Hegel,the Trinity,and the ‘I’

The main goal of this paper is to argue the relevance of Hegel’s notion of the Trinity with respect to two aspects of Hegel’s idealism: the overcoming of subjectivism and his conception of the ‘I’. I contend that these two aspects are interconnected and that the Trinity is important to Hegel’s strategy for addressing these questions. I first address the problem of subjectivism by considering Hegel’s thought against the background of modern philosophy. I argue that the recognitive structure of Hegel’s idealism led him to give the Trinity a decisive role in his philosophical account. Next, I discuss the Trinity by analysing the three divine persons. This analysis paves the way for the conclusion, where I argue that the Trinity represents a model for re-thinking the ‘I’ in a way that overcomes a ‘naïve realist’ and a ‘subjective’ account of the self. I suggest that Hegel’s absolute idealism can be conceived as an approach to the ‘I’ that considers the role of acts of mutual recognition for the genesis of self-conscious thought, and that the Trinity is the Darstellung of the relational and recognitive structure of the ‘I’.     

‘I’

It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways, whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand. I develop an account based around these two requirements.     

I’m curious,I’m open to it,I test it,I trust it! A focus groups study to understand a-priori trust in automated buses

Trust is regarded as one of the main predictors for adopting automated buses (ABs). However, theories about trust (development) in technology generally vary and an in-depths study about trust in ABs specifically is still outstanding. The present study fills this gap by presenting results from focus group interviews to trust (development) in shared automated buses prior to exposure. The objectives of this study are to contrast participants’ naïve concepts of trust with theory and to identify underlying factors influencing a-priori trust in ABs. Results show that the N = 21 focus group participants use different strategies to familiarise themselves with the new technology of ABs, e.g., comparisons with familiar technologies, fundamental tendencies to approach or avoid, additional information seeking, or anthropomorphisation. These strategies largely support existing theories on trust (development) in technology. Differences between naïve interpretations of trust and its theoretical assumptions were found in focus group debates where more control over technology limited uncertainty and led to more trust. While theories suggest control and trust to be incompatible opposites, participants see control as a way to enhance trust. We provide starting points for further theory development and expansion and stress the importance of explanations in emerging technologies for trust and acceptance building.     

I’m Happy, Hope You’re Happy Too.

While most empirical studies show stable and high levels of subjective well-being in Western societies, other studies have documented an apparently contradictory feeling of a loss of sense of community and high levels of discontent with the way society functions. Based on an analysis of the Social Cohesion Indicators survey (SCIF, Belgium), we demonstrate that subjective well-being and one’s view on society are two distinct concepts. Both measurements are related, however, with some spill-over effects from individual well-being toward the assessment of society. Most notably, ethnocentrism does not have an impact on subjective well-being, but it has a strong negative impact on the view on society. Ethnocentrism has a strong effect on the distribution of discontent with society. We hypothesize that ethnocentric actors might still be satisfied with their own living conditions, but that they feel increasingly alienated from the culturally diverse society they live in.     

Frege On ‘I’, ‘Now’, ‘Today’ And Some Other Linguistic Devices

In this paper, I argue against an influential view of Frege's writings on indexical and other context-sensitive expressions, and in favour of an alternative. The centrepiece of the influential view, due to (among others) Evans and McDowell, is that according to Frege, context-sensitiveword-meaning plus context combine to express senses which are essentially first person, essentially present tense and so on, depending on the context-sensitive expression in question. Frege's treatment of indexicals thus fits smoothly with his Intuitive Criterion of difference of sense. On my view, by contrast, Frege stuck by the view which he held in his unpublished 1897 Logic, namely that the senses expressed by the combination of context-sensitive word-meaning and context could just as well be expressed by means of non-context-sensitive expressions: being first person, present tense and so on are properties, in Frege's view, only of language, not of thought. Given the irreducibility of indexicals – a phenomenon noticed by Castañeda, Perry and others – Frege's treatment of indexicals thus turns out to be inconsistent with the Intuitive Criterion. I argue that Frege was not aware of the inconsistency because he was not aware of the irreducibility of indexicals. This oversight was possible because the source of Frege's interest in indexicals, as inother context-sensitive expressions, differed from that of contemporary theorists. Whereas contemporary theorists are most often interested in indexicals (and in Frege's treatment of them) because they are interested in the indexical versions of Frege's Puzzle and their relation to psychological explanation, Frege himself was interested in them because they pose a prima facie threat to his general conception of thoughts. The only indexical expression Frege's view of which the above account does not cover is I insofar as it is associated with special and primitive senses, but Frege did not introduce such senses with a view to explaining theirreducibility of I his real reason for introducing them remains obscure.     

