Cortical coordination dynamics and cognition

New imaging techniques in cognitive neuroscience have produced a deluge of information correlating cognitive and neural phenomena. Yet our understanding of the inter-relationship between brain and mind remains hampered by the lack of a theoretical language for expressing cognitive functions in neural terms. We propose an approach to understanding operational laws in cognition based on principles of coordination dynamics that are derived from a simple and experimentally verified theoretical model. When applied to the dynamical properties of cortical areas and their coordination, these principles support a mechanism of adaptive inter-area pattern constraint that we postulate underlies cognitive operations generally.     

自我和他人的协调与心理理论的神经机制

有关心理理论神经机制的研究远未达到共识。从自我与他人协调的角度看,可认为它是一个由多脑区有机组织而成的系统。自我中心化偏差是人类认知的一种默认选择,要正确理解他人的心理状态,需要抑制自我中心偏差。因此,心理理论的加工至少包括以下几个不同的过程：通过模拟自我理解他人,相应的加工脑区为镜像神经元系统;从他人与客体形成的二元关系中表征心理状态的内容,相应脑区是颞顶联合区;对模拟自我进行抑制,相应脑区为背外侧额叶;以及整合协调以上几个过程,其脑区可能是内侧前额叶     

Electrophysiological measures of resting state functional connectivity and their relationship with working memory capacity in childhood

Functional connectivity is the statistical association of neuronal activity time courses across distinct brain regions, supporting specific cognitive processes. This coordination of activity is likely to be highly important for complex aspects of cognition, such as the communication of fluctuating task goals from higher‐order control regions to lower‐order, functionally specific regions. Some of these functional connections are identifiable even when relevant cognitive tasks are not being performed (i.e. at rest). We used magnetoencephalographic recordings projected into source space to demonstrate that resting state networks in childhood have electrophysiological underpinnings that are evident in the spontaneous fluctuations of oscillatory brain activity. Using the temporal structure of these oscillatory patterns we were able to identify a number of functional resting state networks analogous to those reported in the adult literature. In a second analysis we fused this dynamic temporal information with the spatial information from a functional magnetic resonance imaging analysis of functional connectivity, to demonstrate that inter‐subject variability in these electrophysiological measures of functional connectivity is correlated with individual differences in cognitive ability: the strength of connectivity between a fronto‐parietal network and lower‐level processing areas in inferior temporal cortex was associated with spatial working memory capacity, as measured outside the scanner with educationally relevant standardized assessments. This study represents the first exploration of the electrophysiological mechanisms underpinning resting state functional connectivity in source space in childhood, and the extent to which the strength of particular connections is associated with cognitive ability.     

The self and social cognition: the role of cortical midline structures and mirror neurons

Recent evidence suggests that there are at least two large-scale neural networks that represent the self and others. Whereas frontoparietal mirror-neuron areas provide the basis for bridging the gap between the physical self and others through motor-simulation mechanisms, cortical midline structures engage in processing information about the self and others in more abstract, evaluative terms. This framework provides a basis for reconciling findings from two separate but related lines of research: self-related processing and social cognition. The neural systems of midline structures and mirror neurons show that self and other are two sides of the same coin, whether their physical interactions or their most internal mental processes are examined.     

Mechanisms of motivation–cognition interaction: challenges and opportunities

Recent years have seen a rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation–cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The present issue of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation–cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas, in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming toward a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed toward them.     

Pragmatism,enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism

This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one (the neural dynamics of the sensorimotor contingencies and the emergence of enactive agency) and the personal one (the dynamics that emerges from the organism-environment interaction in ecological terms). If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology.

