COHERENTISM AND THE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL BELIEFS: A CASE STUDY IN HOW TO DO PRACTICAL ETHICS WITHOUT APPEAL TO A MORAL THEORY

This paper defends a coherentist approach to moral epistemology. In “The Immorality of Eating Meat” (2000), I offer a coherentist consistency argument to show that our own beliefs rationally commit us to the immorality of eating meat. Elsewhere, I use our own beliefs as premises to argue that we have positive duties to assist the poor (2004) and to argue that biomedical animal experimentation is wrong (2012). The present paper explores whether this consistency‐based coherentist approach of grounding particular moral judgments on beliefs we already hold, with no appeal to moral theory, is a legitimate way of doing practical ethics. I argue (i) that grounding particular moral judgments on our core moral convictions and other core nonmoral beliefs is a legitimate way to justify moral judgments, (ii) that these moral judgments possess as much epistemic justification and have as much claim to objectivity as moral judgments grounded on particular ethical theories, and (iii) that this internalistic coherentist method of grounding moral judgments is more likely to result in behavioral guidance than traditional theory‐based approaches to practical ethics. By way of illustrating the approach, I briefly recapitulate my consistency‐based argument for ethical vegetarianism. I then defend the coherentist approach implicit in the argument against a number of potentially fatal metatheoretical attacks.     

EFFECTS OF NITROUS OXIDE ON SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE VARIABLES

Effects of nitrous oxide in different subanaesthetic concentrations were studied in twelve subjects. Subjective scales of intoxication and of eight other mood variables were obtained by the method of magnitude estimation. Objective performance was examined by tests on memory and arithmetic. For most variables the dose-response curves obtained showed progressively larger effects with increasing dose-levels. At concentrations below 20 per cent the changes were, on the whole, very slight. The results are compared with similar data from an alcohol experiment.     

HINGE PROPOSITIONS AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract:  Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions , such as there is an external world . In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it.     

RULE-CIRCULARITY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEDUCTION

I examine Paul Boghossian's recent attempt to argue for scepticism about logical rules. I argue that certain rule-and proof-theoretic considerations can avert such scepticism. Boghossian's 'Tonk Argument' seeks to justify the rule of tonk-introduction by using the rule itself. The argument is subjected here to more detailed proof-theoretic scrutiny than Boghossian undertook. Its sole axiom, the so-called Meaning Postulate for tonk, is shown to be false or devoid of content. It is also shown that the rules of Disquotation and of Semantic Ascent cannot be derived for sentences with tonk dominant. These considerations deprive Boghossian's scepticism of its support.     

COHERENTISM AND JUSTIFIED INCONSISTENT BELIEFS: A SOLUTION

The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.     

NATURAL THEOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

First it is argued that the linkage of natural theology to epistemology is invalid historically, epistemologically and metaphysically. Second it is argued that knowledge claims about the ultimate cause of everything should be evaluated not in terms of justified true belief but in terms of the intellectual virtue of wisdom.     

THE INFLUENCE OF INTENSITY AND DURATION OF ELECTRICAL STIMULATION ON SUBJECTIVE VARIABLES

The unpleasantness and subjective duration of an A.C. current of 50 c/sec applied to two fingers was scaled by subjects using the method of magnitude estimation. Stimulation was varied with regard to both intensity and duration. It was found that (1) unpleasantness increased logarithmically with stimulus duration, (2) unpleasantness was a power function, with the exponent 1.5, of stimulus intensity, (3) subjective duration was essentially linearly related to stimulus duration, and (4) subjective duration increased logarithmically with intensity of stimulation.     

主观轮廓和深度线索

一、问题的提出 轮廓是物体的外形线,它在视觉图形知觉中起着重要的作用。一般说来,引起轮廓的刺激,是视野中明度(或颜色)的突然变化。但是,有时在一片完全同质的视域中,人们也能看到轮廓。这种轮廓不是由于客观上的刺激梯度造成的,而是由于一系列其它因素造成的。这种轮廓叫主观轮廓,认知轮廓或错觉轮廓。