Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience

In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show that although the use of intentional predicates in mechanistic explanations sometimes leads to explanatorily inert claims, intentional predicates can also successfully feature in mechanistic explanations as tools for the functional analysis of the explanandum phenomenon. Despite the similarities between my account and Daniel Dennett's intentional-stance approach, I argue that intentional stance should not be understood as a theory of subpersonal causal explanation, and therefore cannot be used to assess the explanatory role of intentional predicates in neuroscience. Finally, I outline a general strategy for answering the question of what kind of language can be employed in mechanistic explanations.     

Computational explanation in neuroscience

According to some philosophers, computational explanation is proprietary to psychology—it does not belong in neuroscience. But neuroscientists routinely offer computational explanations of cognitive phenomena. In fact, computational explanation was initially imported from computability theory into the science of mind by neuroscientists, who justified this move on neurophysiological grounds. Establishing the legitimacy and importance of computational explanation in neuroscience is one thing; shedding light on it is another. I raise some philosophical questions pertaining to computational explanation and outline some promising answers that are being developed by a number of authors.     

The challenge of characterizing operations in the mechanisms underlying behavior

Neuroscience and cognitive science seek to explain behavioral regularities in terms of underlying mechanisms. An important element of a mechanistic explanation is a characterization of the operations of the parts of the mechanism. The challenge in characterizing such operations is illustrated by an example from the history of physiological chemistry in which some investigators tried to characterize the internal operations in the same terms as the overall physiological system while others appealed to elemental chemistry. In order for biochemistry to become successful, researchers had to identify a new level of operations involving operations over molecular groups. Existing attempts at mechanistic explanation of behavior are in a situation comparable to earlier approaches to physiological chemistry, drawing their inspiration either from overall psychology activities or from low-level neural processes. Successful mechanistic explanations of behavior require the discovery of the appropriate component operations. Such discovery is a daunting challenge but one on which success will be beneficial to both behavioral scientists and cognitive and neuroscientists.     

Social neuroscience evidence for dehumanised perception

Dehumanisation describes perceiving a person as nonhuman in some ways, such as lacking a mind. Social psychology is beginning to understand cognitive and affective causes and mechanisms—the psychological how and why of dehumanisation. Social neuroscience research also can inform these questions. After background on social neural networks and on past dehumanisation research, the article contrasts (a) research on fully humanised person perception, reviewing studies on affective and cognitive factors, specifically mentalising (considering another's mind), with (b) dehumanised perception, proposing neural systems potentially involved. Finally, the conclusion suggests limitations of social neuroscience, future research directions, and real-world consequences of this all-too-human phenomenon.     

Notes for a dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience1

The author postulates that the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience is based on the assumption that both deal with virtual structures. They are two facets of the same noumenal reality, but with different phenomenal realities, and it is possible to use metapsychology as a lingua franca to develop communication between the two fi elds. In the second part of the paper, the author refl ects on the results of recent neurophysiological research which seem to offer to psychoanalysis possibilities for fi nding an anatomical‐physiological correlate of some well‐known psychic phenomena and mechanisms, such as imitation, introjection, identifi cation, empathy, identity, mother‐child communication, learning, social communication and the analyst‐patient relationship. Particular neurons, called mirror neurons, have been located in the F5 area of baboons' brains. They are also present in man's brain within Broca's area. These neurons activate our motor system during both the performance of actions and the observation of actions performed by others giving rise to an automatic response, a sort of simulation or, rather, imitation, as the process is not intentional, but automatic and unaware, that is, unconscious.     

Naming our concerns about neuroscience: a review of Bennett and Hacker's philosophical foundations of neuroscience

Bennett and Hacker use conceptual analysis to appraise the theoretical language of modern cognitive neuroscientists, and conclude that neuroscientific theory is largely dualistic despite the fact that neuroscientists equate mind with the operations of the brain. The central error of cognitive neuroscientists is to commit the mereological fallacy, the tendency to ascribe to the brain psychological concepts that only make sense when ascribed to whole animals. The authors review how the mereological fallacy is committed in theories of memory, perception, thinking, imagery, belief, consciousness, and other psychological processes studied by neuroscientists, and the consequences that fallacious reasoning have for our understanding of how the brain participates in cognition and behavior. Several behavior-analytic concepts may themselves be nonsense based on thorough conceptual analyses in which the criteria for sense and nonsense are found in the ways the concepts are used in ordinary language. Nevertheless, the authors' nondualistic approach and their consistent focus on behavioral criteria for the application of psychological concepts make Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience an important contribution to cognitive neuroscience.     

Past and future of near-infrared spectroscopy in studies of emotion and social neuroscience

Near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) enables the non-invasive measurement of spatiotemporal characteristics of brain function, which has received increasing attention during the last years. This new birth of interest is attributable to unique characteristics of the NIRS technique, which may be summarised in certain technical advantages: its experimental and ecological validity and the extension of application to clinical samples. This paper presents the main applications of the NIRS technique that measures changes in brain activation to study emotions and social neuroscience field. In the first part of this paper, we discuss the basic principles, strengths, and limitations of NIRS for the study of principal emotional functions. In the second part, we focus on the actual applications of NIRS in emotional and social research. In this regard, first, we consider some main topics of emotional contexts, such as visual (facial expression) and auditory cues recognition, and social neuroscience field. Second, we discuss the utility to apply NIRS simultaneously to other techniques (electroencephalography, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) to improve the intrinsic power of such measures. Third, we consider the possible applications of NIRS devices to study specific emotion-related functions (such as connectivity and plasticity applications).     

