Consciousness is slower than you think

In easy serial choice reaction time tasks (CRT tasks) young adults can very rapidly "correct" nearly all their errors by making the responses that they should have made (error-correcting responses). They are much less accurate at signalling their errors by making the same, deliberate, response to each (error-signalling responses), and they poorly remember errors that they have not signalled or corrected. When instructed to ignore errors they nevertheless involuntarily register them because the response immediately following them (responses following unacknowledged errors) are unusually slow, and they sometimes make involuntary error correction responses. Errors that are neither signalled nor remembered are registered at some level because responses following unacknowledged errors are slowed. Old age does not impair the accuracy of error correction or reduce the proportion of errors that are acknowledged because they are followed by unusually slow responses, but it does reduce the accuracy of error signalling and of recall of errors. Groups of 40 young adults (mean age 20.1 years, SD 1.1) and 40 older adults (mean 71.2 years, SD 5.1) signalled and recalled their errors increasingly accurately as intervals between each response and the next signal were increased from 150 ms to 1000 ms. Error signalling and recall improved as response-signal interval (RSI) durations increased, reaching asymptote at RSIs of 800 ms for the young and 1000 ms for the older adults. Thus processes necessary for conscious and deliberate choice or error-signalling responses and for subsequent recall of errors require more than 150 ms to complete, are slowed by old age, and may be interrupted by onset of new signals occurring earlier than 800 to 1000 ms after completion of an incorrect response.     

The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is

Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I argue that there is substantial evidence for co-opted mechanisms, leading from one individual’s mental state to a matching state in an observer, but there is no evidence that the output of these co-opted mechanisms serve as the basis for mental state attributions. There is also substantial evidence for attribution mechanisms that serve as the basis for mental state attributions, but there is no evidence that these mechanisms receive their input from co-opted mechanisms.     

I am a better driver than you think: examining self‐enhancement for driving ability

We examined whether people recognized that others might disagree with their high self‐assessments of driving ability, and, if so, why. Participants in four experiments expressed a belief that others would assess them as worse drivers than they assessed themselves. This difference appears to be caused by participants' use of their own, idiosyncratic definition of driving ability. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants reported that others would supply similar assessments of their ability when the skill was less ambiguous. Results of Experiment 4 indicate that participants recognize that there may be more than one way to view driving performance. Participants appear aware that others likely disagree with their self‐assessment of driving ability due to differences in how others define driving ability.     

Scene memory is more detailed than you think: the role of categories in visual long-term memory

Observers can store thousands of object images in visual long-term memory with high fidelity, but the fidelity of scene representations in long-term memory is not known. Here, we probed scene-representation fidelity by varying the number of studied exemplars in different scene categories and testing memory using exemplar-level foils. Observers viewed thousands of scenes over 5.5 hr and then completed a series of forced-choice tests. Memory performance was high, even with up to 64 scenes from the same category in memory. Moreover, there was only a 2% decrease in accuracy for each doubling of the number of studied scene exemplars. Surprisingly, this degree of categorical interference was similar to the degree previously demonstrated for object memory. Thus, although scenes have often been defined as a superset of objects, our results suggest that scenes and objects may be entities at a similar level of abstraction in visual long-term memory.     

What you think is what you get: comparative evaluations of close relationships

Three studies tested the hypothesis that focus of comparison moderates the influence of comparison standards on relationship satisfaction. Participants were asked to evaluate either their current relationships or their alternative relationships relative to an external comparison standard: a romantic stereotype (Study 1) or others' relationships (Studies 2 and 3). Consistent with the focusing hypothesis, the results show that people are more satisfied when they assimilate their relationship outcomes to a high standard or when they contrast them away from a low standard. Satisfaction, however, also increases when alternative relationships are contrasted away from a high standard or when they are assimilated to a low standard of comparison. Perceived quality of alternatives partially mediated the impact of focus of comparison on satisfaction. This finding is consistent with interdependence theory's distinction between a comparison level and a comparison level for alternative relationships, which are not completely independent from each other.     

