Demystifying Meaning

Abstract

Some philosophers find linguistic meaning mysterious. Two approaches suggest themselves for removing the felt mystery, or demystifying meaning. One involves providing a substantive account of meaning in meaning-free terms. Although this approach has come under serious attack in recent years, Paul Horwich has recently presented a version of the approach that might be thought impervious. A preliminary attempt is made to argue that Horwich's version is vulnerable to the considerations felt to undermine other versions of the substantive approach to demystification. That leaves the second approach, quietism, which involves showing that although meaning is primitive it is un-mysterious. It is suggested that this approach is worthy of exploration.     

Distributed Cognition in Scientific Contexts

Even though it has been argued that scientific cognition is distributed, there is no consensus on the exact nature of distributed cognition. This paper aims to characterize distributed cognition as appropriate for philosophical studies of science. I first classify competing characterizations into three types: the property approach, the task approach, and the system approach. It turns out that the property approach and the task approach are subject to criticism. I then argue that the most preferable way to understand distributed cognition in science is provided by the system approach that takes a distributed-cognitive system as the unit of analysis. I clarify this position by considering possible objections and replies.     

A Critique of the Constitutive Role of Truthlikeness in the Similarity Approach

The similarity approach stands as a significant attempt to defend scientific realism from the attack of the pessimistic meta-induction. The strategy behind the similarity approach is to shift from an absolute notion of truth to the more flexible one of truthlikeness. Nonetheless, some authors are not satisfied with this attempt to defend realism and find that the notion of truthlikeness is not fully convincing. The aim of this paper is to analyze and understand the reasons of this dissatisfaction. Our thesis is that the dissatisfaction with the notion of truthlikeness concerns the double role that this notion plays within the similarity approach: This notion plays both a regulative role in the conception of theories and a constitutive one in their selection.     

The harms of ignoring the social nature of science

In this paper I argue that philosophers of science have an obligation to recognize and engage with the social nature of the sciences they assess if those sciences are morally relevant. Morally-relevant science is science that has the potential to risk harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment. My argument and the approach I develop are informed by an analysis of the philosophy of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human psychology and behaviour. From this literature, I tease out two different methods of scientific critique. The first I call the “truth-detectional” approach. Those who take this approach are first and foremost concerned about the truth of EP claims as that truth can be determined by evidence. The second I call the “social-dimensional” approach. Those who take this approach talk about the production and truth of EP claims but within a social framework. On this account, the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of EP claims are not separate from the institutional and social processes and values that lend to their production. I show that the truth-detectional approach risks harms to society and to the philosophy of science, but that the social-dimensional approach avoids these harms. Philosophers of science, therefore, should take a social-dimensional approach to the assessment of morally-relevant science.

     

CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VS. CULTURE-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Two approaches to the interpretation of and theorizing about cross-cultural differences are identified. In the individual-level approach, cultural differences are assumed to be consistent with individual differences within each of the cultures included in the cross-cultural comparison. The use of antecedent variables to eliminate alternative explanations based on biases is reviewed and some problems noted. It is suggested that explicit theories be used to guide the selection of antecedent variables to minimize the impact of cultural biases. In the second approach, the culture-level approach, culture is the unit of analysis and there is no assumption regarding the correspondence between culture- and individual-level relationships. Two examples are given to illustrate the potential usefulness of this approach to developing concepts and theories that are very different from those derived from the individual-level approach. The problems of bias in this level of analysis are also discussed. Finally, it is argued that in cross-cultural psychology the individual-level approach dominates, but we should pay more attention to culture-level research. This approach may lead to the development of concepts and theories that are not likely to be produced by mono-cultural works.     

A modal view of the semantics of theoretical sentences

In this paper, a new account of empirical claims in structuralism is developed. Its novelty derives from the use that is made of the linguistic approach to scientific theories despite the presumed incompatibility of structuralism with that approach. It is shown how the linguistic approach can be applied to the framework of structuralism if the semantic foundations of that approach are refined to do justice to the doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine goes back to Carnap but has been advanced until the present day without a proper semantic explanation.     

Weighing evils: the C. S. Lewis approach

It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would, and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases. Often, an additive approach to quantifying evil is employed in such arguments. In this paper, we examine C. S. Lewis’ objection to the additive approach, arguing that although he is correct to reject this approach, there is a sense in which he underestimates the quantity of pain. However, the quantity of pain in that sense does not significantly increase the probability that some pain is gratuitous. Therefore, the quantitative argument likely fails.     