‘If I only had a little humility,I would be perfect’: Children’s and adults’ perceptions of intellectually arrogant,humble, and diffident people

Abstract

Intellectual humility is usually regarded as a virtue. In this paper, we conceptualized intellectual humility along two dimensions: (1) placing an adequate level of confidence in one’s own beliefs; (2) being willing to consider other people’s beliefs. We tested whether children (ages 4 to 11 years) and adults perceived intellectual humility as positive and how these perceptions changed across development. To do so, we asked participants to evaluate an intellectually humble person as compared to an intellectually arrogant person, who readily dismissed other people’s beliefs, or to an intellectually diffident person, who was unsure of a well-supported belief. Young children did not favor the intellectually humble person over the others, but older children and adults liked this person better and tended to consider her nicer than the arrogant one and smarter than the diffident one. These findings suggest that the virtuousness of intellectual humility in others is recognized from mid-childhood on.     

I’m merciful,am I not? Facets of narcissism and forgiveness revisited

Narcissists are said to be particularly unforgiving, yet previous research remains inconclusive. This is likely because most previous studies focused on narcissism as a unitary construct, thereby neglecting its multiple facets. The present study (N = 1101) thus aimed to clarify the nuanced associations between different facets of narcissism and forgiveness, the latter being assessed via self-report and non-self-report measures. The results of a structural equation model (SEM) showed that antagonistic aspects of narcissism were negatively correlated with explicit forgiveness. Importantly, agentic as well as communal aspects of narcissism were positively correlated with explicit forgiveness. Aspects of narcissistic personality were not correlated with implicit forgiveness. Results suggest that not all facets of narcissism are associated with an unforgiving stance.     

“I’ve said I’m sorry,haven’t I?” A study of the identity implications and constraints that apologies create for their recipients

In contrast to previous research on apologies, which has examined their role in enhancing impressions of those issuing them (e.g., Darby and Schlenker, 1989), the research reported here draws upon Goffman’s (1955) analysis of the “corrective cycle” and is concerned with constraints associated with the receipt of apologies. Study 1 examines the implications for the actor of accepting, not accepting, or rejecting apologies. It is demonstrated that across a variety of judgments, most positive views of the actor result when apologies are accepted; least positive views are associated with their rejection. A follow-up study sought to establish whether this effect would occur under circumstances in which unconvincing apologies are rejected. Results indicate that the apology’s status (convincing versus unconvincing) has no bearing on perceptions of actors. Based on a hypothetical role-play format, Study 2 addresses the matter of whether actors experience a subjective sense of constraint upon receipt of unsatisfactory apologies. The data suggest that there exists a pronounced tendency to accept such apologies, though typically with conditions that would be specified to the offender. More general implications of the data are discussed.     

‘I am of Popper’, ‘I am of Asante’: The Polemics of Scholarship in South Africa

Studies in Philosophy and Education - In this article, I examine the state of knowledge construction within the South African academe. This, I do by looking at how issues of epistemology and...     

Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal (and more generally indexical and demonstrative) contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the implications of this idea for a theory of first-person content and of immunity to error though misidentification. I then make some comparisons with Pryor’s notion of wh-misidentification and immunity thereof and with Cappelen and Dever’s position on immunity to error through misidentification and show why they are defective.     

How can I know I’ve perceived God?

In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of ones perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one directly enough by God and – bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort – discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not directly enough caused any such experience.     

‘I quit’ versus ‘I’m sorry I used’: A preliminary investigation of variations in narrative ending and transportation

A narrative experience can partly depend on how a narrative ends or concludes. This study examined prevention effects of personal drug use narratives varying by type of ending and gender of protagonist. Additionally, the role of transportation in the persuasion process, particularly the association between transportation and cocaine use intentions, both directly and indirectly, through the mediation of anti-drug and pro-drug expectancies was assessed. A total of 500 undergraduate students at a large northern university in the UK participated in the experiment which was a 2?×?2?×?2 mixed design with ending (progressive vs. regressive) and gender of protagonist (male vs. female) as within-participants factors and participant gender (male vs. female) as between-participants factors. The results demonstrated significant main effects for ending, gender of protagonist in the narrative and participant gender, but no interaction effects. Finally, greater transportation was associated with stronger anti-cocaine expectancies, which were further associated with lower cocaine use intentions. Important theoretical and empirical implications are discussed.     