     

Learning as change of coordination dynamics: theory and experiment

Learning of coordination patterns was investigated theoretically from the point of view of a dynamic theory of biological coordination and with reference to recent experiments on the learning of relative timing patterns. The theory is based on theoretical and experimental work showing that coordinated movement is characterized not only by the actually performed pattern of coordination but by an entire dynamics of coordination. Theoretically, such dynamics are captured as equations of motion of relevant collective variables. Experimentally, signatures of these underlying dynamics can be found in the temporal stability of coordination patterns, which can be assessed through various stability measures as well as through processes of pattern change. We argue that not only intrinsic coordination tendencies, but also specific behavioral requirements, be they perceived, memorized, or intended, must be expressed in terms of such dynamics. The concept of behavioral information captures such requirements as part of the coordination dynamics. We expound two hypotheses on the nature of learning in this framework. First, we assume that at each point during the learning process the system is governed by a well-defined coordination dynamics. This equation of motion evolves with learning so as to acquire an attractor solution near the to-be-learned pattern. Second, we hypothesize that this change of the coordination dynamics, captured by the time course of memorized behavioral information, can itself be ascribed to an additional layer of dynamics, the slower learning dynamics. Testable consequences of these views are discussed in the light of recent experimental findings on the learning of a relative phase in rhythmic movement: (a) Learning affects dynamic properties of performed coordination patterns, in particular, their stability; (b) the change of the coordination dynamics due to learning leads to specific changes of behavior also under conditions other than the learned condition, namely, to systematic deviation toward the learned patterns; (c) learning may lead to instabilities in the coordination behavior if initial and learned performance differ sufficiently; and (d) the dynamic properties of the performed coordination patterns are distinct on the two time scales of learning and of performance.     

Self-organization of coordinative movement patterns

We present a strictly operational approach — in which theoretical tools and experimental data are developed together — to the problem of understanding the coordination of movement patterns. The empirical aspects are guided by synergetics, a theory of spontaneous pattern formation in open systems. Following an outline of our theoretical strategy, recent experimental results are reviewed that demonstrate the validity of the approach. From these studies, it is possible to establish the linkage between order-order transitions in movement behavior and other nonequilibrium phase transitions in nature. Behavioral patterns (corresponding to low-dimensional attractors for collective variables) and their dynamics are shown to arise in a purely self-organized fashion from cooperative coupling among individual components. This step has been implemented analytically and computationally. The insights gained from the present research allow a generalization in the form of seven theoretical propositions that aim at characterizing pattern formation, stability and change in complex, biological systems. In turn, a number of new research directions emerge, including studies of the collective dynamics of the environment-movement system, learning, and multiple-limb coordination.     

Characterizing variation in the functional connectome: promise and pitfalls

The functional MRI (fMRI) community has zealously embraced resting state or intrinsic functional connectivity approaches to mapping brain organization. Having demonstrated their utility for charting the large-scale functional architecture of the brain, the field is now leveraging task-independent methods for the investigation of phenotypic variation and the identification of biomarkers for clinical conditions. Enthusiasm aside, questions regarding the significance and validity of intrinsic brain phenomena remain. Here, we discuss these challenges and outline current developments that, in moving the field toward discovery science, permit a shift from cartography toward a mechanistic understanding of the neural bases of variation in cognition, emotion and behavior.     

杜威反射弧概念中的具身认知思想

伴随第二代认知科学的兴起,大量研究者开始在具身认知这一主张上达成共识,即有机体的身体运动以及与身体运动相关的特征和感觉经验（或称身体经验）在认知过程中扮演重要角色,而有机体的身体又嵌入到其所处的动态环境之中,从而形成一个不可分割的整体。杜威在《心理学中的反射弧概念》一文中的论证蕴含了上述具身认知思想的雏形,主要体现在：（1）身体运动协调构成了感觉运动回路。（2）在身体运动协调基础上形成的身体经验在感觉运动回路中具有连续性。（3）感觉运动回路中的身体运动与经验以环境为背景,最终目的是为了适应环境。未来的具身认知研究可以借鉴杜威所论证的反射弧概念,对上述三个方面作出进一步探索。     

