Occurrent states

The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed (and occasionally stated explicitly). One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue that neither of these accounts is adequate, and therefore that another account is needed. I propose that occurrent states are active states.     

WHAT ARE SEEMINGS?

We are all familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true. Many think that these seeming states can yield justified beliefs. Very few have seriously explored what these seeming states are. I argue that seeming states are not plausibly analyzed in terms of beliefs, partial beliefs, attractions to believe, or inclinations to believe. Given that the main candidates for analyzing seeming states are unsatisfactory, I argue for a brute view of seemings that treats seeming states as irreducible propositional attitudes.     

Opacity,Transparency, and the Paradox of the Accessibility Requirement

Key issues in epistemology for the most part have to do with epistemic values such as justification, truth, and knowledge—that is, values related to the epistemic status of our propositional attitudes, mental events, and states. However, another important issue that is worth examining is the extent to which a subject is in a position to evaluate the strength of her epistemic position. In this paper, I wish to emphasize two properties of our mental states that play a decisive part in that respect: their opacity and transparency. In the following, I will assume that a mental state is opaque whenever it presents itself with no underlying reason, whereas states that are supported by apparent reasons are transparent. One main argument that I will defend is that even when the opacity and transparency of our mental states are not reliable cues, still they remain highly informative. Notably, I draw some implications relative to the externalist/internalist debate in epistemology. I examine the claim that only mental states that are justified are well grounded or justification conferring and the idea that often stands behind, that is, that only states whose reasons are accessible are justified—namely, the Accessibility Requirement. I also examine the source of a recent debate in epistemology: the epistemic status of our intuitive states, as these are perfect instances of opaque mental states. I conclude that intuitive states in some respect are less misleading than states that are supported by apparent reasons.     

Quantum No-Go Theorems and Consciousness

Our conscious minds exist in the Universe, therefore they should be identified with physical states that are subject to physical laws. In classical theories of mind, the mental states are identified with brain states that satisfy the deterministic laws of classical mechanics. This approach, however, leads to insurmountable paradoxes such as epiphenomenal minds and illusionary free will. Alternatively, one may identify mental states with quantum states realized within the brain and try to resolve the above paradoxes using the standard Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics. In this essay, we first show that identification of mind states with quantum states within the brain is biologically feasible, and then elaborating on the mathematical proofs of two quantum mechanical no-go theorems, we explain why quantum theory might have profound implications for the scientific understanding of one’s mental states, self identity, beliefs and free will.     

Positive affect as implicit motivator: on the nonconscious operation of behavioral goals

Recent research has revealed that nonconscious activation of desired behavioral states--or behavioral goals--promotes motivational activity to accomplish these states. Six studies demonstrate that this nonconscious operation of behavioral goals emerges if mental representations of specific behavioral states are associated with positive affect. In an evaluative-conditioning paradigm, unobtrusive linking of behavioral states to positive, as compared with neutral or negative, affect increased participants' wanting to accomplish these states. Furthermore, participants worked harder on tasks that were instrumental in attaining behavioral states when these states were implicitly linked to positive affect, thereby mimicking the effects on motivational behavior of preexisting individual wanting and explicit goal instructions to attain the states. Together, these results suggest that positive affect plays a key role in nonconscious goal pursuit. Implications for behavior-priming research are discussed.     

Sufficiency,Priority, and Selecting Refugees

There are more refugees than many states have a duty to accept. As a result, many states are permitted to accept only some refugees and not others. This raises the question of how states should select these refugees. I defend the claim that states should resettle the worst-off refugees, and maximize the number of refugees gaining a sufficiently decent life. When resettling the worst off conflicts with maximising the number gaining a sufficiently decent life, states should select refugees to maximise aggregate benefits, with benefits holding greater weight the further refugees are from a sufficiency threshold. The only exception to this rule is when it entails wrongful discrimination, in which case states should only follow this rule if victims of discrimination benefit and consent to its implementation.     

A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection

Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe.     

