Modality and Mellor's McTaggart

This paper explores a modal analogue of Hugh Mellor's version of McTaggart's argument against the reality of tense. I show that if Mellor's argument succeeds in showing that the present moment cannot be any more real than any other moment then it also shows that the actual world cannot be any more real than any other possible world.     

THE PROBLEM OF HEAVEN

An argument against the rationality of desiring to go to heaven might be put in the form of a trilemma: (1) any state of being that both lasts eternally and preserves me as the person I am would be hellish and therefore would not be a state of being that I could have any reason to desire; (2) any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve my personhood by turning me into a non‐person would not be a state of being that I (qua person that I am) could have any reason to desire; and (3) any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve my personhood by turning me into some other person would not be a state of being that I (qua person that I am) could have any reason to desire. This paper offers defenses of each of the three horns of this trilemma and concludes that there is no rationally compelling reason for any human being to desire to go to heaven.     

The Virtue of Epistemological Dualism

The article tries to answer the following question: what is the most promising epistemological strategy if my objective is the construction of a theory which gives me the opportunity to decrease the risk of getting to what is actually absolute, that is, to irreversible negative actions (irreversible as a theory might not be, but as an action often is)? The answer proposed is a form of epistemological dualism which means that I metaphysically believe (that is, I programmatically and systematically believe, without certainly knowing it) that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is dualistic. More specifically, I metaphysically believe that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is not saturated: in any theory there is an ideal error, because there is no theory which is totally saturated by reality, and any reality can actualize the ideal error, because there is no reality which is totally saturated by theory.     

Preservation Theorems Without Continuum Hypothesis

Many results concerning the equivalence between a syntactic form of formulas and a model theoretic conditions are proven directly without using any form of a continuum hypothesis. In particular, it is demonstrated that any reduced product sentence is equivalent to a Horn sentence. Moreover, in any first order language without equality one now has that a reduced product sentence is equivalent to a Horn sentence and any sentence is equivalent to a Boolean combination of Horn sentences.     

On the dynamics and adaptivity of mental processes: Relating adaptive dynamical systems and self-modeling network models by mathematical analysis

In this paper, it is addressed by mathematical analysis how network-oriented modeling relates to the dynamical systems perspective on mental processes. It has been mathematically proven that any dynamical system can be modeled as a temporal-causal network model and that any adaptive dynamical system (of any order) can be modeled by a self-modeling network (of the same order).     

Multi-criteria Proposal Assessment Methodology

In any practical assessment process, any mathematical analysis can only at best be a pointer to human issues. In consequence, the key aspect of any assessment process is the sensitivity with which it is ensured that the reality which lies beyond the pointer is properly addressed.     

Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism

Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail.     

On Perfect Goodness

God is typically conceived as perfectly good and necessarily so, in two senses: in terms of always performing the best possible act and in terms of having maximal moral worth. Yet any being that freely performs the best act she can must be accorded greater moral worth for any such action than a being that does so necessarily. I conclude that any being that performs the best possible act of necessity cannot also have maximal moral worth, making the concept of God’s perfect goodness incoherent.     

儒家哲理特征与文化间对话——普遍主义还是非普遍主义

Confucianism is a rather typical non-universalism, even though it does believe that its own doctrines are indeed the ultimate truth, and denies the validity of any higher, universalist meta-standard. Therefore, when facing the contemporary culture intercourse, Confucianism advocates genuine discourse: It rejects any cultural conflict to-the-death, refuses to engage in universalist competition and antagonism, and maintains a mutually-beneficial interaction with other cultures. However, it also adheres to a “free-to-terminate-relations” principle, which implies that any side is free to terminate, at any time, all potential and actual interactions, whenever it feels that its original cultural vitality is threatened. In other words, cultural interactions must only occur when the cultural uniqueness and independence of all participating sides is guaranteed.     

Relativistic hidden variable theories?

I show that for any quantum dynamics and any choice of observables as hidden variables an adequate hidden variable theory always exists. I argue that hidden variable theories have no more problems in reconciling non-locality with relativity than no-hidden-variable theories.     

THE LIMITS OF NEO-ARISTOTELIAN PLENITUDE (AND ITS CONCEPTUAL NEIGHBORS)

Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude is the thesis that, necessarily, any property that could be had essentially by something or other is had essentially by something or other if and only if and because it is instantiated; any essentializable property is essentialized iff and because it is instantiated. In this paper, I develop a partial nonmodal characterization of ‘essentializable' and show it cannot be transformed into a full characterization. There are several seemingly insurmountable obstacles that any full characterization of essentializability must overcome. Moreover, these obstacles threaten other views in the conceptual neighborhood such as Counterpart Theoretic Plenitude and Conceptualist Plenitude.     

The memory of Topoľčany: the relationship of the Jewish inhabitants of Topoľčany after the tragedy of the “Topoľčany pogrom”

The aim of this article is to discuss the town of Topo??any in Slovakia and present the memories and testimonies of the Jewish (and non-Jewish) population about the incident known as “The pogrom of Topo??any.” The topic on which this article will be primarily focused is the relationship and attitude of the former Jewish inhabitants of Topo??any now living far away towards the town after the tragedies that affected it. Moreover, I want to comment on the problematics of “home.” The main questions are how the Jews of Topo??any perceive their birthplace 70 years after the pogrom; how the tragedy has influenced their relationship to Topo??any and its inhabitants; what has changed since then and what has not.     

