What we think we do (to each other): how personality can bias behavior schemas through the projection of if-then profiles

People's knowledge about others includes not only person schemas about the typical traits of others but also behavior schemas about the likely interpersonal consequences of different behaviors. In this article, it is argued that perceiver effects can be interactive at the level of behavior schemas. A person's own personality configuration of if-then responses in social interactions (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) may contribute to that person's beliefs about the meaning and impact of relational behaviors more generally. In consequence, people who experience strong (or weak) responses to behaviors that vary along a particular trait dimension, such as warmth-coldness, may expect others to experience similarly strong (or weak) responses to those same kinds of behaviors. In 3 studies, people who were high in trait communion expected others to respond more strongly to behaviors that varied in warmth-coldness than did people who were low in trait communion, and people who were low in trait agency expected others to respond more strongly to behaviors that varied in assertiveness-unassertiveness than did people who were high in trait agency. Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence that participants' behavior schemas were based on assumptions derived from their own if-then personality profiles.     

What we know and what to do

This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we know) and practical rankings of possibilities and actions (what to do). I argue that (i) relevant information determines whether considerations of value may be treated as reasons for actions that realize them and against actions that don’t, (ii) incorporating this normative fact requires a revision of the standard ordering semantics for weak (but not for strong) deontic necessity modals, and (iii) an off-the-shelf semantics for weak deontic necessity modals, due to von Fintel and Iatridou, which distinguishes “basic” and “higher-order” ordering sources, and interprets weak deontic necessity modals relative to both, is well-suited to this task. The prominence of normative considerations in our proposal suggests a more general methodological lesson: formal semantic analysis of natural language modals expressing normative concepts demands that close attention be paid to the nature of the underlying normative phenomena.     

What we look at when we read

The entire surface phrase structure hierarchy of sentences influences visual scanning patterns in reading familiar material. A general eye-fixation rule predicts the pattern of adults’ eye-fixations in a study of reading predictable sentences: “fixate on the first half of phrase structure constituents.” This rule applies cumulatively at all levels of the surface phrase structure.     

People believe each other to be selfish hedonic maximizers

Current computational models of theory of mind typically assume that humans believe each other to selfishly maximize utility, for a conception of utility that makes it indistinguishable from personal gains. We argue that this conception is at odds with established facts about human altruism, as well as the altruism that humans expect from each other. We report two experiments showing that people expect other agents to selfishly maximize their pleasure, even when these other agents behave altruistically. Accordingly, defining utility as pleasure permits us to reconcile the assumption that humans expect each other to selfishly maximize utility with the fact that humans expect each other to behave altruistically.     

Stories we tell each other: A comparison of families' and their therapists' explanations of presenting problems

This study reports the explanations of presenting problems given by 10 mothers of children referred to a department of child and family psychiatry and their therapists. Video-recordings of therapists' pre-session meetings and the initial therapy sessions were searched for explanatory statements. These statements were then coded. It was found that therapists referred to past events, present circumstances, relationships, and possible future events in their explanations of presenting problems significantly more frequently than mothers. It was rare for mothers to speak in terms of past or future events at all. The mothers explained difficulties in terms of character traits significantly more often than did the therapists. The implications of these findings are discussed.Thanks to all of the child and family consultation team at 1 Wolverton Gardens for their participation in this research and particularly to Ruth Kossoff for her great help with organising data collection.     

What we can do

Philosophical Studies - Plural first-person pronouns have often been ignored in the literature on indexicals and pronouns. The assumption seems to be that we is just the plural of I. So, we can...     

Elephant psychology: What we know and what we would like to know

Although elephants are well-known and one of the most popular species among people, their behavior and cognitive abilities have not been studied very extensively. But recently, more and more researchers are becoming interested in studying their cognition, particularly their general intelligence, including causal reasoning and mirror self recognition, memory, and numerical cognition. Although genetically elephants are more closely related to the small-brained aardvarks and manatees than to primates, they hold enormous potential in their cognitive skills. Also, studying their cognition is important from the point of view of animal welfare in captivity.     