The effect of embodied emotive states on cognitive categorization

Research has uncovered that positive affect broadens cognitive categorization. The motivational dimensional model, however, posits that positive affect is not a unitary construct with only one cognitive consequence. Instead, this model puts forth that there are different positive affects varying in approach motivational intensity. According to this model, only positive affects lower in motivational intensity should broaden cognitive processes, whereas positive affects higher in motivational intensity should narrow cognitive processes. Consistent with these predictions, high approach positive affect has been shown to narrow attention, whereas low approach positive affect has been shown to broaden it (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). High approach positive affect, therefore, might narrow categorization. Two experiments investigated this possibility by having participants respond to cognitive categorization tasks in 3 body postures designed to elicit different levels of approach motivation: reclining backward, which should evoke low approach motivation; sitting upright, which should evoke moderate approach motivation; and leaning forward, which should evoke high approach motivation. Participants smiled while in each posture in order to experience positive affect. Experiment 1 provided initial support for the idea that high approach positive affect narrows categorization and low approach positive affect broadens categorization. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with improved smiling instructions. These results extend previous work by showing that the motivational model's predictions hold for basic attentional processes as well as higher level cognitive processes such as categorization.     

New account of empirical claims in structuralism

In this paper, a new account of empirical claims in structuralism is developed. Its novelty derives from the use that is made of the linguistic approach to scientific theories despite the presumed incompatibility of structuralism with that approach. It is shown how the linguistic approach can be applied to the framework of structuralism if the semantic foundations of that approach are refined to do justice to the doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine goes back to Carnap but has been advanced until the present day without a proper semantic explanation.     

Animal cognition + optimal choice = behavior: A review of adaptive behavior and learning, 2nd Ed., by J. E. R. Staddon

Staddon discusses a vast array of topics in comparative psychology in this book. His view is that adaptive behavior in most cases is the result of optimal choice acting on an animal's knowledge about the world. Staddon refers to this as a functional teleonomic approach inasmuch as it attempts to understand an animal's behavior in terms of goals. He builds mathematical models based on this idea that are designed to reproduce specific sets of empirical observations, usually qualitatively. A natural consequence of Staddon's approach is that many models are developed, each of which applies to a specific set of observations. An alternative to functional teleonomy is a functional approach that builds on prior principles. In most cases, this approach favors a single‐theory account of behavior. Prior principles can be understood as functional stand‐ins for antecedent material causes, which means that these accounts are closer to mechanistic theories than are goal‐based teleonomic accounts. An ontological perspective, referred to as supervenient realism, is a means of understanding the relationship between functional theories and the material world. According to this perspective, the algorithmic operation of a successful functional theory may be understood to supervene on the material operation of the nervous system.     

The emergence of psychopathy: implications for the neuropsychological approach to developmental disorders

In this paper, I am going to examine the disorder of psychopathy and consider how genetic anomalies could give rise to the relatively specific neuro-cognitive impairments seen in individuals with this disorder. I will argue that genetic anomalies in psychopathy reduce the salience of punishment information (perhaps as a function of noradrenergic disturbance). I will argue that the ability of the amygdala to form the stimulus-punishment associations necessary for successful socialization is disrupted and that because of this, individuals with psychopathy do not learn to avoid actions that will harm others. It is noted that this model follows the neuropsychological approach to the study of developmental disorders, an approach that has been recently criticized. I will argue that these criticisms are less applicable to psychopathy. Indeed, animal work on the development of the neural systems necessary for emotion, does not support a constructivist approach with respect to affect. Importantly, such work indicates that while environmental effects can alter the responsiveness of the basic neural architecture mediating emotion, environmental effects do not construct this architecture. However, caveats to the neuropsychological approach with reference to this disorder are noted.     

Blameworthiness, Vice, and The Objectivity of Morals

Abstract: The following thesis is defended: whether actions are morally required is an objective matter – that is, independent of the beliefs, intentions, etc. with which the actions are preformed. This thesis needs defending because it seems vulnerable to certain counterexamples. One approach to dealing with these counterexamples centers on the concept of blameworthiness, but this approach is flawed. An alternative approach is developed that relies on the concept of a vicious action. And although it too centers on the concept of blameworthiness, it lacks the flaws that are present in the original approach.     

Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets

In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.     

