SOCIAL DISTANCE NORMS IN CANADA: EFFECTS OF STIMULUS CHARACTERISTICS AND DOGMATISM*

The effects of stimulus person characteristics (viz., race, occupational status, religion, and nationality) and the respondent's level of dogmatism upon the social distance responses of a sample of Canadian university students were examined. Occupational status, race, and nationality of the stimulus person emerged as significant determinants, with occupational status being by far the most important. Dogmatism was also correlated with social distance responses. Highly dogmatic persons, but not those low in dogmatism, focused on occupational status in deciding acceptable bounds of intimacy with others. Several explanations for the prominence of occupational status as a social distance cue are discussed. As well, directions for future research into social distance norms in Canada are suggested.     

A REFUTATION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM

Abstract: This article argues that consequentialism does not work as a comprehensive theory of right action. The argument is that what course of action maximizes the good makes sense only within a particular context, but that it is impossible to supply such a context while adhering to a global consistency requirement. A global consistency requirement merely specifies the demand for maximization: it insists that an individual action, in order to be morally right, must be optimific relative not only to a set of temporally and spatially local alternatives but also to all future possibilities that the action would preclude. I further argue that an appropriate context is impossible to provide because act consequentialism invokes incompatible temporal horizons, that of action and that of a maximizable good. The incompatibility between these two horizons makes it impossible for there to be any morally salient, consistent assignment of consequences to actions, and thus renders act consequentialism empty.     

INTERPRETING PUTNAM'S DIALECTICAL METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: Hilary Putnam's philosophical views have undergone extensive interpretation over many years. One such interpretive work is George Myerson's book Rhetoric, Reason and Society. Myerson's interest in dialogic rationalism leads him to examine the views of many theorists of rationality, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. As a prominent philosopher of rationality, Putnam is at the very center of this examination. Notwithstanding this fact, I contend that Myerson misinterprets the dialectical character of Putnam's philosophy in general and of Putnam's views on rationality in particular. This misinterpretation, I argue, is revealing of an illusion of thought to which Myerson is subject, an illusion that makes it seem that it is possible to theorize intelligibly about rationality from a metaphysical standpoint. This same illusion, I claim, also makes it seem that Myerson's positive views on rationality are intelligible. Employing a close textual analysis of Myerson's book, I argue that neither scenario is the case.     

A REFUTATION OF PURE CONJECTURE

The present paper explores three interrelated topics in Popper's theory of science: (1) his view of conjecture, (2) the aim of science, and (3) his (never fully articulated) theory of meaning. Central to Popper's theory of science is the notion of conjecture. Popper writes as if scientists faced with a problem proceed to tackle it by conjecture, that is, by guesses uninformed by inferential considerations. This paper develops a contrast between guesses and educated guesses in an attempt to show that there is more to scientific conjecture than conjecture. The suggestion is made that some inductive considerations enter into the process of educated guessing or scientific conjecture in such a way that the ‘context of discovery’ cannot be sharply separated from the ‘context of justification’. This discussion leads to a tension between Popper's negative method of conjecture and his realism. Given Popper's (implicit) theory of meaning it seems Popper's epistemology (the conjecture and refutation method) is incompatible with his metaphysical realism.     

PRIEST AND NAGEL ON BEING SOMEONE: A REFUTATION OF PHYSICALISM

Physicalism entails that a possible world which is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world be a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. Because what I really am is not a particular human being, there exists a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. Therefore, physicalism is false.     

ON DAVIDSON'S REFUTATION OF CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES AND CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM

Despite Donald Davidson's influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion continues enjoying its popularity in contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, conceptual relativism is still very much alive. There is one major reason responsible for Davidson's failure which has not been widely recognized: What Davidson attacks fiercely is not the very notion , but a notion of conceptual schemes, namely, the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and its underlying Kantian scheme-content dualism. However, such a notion simply cannot carry the weight of conceptual relativism for it does not catch the essences of conceptual relativism. Consequently, I argue that the very notion of conceptual schemes and conceptual relativism have survived Davidson's attack. Therefore, the failure of the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and Kantian scheme-content dualism, even if Davidson can claim victory, does not mark the end of the very notion of conceptual schemes.     

雏鸡左眼视剥夺不同时程后记忆形成过程与脑内Jun样蛋白表达差异的研究

本实验采用一次性味觉厌恶回避学习,研究２日龄雏鸡左眼视剥夺２４小时后的记忆形成过程,并与左眼视剥夺２小时后的记忆形成过程进行比较,同时利用免疫组化技术,观察并比较单眼视剥夺不同时程及单眼学习后Ｊｕｎ样蛋白在雏鸡脑内不同区域（ＨＶ和ＬＰＯ）的表达。结果表明：１．视剥夺左眼２４小时后对雏鸡的短时记忆、中时记忆和长时记忆均无明显影响,但中时记忆保持水平略低于双眼学习条件下的中时记忆保持水平。这与视剥夺２     

NEUROMYTHOLOGY: BRAINS AND STORIES

Abstract. I sketch a synthetic integration of several levels of explanation in addressing how myths, narratives, and stories engage human beings, produce their sense of identity and self‐understanding, and shape their intellectual, emotional, and embodied lives. Ultimately it is our engagement with the metanarratives of religious imagination by which we address a set of existentially necessary but ontologically unanswerable metaphysical questions that form the basis of religious belief. I show how a multileveled understanding of evolutionary biology, history, neuroscience, psychology, narrative, and mythology may form a coherent picture of the human spirit. Neuropsychological functions involved in constructing and responding to the narratives by which we form our identities and build meaningful lives include memory, attention, emotional marking, and temporal sequencing. It is the neural substrate, the emotional shaping, and the narrative structuring of higher cognitive function that provide the sine qua non for the construction of meaning, relationship, morality, and purpose that extend beyond our personal boundaries, both spatial and temporal. This includes a neural affect system shaped by our developmental dependency, the dynamic narratives of self formed in the development of identity and reconstructed over the life span, drawing on culturally available mythic and storied forms. Narrative constitutes our movement in moral space and may have the potential both for healing and for disruption for us as individuals and as a species, providing a contingent solution to the alienation and fragmentation of personhood, relationship, and community.     

CONDEMNATION OF A SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE: A CHRONOLOGY AND REFUTATION OF THE ATTACKS AND A DISCUSSION OF THREATS TO THE INTEGRITY OF SCIENCE

On July 12, 1999, our meta-analysis on child sexual abuse published in Psychological Bulletin, one of the American Psychological Association's (APA) premiere journals, was condemned by the U.S. Congress (H. Con. Res. 107). The condemnation followed months of attacks on the article, the APA, and us by various social conservatives and psychoanalytically-oriented clinicians. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was asked by the APA to independently review our article. After considering criticisms of it and the article itself, AAAS declined, but commented that it was the criticisms, not our methods or analyses, that troubled them because these criticisms misrepresented what we wrote. The current article chronicles this whole affair. First, we provide background, explaining why an article such as ours was needed. Then we accurately summarize the article, given that it has been so widely misrepresented. Next we present a chronology of the events leading up to and following the condemnation. We then present and refute all the major criticisms of the article, which have included both methodological and conceptual attacks. Next we discuss the threat to science that these events portend. We conclude by discussing the need to separate moral judgments from scientific research, the conflation of which formed the basis for the distortions and condemnation.