The paradox of countertransference: you and me,here and now

Abstract

I am moved to write by Stephen Gross's article ‘Revenge of the fathers: incest and the male therapist’, which appeared in the February 1995 issue of Psychodynamic Counselling     

Ambiguous figures and representationalism

Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous figures often causes a change in phenomenal properties, this change is accompanied by a change in non-conceptual content. I illustrate the case by considering specific examples.     

The workable here and now and the why of there and then

At an earlier time our work as analysts was easier. We searched for the repressed in order to make constructions that connected the past to the present symptoms. Making these connections conscious, based upon the continuing influence of the Topographic theory, was thought to be the curative factor in psychoanalysis. Freud (1912, 1914) briefly expressed the importance of working in the present but his main focus remained the importance of reconstructing the past. The importance of working in the present started to be fully articulated approximately 30 years ago, and has become a central part of most views on technique. However, it is the contention of this paper that, while there is general agreement on the necessity of working in the here and now, the understanding of what this means or why it is useful runs along parallel lines rather than leading to a central point. Further, it is my impression there is little agreement on the reasons for interpreting the there and then. The idea of a 'workable here and now' is introduced to capture how the here and now might best include the analysand's readiness to synthesize what is offered, while a theory of the necessity for working in the here and now and the there and then is offered.     

Colour constancy and Fregean representationalism

All representationalists maintain that there is a necessary connection between an experience’s phenomenal character and intentional content; but there is a disagreement amongst representationalists regarding the nature of those intentional contents that are necessarily connected to phenomenal character. Russellian representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of objects and/or properties, while Fregean representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of modes of presentation of objects and properties. According to Fregean representationalists such as David Chalmers and Brad Thompson, the Fregean variety of the view is preferable to the Russellian variety because the former can accommodate purported counterexamples involving spectrum inversion without illusion and colour constancy while the latter cannot. I maintain that colour constancy poses a special problem for the Fregean theory in that the features of the theory that enable it handle spectrum inversion without illusion cannot be extended to handle colour constancy. I consider the two most plausible proposals regarding how the Fregean view might be developed in order to handle colour constancy—one of which has recently been defended by Thompson (Australas J Philos 87:99–117, 2009)—and argue that neither is adequate. I conclude that Fregean representationalism is no more able to accommodate colour constancy than is Russellian representationalism and, as such, ought to be rejected.     

Visual prominence and representationalism

A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.     

Ambiguous figures and representationalism

Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of experience. Her argument is the claim that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the experience of ambiguous figures, the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to the square/regular diamond and some other ambiguous figure representationalism fails to offer a unified account of how representational content makes them ambiguous. In this paper, I aim, first, to offer a representationalist account of ambiguous figures and, second, to examine and rebut Macpherson’s arguments. My main point is that in each ambiguous figure Macpherson discusses there are differences in representational content that can explain differences in phenomenal character or content. The representational differences are due to the ways the Cartesian frame of reference in which perceptual content is always cast cuts the figure, underlying different properties of the figure with respect to the axes of the Cartesian frame of reference.     

Strong representationalism and centered content

I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and not have certain properties, for example, my bracelet may phenomenally look to be circular-shaped and oval-shaped (and hence non-circular-shaped). So, if strong representationalism is true, then the content of my experience ought to represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. Yet, intuitively, the content of my experience does not represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. The duplication problem is this. On a standard conception of content, spatio-temporally distinct experiences and experiences had by distinct subjects may differ in content despite the fact that they are phenomenally indistinguishable. But this undermines the thesis that phenomenal character determines content. I argue that the two problems can be solved by applying a version of an idea from David Chalmers, which is to recognize the existence of genuinely centered properties in the content of perceptual experience.     

On needing time to think: consciousness,temporality, and self-expression

I examine an argument proposed by Tye and Wright (2011), inspired by Geach (1957), which holds that a correct understanding of how conceptual thought occur     

Grassroots spirituality: What it is,why it is here,where it is going,by Robert K. Forman

Among Asian Americans, particularly within immigrant communities, religious leaders are respected and sought out for support and guidance. There is a need to examine how religious leaders, especially within non-Christian faiths, identify persons and ascribe meaning and attributions to mental health concerns. The aim of this paper was to address this knowledge gap by exploring the perceptions of five Vietnamese American Buddhist leaders in regards to mental illness. Using qualitative analytic techniques we identified appearance, behaviours, and cognitive impairments that leaders interpreted as indicators of a mental health condition. Religious leaders cited messy and overly adorned outer appearance, aggressive and violent behaviours, and abnormal cognitive functioning as indicative of mental health problems. They attributed mental illness to a variety of causes: daily stressors, mind-body imbalance, karma, virtuous deeds, and spiritual possession. Findings inform strategies for faith-based initiatives and mental health service delivery to religiously affiliated Asian Americans.