Regression analysis of correlated binary outcomes

The purpose of this paper is to describe and illustrate a regression approach to the analysis of correlated binary outcomes (Liang & Zeger, 1986). Ignoring the correlations between repeated observations can lead to invalid inferences. This approach extends logistic regression to account for repeated observations in each of a series of individuals. In this paper, I present a nontechnical introduction to the generalized estimating equations (GEE) approach. A fictitious example is used to demonstrate that GEE regression correctly adjusts for the correlations between repeated binary observations. The approach is illustrated with an analysis of safer sex practices among high-risk teenagers.     

Ethical Criteria of Risk Acceptance

Mainstream moral theories deal with situations in which the outcome of each possible action is well-determined and knowable. In order to make ethics relevant for problems of risk and uncertainty, moral theories have to be extended so that they cover actions whose outcomes are not determinable beforehand. One approach to this extension problem is to develop methods for appraising probabilistic combinations of outcomes. This approach is investigated and shown not to solve the problem. An alternative approach is then developed. Its starting-point is that everyone has a prima facie moral right not to be exposed to risk. However, this right can be overridden if the risk-exposure is part of an equitable system for risk-taking that works to the advantage of the individual risk-exposed person.     

Approach and Avoidance Relationship Commitment

The current paper proposes that relationship commitment is a goal; and as such, is regulated by the approach and avoidance dimensions. We suggest that two types of commitment exist: approach commitment, the desire to maintain and continue the relationship, and avoidance commitment, the desire to avoid relationship dissolution. Specifically, approach commitment is associated with a desire for future relationship incentives and rewards; and avoidance commitment is a desire to avoid the negative consequences or costs of relationship dissolution. In this paper, we evaluate previous research on relationship commitment from an approach and avoidance goal theory perspective, and then present an approach and avoidance commitment model and hypotheses testable in future research.     

Intergenerational Relationships Within the Local Congregation

ABSTRACT

The following article explores the effect of the quality of intergenerational relationships on the health, healing and wholeness of the congregation. The fundamental premise is that an intergenerational approach to congregational life is a conscious, intentional choice on the part of the leadership and membership of that congregation to honor both the contributions and the requirements of each and every generation for the good of that generation as well as the good of the whole community. A casestudy is presented to demonstrate this approach. A reflection on the casestudy focuses on three dimensions of this approach to building up intergenerational relationships, i.e., the revelation of 1 Corinthians 12, the approach of family systems theory, and the paradigm of pastoral care.     

Personal Sovereignty and Our Moral Rights to Non‐Interference

In this article, I defend the inviolability approach to solving the paradox of deontology against a criticism raised by Michael Otsuka. The paradox of deontology revolves around the question whether it should always be permissible to infringe someone's right to non‐interference when this would serve to minimize the overall number of comparable rights infringements that occur. According to the inviolability approach, rights to non‐interference protect and give expression to our personal sovereignty, which is not advanced through the minimization of rights infringements. This seems to dissolve the paradox. Otsuka, however, contends that the proposed solution relies on too narrow an understanding of personal sovereignty. He argues that there is an enforceability dimension to personal sovereignty that would seem to undermine the inviolability approach. While I agree with Otsuka that enforceability is an important aspect of personal sovereignty, I argue that properly construed, the enforceability dimension of personal sovereignty does not undermine the inviolability approach.     

On Targeting Emotion Regulation Deficits in Eating Disorders through Defense Analysis

ABSTRACT

Psychodynamic approaches to the treatment of individuals with eating disorders are underrepresented in research and in academia. This will increasingly deprive patients of a viable therapeutic alternate to the dominant behavioral family-based models. As psychodynamic approaches may have unique benefits, there is value in resolving this loss. Recent models of dynamic therapies for eating disorders within modern, empirically derived theory show promise for future psychodynamic viability. An attachment-focused approach targeting disordered attachment patterns that are common in individuals with eating disorders has recently been introduced. To complement this model, this article proposes an approach for individuals with eating disorders that is hypothesized to target emotion regulation deficits that are also commonly found in individuals with eating disorders. Observed parallels between the implicit branch of the emotion regulation system and that of contemporary constructs of defense mechanisms guide this proposal. Developmental considerations reveal important connections between this biologically based model and a two-person model based in attachment theory. In this way, this proposal offers a flexible psychodynamic approach that integrates with the existing literature. Further development of this approach could one day help patients to have a greater range of therapeutic options for recovery from eating disorders.