Evaluation of third-party reciprocity by squirrel monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Saimiri sciureus</Emphasis>) and the question of mechanisms

Social evaluation during third-party interactions emerges early in human ontogeny, and it has been shown in adult capuchin monkeys who witness violations of reciprocity in object exchanges: Monkeys were less inclined to accept food from humans who refused to reciprocate with another human. A recent study reporting similar evidence in marmoset monkeys raised the possibility that such evaluations might be based on species’ inherent cooperativeness. We tested a species not renowned for cooperativeness—squirrel monkeys—using the procedure used with marmosets and found a similar result. This finding rules out any crucial role for cooperative tendencies in monkeys’ responses to unfair exchanges. We then tested squirrel monkeys using procedures more similar to those used in the original study with capuchins. Squirrel monkeys again accepted food less frequently from non-reciprocators, but unlike capuchins, they also strongly preferred reciprocators. We conclude that neither squirrel monkeys nor marmoset monkeys engaged in emotional bookkeeping of the type that probably underlies social evaluation in capuchin monkeys; instead, they employed one or more simple behavioral rules. Further comparative studies are required to clarify the mechanisms underlying social evaluation processes across species.     

Physical Attractiveness,Altruism and Cooperation in an Ultimatum Game

Explaining cooperative tendencies through an evolutionary lens has been problematic for theorists. Traditional explanations derive from theories of reciprocity, biological markets, and more recently via partner choice and sexual selection. The sexual selection hypothesis has been tested within game-theoretic frameworks gaining empirical support in explaining the evolution of altruism. Males have been found to be more altruistic towards attractive females. However, previous research has predominantly adopted a design where participants are not engaging with ‘real people’. Instead, participants make decisions when viewing images or hypothetical scenarios without visual cues. The present study aimed to investigate the sexual selection hypothesis using a face-to-face game theoretic framework. One hundred and thirty-eight participants played a 2-round ultimatum game with chocolate coins as the monetary incentive. We find, that physical attractiveness had no influence on generosity and cooperation when participants play a face-to-face ultimatum game. Instead, proposers were fair when allocating stakes, offering an average of half the endowment to responders. This study refutes the link between the sexual selection hypothesis and generosity when playing economic games with real people. Fairness appeared to drive generosity and cooperation.     

间接互惠中的声誉机制：印象、名声、标签及其传递

Alexander在1986年提出了间接互惠的概念, 并在次年出版的《道德体系生物学》一书中进行了系统阐述, 用来解释人类道德以及大规模合作行为的起源。间接互惠一经提出就得到了广泛的关注, 研究者基于进化博弈论的视角对间接互惠进行了诸多研究, 认为人群中间接互惠的大量存在是声誉机制的结果, 并提出了诸如印象分数、名声、标签等不同的声誉机制, 但是目前关于声誉机制的研究大都建立在个体信息可被所有他人观察到的假设之上, 多在个体层面展开声誉机制的研究。今后应该注重在信息不充分情景下开展群体层面上声誉传递机制的研究, 探讨间接互惠中心理机制(如信任、公平等)的作用并提高研究的生态效度。     

Reciprocity of support in coatis (Nasua nasua)

Primate sociality has received much attention and its complexity has been viewed as a driving force for the evolution of cognitive abilities. Improved analytic techniques have allowed primate researchers to reveal intricate social networks based on the exchange of cooperative acts and services. Although nonprimates are known to show similar behavior (e.g., cooperative hunting, food sharing, coalitions) there seems a consensus that social life is less complex than in primates. Here the authors present the first group-level analysis of reciprocity of social interactions in a social carnivore, the ring-tailed coati (Nasua nasua). The authors found that support in aggressive conflicts is a common feature in coatis and that this behavior is reciprocally exchanged in a manner seemingly as complex as in primates. Given that reciprocity correlations persisted after controlling for the effect of spatial association and subunit membership, some level of scorekeeping may be involved. Further studies will be needed to confirm our findings and understand the mechanisms underlying such reciprocity, but our results contribute to the body of work that has begun to challenge primate supremacy in social complexity and cognition.     