Conflict and Loss Aversion in Multiattribute Choice: The Effects of Trade-Off Size and Reference Dependence on Decision Difficulty

Two experiments assess the type and amount of conflict influencing decision difficulty in hypothetical scenarios where subjects chose between two alternatives made to appear relatively attractive (approach–approach conflicts) or relatively unattractive (avoidance-avoidance conflicts), each involving attribute trade-offs across alternatives (embedded approach–avoidance conflicts). In Experiment 1, independent of information processing demands, decisions are more difficult when alternatives are unattractive and/or attribute trade-offs are large. Reference states that change the relative attractiveness of the alternatives increase or decrease decision difficulty in a manner consistent with loss aversion: Superior reference states increase decision difficulty more than inferior reference states reduce it. Experiment 2 further tests the reference dependence of decision difficulty by varying the nature of the reference state (stated comparators, as in Experiment 1, or endowments) as well as its extremity. Endowed reference states affect decision difficulty more than reference states that are stated comparators. Moreover, consistent with loss aversion, inferior reference states that are twice as extreme as superior reference states reduce decision difficulty about as much as the superior reference states increase it. The results demonstrate that decisions can be made easier or harder by way of reference dependence, and that the loss aversion so prevalent in preference formation generalizes to perceptions of decision difficulty in multiattribute settings.     

„Affektlose Zustände?“

In clinical work psychoanalysts are confronted with phenomena that are marked by affectless states and an apparent non-existence of affects. The author refers to patients who are addicted to near-death, dwell in states of confusion and inhibition in which affects are not found to be attached to thoughts, where splitting dominates and containment for fragmentation is sought. Instead of the latter it comes to pulverization and atomization and therefore to the annihilation of affects: affects seem to be unperceivable. Such phenomena allow considerations concerning the concept of the death drive. The questions are considered whether the apparent non-existence of affects is an expression of a silent death drive, what the function of these affectless states is and what the object relationship, which is expressed and communicated within these states looks like. Three concepts are taken into consideration: whether these affectless states are manifestations of a developmental state in which splitting is yet not an issue (Fairbairn), or must they be seen under a defensive aspect as a protection against persecutory tantalizing affects (Klein), or are these states the pure manifestations of the death drive (Green). By means of a clinical vignette of a patient suffering from an inhibition of thought processes, an inability to work on the basis of a borderline pathology and treated with high-frequency psychoanalysis, the phenomenon of ?affectless states“ is elaborated on the basis of the three aforementioned theoretical concepts and the dynamic unconscious fantasy associated with these seemingly affectless states is discussed.     

Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes

The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ' S V s that p '. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. A reason for the characterization relying on beliefs, etc., about non-existing things is also rejected. Last, some sentences ascribing abilities and dispositions have the same grammatical form as some senses that ascribe mental states, so that the attempt to paraphrase the latter would obscure the conceptual relations between the two sorts. It follows that mental states are not relations to propositions.     

First-Person Neuroscience: A new methodological approach for linking mental and neuronal states

Though the brain and its neuronal states have been investigated extensively, the neural correlates of mental states remain to be determined. Since mental states are experienced in first-person perspective and neuronal states are observed in third-person perspective, a special method must be developed for linking both states and their respective perspectives. We suggest that such method is provided by First-Person Neuroscience. What is First-Person Neuroscience? We define First-Person Neuroscience as investigation of neuronal states under guidance of and on orientation to mental states. An empirical example of such methodological approach is demonstrated by an fMRI study on emotions. It is shown that third- and first-person analysis of data yield different results. First-person analysis reveals neural activity in cortical midline structures during subjective emotional experience. Based on these and other results neural processing in cortical midline structures is hypothesized to be crucially involved in generating mental states. Such direct linkage between first- and third-person approaches to analysis of neural data allows insight into the "point of view from within the brain", that is what we call the First-Brain Perspective. In conclusion, First-Person Neuroscience and First-Brain Perspective provide valuable methodological tools for revealing the neuronal correlate of mental states.     

A temporal modelling environment for internally grounded beliefs,desires and intentions

In this paper the internal dynamics of mental states, in particular states based on beliefs, desires and intentions, is formalised using a temporal language. A software environment is presented that can be used to specify, simulate and analyse temporal dependencies between mental states in relation to traces of them. If also relevant data on internal physical states over time are available, these can be analysed with respect to their relation to mental states as well.     

The Natural History of Desire

Sterelny (2003) develops an idealised natural history of folk-psychological kinds. He argues that belief-like states are natural elaborations of simpler control systems, called detection systems, which map directly from environmental cue to response. Belief-like states exhibit robust tracking (sensitivity to multiple environmental states), and response breadth (occasioning a wider range of behaviours). The development of robust tracking and response-breadth depend partly on properties of the informational environment. In a transparent environment the functional relevance of states of the world is directly detectable. Outside transparent environments, selection can favour decoupled representations.

