The value problem and the nature of knowledge

Jason Baehr has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to motivate the value problem in epistemology. What he calls the “guiding intuition” is not completely general: our intuition does not reveal that knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and not strictly formal: the intuition is not merely the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. If he is right, the value problem (as we know it) is not a real problem. I will argue in this paper that he is wrong about the generality claim: knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and yet he is right about the formality claim—there is more to the intuition than just the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. What this amounts to, I will argue, is that there is still a value problem but that the guiding intuition can tell us how to solve it.     

Zen Buddhism and the intrinsic value of nature

Part IIt is a perennial theme in the literature on environmental ethics that the exploitation of the environment is the result of a blindness to (or perhaps a refusal to recognize) the intrinsic value of natural beings. The general story here is that Western traditions of thought have tended to accord natural beings value only to the extent that they prove useful to humans, that they have tended to see nature as only instrumentally valuable. By contrast, it is said that a new, environmentally friendly understanding of the world would value nature ‘for its own sake’, would conceive natural beings as having intrinsic value. In the light of such an understanding, the oak tree, for instance, would be seen not merely as a source of timber or shade or as a decoration for the front lawn, but as valuable ‘in itself’, as having an intrinsic value that ought to be respected (see further, O'Neill 1993, chapter 2).     

The Utopianism of Hamilton's State of Needs: on rights,deliberation, and the nature of politics

Abstract

This article explores the role and conception of politics in Lawrence Hamilton's The Political Philosophy of Needs (Cambridge, 2003), including his critique of the 'rights-preference couple' and of rights in general; his critique of deliberation; and his view regarding the role of political philosophy. It argues that his theory rests on a remarkably high epistemic, moral and political confidence in the state, or rather in what states might be capable of becoming; equally, it rests on an underexplored understanding of the nature of politics itself. The article also criticizes Hamilton's approach to needs by comparing it to the needs approach of Wiggins and the capabilities approach of Alkire, arguing that the difference is not as great as Hamilton believes. Finally, it is suggested that Hamilton needs additional elements to his argument to show how a state of needs could be psychologically and politically self-sustaining.     

The rights and wrongs of consequentialism

I argue that the strongest form of consequentialism is one which rejects the claim that we are morally obliged to bring about the best available consequences, but which continues to assert that what there is most reason to do is bring about the best available consequences. Such an approach promises to avoid common objections to consequentialism, such as demandingness objections. Nevertheless, the onus is on the defender of this approach either to offer her own account of what moral obligations we do face, or to explain why offering such a theory is ill-advised. I consider, and reject, one attempt at the second sort of strategy, put forward by Alastair Norcross, who defends a ‘scalar’ consequentialism which eschews the moral concepts of right, wrong and obligation, and limits itself to claims about what is better and worse. I go on to raise some considerations which suggest that no systematic consequentialist theory of our moral obligations will be plausible, and propose instead that consequentialism should have a more informal and indirect role in shaping what we take our moral obligations to be.     

The rights of humans and other animals

Human moral rights place justified limits on what people are free to do to one another. Animals also have moral rights, and arguments to support the use of animals in scientific research based on the benefits allegedly derived from animal model research are thus invalid. Animals do not belong in laboratories because placing them there, in the hope of benefits for others, violates their rights.     

The globalization of human rights

The argument of this article is that what I term generic globalization has created unprecedented opportunities for advances in human rights universally, but that the dominant actually existing historical form of globalization – capitalist globalization – undermines these opportunities. Substantively, I argue that taking the globalization of human rights seriously means eliminating the ideological distinction that exists between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights on the other. Doing this systematically undermines the three central claims of capitalist globalization – namely, that globalizing corporations are the most efficient and equitable form of production, distribution and exchange; that the transnational capitalist class organizes communities and the global order in the best interests of everyone; and that the culture-ideology of consumerism will satisfy our real needs.     

Organizing principles of involvement in human rights and their social anchoring in value priorities

Two questionnaire studies were conducted (N=80 and N=175) to examine the structure and the social anchoring of the organizing principles of personal and governmental involvement concerning human rights. The results indicated that these organizing principles had, as hypothesized one abstract and one applied dimension. The second study evaluated the correlations between these dimensions and values. Results were consistent with Schwartz's (1992) model predicting both the internal structure of values and their relations with other variables. Amongst other results, self-transcendence values were positively correlated with the abstract involvements and the applied personal involvement, and negatively with the applied governmental involvement. The results concerning the correlations between conservation values and the four organizing principles were the opposite. Results concerning the links between different levels of social anchorings, particularly between the value types and variables such as religious affiliation and practice political preferences, and social and political activism were also presented and discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

天人合一与道法自然——道教关于人与自然和谐的理念与追求

人与自然的关系始终是人类社会关注的问题。道教的自然观强调人与自然的和谐共生,人与自然和谐的法则就是“天人合一”与“道法自然”。“人法地,地法天,天法道,道法自然”是道教处理人与自然关系的准则,它反映了道教“天人合一”的和谐理念,“道法自然”的和谐原则。一、道教对理想仙境的追求道教对于理想仙境的追求,实际上是对于人与自然万物和谐的一种向往,也是达到人与自然和谐的一种借助力。这种追求,一方面表现在对神仙洞府的描述;另一方面也体现在道教的神仙信仰之中和对自然的态度上。道教对理想仙境的追求,首先表现在对神仙洞府的…     

India's environment: The enclosure of nature and the nature of enclosure

This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India, by Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992, 274 pages, £4.95 pb.

Nature, Culture and Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia, David Arnold and Ramachandra Guha. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995, 376 pages, £19.50.