Gender discrimination may be worse than you think: testing ordinal interactions in power research

The authors reanalyze the data of a study by S. M. Elias and R. J. Loomis (2004), which aimed to determine how an instructor's gender may influence his or her ability to gain student compliance. S. M. Elias and R. J. Loomis observed few significant gender effects using traditional multivariate analyses of variance. The authors reanalyze this data using the more appropriate statistical techniques for detecting ordinal interactions recommended by M. J. Strube and P. Bobko (1989) and S. M. Elias (2004). An ordinal interaction occurs when 1 cell of a 2 x 2 design is responsible for a significant interaction (e.g., female instructors suffering only when rated by male students). Reanalysis of the data resulted in more robust findings.     

Two is better than one, but mine is better than ours: Preschoolers’ executive function during co-play

The current study investigated how playing with another individual may influence 3- and 4-year-olds’ executive function in the Less-Is-More (LIM) task, where children point to the tray with the smaller amount of treats so as to obtain the larger amount of treats in the other tray. In Experiment 1, 35 Singaporean children were tested with a self version and a co-player-split version of the LIM task. Results showed that children appeared to be less impulsive when playing with a co-player than when playing individually. Experiment 2 further investigated how the intention of the co-player, collective profit oriented versus individual profit oriented, may influence children’s executive function. In total, 96 children were tested with a self version, a co-player-share version, and a co-player-opponent version. Results showed that the co-playing facilitation effect appeared in only the co-player-opponent version. Together, the results of the current study showed that when preschoolers play with an individual who shares a common goal with them, they may become more efficient in executive control.     

Vertical-horizontal illusion: One eye is better than two

The vertical-horizontal illusion is the tendency for observers to overestimate the length of a vertical line relative to a horizontal line that has the same length. One explanation of this illusion is that the visual field is elongated in the horizontal direction, and that the vertical-horizontal illusion is a kind of framing effect (Künnapas, 1957a, 1957b, 1957c). Since the monocular visual field is less asymmetric than the combined visual field, this theory predicts that the illusion should be reduced with monocular presentation. This prediction was tested in five experiments, in which the vertical-horizontal illusion was examined in a variety of situations—including observers seated upright versus reclined 90°, monocular presentation with the dominant versus the nondominant eye, viewing in the dark versus in the light, and viewing with asymmetrical frames of reference. The illusion was reliably reduced with monocular presentation under conditions that affected the asymmetry of the phenomenal visual field.     

There's more in a number than you think: new validity data for the Global Assessment Scale

Holcomb and Otto (1988) recently suggested that the widely used Global Assessment Scale may have ". . . questionable validity as an index of psychopathology." The present paper points out procedural and conceptual problems in their study and presents extensive evidence supporting the concurrent and predictive validity of the scale.     

Error and bias in comparative judgment: on being both better and worse than we think we are

People believe that they are better than others on easy tasks and worse than others on difficult tasks. In previous attempts to explain these better-than-average and worse-than-average effects, researchers have invoked bias and motivation as causes. In this article, the authors develop a more parsimonious account, the differential information explanation, in which it is assumed only that people typically have better information about themselves than they do about others. When one's own performance is exceptional (either good or bad), it is often reasonable to assume others' will be less so. Consequently, people estimate the performance of others as less extreme (more regressive) than their own. The result is that people believe they are above average on easy tasks and below average on difficult tasks. These effects are exacerbated when people have accurate information about their performances, increasing the natural discrepancy between knowledge of the self and knowledge of others. The effects are attenuated when people obtain accurate information about the performances of others.     

Suboptimal choice by dogs: when less is better than more

The less is more effect, an example of an affect heuristic, can be shown in humans when they give greater value to a set of six baseball cards in perfect condition, than to the same set of six perfect cards together with three additional cards each with some value but in fair condition. A similar effect has been reported in monkeys which will eat both grapes and cucumbers but prefer grapes, when they prefer a single grape over a single grape plus a slice of cucumber. In the present experiment, we tested the less is more effect with a nonprimate but social species, dogs. We used dogs that would eat a slice of carrot and a slice of cheese but preferred the cheese. When we then gave them a choice between a slice of cheese and a slice of cheese plus a slice of carrot, most dogs preferred the single slice of cheese. Thus, the less is more effect appears to occur in several species.     