Sterelny maintains that these arguments do not generalise to desire. Unlike the external environment, the internal processes of an organism, he argues, are selected for transparency. Parts of a single organism gain nothing from deceiving one another, but gain significantly from accurate signalling of their states and needs. Key conditions favouring the development of belief-like states are therefore absent in the case of desires. Here I argue that Sterelny's reasons for saying that his treatment of belief does not generalise to motivation (desires, or preferences) are insufficient. There are limits to the transparency that internal environments can achieve. Even if there were not, tracking the motivational salience of external states suggests possible gains for systematic tracking of outcome values in any system in which selection has driven the production of belief-like states.     

Some suggestions on epileptic psychoses, their differential diagnosis and therapy

From a present point of view, some clinical suggestions are put forward concerning the symptomatology, differential diagnostics, and therapy of psychotic states in epileptic patients (twilight states, states of emotional deterioration and epileptic psychoses proper).     

Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity

Abstract

Thomas Polger has argued in favour of the mind–brain type‐identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type‐identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type‐materialist must respond to Kripke’s modal anti‐materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke’s argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non‐identical when one knows the identity conditions for both x and y. Replace x and y with ‘brain states’ and ‘sensations’ and it follows that one can know that brain states and sensations are non‐identical only if one knows the identity conditions for brain states. But according to Polger, we do not know the identity conditions for brain states. Hence, we should not be so confident that brain states and sensations are non‐identical after all. But Polger’s account is terribly flawed. Ironically, if Polger’s scepticism is warranted, then Polger himself has no good reasons to be a type‐materialist. But more importantly, Polger’s scepticism regarding the identity conditions of brain states is deeply defective. We do, I submit, understand the identity conditions of brain states. In the end, I submit, Kripke is safe from Polger.     

Band-edge states in ultrasmall silicon quantum boxes: Calculations of electronic states and oscillator strengths

Band-edge states and oscillator strengths in four configurations of ultrasmall Si quantum boxes (QBs) with (100) planes saturated by H have been calculated using the extended Hückel-type non-orthogonal tight-binding method. It is found that, while the valence-band edge states are always bulk like, both bulk-like and surface-like states occur at the conduction-band (CB) edge, depending on the atom configuration of the QB studied. An analysis shows that the surface-like CB edge states are caused by an interhydride interaction between trihydride units on the hydrogenated QB surface and there is significant correlation of oscillator strength with the CB edge states.     

Emotions while writing about emotional and non-emotional topics

Research on the effects of expressive writing about emotional experiences and traumatic events has a long history in the affective and social sciences. However, very little is known about the incidence and impact of affective states when the writing activities are not explicitly emotional or are less emotionally charged. By integrating goal-appraisal and network theories of affect within cognitive process models of writing, we hypothesize that writing triggers a host of affective states, some of which are tied to the topic of the essays (topic affective states), while others are more closely related to the cognitive processes involved in writing (process affective states). We tested this hypothesis with two experiments involving fine-grained tracking of affect while participants wrote short essays on topics that varied in emotional intensity including topics used in standardized tests, to socially charged issues, and personal emotional experiences. The results indicated that (a) affect collectively accounted for a majority of the observations compared to neutral, (b) boredom, engagement/flow, anxiety, frustration, and happiness were most frequent affective states, (c) there was evidence for a proposed, but not mutually exclusive, distinction between process and topic affective states, (d) certain topic affective states were predictive of the quality of the essays, irrespective of the valence of these states, and (e) individual differences in scholastic aptitude, writing apprehension, and exposure to print correlated with affect frequency in expected directions. Implications of our findings for research focused on monitoring affect during everyday writing activities are discussed.     

A multilevel framework for understanding relationships among traits,states, situations and behaviours

A conceptual and analytic framework for understanding relationships among traits, states, situations, and behaviours is presented. The framework assumes that such relationships can be understood in terms of four questions. (1) What are the relationships between trait and state level constructs, which include psychological states, the situations people experience and behaviour? (2) What are the relationships between psychological states, between states and situations and between states and behaviours? (3) How do such state level relationships vary as a function of trait level individual differences? (4) How do the relationships that are the focus of questions 1, 2, and 3 change across time? This article describes how to use multilevel random coefficient modelling (MRCM) to examine such relationships. The framework can accommodate different definitions of traits and dispositions (Allportian, processing styles, profiles, etc.) and different ways of conceptualising relationships between states and traits (aggregationist, interactionist, etc.). Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.