The relations between neuroscience and human behavioral science.

Neuroscience seeks to understand how the human brain, perhaps the most complex electrochemical machine in the universe, works, in terms of molecules, membranes, cells and cell assemblies, development, plasticity, learning, memory, cognition, and behavior. The human behavioral sciences, in particular psychiatry and clinical psychology, deal with disorders of human behavior and mentation. The gap between neuroscience and the human behavioral sciences is still large. However, some major advances in neuroscience over the last two decades have diminished the span. This article reviews the major advances of neuroscience in six areas with relevance to the behavioral sciences: (a) evolution of the nervous system; (b) visualizing activity in the human brain; (c) plasticity of the cerebral cortex; (d) receptors, ion channels, and second/third messengers; (e) molecular genetic approaches; and (f) understanding integrative systems with networks and circadian clocks as examples.     

Libet-style experiments,neuroscience, and libertarian free will

People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not (but possibly could) support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will, but that Libet-style experiments have not done that so far.     

Relations among functional systems in behavior analysis

This paper proposes that an organism's integrated repertoire of operant behavior has the status of a biological system, similar to other biological systems, like the nervous, cardiovascular, or immune systems. Evidence from a number of sources indicates that the distinctions between biological and behavioral events is often misleading, engendering counterproductive explanatory controversy. A good deal of what is viewed as biological (often thought to be inaccessible or hypothetical) can become publicly measurable variables using currently available and developing technologies. Moreover, such endogenous variables can serve as establishing operations, discriminative stimuli, conjoint mediating events, and maintaining consequences within a functional analysis of behavior and need not lead to reductionistic explanation. I suggest that explanatory misunderstandings often arise from conflating different levels of analysis and that behavior analysis can extend its reach by identifying variables operating within a functional analysis that also serve functions in other biological systems.     

Behavior analysis and neuroscience: Complementary disciplines

Behavior analysis and neuroscience are disciplines in their own right but are united in that both are subfields of a common overarching field—biology. What most fundamentally unites these disciplines is a shared commitment to selectionism, the Darwinian mode of explanation. In selectionism, the order and complexity observed in nature are seen as the cumulative products of selection processes acting over time on a population of variants—favoring some and disfavoring others—with the affected variants contributing to the population on which future selections operate. In the case of behavior analysis, the central selection process is selection by reinforcement; in neuroscience it is natural selection. The two selection processes are inter‐related in that selection by reinforcement is itself the product of natural selection. The present paper illustrates the complementary nature of behavior analysis and neuroscience through considering their joint contributions to three central problem areas: reinforcement—including conditioned reinforcement, stimulus control—including equivalence classes, and memory—including reminding and remembering.     

教与学的大脑：人际神经科学助推教育研究

如何从神经生理层面刻画教育活动的人际互动模式和动态性是教育神经科学面临的一个重要挑战。人际神经科学视角为其提供了可能的解决途径; 这一新兴的视角通过记录和分析进行同一认知活动时两人或多人大脑活动之间的关联, 来揭示大脑活动的群体模式。目前, 人际神经科学方法已被应用于教育研究, 例如监控教学过程、预测教学效果和识别教学影响因素, 相应的研究成果对教育活动具有重要启示。未来的研究者可以更多地关注不同学习水平的学生大脑的互动机制及人际神经科学方法应用于技能教学及线上教学评估的巨大潜力。     

Composition and transactive memory systems

A recurrent theme in research on socially distributed cognition is to establish the claim that the cognitive phenomenon of transactive memory is grounded in a specific mode of organization: mechanistic compositional organization. My topic is the confluence of transactive remembering or transactive memory systems (TMSs) and mechanistic compositional organization. In relation to this confluence, the paper scrutinizes the claim that the kind of organization grounding TMSs and/or tokens of transactive remembering takes the specific form of mechanistic compositional organization – at least as the latter is usually construed. It is argued (i) that the usual account of mechanistic compositional organization is based on a synchronic composition function, and (ii) that the organization of TMSs and/or transactive remembering is not well understood by way of synchronic composition. The positive account pursued is that TMSs and/or transactive remembering are better understood as grounded in a diachronic composition function.     