Moral tribalism and its discontents: How intuitive theories of ethics shape consumers' deference to experts

We study the psychology at the intersection of two social trends. First, as markets become increasingly specialized, consumers must increasingly defer to outside experts to decide among complex products. Second, people divide themselves increasingly into moral tribes, defining themselves in terms of shared values with their group and often seeing these values as being objectively right or wrong. We tested how and why these tribalistic tendencies affect consumers' willingness to defer to experts. We find that consumers are indeed tribalistic in which experts they find convincing, preferring products advocated by experts who share their moral values (Study 1), with this effect generalizing across product categories (books and electronics) and measures (purchase intentions, information‐seeking, willingness‐to‐pay, product attitudes, and consequential choices). We also establish the mechanisms underlying these effects: because many consumers believe moral matters to be objective facts, experts who disagree with those values are seen as less competent and therefore less believable (Studies 2 and 3), with this effect strongest among consumers who are high in their belief in objective moral truth (Study 4). Overall, these studies seek not only to establish dynamics of tribalistic deference to experts but also to identify which consumers are more or less likely to fall prey to these tribalistic tendencies.     

Reputation,Gossip, and Human Cooperation

Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of reputation: people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation in their social environment. Reputation is a key element fueling a system of indirect reciprocity, where cooperators establish a good reputation and are thus more likely to receive future benefits from third parties. The tendencies to monitor, spread, and manage each other's reputation help explain the abundance of human cooperation with unrelated strangers. We review research on the phenomenon of reputation‐based cooperation in the domains of how people manage their reputation in response to varying cues of reputation, when reputation can promote cooperation, and individual differences in reputation management. We also propose three directions for future research: group stability and reputation‐based cooperation, solutions to cope with noise and biased reputation, and the relative efficiency of positive versus negative reputation systems.     

Shifting toward cooperative tendencies and forgiveness: How partner‐focused prayer transforms motivation

Several studies tested whether partner‐focused prayer shifts individuals toward cooperative tendencies and forgiveness. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who prayed more frequently for their partner were rated by objective coders as less vengeful. Study 3 showed that, compared to partners of targets in the positive partner thought condition, the romantic partners of targets assigned to pray reported a positive change in their partner's forgiveness. In Study 4, participants who prayed following a partner's “hurtful behavior” were more cooperative with their partners in a mixed‐motive game compared to participants who engaged in positive thoughts about their partner. In Study 5, participants who prayed for a close relationship partner reported higher levels of cooperative tendencies and forgiveness.     

Empathy and generalized reciprocity in compliance with requests for help

This study examined empathy and reciprocity as explanations for why people comply with requests for help. Participants (35 male and 62 female) imagined being asked for money by a person who had locked keys in a car and then reported how likely they would he to comply with such a request, whether they had previously locked their keys in their car (empathy), and, if so, whether they had been helped (reciprocity). In support of the explanation based on empathy, people who reported previously locking their keys in their cars indicated being more likely to comply.     

Reciprocity and Discrimination: An Experiment of Hindu‐Muslim Cooperation in Indian Slums

This article shows that indirect positive reciprocity triggered by experiencing short and superficial cooperation with outgroups' individual members reduces discrimination of other members of the same group. The field research combined a lab‐in‐the‐field experiment and a survey conducted in the slums of Mumbai, an Indian city notorious for Hindu‐Muslim violence. After the treatment manipulated expectations of cooperative behavior, ethnically heterogeneous groups produced as much public goods in a public goods game as homogeneous groups. This positive experience radically reduced Hindu subjects' discriminatory attitudes towards the Muslim minority after the experiment. The effect was equally strong among voters of two extremist parties implicated in ethnic riots. The survey compared reciprocity with alternative explanations of why people discriminate against some, but not other ethnic groups. Indirect positive reciprocity and intergroup contact are associated with less, and relative size of the outgroup with more discriminatory attitudes.     

When and Why People Evaluate Negative Reciprocity as More Fair Than Positive Reciprocity

If you are kind to me, I am likely to reciprocate and doing so feels fair. Many theories of social exchange assume that such reciprocity and fairness are well aligned with one another. We argue that this correspondence between reciprocity and fairness is restricted to interpersonal dyads and does not govern more complex multilateral interactions. When multiple people are involved, reciprocity leads to partiality, which may be seen as unfair by outsiders. We report seven studies, conducted with people from the United States, in which participants were asked to evaluate situations involving resource distribution in contexts such as economic games, government, and the workplace. Specifically, we find that equal resource distribution in multilateral interactions is seen as more fair than engaging in reciprocity. We also find that negative reciprocity is seen as more fair than positive reciprocity in these multilateral situations because positive reciprocity is perceived as based in favoritism. We rule out alternative explanations and demonstrate that there are contexts where favoritism is not viewed as unfair. These findings are important for theories of fairness and reciprocity as they demonstrate the central role of perceived partiality in the evaluation of multi‐party resource allocation.     