What we talk about when we talk about epistemic justification

Stewart Cohen argues that much contemporary epistemological theorizing is hampered by the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ is a term of art (rather than something we all pretheoretically understand) and one that is never given any serious explication in a non-tendentious, theory-neutral way. He suggests that epistemologists are therefore better off theorizing in terms of rationality, rather than in terms of ‘epistemic justification’. Against this, I argue that even if the term ‘epistemic justification’ is not broadly known, the concept it picks out is quite familiar, and partly because it’s a term of art, justification talk is a better vehicle for philosophical theorizing. ‘Rational’ is too unclear for our philosophical purposes, and the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ gets fleshed out by appeal to substantive, controversial theses is no obstacle to its playing the needed role in epistemological theorizing.     

Why promises and threats need each other

Despite the pervasive use of promises and threats in social life, very little research has been devoted to examining the effectiveness of these interpersonal tactics in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas. Based on the Goal‐Prescribes‐Rationality principle, we hypothesized that cooperation should be most strongly enhanced when promises and threats are communicated in combination, rather than in isolation. Also, we hypothesized that the combination of promises and threats should be especially effective among individuals with prosocial rather than proself orientations. Two studies provided good evidence for the latter hypothesis, in that the combination of promises and threats was only effective in people with prosocial orientations, people who are concerned with equality and collective interest. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What we talk about when we talk about pediatric suffering

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - In this paper I aim to show why pediatric suffering must be understood as a judgment or evaluation, rather than a mental state. To accomplish this task, first I...     

Rational emotive behavior therapy research: What we know and what we need to know

Rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT) has achieved positive results in quantitative reviews of treatment outcome studies. In part because of methodological limitations of these studies, however, the generalizability of their favorable results to routine clinical practice is unknown. Also unknown are the clinical significance of outcomes achieved by REBT, the contribution made by its distinctive and specialized procedures, and the types of patients for whom REBT is particularly useful. Recommendations are provided for refining our knowledge of the effectiveness of REBT.     

What we look for in poetry

A chain of events was triggered on the nights of April 23 and 24, 1915, in Constantinople, Turkey, that would end, approximately six years later, with death or forced deportation of more than two and a half million Armenians from their historical homeland in Central and Eastern Turkey. During those two nights over two hundred Armenian writers, historians, translators, poets, journalists, editors, and political leaders were arrested in their homes, taken to the central police station, and never seen again.

The shock of the genocide not only nearly destroyed a nation, together with its articulate literary, political, and cultural leaders, but also paralyzed the creative abilities of its survivors. With their writers, poets, and political leaders lost, their symbolic vocabulary shattered, the Armenians have been unable to distill from the genocide a transcendent wisdom and to present to all cultures the fruits of that distillation via new poetry, art, theater, film, literature, and philosophy, hi the words of V. Oshagan, a modern writer on Armenian and American themes

Seventy years after the event, the Genocide has still not been tackled by any author of note. The Armenians have not recovered from the trauma and with nothing forgotten and nothing forgiven, the Genocide is still continuing. As long as the Turk is identified with the principle of evil in the Armenian imagination, and as long as the Turkish government refuses to admit its guilt and make amends to the victims, the Genocide will continue and will prevent the Armenians from producing any work of art from the theme.

Slowly, over the past two decades, powerful works have emerged that convey to the world, through poetry and myth, the true stupefaction of that horrendous time period. Among these works is the 1980 short story, “Uncle Toros,” by the Armenian writer Mooshegh Galshoyan. With insight and intuition, he portrayed the life of one eighty-year-old victim of the genocide. Old Uncle Toros's recurring nightmare of that event, as vividly told by Galshoyan, allows one to enter the Armenian trauma, to step into the unconscious life of a genocide victim. –A. Chutjian