Why The Pessimistic Induction Is A Fallacy

Putnam and Laudan separately argue that the falsity of past scientific theories gives us reason to doubt the truth of current theories. Their arguments have been highly influential, and have generated a significant literature over the past couple of decades. Most of this literature attempts to defend scientific realism by attacking the historical evidence on which the premises of the relevant argument are based. However, I argue that both Putnam's and Laudan's arguments are fallacious, and hence attacking their premises is unnecessary. The paper concludes with a discussion of the further historical evidence that would be required if the pessimistic induction is to present a serious threat to scientific realism.     

为什么伪科学是危险的……

俄罗斯伪科学现象日渐猖獗.报纸、杂志、互联网以及电视上到处都是宣传能治百病的医疗器械的广告,宣扬现代科学危机以及摆脱危机的希望等等.那些毫不负责的观点带来了危害,俄<科学与生活>杂志就此多次刊载文章.俄罗斯科学院反伪科学和反科学造假委员会主席、俄罗斯科学院西伯利亚分部院士埃·巴·克鲁格利亚科夫就此题目继续发表文章.     

Why Expecting Conflict Is Good

To understand whether young women's expectations of marriage-career role conflict may lead to strategic plans for combining roles and more successful role combination, data were analyzed from 117 women, primarily Caucasian, completing surveys in the Women's Life Paths Study in 1967 as college seniors and again in 1981. Seniors who wanted careers but anticipated conflict more often combined marriage and full-time career in 1981 than did those who wanted careers but expected no conflict. The latter combined marriage and career even less often than did those not initially wanting careers. Those who expected conflict asserted their career intentions with spouses, postponed childbearing, and had fewer children by 1981. Women not combining roles in 1981 most often reported conflict. Women with supportive partners less often reported conflict.     

Why Dynamical Self-Excitation Is Possible

In Pérez Laraudogoitia (1996), I introduced a simple example of a supertask that involved the possibility of spontaneous self-excitation and, therefore, of a particularly interesting form of indeterminism in classical dynamics. Alper and Bridger (1998) criticised (among other things) this result. In the present article, I answer their criticisms. In what follows I assume familiarity both with Pérez Laraudogoitia (1996) and Alper and Bridger’s subsequent article. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The No Probabilities For Acts-Principle

One can interpret the No Probabilities for Acts-Principle, namely that any adequate quantitative decision model must in no way contain subjective probabilities for actions in two ways: it can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. In this paper, I will show that the former is the better interpretation of the principle.     

Why There Still Are No People

This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons.     

Why Only Perfection Is Good Enough

Abstract

I argue that the traditional problem of evil mislocates the problem which confronts the theist. The real problem arises not from the evil in the world, but from the non-perfection of the world. Given that a perfect God could create only a perfect world, and given that the world is not in fact perfect, I construct an argument for atheism. I show that the argument is not open to the objections which theists standardly bring against the traditional objection from evil.     

Why Pragmatics Is Probably Enough for Now

In place of aesthetic, essentialist, or foundational pursuits, family therapy might be better served by simply seeking to be helpful. Within such a perspective, ideas are valued/embraced for their functionality and utility. In the following essay, a critical discussion concerning this pragmatic emphasis is undertaken with illustrative clinical case examples from the Eastside Family Centre in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.     

Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori

This paper argues that nearly every proposition could in principle be known a priori, with exceptions for necessary falsehoods and a few other odd cases. The argument for this conclusion has two main premises: (i) Odd exceptions aside, if it is possible that p, then it is possible that someone knows innately that p. (ii) Necessarily, whatever is known innately is known a priori. After defending (i) and (ii), I conclude by suggesting that the best way to recover a reasonably limited and interesting conception of the a priori is to adopt an anthropocentric conception of a priori knowability, one that is relativized to our own innate cognitive capacities. However, this proposal has consequences that contradict prevailing views about the a priori. More importantly, this proposal has the result that many philosophical applications of the notion of apriority are misguided.     

医学为什么会愈加凸现人文意义

从医学的特殊性所包含的丰富的人文价值。弘扬人文精神对医学科技正确发展的作用,论述了注重医学发展中凸现人文意义的原因。     

安乐死立法为什么这样难

关于安乐死的争论由来已久,虽然目前全世界仅有荷兰等极少数国家通过了有关安乐死的法案,但安乐死实际已经在许多国家悄悄实施,越来越多的人对安乐死持肯定态度已成为不争的事实.贵州省贵阳市一个体行医者赵某还声称自己实施过几例"安乐死".我们实在不知道这种"违规"操作在现实中究竟有多少?这些事实提醒我们不应再就安乐死问题采取回避和视而不见的态度,而应正视它,并尽快制定出明确的法规,在认可安乐死的同时,规范安乐死的实施,作出符合人类理性的选择和符合人类法的精神决断.