Altruistic behavior and cooperation: The role of intrinsic expectation when reputational information is incomplete

Altruistic behavior is known to be conditional on the level of altruism of others. However, people often have no information, or incomplete information, about the altruistic reputation of others, for example when the reputation was obtained in a different social or economic context. As a consequence, they have to estimate the other's altruistic intentions. Using an economic game, we showed that without reputational information people have intrinsic expectations about the altruistic behavior of others, which largely explained their own altruistic behavior. This implies that when no information is available, intrinsic expectations can be as powerful a driver of altruistic behavior as actual knowledge about other people's reputation. Two strategies appeared to co-exist in our study population: participants who expected others to be altruistic and acted even more altruistically themselves, while other participants had low expected altruism scores and acted even less altruistically than they expected others to do. We also found evidence that generosity in economic games translates into benefits for other social contexts: a reputation of financial generosity increased the attractiveness of partners in a social cooperative game. This result implies that in situations with incomplete information, the fitness effects of indirect reciprocity are cumulative across different social contexts.     

Towards a unified theory of reciprocity

In a unified theory of human reciprocity, the strong and weak forms are similar because neither is biologically altruistic and both require normative motivation to support cooperation. However, strong reciprocity is necessary to support cooperation in public goods games. It involves inflicting costs on defectors; and though the costs for punishers are recouped, recouping costs requires complex institutions that would not have emerged if weak reciprocity had been enough.     

Interpersonal betrayal and cooperation: effects on self-evaluation in depression

Despite numerous studies demonstrating that depressed people are generally self-critical, little is known about interpersonal stressors that may activate or increase this negative self-evaluation. In this study, the effect of interpersonal betrayal and cooperative social interaction on self-evaluation processes in depressed and nondepressed women was assessed. Depressed subjects who experienced interpersonal betrayal were more critical of their performance on a subsequent task than were nondepressed subjects or depressed subjects who had experienced a cooperative interaction. Depressed subjects in the betrayal condition also behaved more aggressively toward their betraying partner than did nondepressed betrayed subjects. Depressed subjects were more critical of their own personality characteristics than were nondepressed subjects, regardless of condition. Results suggest that some negative cognitive schema among depressed persons may be altered by interpersonal factors, although it is not clear whether such effects are secondary to increases in self-criticism after conflict or to decreases in self-critical tendencies after positive interaction. Given the variability in results with different measures of self-evaluation, researchers are urged to use multiple, diverse measures of self-evaluation in future efforts to study variability in self-appraisal.     

"Pray for those who mistreat you": effects of prayer on anger and aggression

Although some religious teachings have been used to justify aggression, most religious teachings promote peace in human affairs. Three experiments tested the hypothesis that praying for others brings out the more peaceful side of religion by reducing anger and aggression after a provocation. In Experiment 1, praying for a stranger led provoked participants to report less anger than control participants who thought about a stranger. In Experiment 2, provoked participants who prayed for the person who angered them were less aggressive toward that person than were participants who thought about the person who angered them. In Experiment 3, provoked participants who prayed for a friend in need showed a less angry appraisal style than did people who thought about a friend in need. These results are consistent with recent evolutionary theories, which suggest that religious practices can promote cooperation among nonkin or in situations in which reciprocity is highly unlikely.     

Solidarity and Reciprocity Between People With and Without Disabilities

Governments of contemporary welfare states call upon citizens to care for people with psychiatric or intellectual disabilities. This is deemed sensible and morally just. However, social–psychological theory suggests that stereotyping may stand in the way of engaging into contact. Sociological theory suggests that the giving of help is based on either balanced or generalized reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity depends on one's ability to ‘pay back’, which people with disabilities may have trouble doing. Generalized reciprocity depends on close social bonds, while people with disabilities often have fewer social bonds than other citizens. The current study aimed to find out whether citizens—despite socio‐psychological and sociological theories expecting otherwise—enter into supporting relationships with people with intellectual or psychiatric disabilities. Although we found socio‐psychological and sociological theory to be largely correct, we also found people to be more creative than theory assumes. A smile can be experienced as a return gift, thus including people with intellectual disabilities in the web of balanced reciprocity. Some people create new social bonds to include people with disabilities: they feel close to them because they had a job in the healthcare sector or because they had a family member with a disability. In disadvantaged neighbourhoods, recognition of each other's problems can create feelings of similarity and concomitant reciprocity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The mathematics of sharing / Las matemáticas que realizan los niños al compartir

