Don Jackson's "A critique of the literature on the genetics of schizophrenia": a reappraisal after 40 years

In 1960, Don Jackson published "A Critique of the Literature on the Genetics of Schizophrenia." Jackson's critique nearly relegated the classical twin method to obscurity as being hopelessly confounded by environmental factors. Jackson noted several trends in the schizophrenia twin data that were difficult to explain on genetic grounds. In fact, none of Jackson's 12 major points, examined in this article, have been satisfactorily answered by proponents of the twin method. The evidence in support of Jackson's most controversial claim-that the psychology of twinship itself might lead to a greater rate of schizophrenia among twins when compared with the single-born population--is inconclusive. However, although several leading twin researchers have dismissed Jackson's entire thesis on the basis of the inconclusiveness of this one claim, this idea was not central to Jackson's basic argument. The research undertaken for this article appears to confirm the validity of the most important points of Jackson's analysis and that therefore the classical twin method is of doubtful value as an indicator of genetic influences on schizophrenia and other diagnoses or psychological trait differences. Jackson's article demonstrated the implausibility of what came to be known as the MZ/DZ "equal environment assumption" of the twin method, implying that the twin method records nothing more than environmental differences between monozygotic and dizygotic twins.     

Psychology and phenomenology: a clarification

Controversies are rampant in contemporary psychology concerning the appropriate method for observing consciousness and the role inner experience should play in psychological theorizing. These conflicting orientations reflect, in part, methodological differences between natural science and human science interpretations of psychology. Humanistic psychology and philosophical phenomenology both employ a human science approach to psychology that seeks to explain behavior in terms of a person's subjective existence. Maslow's and Heidegger's formulations are both fulfillment theories in that they specify moral values that suggest how life ought to be lived. Natural science methodology rejects the possibility that moral imperatives can be validated, whereas human science methodology allows phenomenological convictions to justify recommendations about a fulfilled life and a good society. The social role of psychology is analyzed within the framework of phenomenological convictions and scientific truth.     

Causal Analyses Of Seeing

I critically analyse two causal analyses of seeing, by Frank Jackson and Michael Tye.I show that both are unacceptable. I argue that Jackson's analysis fails because it doesnot rule out cases of non-seeing. Tye's analysis seems to be superior to Jackson's in thisrespect, but I show that it too lets in cases of non-seeing. I also show that Tye's proposed solution to a problem for his theory – which involves a robot that mimics another (unseen) robot – fails. Finally I show that his `variability' requirement is not necessary, because there are cases where someone can see an object even though the variability that Tye requires doesnot exist.     

A personal encounter with psychology (1937-2002)

An undergraduate assistantship with Abraham Maslow, research with Solomon Asch, and an indirect exposure to Ernest Nagel's philosophy of science encouraged Howard H. Kendler to become involved with methodological issues in psychology. Graduate training with Kenneth Spence led to an active research career that was initially immersed in the latent learning controversy and later, with the collaboration of his wife Tracy Kendler, in the extension of the Hull-Spence model of cognitive development. Methodological concerns from a variety of sources encouraged Kendler to express his ideas on the methodology and history of psychology as well as its role in ethical and social policy issues. A productive symbiotic relationship is created from the interaction of democracy, natural-science psychology, and moral pluralism.     

Psychological science in the public arena: Three cases of dubious influence

Psychological science has a great deal to contribute to social welfare in all societies, because the world's most pressing social problems are behavioral in nature—violence, hunger, drug abuse, environmental pollution, low worker productivity, poor educational outcomes, and so forth. Thus, psychological research can inform public policies to improve approaches to these important social problems. The relationship of psychological science to public policy is often troubled, however, by misunderstandings about the role of science in the policy making process. Many scientists fear that their research results will be "misused" by others whose values differ from those of scientists. Thus, psychologists are reluctant to publish research results that can be used to support policies contrary to their own values and hesitate to ask research questions that can generate politically incorrect results. In this article, I argue that psychological science has a primary responsibility to ask dangerous questions and to report results honestly, without fear of their use; that research is not translated directly into public policies; and that psychological science should not be perverted either by fear of political consequences or by compromising truth in a quest for power. Three research examples are given to illustrate the different faces of temptation to pervert psychological science in a misguided hope that scientists' own values will be reflected in public policies.     