Hints of beauty in social cognition: Broken symmetries in mental dynamics

It is a widely held assumption that social cognition is wholly the result of natural selection and learning, debates arising over how much was naturally selected versus how much is learned. I argue here, however, for there being a third factor, namely physics, specifically symmetries and symmetry breakings in neural dynamics. These symmetries manifest themselves in social judgments in a fairly direct way as descending chains of subgroup types in mental social schemata. These schemata are the four models of Alan Page Fiske's relational-models typology. Descending chains of subgroup types are a phenomenon widely observed in nature; their presence in social cognition is consistent with there being a relevant neural network, the activity of which can undergo symmetry breakings. This would be analogous to the neural activity that has been computer modeled in an attempt to explain animal locomotion. This should encourage work towards specifying the particular symmetry groups in social cognition as a step towards devising computer models of the relevant neural mechanism. Approaches to animal locomotion suggest at least the broad outlines of how to proceed. Evidence of symmetry groups in social schemata also supports the view that the innate aspects of social cognition are at least partly structured by dynamics without being encoded in genes, just as the shape of the protective shell of some viruses results from dynamics without being genetically encoded.     

Distal engagement: Intentions in perception

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use.     

Symmetry axiom of Haken–Kelso–Bunz coordination dynamics revisited in the context of cognitive activity

We present an axiomatic derivation of a model proposed by Haken, Kelso, and Bunz (1985) that describes dynamical aspects of the rhythmic coordination between two limbs. Elaboration of this model has included a symmetry parameter that captures the coordination consequences of an inherent or imposed frequency difference between the limbs. We modified one of the axioms involved in the model derivation, a symmetry axiom, in order to incorporate a new symmetry parameter. This new parameter defines a shift between (a) the laboratory coordinate system, in which the behavior is observed, and (b) a second, postulated coordinate system. It is this second coordinate system, in which the relevant state dynamics is assumed to take place and in which the state dynamics evolves under the impact of an attractor. The state dynamics as described in the attractor coordinate system is then mapped by means of the new symmetry parameter to the laboratory coordinate system. We discuss analytically the bifurcation diagram of the model and determine main effects and interaction effects of manipulations related to the symmetry parameters and related to the mode of coordination (in-phase and anti-phase). The theoretical results are brought to bear on the challenging experimental observation that concurrent cognitive activity (counting, encoding, retrieving, sentence analysis) changes the location of the bimanual coordination attractor but not its strength. The theoretical results suggest that cognitive activity may have the effect it has because it shifts the attractor coordinate system relative to the laboratory coordinate system.     

Is cognition seasonal?

The idea that our mental life is more sluggish in winter is apparently seductive. This article reviews the evidence for the claim that there is a seasonal cycle in human cognition. Several methodologies have been used with participants such as over-wintering scientists in Antarctica, residents of polar regions, and patients with seasonal psychopathology and there is no clear tendency for cognition to be impaired in winter. Some large-scale public health studies report seasonality of cognition but are inconsistent regarding when in the year there is a peak and trough. Claims that human cognition has an annual cycle should be regarded as speculative and the burden of proof must be borne by anyone inclined to claim that such a cycle exists. An analysis of the influence of some key studies shows that their results are misleadingly cited and that there is resistance to the null conclusion.     

The organization of thinking: What functional brain imaging reveals about the neuroarchitecture of complex cognition

Recent findings in brain imaging, particularly in fMRI, are beginning to reveal some of the fundamental properties of the organization of the cortical systems that underpin complex cognition. We propose an emerging set of operating principles that govern this organization, characterizing the system as a set of collaborating cortical centers that operate as a large-scale cortical network. Two of the network’s critical features are that it is resource constrained and dynamically configured, with resource constraints and demands dynamically shaping the network topology. The operating principles are embodied in a cognitive neuroarchitecture, 4CAPS, consisting of a number of interacting computational centers that correspond to activating cortical areas. Each 4CAPS center is a hybrid production system, possessing both symbolic and connectionist attributes. We describe 4CAPS models of sentence comprehension, spatial problem solving, and complex multitasking and compare the accounts of these models with brain activation and behavioral results. Finally, we compare 4CAPS with other proposed neuroarchitectures.     