Abstract

The purpose of sharing is to construct equivalent sets, making it an ideal context for analysing important quantitative concepts such as counting, equivalence and cardinality. Two studies analysed how four- and five-year-olds shared blocks in equal sharing and reciprocity conditions and their number inferences about one set after counting the other. The researcher asked children to share double and single blocks between two characters. They succeeded more in building equivalent shares in an equal sharing than reciprocity condition. Most children who shared correctly also made appropriate number inferences. To examine whether perceptual cues helped children share the blocks, a second study used Canadian $1 and $2 coins. A double block is twice the size of a single, whereas there is no visual cue about the value relation between coins because they are the same size. Unexpectedly, children shared equally well with blocks and coins, and most children made number inferences.     

Punishing Those Responsible for the Prison Abuses at Abu Ghraib: The Influence of the Negative Reciprocity Norm (NRN)

The negative reciprocity norm (NRN) is the personal moral code specifying retaliation as a proper response to wrongdoing ( Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004 ). We examined the role of negative reciprocity in interpreting and reacting to the prison abuses at Abu Ghraib. Results showed that people who believed that American soldiers behaved wrongly at Abu Ghraib were more likely to view punishing the soldiers responsible as a highly moral response and were less likely to contribute money to a charitable organization that helps American soldiers. These relationships were only present among those highly endorsing the negative reciprocity norm.     

What We Deserve, and how We Reciprocate

Samuel Scheffler says, “none of the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assigns a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle.” To the extent that this is true, the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism are mistaken. In particular, there is an aspect of what we do to make ourselves deserving that, although it has not been discussed in the literature, plays a central role in everyday moral life, and for good reason. As with desert, reciprocity inspires skepticism. What Allen Buchanan calls justice as reciprocity implies that duties of justice obtain only among those who can do each other favors. So characterized, justice as reciprocity is at best only a part of justice – a part that is silent on duties between people who have no favors to offer each other. Still, the more modest root idea of reciprocity – the idea that returning favors is at very least a good thing – remains compelling. What can we say on behalf of this root idea? This article is part of a larger work on the elements of justice. Both parts of it begin with and build on James Rachels’ seminal paper “What People Deserve.”     

Why do people rideshare? An experimental study

Enabled by mobile technologies and fueled by the economic downturn, ridesharing has emerged in recent years as a private transportation facet of the shared economy. Our study investigates the motives for participation in situated ridesharing. We propose a theoretical model that includes economic benefits, time benefits, transportation anxiety, trust, and reciprocity either as direct antecedents of ridesharing participation intention, or mediated through attitude towards ridesharing. We conduct a scenario-based survey, with 300 participants. Our findings indicate that, in situations where transportation anxiety is high (e.g. construction on the road), if people can trust the ridesharing service providers and participants, in the presence of economic and time benefits, they will have a strong intention to participate in ridesharing.     

Changes in Negative Reciprocity as a Function of Age

Standard economic models assume people exclusively pursue material self‐interests in social interactions. However, people exhibit social preferences; that is, they base their choices partly on the outcomes others obtained in a social interaction. People care about fairness, and reciprocity affects behavior. This study examines the differences in negative reciprocity (costly punishment for unfair divisions) as a function of age. Sixty‐one kindergarteners (5‐year‐olds), 53 second graders (8‐year‐olds), and 57 sixth graders (12‐year‐olds) played a dictator game or a mini–ultimatum game either with a human proposer or with a random machine that determined the division between the two players. By keeping the divisions between the players constant and varying the source of the unfair proposal, we were able to differentiate between reciprocity‐based and inequality‐aversion preferences. We found that kindergarteners proposed and accepted unfair divisions regardless of the source of the offer, behaving according to the standard economic model. Children in the sixth grade tended to reject unfair offers from a human proposer but accept unfair divisions from a random device, indicating the emergence of negative reciprocity preferences by age eight (and contrary to inequality aversion). Children at this age also tended to give more fair offers in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game, indicating the emergence of strategic thinking. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.