近红外光学成像在社会认知神经科学中的应用

社会认知神经科学是运用认知神经科学的研究手段,探讨社会科学问题与理论的多学科交叉领域。近来,功能性近红外光学成像技术(functional near-infrared spectroscopy,fNIRS)凭借生态效度高、成像安全、对头动耐受性高、成本低等优势,成为了该领域新兴的热点技术。无论是在婴儿发育和社会经济决策的单脑研究中,还是在人际互动的多脑研究中,它都有广泛应用。未来近红外光学成像的应用可以向多脑神经反馈、脑机接口技术、设备无线化和多模态成像做进一步探索。     

情绪调节的理论观点、相关模型及其展望

情绪调节近年来获得许多研究的关注,呈现跨学科趋势,但对其内涵仍存在争议。本文首先评述了情绪调节研究领域内两种典型的观点--单因素观和双因素观,然后对目前盛行的Gross的情绪调节过程模型进行述评,并从神经科学出发着重于Ochsner的情绪认知控制模型。未来可基于发展观采用观测和经验取样测量开展纵向研究,加强多水平的神经生物学研究,和情绪调节中个体差异的分子遗传研究。     

Characterizing neurocognitive late effects in childhood leukemia survivors using a combination of neuropsychological and cognitive neuroscience measures

Knowledge about cognitive late effects in survivors of childhood acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL) is largely based on standardized neuropsychological measures and parent reports. To examine whether cognitive neuroscience paradigms provided additional insights into neurocognitive and behavioral late effects in ALL survivors, we assessed cognition and behavior using a selection of cognitive neuroscience tasks and standardized measures probing domains previously demonstrated to be affected by chemotherapy.

130 ALL survivors and 158 control subjects, between 8 and 18 years old at time of testing, completed the n-back (working memory) and stop-signal (response inhibition) tasks. ALL survivors also completed standardized measures of intelligence (Wechsler Intelligence Scales [WISC-IV]), motor skills (Grooved Pegboard), math abilities (WIAT-III), and executive functions (Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System). Parents completed behavioral measures of executive functions (Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function [BRIEF]) and attention (Conners-3).

ALL survivors exhibited deficiencies in working memory and response inhibition compared with controls. ALL survivors also exhibited deficits on WISC-IV working memory and processing speed, Grooved Pegboard, WIAT-III addition and subtraction fluency, and numerical operations, as well as DKEFS number-letter switching. Parent reports suggested more attention deficits (Conners-3) and behavioral difficulties (BRIEF) in ALL survivors compared with referenced norms. Low correspondence between standardized and experimental measures of working memory and response inhibition was noted.

The use of cognitive neuroscience paradigms complements our understanding of the cognitive deficits evident after treatment of ALL. These measures could further delineate cognitive processes involved in neurocognitive late effects, providing opportunities to explore their underlying mechanisms.     

14 challenges and their solutions for conducting social neuroscience and longitudinal EEG research with infants

The use of electroencephalography (EEG) to study infant brain development is a growing trend. In addition to classical longitudinal designs that study the development of neural, cognitive and behavioural functions, new areas of EEG application are emerging, such as novel social neuroscience paradigms using dual infant-adult EEG recordings. However, most of the experimental designs, analysis methods, as well as EEG hardware were originally developed for single-person adult research. When applied to study infant development, adult-based solutions often pose unique problems that may go unrecognised. Here, we identify 14 challenges that infant EEG researchers may encounter when designing new experiments, collecting data, and conducting data analysis. Challenges related to the experimental design are: (1) small sample size and data attrition, and (2) varying arousal in younger infants. Challenges related to data acquisition are: (3) determining the optimal location for reference and ground electrodes, (4) control of impedance when testing with the high-density sponge electrode nets, (5) poor fit of standard EEG caps to the varying infant head shapes, and (6) ensuring a high degree of temporal synchronisation between amplifiers and recording devices during dual-EEG acquisition. Challenges related to the analysis of longitudinal and social neuroscience datasets are: (7) developmental changes in head anatomy, (8) prevalence and diversity of infant myogenic artefacts, (9) a lack of stereotypical topography of eye movements needed for the ICA-based data cleaning, (10) and relatively high inter-individual variability of EEG responses in younger cohorts. Additional challenges for the analysis of dual EEG data are: (11) developmental shifts in canonical EEG rhythms and difficulties in differentiating true inter-personal synchrony from spurious synchrony due to (12) common intrinsic properties of the signal and (13) shared external perturbation. Finally, (14) there is a lack of test-retest reliability studies of infant EEG. We describe each of these challenges and suggest possible solutions. While we focus specifically on the social neuroscience and longitudinal research, many of the issues we raise are relevant for all fields of infant EEG research.     

Structures,dynamics and mechanisms in neuroscience: an integrative account

Proponents of mechanistic explanations have recently proclaimed that all explanations in the neurosciences appeal to mechanisms. The purpose of the paper is to critically assess this statement and to develop an integrative account that connects a large range of both mechanistic and dynamical explanations. I develop and defend four theses about the relationship between dynamical and mechanistic explanations: that dynamical explanations are structurally grounded, that they are multiply realizable, possess realizing mechanisms and provide a powerful top-down heuristic. Four examples shall support my points: the harmonic oscillator, the Haken–Kelso–Bunz model of bimanual coordination, the Watt governor and the Gierer–Meinhardt model of biological pattern formation. I also develop the picture of “horizontal” and “vertical” directions of explanations to illustrate the different perspectives of the dynamical and mechanistic approach as well as their potential integration by means of intersection points.