Autonomy and morality: A Self-Determination Theory discussion of ethics

Kantian ethics is based on a metaphysical conception of autonomy that may seem difficult to reconcile with the empirically-based science of psychology. I argue that, although not formally developed, a Self-Determination Theory (SDT) perspective of ethics can broaden the field of Kantian-based moral psychology and specify what it means, motivationally, to have autonomy in the application of a moral norm. More specifically, I argue that this is possible when a moral norm is fully endorsed by the self through a process of internalization that is energized by intrinsic motivation and is facilitated by the fulfillment of the basic needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness. The conditions of the fulfillment of these needs may even implicitly reveal which norms will be integrated and treated as moral norms. I conclude that SDT offers a motivational approach that is useful in understanding the development of moral norms.     

Japanese‐American confinement and scientific democracy: Colonialism,social engineering,and government administration

During World War II, the U.S. Indian Service conducted social science experiments regarding governance among Japanese Americans imprisoned at the Poston, Arizona, camp. Researchers used an array of techniques culled from anthropological culture and personality studies, psychiatry, psychology, medicine, and public opinion research to probe how the personality traits of the confined Japanese‐Americans and camp leaders affected the social interactions within each group and between them. The research drew on prior studies of Indian personality in the US Southwest, Mexico's Native policies, and indirect colonial rule. Researchers asked how democracy functioned in contexts marked by hierarchy and difference. Their goal was to guide future policies toward US “minorities“ and foreign races in post‐war occupied territories. We show how researchers deployed ideas about race, cultural, and difference across a variety of cases to create a universal, predictive social science, which they combined with a prewar romanticism and cultural relativism. These researchers made ethnic, racial, and cultural difference compatible with predictive laws of science based on notions of fundamental human similarities.     

Moral Progress and Human Agency

The idea of moral progress is a necessary presupposition of action for beings like us. We must believe that moral progress is possible and that it might have been realized in human experience, if we are to be confident that continued human action can have any morally constructive point. I discuss the implications of this truth for moral psychology. I also show that once we understand the complex nature and the complicated social sources of moral progress, we will appreciate why we cannot construct a plausible comprehensive action-guiding theory of moral progress. Yet while the nature and sources of moral progress consistently thwart many theoretical hopes, the idea of moral progress is a plausible, critically important and morally constructive principle of historical interpretation.     

When psychology undermines beliefs

This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (ii) can be explained by a psychological mechanism that is (iii) unreliable for the task of believing p; and (iv) any other evidence for belief p is based on rationalization. I will also consider and defend two equally valid arguments for establishing unreliability: the redundancy argument and the argument from irrelevant factors. With this more specific understanding of debunking arguments, it is possible to develop new replies to some objections to psychological debunking arguments from both ethics and philosophy of religion.     

Stripping the Boss: The Powerful Role of Humor in the Egyptian Revolution 2011

The Egyptian Revolution 2011 has shaken the Arab world and stirred up Middle-East politics. Moreover, it caused a rush in political science and the neighboring disciplines, which had not predicted an event like this and now have troubles explaining it. While many things can be learned from the popular uprising, and from the limitations of previous scholarship, our focus will be on a moral resource, which has occasionally been noticed, but not sufficiently explored: the role of humor in keeping up the spirit of the Revolution. For 18 days, protestors persevered at Liberation Square in Central Cairo, the epicenter of resistance; at times a few dozens, at times hundreds of thousands. What they did was to fight the terror of the regime, which reached absurd peaks during those days, with humor—successfully. We offer a social-functionalist account of the uprising, which includes behavioral as well as cultural levels of analysis, and illuminates how humorous means helped to achieve deadly serious goals. By reconstructing how Egyptians laughed themselves into democracy, we outline a social psychology of resistance, which uses humor both as a sword and a shield.     

Is the moral domain unique? A social influence perspective for the study of moral cognition

The nature of the cognitive processes that give rise to moral judgment and behavior has been a central question of psychology for decades. In this paper, we suggest that an often ignored yet fruitful stream of research for informing current debates on the nature of moral cognition is social influence. We introduce what we call the “social‐moderation‐of‐process” perspective, a methodological framework for leveraging insights from social influence research to inform debates in moral psychology over the mechanisms underlying moral cognition and the moral domains in which those mechanisms operate. We demonstrate the utility of the social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective by providing a detailed example of how research on social influence in behavioral ethics can be utilized to test a research question related to a debate between two prominent theories in moral psychology. We then detail how researchers across the field of moral psychology can utilize our social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective.     