Why are you looking at me? It’s because I’m talking,but mostly because I’m staring or not doing much

Our attention is particularly driven toward faces, especially the eyes, and there is much debate over the factors that modulate this social attentional orienting. Most of the previous research has presented faces in isolation, and we tried to address this shortcoming by measuring people’s eye movements whilst they observe more naturalistic and varied social interactions. Participants’ eye movements were monitored whilst they watched three different types of social interactions (monologue, manual activity, active attentional misdirection), which were either accompanied by the corresponding audio as speech or by silence. Our results showed that (1) participants spent more time looking at the face when the person was giving a monologue, than when he/she was carrying out manual activities, and in the latter case they spent more time fixating on the person’s hands. (2) Hearing speech significantly increases the amount of time participants spent looking at the face (this effect was relatively small), although this was not accounted for by any increase in mouth-oriented gaze. (3) Participants spent significantly more time fixating on the face when direct eye contact was established, and this drive to establish eye contact was significantly stronger in the manual activities than during the monologue. These results highlight people’s strategic top-down control over when they attend to faces and the eyes, and support the view that we use our eyes to signal non-verbal information.     

Why I’m still a proportionalist

Mark Schroeder has, rather famously, defended a powerful Humean Theory of Reasons. In doing so, he abandons what many take to be the default Humean view of weighting reasons—namely, proportionalism . On Schroeder’s view, the pressure that Humeans feel to adopt proportionalism is illusory, and proportionalism is unable to make sense of the fact that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. He thus offers his own ‘Recursive View’, which directly explains how it is that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. In this paper, I argue against Schroeder that a Humean ought to be a proportionalist. On my view, proportionalism is clearly an intuitive theory of weighting for a Humean, so we should resist it only if Schroeder can demonstrate either that there is a serious problem with the view, or that there is a better alternative. I then further argue that Schroeder fails to deliver on either condition. As a result, I conclude that there are good intuitive reasons for a Humean to be a proportionalist, and no good reason not to be.     

“I didn’t understand their system,and I didn’t know what to do”: Migrant Parents’ Experiences of Mandated Therapy for Their Children

In this phenomenological study, we explored the experiences of migrant parents whose children received mandated therapy in Southern California. Migrants are people who move to a host country either voluntarily as immigrants or involuntarily as refugees. Mandated therapy means that the school or court system required that their children receive services from a mental health provider. Parents often participated by having to take parenting classes and join in some sessions with their children; however, the children were the identified clients. We conducted eight, in-depth interviews with migrant parents. We employed Giorgi and Giorgi’s (Qualitative research in psychology: expanding perspectives in methodology and design. American Psychological Association, Washington, 2003; Qualitative psychology: a practical guide to research methods. Sage, London, 2008) phenomenological psychological research approach to analyze data. Analysis revealed four constituents, which are overarching themes related to the essential structure of the shared phenomenon: (a) migrant parents encountered discrimination and devaluation; (b) migrant parents experienced increased exposure to US culture and the mental health system, which accelerated acculturation; (c) the degree of cultural sensitivity exhibited by providers both positively and negatively influenced participants’ attitudes and perceptions toward mental health services; and (d) migrant parents used their mandated therapy experiences as opportunities to examine their family relationships and to learn new skills and concepts.     

I’ll Never Forgive You: High Conflict Divorce,Social Network,and Co-Parenting Conflicts

The relation between divorce, co-parenting conflicts, and children’s adjustment problems has been well established. An unresolved question for research and clinical interventions, however, is how conflicts between parents are maintained and/or escalate. This cross-sectional research tested the hypothesis that co-parenting conflicts in divorced couples are associated with perceived social network disapproval and that this relation is mediated by parents’ tendency to forgive each other. In Study 1, a convenience sample of 136 divorced parents recruited via online forums, we showed that perceived social network disapproval was indeed positively related to co-parenting conflicts and that parents’ tendency to forgive the other parent—albeit partly—explained this relationship. Strength of our research is that in Study 2, 110 parents referred to children’s mental health care because the wellbeing of the children was severely compromised by the severity of the conflicts between parents, we replicated these results. In both studies perceived social network disapproval and co-parenting conflicts were positively related and this link was mediated by forgiveness: perceived social network disapproval was negatively related to forgiveness, which in turn was negatively related to more parental conflicts.     

Please May I Have a Bike? Better Yet, May I Have a Hug? An Examination of Children’s and Adolescents’ Happiness

Academic research on children’s and adolescents’ happiness has been slow to develop. This research provides an empirical investigation to answer the question, “What makes children and adolescents happy?” We explore this question in two studies with a total of 300 participants ages 8–18. Study 1 asks participants to answer the open-ended question, “What makes me happy?” There were five emergent themes—“people and pets,” “achievements,” “material things,” “hobbies,” and “sports”. Study 2 also asks participants to answer the question, “What makes me happy?”, but uses two different measures (a semi-structured thought listing task and a collage task). Using three different happiness measures, we found consistent age differences in what children perceive to make them happy.