Social cognition, artefacts, and stigmergy: A comparative analysis of theoretical frameworks for the understanding of artefact-mediated collaborative activity

Collective behaviour is often characterised by the so-called ‘coordination paradox’: looking at individual ants, for example, they do not seem to cooperate or communicate explicitly, but nevertheless at the social level cooperative behaviour, such as nest building, emerges, apparently without any central coordination. In the case of social insects such emergent coordination has been explained by the theory of stigmergy, which describes how individuals can effect the behaviour of others (and their own) through artefacts, i.e., the product of their own activity (e.g., building material in the ants’ case). Artefacts clearly also play a strong role in human collective behaviour, which has been emphasised, for example, by proponents of activity theory and distributed cognition. However, the relation between theories of situated/social cognition and theories of social insect behaviour has so far received relatively little attention in the cognitive science literature. This paper aims to take a step in this direction by comparing three theoretical frameworks for the study of cognition in the context of agent–environment interaction (activity theory, situated action, and distributed cognition) to each other and to the theory of stigmergy as a possible minimal common ground. The comparison focuses on what each of the four theories has to say about the role/nature of (a) the agents involved in collective behaviour, (b) their environment, (c) the collective activities addressed, and (d) the role that artefacts play in the interaction between agents and their environments, and in particular in the coordination of cooperation.     

Facing up to Complexity: Implications for Our Social Experiments

Biological systems are highly complex, and for this reason there is a considerable degree of uncertainty as to the consequences of making significant interventions into their workings. Since a number of new technologies are already impinging on living systems, including our bodies, many of us have become participants in large-scale “social experiments”. I will discuss biological complexity and its relevance to the technologies that brought us BSE/vCJD and the controversy over GM foods. Then I will consider some of the complexities of our social dynamics, and argue for making a shift from using the precautionary principle to employing the approach of evaluating the introduction of new technologies by conceiving of them as social experiments.     

What’s an early triadic interaction made of? A methodological proposal to study the musical dynamics of interaction

Classical theories of intersubjectivity hold that the first interactions in which children participate are dyadic (adult-baby). However, thanks to the material shift that is taking place in the cognitive sciences, an increasing number of authors began to recognise the constitutive role that materiality has for cognition, from the very beginning of life. Interactions do not occur in a vacuum, but within a meaning-loaded material world that adults actively seek to bring to children. While in the field of dyadic interactions studies on communicative musicality have shown how interactive exchanges are structured and how that structure unfolds over time, little is known yet about the internal structure of early triadic interactions. In this paper, we propose a longitudinal, mixed and multilevel methodological framework aimed at describing the dynamics of the musical organisation of early triadic interactions between adults, babies and things, and its development over different timescales. We conclude that if researchers want to fully understand early triadic interactions and their musical structuring, further studies that take into account the cognitive relevance of things and the dynamics of our interactions with and through materiality are needed.     

Distributed primate cognition: a review

A model of "distributed cognition" is contrasted with the "mental representation" model exemplified by Tomasello and Call's Primate Cognition. Rather than using behavior as a basis for inferences to invisible mental events such as intentions, the distributed approach treats communicative interactions as, themselves, directly observable cognitive events. Similar to a Vygotskian approach, this model characterizes cognition as "co-constructed" by the participants. This approach is thus particularly suitable for studying primates (including humans), whose reliance on multiparty negotiations can undermine the researcher's ability to extrapolate from observable outcomes back to individual intentions. Detailed (e.g., frame-by-frame) analyses of such interactions reveal cross-species differences in the relevant media of information flow (e.g., behavioral coordination, relative gaze) as well as in the flexibility and complexity of the trajectories observed. Plus, with its focus on dynamics, the distributed approach is especially useful for modeling developmental and evolutionary processes. In discussing enculturation and the ontogeny of imitation, its emphasis is on changes in how expert and novice participate in such events, rather than how either may represent them. Primate cognitive evolution is seen as involving changes in context sensitivity, multi-tasking, and the coordination of social attention. Humans in particular – in, especially, the context of teaching – are seen as having specialized in linking co-perception with the refined sensory-motor coordination that enables them to translate observed behavior into strategically similar action. Highlighting the continuity between human and nonhuman development, this promising, complementary model enables us to tap the richness of micro-ethology as a cognitive science. Accepted after revision: 7 January 2001 Electronic Publication