The Future of Social‐Health Psychology: Prospects and Predictions

Social‐health psychology has made substantial contributions to health psychology and is poised to make many more in the future. Some new developments will come from empirical progress in theoretical and empirical social psychology that can elucidate the psychological mechanisms whereby social variables affect health. Others will come from technological advances, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging, that will uncover mechanisms that underlie effects of stress, coping, persuasive communications, and other factors on health. Progress will also come from social psychologists’ increasing comfort with biological processes and measures, including genetics and neuroendocrine mechanisms. As such, social‐health psychology will not only continue to enrich both health psychology and social psychology, but increasingly be able to speak to intervention possibilities. Moreover, by virtue of its emphasis on psychobiological mechanisms, social‐health psychology leads the way for an expanding role of social psychology in the integrative science of the future.     

The Relevance of Social Theory in the Practice of Environmental Management

In this paper I argue that the dominance of certain paradigms and theories on policies can have an influence on the value added by impact assessments. A link exists between paradigms and theories and policies and consequently the practices humans develop to tackle real world problems. I also argue that different types of thinking (contained in paradigms and theories) need to be integrated, at least at the scientific level, to enhance our understanding of social phenomena. This in turn can have a positive influence on policy processes that follow impact assessment recommendations. I am not arguing for the adoption of theoretical positions by practitioners, Instead, I contend that if impact assessments are informed by a variety of paradigms and theories, the policy practitioner might have a better understanding of the issue and the moral choices he or she needs to make. I will highlight the connection between theory and policies with practical examples from the social impact assessment of the De Hoop Dam, which was constructed on the Steelpoort River. I also argue for an integration of different theories to give a deeper understanding of real world problems.     

Assessing two competing approaches to the psychology of moral judgments

This paper brings together the social intuitionist view of the psychology of moral judgments developed by Jonathan Haidt, and the recent morphological rationalist position of Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. I will end up suggesting that Horgan and Timmons have offered us a more plausible account of the psychology of moral judgment formation. But the view is not without its own difficulties. Indeed, one of them might prove to be quite serious, as it could support a form of skepticism about understanding our own motivating reasons.     

The harms of ignoring the social nature of science

In this paper I argue that philosophers of science have an obligation to recognize and engage with the social nature of the sciences they assess if those sciences are morally relevant. Morally-relevant science is science that has the potential to risk harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment. My argument and the approach I develop are informed by an analysis of the philosophy of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human psychology and behaviour. From this literature, I tease out two different methods of scientific critique. The first I call the “truth-detectional” approach. Those who take this approach are first and foremost concerned about the truth of EP claims as that truth can be determined by evidence. The second I call the “social-dimensional” approach. Those who take this approach talk about the production and truth of EP claims but within a social framework. On this account, the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of EP claims are not separate from the institutional and social processes and values that lend to their production. I show that the truth-detectional approach risks harms to society and to the philosophy of science, but that the social-dimensional approach avoids these harms. Philosophers of science, therefore, should take a social-dimensional approach to the assessment of morally-relevant science.

     

Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame

In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we also tend to commit a kind of fundamental attribution error with respect to moral responsibility and blame. Do we also tend to ignore situational factors and overconfidently assume that people are morally responsible and blameworthy for their distinctive patterns of wrongful behaviour? Very few scholars have addressed this issue, and none has ever given a comprehensive account of moral responsibility and blame from a situationist perspective. In this paper, I argue that situationist social psychology impugns subjective theories of responsibility and blame which focus on the agent’s inner states and supports an objective theory—namely, the standard of the reasonable person. I defend this standard as a tool for moral appraisal, and then I refute the common misperception that this approach lets most perpetrators off the hook and poses a threat to society.     

Recontextualising moral injury among military veterans: An integrative theoretical review

Moral injury was originally conceived as a socially-inflicted wound of betrayal experienced by military veterans (Shay, 1994). However, moral injury has since been redefined by psychological researchers as an individualised, predominantly perpetration-driven, and psychopathological phenomenon (e.g., Currier et al., 2015; Jinkerson, 2016). However, social scientific researchers (e.g., Hodgson & Carey, 2017; Molendijk, 2019; Wiinikka-Lydon, 2017) have contested mainstream psychology's medicalisation and decontextualisation of moral injury. This theoretical review integrates insights from across these discourses, and brings them into dialogue with ideas from moral psychology, evolutionary science, and community psychology. The aim of this cross-disciplinary review is to promote a more holistic understanding of moral injury that does justice to its individual and social dimensions. Drawing on these different theoretical strands, this paper proposes that moral injury can be best understood as a psychological wound to basic human needs for social belonging and cohesion. The implications of this integrative understanding of moral injury for applied psychologists and other societal actors are explored. While the relevance of moral injury to civilian populations such as health and social care professionals is clear (e.g., Dombo et al., 2013; French et al., 2021), this paper focuses on military veterans, whose experiences originally prompted the coinage of the term. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement.