Virtual Reality Based Treatments in Eating Disorders and Obesity: A Review

Since the late 1990s the use of virtual reality (VR) has expanded in the field of mental disorders. During this time, several VR-based applications have been developed for the treatment of eating disorders (ED) and obesity. Both these pathologies involve disturbances related to eating behavior, weight, and body image. Although effective and well-established protocols are now available for the treatment of ED and obesity, relapses are frequent and a proportion of patients do not improve after intervention. In this context, VR has been shown to be a useful technology for enhancing traditional cognitive-oriented therapies. The main objective of this review was therefore to examine the evidence regarding the efficacy of VR-based treatments as a component of therapeutic interventions for ED and obesity. To this end, three databases (PsycInfo, Medline, and PsycArticles) were searched for the period 1986–2012. Only research articles and case studies were selected. Although several methodological deficiencies were detected in the reviewed studies, there is fair evidence for the effectiveness of VR-based treatments in ED and obesity. VR-based interventions usually combine exposure to VR environments with cognitive therapies. The VR component seems to be especially suitable for reducing body image disturbances, such as body image dissatisfaction, and for increasing self-esteem and self-efficacy. The rationale for the use of VR in these areas is also presented and discussed.     

Once a Utilitarian,Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences

Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects—effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near‐perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment.     

Can cognitive psychological research on reasoning enhance the discussion around moral judgments?

In this article we will demonstrate how cognitive psychological research on reasoning and decision making could enhance discussions and theories of moral judgments. In the first part, we will present recent dual-process models of moral judgments and describe selected studies which support these approaches. However, we will also present data that contradict the model predictions, suggesting that approaches to moral judgment might be more complex. In the second part, we will show how cognitive psychological research on reasoning might be helpful in understanding moral judgments. Specifically, we will highlight approaches addressing the interaction between intuition and reflection. Our data suggest that a sequential model of engaging in deliberation might have to be revised. Therefore, we will present an approach based on Signal Detection Theory and on intuitive conflict detection. We predict that individuals arrive at the moral decisions by comparing potential action outcomes (e.g., harm caused and utilitarian gain) simultaneously. The response criterion can be influenced by intuitive processes, such as heuristic moral value processing, or considerations of harm caused.     

Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

In 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment

ABSTRACT

Morality primarily serves social-relational functions. However, little research in moral psychology investigates how relational factors impact moral judgment, and a theoretically grounded approach to such investigations is lacking. We used Relational Models Theory and Moral Foundations Theory to explore how varying actor-victim relationships impacts judgment of different types of moral violations. Across three studies, using a diverse range of moral violations and varying the experimental design, relational context substantially influenced third-party judgment of moral violations, and typically independent of several factors strongly associated with moral judgment. Results lend novel but mixed support to Relationship Regulation Theory and provide some novel implications for Moral Foundations Theory. These studies highlight the importance of relational factors in moral psychology and provide guidelines for exploring how relational factors might shape moral judgment.     

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.     

Emotions as guardians of group norms: expressions of anger and disgust drive inferences about autonomy and purity violations

Other people’s emotional reactions to a third person’s behaviour are potentially informative about what is appropriate within a given situation. We investigated whether and how observers’ inferences of such injunctive norms are shaped by expressions of anger and disgust. Building on the moral emotions literature, we hypothesised that angry and disgusted expressions produce relative differences in the strength of autonomy-based versus purity-based norm inferences. We report three studies (plus three supplementary studies) using different types of stimuli (vignette-based, video clips) to investigate how emotional reactions shape norms about potential norm violations (eating snacks, drinking alcohol), and contexts (groups of friends, a university, a company). Consistent with our theoretical argument, the results indicate that observers use others’ emotional reactions not only to infer whether a particular behaviour is inappropriate, but also why it is inappropriate: because it primarily violates autonomy standards (as suggested relatively more strongly by expressions of anger) or purity standards (as suggested relatively more strongly by expressions of disgust). We conclude that the social functionality of emotions in groups extends to shaping norms based on moral standards.     

听觉刺激对虚拟环境中空间压缩的影响

人们往往会低估虚拟环境中空间的距离(空间压缩)。早期研究发现视听刺激的不一致会改善空间压缩,但听觉刺激在其中的作用及其影响效果需进一步研究。本研究首先探究了听觉刺激的有无对空间压缩的影响,接着操控视听刺激之间的物物距离进一步探究其对空间压缩的影响和改善。研究发现听觉刺激以两种方式影响空间压缩：听觉刺激的存在可以改善空间压缩;空间压缩与视听刺激的物物距离负相关。研究建议为了改善空间压缩,视听刺激应当同时呈现且物物距离至少为1 m。     

信念与结果对道德、法律责任判断的影响

在"执行者"和"旁观者"两个情境中,通过操纵当事人的信念和事件结果,考察了被试的道德与法律责任判断。结果显示:进行道德责任判断时,被试对当事人的信念信息更敏感;进行法律责任判断时,则对事件结果的信息更敏感。"执行者"情境中的道德和法律责任评分均高于"旁观者"情境中的责任评分。这说明道德、法律责任判断的内部机制有所不同,并且当事人的不同角色导致第三方对其的责任判断出现差异。     

Moral judgment toward relationship betrayals and those who commit them

In three experimental studies (total N = 1,056), we examined moral judgments toward relationship betrayals, and how these judgments depended on whether characters and their actions were perceived to be pure and loyal compared to the level of harm caused. In Studies 1 and 2, the focus was on confessing a betrayal, whereas in Study 3, the focus was on the act of sexual infidelity. Perceptions of harm/care were inconsistently and less strongly associated with moral judgment toward the behavior or the character, relative to perceptions of purity and loyalty, which emerged as key predictors of moral judgment across all studies. Our findings demonstrate that a diversity of cognitive factors play a key role in the moral perception of relationship betrayals.     

Reality check: the role of realism in stress reduction using media technology.

There is a growing interest in the use of virtual and other mediated environments for therapeutic purposes. However, in the domain of restorative environments, virtual reality (VR) technology has hardly been used. Here the tendency has been to use mediated real environments, striving for maximum visual realism. This use of photographic material is mainly based on research in aesthetics judgments that has demonstrated the validity of this type of simulations as representations of real environments. Thus, restoration therapy is developing under the untested assumption that photorealistic images have the optimal level of realism, while in therapeutic applications 'experiential realism' seems to be the key rather than visual realism. The present paper discusses this contrast and briefly describes data of three studies aimed at exploring the importance and meaning of realism in the context of restorative environments.     

A Theory of Blame

We introduce a theory of blame in five parts. Part 1 addresses what blame is: a unique moral judgment that is both cognitive and social, regulates social behavior, fundamentally relies on social cognition, and requires warrant. Using these properties, we distinguish blame from such phenomena as anger, event evaluation, and wrongness judgments. Part 2 offers the heart of the theory: the Path Model of Blame, which identifies the conceptual structure in which blame judgments are embedded and the information processing that generates such judgments. After reviewing evidence for the Path Model, we contrast it with alternative models of blame and moral judgment (Part 3) and use it to account for a number of challenging findings in the literature (Part 4). Part 5 moves from blame as a cognitive judgment to blame as a social act. We situate social blame in the larger family of moral criticism, highlight its communicative nature, and discuss the darker sides of moral criticism. Finally, we show how the Path Model of Blame can bring order to numerous tools of blame management, including denial, justification, and excuse.     

Cautious behaviors of pedestrians while crossing narrow streets: Exploration of behaviors using virtual reality experiments

This study explores the cautious behaviors of pedestrians in a typical local street environment using virtual reality (VR)-based experiments under various physical safety design scenarios for roadways. The built environment of this study focused on narrow local roads where frequent daily walking occurs within a neighborhood. VR experiments can provide an objective and accurate measurement of pedestrian behaviors, thus improving the understanding of complicated pedestrian behaviors. Based on experimental data from 200 university students, we identified pedestrians’ crossing behavior that is cautionary or risky concerning various physical safety designs of streets. This study found that there are trade-off relationships between various behaviors which should be systematically studied to produce safer street design guidelines. Furthermore, as the contexts and sequences matter in behaviors for intersection crossing, the interpretation of behaviors should carefully consider the context of built environments and sequential decisions made by pedestrians. This sequential understanding of before- and during-crossing behaviors and their connections expands our knowledge of pedestrians’ crossing behaviors.     