The Structure of Frege's Thoughts

Fregean thoughts (i.e. the senses of assertoric sentences) are structured entities because they are composed of simpler senses that are somehow ordered and interconnected. The constituent senses form a unity because some of them are ‘saturated’ and some ‘unsaturated’. This paper shows that Frege's explanation of the structure of thoughts, which is based on the ‘saturated/unsaturated’ distinction, is by no means sufficient because it permits what I call ‘wild analyses’, which have certain unwelcome consequences. Wild analyses are made possible because any ‘unsaturated’ sense that is a mode of presentation of a concept together with any ‘saturated’ sense forms a thought. The reason is that any concept can be applied to any object (which is presented by a ‘saturated’ sense). This stems from the fact that Frege was willing to admit only total functions. It is also briefly suggested what should be done to block wild analyses.     

Eternal Recurrence and the Categorical Imperative

The question has been raised whether Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to be like a categorical imperative. The obvious objection to understanding eternal recurrence as like a categorical imperative is that for a categorical imperative to make any sense, for moral obligation to make any sense, it must be possible for individuals to change themselves. And Nietzsche denies that individuals can change themselves. Magnus thinks the determinism “implicit in the doctine of the eternal recurrence of the same renders any imperative impotent…. How can one will what must happen in any case?” At the other end of the spectrum, those who do hold that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative, for their part, tend to ignore or deny the determinism involved in eternal recurrence. This article explores the extent to which it can be claimed that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative without downplaying Nietzsche's dterminism.     

Marital dissatisfaction and psychiatric disorders: results from the National Comorbidity Survey

The association between marital dissatisfaction and 12-month prevalence rates of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., rev., 1987) Axis I psychiatric disorders was examined in married respondents from the National Comorbidity Survey (N = 2,538). Results indicate that marital dissatisfaction was associated with the presence of any disorder, any mood disorder, any anxiety disorder, and any substance-use disorder; dissatisfaction was also associated with 7 of 12 specific disorders for women and 3 of 13 specific disorders for men. To evaluate the unique association between marital dissatisfaction and psychiatric disorders, analyses were conducted controlling for comorbid disorders. Covariance analyses generally attenuated the bivariate associations between marital dissatisfaction and specific disorders and groupings of disorders. Results indicate that marital dissatisfaction was uniquely related to major depression and posttraumatic stress disorder for women and dysthymia for men.     

Religion as Orienting Worldview

Religions are complex, and any attempt at defining religion necessarily falls short. Nevertheless, any scholarly inquiry into the nature of religion must use some criteria in order to evaluate and study the character of religious traditions across contexts. To this end, I propose understanding religion in terms of an orienting worldview. Religions are worldviews that are expressed not only in beliefs but also in narratives and symbols. More than this, religions orient action, and any genuine religious tradition necessarily is concerned with normative behavior, whether ethical or religious in character. Such an understanding of religion has several advantages, one of which is its natural relation to current forms of the science-religion dialogue. Not only can the findings of cognitive science and related areas inform us about the nature of religion; scientific discoveries also prove to be important for any religious synthesis that attempts to construct a worldview for the twenty-first century.     

Any Size for a Dollar: The Effect of Any‐Size‐Same‐Price Versus Standard Pricing on Beverage Size Choices

Overconsumption of sugary drinks is linked with obesity. These beverages have been the target of recent public health policies, and, simultaneously, some firms have altered their pricing of such beverages, including charging the same price for all beverage sizes (“any‐size‐same‐price” pricing). We compare the effect of any‐size‐same‐price pricing versus standard pricing on soft drink beverage size choices and further explore the effect of this firm lever under different health‐related policy situations. Overall, we show that any‐size‐same‐price pricing increases consumers’ focus on the value of getting a good financial deal and thereby increases beverage size selections. Further, the allure of any‐size‐same‐price pricing prevents calorie postings from successfully reducing choice of larger sizes as occurs under standard pricing. However, a more graphic health intervention can reduce the appeal of larger sizes under any‐size‐same‐price pricing. Finally, the findings are not moderated by diet versus nondiet beverage selections, indicating that consumers do not perceive the value of larger sizes under any‐size‐same‐price pricing to come from getting more calories. We conclude by discussing how this work can improve the design of public health nutrition policies.     

Entirely irrelevant distractors can capture and captivate attention

The question of whether a stimulus onset may capture attention when it is entirely irrelevant to the task and even in the absence of any attentional settings for abrupt onset or any dynamic changes has been highly controversial. In the present study, we designed a novel irrelevant capture task to address this question. Participants engaged in a continuous task making sequential forced choice (letter or digit) responses to each item in an alphanumeric matrix that remained on screen throughout many responses. This task therefore involved no attentional settings for onset or indeed any dynamic changes, yet the brief onset of an entirely irrelevant distractor (a cartoon picture) resulted in significant slowing of the two (Experiment 1) or three (Experiment 2) responses immediately following distractor appearance These findings provide a clear demonstration of attention being captured and captivated by a distractor that is entirely irrelevant to any attentional settings of the task.     

An axiomatization of family resemblance

We invoke concepts from the theory of hypergraphs to give a measure of the closeness of family resemblance, and to make precise the idea of a composite likeness. It is shown that for any positive integer m, for any general term possessing any extent of family resemblance strictly greater than m, there is a taxonomical representation of the term whereby each subordinate taxon has an extent of family resemblance strictly greater than m.