The Doppler effect is not what you think it is: dramatic pitch change due to dynamic intensity change

Historically, auditory pitch has been considered to be a function of acoustic frequency, with only a small effect being due to absolute intensity. Yet we found that when tones are Doppler shifted so that frequency drops, the pitch dramatically rises and falls, closely following the pattern of dynamic intensity change. We show that continuous intensity change can produce pitch variation comparable to a frequency change approaching an octave. This effect opposes and is an order of magnitude larger than the well-known effect of discrete intensity change in the frequency range employed. We propose that the perceptual interaction of continuous changes in pitch and loudness reflects a natural correlation between changes in frequency and intensity that is neurally encoded to facilitate the parsing and processing of meaningful acoustic patterns.     

Your life satisfaction will change more than you think: A comment on Harris and Busseri (2019)

Harris and Busseri (2019) examined the changes in life satisfaction people predicted vs. experienced for 30-years based on the three waves of the Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) survey. They conclude that “Contrary to the EOHI [end of history illusion], most individuals either were accurate or anticipated too much change into the future, rather than too little” (abstract). Examining these same data we arrive at the opposite conclusion, that people systematically underestimate future changes to their life satisfaction. The discrepancy arises because Harris and Busseri find stability in the average life satisfaction across the entire sample, while we find instability in life satisfaction within individuals. Both of these can happen. Although the average altitude of all the elevators in a skyscraper is remarkably stable over time, the altitude of each elevator changes by the second.     

Things are always more complicated than you think: An open systems approach to the organizational effects of computer-automated technology

The effects of computerized office and factory automation are examined. An open systems framework is used to organize this literature. The review suggests that the benefits of technology are derived from theintermediate effects of the technology on organizational processes (the task structure, personnel system, formal structure, and informal organization). Thus, it is misleading to examine thedirect effects of computerized technology on organizational outcomes such as profits and satisfaction. Some of the effects of technology on the organizational processes are inevitable (e.g., changes in informal communication patterns). Others are determined less by the technology than by management decisions. The key to achieving success with computerized technology is matching changes in organizational processes to each other, as well as to the technology and the larger environment of the organization.Ann Majchrzak is currently Associate Professor of Human Factors at the Institute of Safety and Systems Management at the University of Southern California. She has recently written two books on the subject of technological change. Katherine J. Klein is an Assistant Professor of Industrial and Organizational Psychology in the Psychology Department of the University of Maryland at College Park.     

Modality effects in delayed free recall and recognition: Visual is better than auditory

During presentation of auditory and visual lists of words, different groups of subjects generated words that either rhymed with the presented words or that were associates. Immediately after list presentation, subjects recalled either the presented or the generated words. After presentation and test of all lists, a final free recall test and a recognition test were given. Visual presentation generally produced higher recall and recognition than did auditory presentation for both encoding conditions. The results are not consistent with explanations of modality effects in terms of echoic memory or greater temporal distinctiveness of auditory items. The results are more in line with the separate-streams hypothesis, which argues for different kinds of input processing for auditory and visual items.     

Neuropragmatics: Extralinguistic pragmatic ability is better preserved in left-hemisphere-damaged patients than in right-hemisphere-damaged patients

The aim of the present study is to compare the pragmatic ability of right- and left-hemisphere-damaged patients excluding the possible interference of linguistic deficits. To this aim, we study extralinguistic communication, that is communication performed only through gestures. The Cognitive Pragmatics Theory provides the theoretical framework: it predicts a gradient of difficulty in the comprehension of different pragmatic phenomena, that should be valid independently of the use of language or gestures as communicative means. An experiment involving 10 healthy individuals, 10 right- and 9 left-hemisphere-damaged patients, shows that pragmatic performance is better preserved in left-hemisphere-damaged (LHD) patients than in right-hemisphere-damaged (RHD) patients.