The Use of the Term Virtual Reality in Post-Stroke Rehabilitation: A Scoping Review and Commentary

Virtual reality (VR) offers many opportunities for post-stroke rehabilitation. However, “VR” can refer to several types of computer-based rehabilitation systems. Since these systems may impact the feasibility and the efficacy of VR interventions, consistent terminology is important. In this study, we aimed to optimize the terminology for VR-based post-stroke rehabilitation by assessing whether and how review papers on this topic defined VR and what types of mixed reality systems were discussed. In addition, this review can inspire the use of consistent terminology for other researchers working with VR. We assessed the use of the term VR in review papers on post-stroke rehabilitation extracted from Scopus, Web of Science and PubMed. We also developed a taxonomy distinguishing 16 mixed reality systems based on three factors: immersive versus semi-immersive displays, the way in which real and virtual information is mixed, and the main input device. 64% of the included review papers (N = 121) explicitly defined VR and 33% of them described different subtypes of VR, with immersive and non-immersive VR as the most common distinction. The most frequently discussed input devices were motion-capture cameras and handheld devices, while regular 2D monitors were the most frequently mentioned output devices. Our analysis revealed that reviews on post-stroke VR rehabilitation did not or only broadly defined “VR” and did not focus on a specific system. Since the efficacy and feasibility of rehabilitation may depend on the specific system, we propose a new data-driven taxonomy to distinguish different systems, which is expected to facilitate communication amongst researchers and clinicians working with virtual reality.     

TIES that BIND: an introduction to domain mapping as a visualization tool for virtual rehabilitation.

The application of virtual reality (VR) to rehabilitation is a young, interdisciplinary field where clinical implementation very rapidly follows scientific discovery and technological advancement. Implementation is often so rapid that demonstration of intervention efficacy by investigators, and establishment of research and development priorities by funding bodies tend to be more reactive than proactive. An examination of the dynamic unfolding of the history of our young discipline may help us recognize the facilitators of current practice and identify the barriers that limit greater progress. This paper presents a first step towards the examination of the past and future growth of VR-based rehabilitation by presenting the use of concept maps to explore the publication history of application of VR to rehabilitation.     

情绪状态对大学生道德判断能力的影响

采用道德判断测验(MJT中文版),以300名大学生为被试,考察了情绪状态对大学生道德判断能力的影响。结果发现:(1)大学生道德判断能力的年级差异显著;(2)情绪状态对大学生道德判断能力具有显著影响,快乐状态下的道德判断能力高于悲伤状态,这与国外的研究结论正好相反;(3)道德判断任务的自我相关性对大学生道德判断能力的影响不显著。     

The influence of war on moral judgments about harm

How does war influence moral judgments about harm? While the general rule is “thou shalt not kill,” war appears to provide an exception to the moral prohibition on intentional harm. In three studies (n = 263, n = 557, n = 793), we quantify the difference in moral judgments across peace and war contexts, and explore two possible explanations for the difference. The findings demonstrate that third-party observers judge a trade-off of one life for five as more morally acceptable in war than in peace, especially if the one person is from an outgroup of the person making the trade-off. In addition, the robust difference in moral judgments across “switch” and “footbridge” trolley problems is attenuated in war compared to in peace. The present studies have implications for moral psychology researchers who use war-based scenarios to study broader cognitive or affective processes. If the war context changes judgments of moral scenarios by triggering group-based reasoning or altering the perceived structure of the moral event, using such scenarios to make decontextualized claims about moral judgment may not be warranted.     

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.