relations. The present research investigates the role of programming knowledge in program comprehension and the nature of mental representations of programs; specifically, whether procedural (control flow) or functional (goal hierarchy) relations dominate programmers' mental representations of programs. In the first study, 80 professional programmers were tested on comprehension and recognition of short computer program texts. The results suggest that procedural rather than functional units form the basis of expert programmers' mental representations, supporting work in other areas of text comprehension showing the importance of text structure knowledge in understanding. In a second study 40 professional programmers studied and modified programs of moderate length. Results support conclusions from the first study that programs are first understood in terms of their procedural episodes. However, results also suggest that a programmer's task goals may influence the relations that dominate mental representations later in comprehension.     

The expression and regulation of anger in toddlers: relations to maternal behavior and mental representations

Anger is an intense and adaptive approach emotion that undergoes significant development during the toddler years. We assessed the expression of anger and the strategies toddlers use to regulate it in relation to maternal behavior and mental representations. Seventy-four toddlers were observed in three anger-eliciting paradigms: toy removal (TR), still-face (SF), and delayed gratification (DG). Anger expression and three clusters of regulatory behaviors were micro-coded: putative regulatory behaviors, attention manipulation, and play behaviors. Maternal relational style was coded for sensitivity and intrusiveness, and mental representations of the mother-child relationship were assessed for joy and anger. Children expressed the most anger during the TR, less during the SF, and minimally during the DG. Use of putative regulatory behaviors was highest during the SF, whereas during the TR children employed newly acquired skills, such as focused attention and substitutive play, in the service of anger regulation. Anger expression and regulation were differentially related to the negative and positive components in the mother's behavior and representations, and maternal intrusiveness moderated the relations between angry representations and the degree of child anger during the SF. Results are consistent with dynamic models of emotions and accord with perspectives that emphasize the role of sensitive parenting in facilitating emotion regulation.     

Identification and ratings of caricatures: Implications for mental representations of faces

S. Brennan (1985, Leonardo, 18, 170–178) has developed a computer-implemented caricature generator based on a holistic theory of caricature. A face is represented by 37 lines, based on a fixed set of 169 points. Caricatures are produced by exaggerating all metric differences between a face and a norm. Anticaricatures can be created by reducing all the differences between a face and a norm. Caricatures of familiar faces were identified more quickly than veridical line drawings, which were identified more quickly than anticaricatures. There was no difference in identification accuracy for the three types of representation. The best likeness was considered to be a caricature. We discuss the implications of these results for how faces are mentally represented. The results are consistent with a holistic theory of encoding in which distinctive aspects of a face are represented by comparison with a norm. We suggest that this theory may be appropriate for classes of visual stimuli, other than faces, whose members share a configuration definable by a fixed set of points.