Role of the preprobe delay in memory-scanning tasks

In a variation of Sternberg's (1966, 1969) memory-scanning task not requiring an explicit negative response, Diener (1988) found that a preprobe delay was necessary to produce the usual set-size effect. In Experiment 1 of the present study, the effect of the preprobe delay was investigated in the typical two-response task. In the absence of a preprobe delay, the function relating response latency to set size was virtually flat for negative responses, but was described by a slope of about 18 msec/item for positive responses. Further research suggested that the reduced set-size effect in the absence of a preprobe delay is the result of expectancy effects usually controlled by the preprobe delay. Informing the subject of the size of the memory set before it was presented (Experiment 2) produced a set-size effect of the usual magnitude in the absence of a preprobe delay. Experiment 3 was designed to assess the effects of expectancy in the absence of a memory search. A task similar in stimulus arrangement to the memory-scanning task but requiring the subject to indicate whether the last digit in the set was odd or even produced a decrease in response latency with set size of 29 msec/item in the absence of a preprobe delay.     

Gelotophobia and thinking styles in Sternberg's theory'

A hypothesis was examined, that gelotophobia (the fear of being laughed at) was negatively related to Type I thinking styles and positively related to Type II thinking styles as defined in Sternberg's theory of mental self-government. 431 university students (250 women, 181 men; M age = 20.4 yr., SD = 1.2) completed self-report measures of gelotophobia (GELOPH <15>) and thinking styles (Thinking Styles Inventory-Revised). Correlation and regression analyses were conducted. The results indicated that gelotophobia was negatively and significantly related to four Type I thinking styles (legislative, judicial, liberal, and hierarchical thinking styles) and a Type III thinking style (external), while it was positively and significantly related to a Type II thinking style (conservative). Thinking styles uniquely explained 18% of the total variance in gelotophobia scores. Possible interventions from the perspective of thinking styles in the treatment of gelotophobia were discussed.     

斯腾伯格的智慧平衡理论述评

斯腾伯格(R．J．Stemberg)是美国耶鲁大学的心理学教授。本文介绍的是他1998年提出的与成功智力关系密切而有影响的新理论——智慧平衡理论(a balance theory of isdom)。     

The attentional demands of negation in a memory-scanning task

Subjects were run in a Sternberg recognition memory task modified to occasionally require a transformation prior to response. The transformation was similar to logical negation since onplus or nontransformed trials subjects responded "yes" if the probe was from the current memory set and "no" otherwise, while onminus or transformed trials subjects responded "no" to memory set probes and "yes" to nonmemory set probes. Two models proposed to account for the effects of logical negation were compared: The encoding and comparison model predicts that logical negation requires an additional processing stage, while the capacity sharing model argues that negation adds a processing stage and also retards the rate of memory search. The results indicated that minus probes had 50% larger mean reaction time by set size slopes than the corresponding plus probes. This finding offers clear support for the capacity sharing model.     

Separating perception time from response time: the slope transition paradigm

This paper describes the slope transition paradigm (STP), a variant of rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) that separates early (perceptual) processing time from total response time. The paradigm is based on a very simple idea: provide varying amounts of time for perceptual processing and find the moment when the subject begins to waste time waiting for more data. That moment is a measure of how much time was actually needed. The method was used in two experiments. Results are discussed in relation to set-size effects, perceptual capacity limits, attentional dwell times, and some related neurophysiological findings. The method appears to tap aspects of information processing that differ from those tapped in studies of the psychological refractory period, the attentional blink, and repetition blindness.     

Exhaustive memory-scanning and familiarity discrimination: Separate mechanisms in recognition memory tasks

Experiment I was a yes-no recognition task with lists of one, two or four items to remember. Each item in the experiment appeared in only one list, and each list was presented only once. One group of subjects performed the task with complex pictures. Their results were incompatible with the hypothesis of exhaustive memory scanning, since the function relating “yes” response latency to list length was not parallel to but steeper than the function for “no” responses. Another group performed the task with words. Their results were consistent with exhaustive memory-scanning. Experiment II was a similar task in which the familiarity was varied of the test items to which the subjects had to respond “no”. That variation affected response latency with pictures but not with words. From these results and from a consideration of relevant neurological data, the hypothesis is advanced that familiarity discrimination and exhaustive memory-scanning are separate mechanisms.     

Mental health and thinking styles in Sternberg's theory: an exploratory study

The relationship between thinking styles, as defined in Sternberg's theory of mental self-government, and mental health was investigated. 583 university students (362 women, 221 men; M age = 21.4 yr., SD = 0.9) in Guangzhou, P. R. China, were invited to fill out the Thinking Styles Inventory-Revised and the Symptom Checklist-90 on a voluntary basis. Results indicated that scores on six of Sternberg's 13 thinking styles were significantly correlated with the Mental Health Index. The hierarchical style (one Type I style) negatively predicted the General Severity Index beyond sex and age, whereas the judicial, anarchic, and internal styles did so positively. The specific ways in which the thinking styles and mental health scales were related to one another supported Zhang and Sternberg's (2006) claim that thinking styles are value-laden. Applications of thinking styles in enhancing mental health are discussed.     

Avoiding degeneracy in metric unfolding by penalizing the intercept

It has long been thought that degeneracy in unfolding only concerned non‐metric unfolding. Recently, Busing, Groenen, and Heiser have established that degeneracy occurs for all transformations that include estimation of an intercept and a slope. Consequently, degeneracy also plagues metric unfolding, since one member of the metric transformation family, the interval transformation, includes estimation of both an intercept and a slope. In this paper, a simple solution is proposed to the degeneracy problem for metric unfolding by penalizing for an undesirable intercept. An application of this approach will illustrate its potential.     

Dependence and Independence

We introduce an atomic formula ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ intuitively saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are independent from the variables ${\vec{z}}$ if the variables ${\vec{x}}$ are kept constant. We contrast this with dependence logic ${\mathcal{D}}$ based on the atomic formula = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ , actually equivalent to ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{y}}$ , saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are totally determined by the variables ${\vec{x}}$ . We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ gives rise to a natural logic capable of formalizing basic intuitions about independence and dependence. We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ can be used to give partially ordered quantifiers and IF-logic an alternative interpretation without some of the shortcomings related to so called signaling that interpretations using = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ have.     

Dependency and Independence in Young Children

The present study investigated the hypothesis that a positive relation exists between self-concept and moral judgment in young children. In the first experiment 40 kindergarten children between the ages of 5–1 and 6–6 with mental ability scores ranging from 82 to 144 were each administered a self-concept appraisal and a series of Piagetian moral dilemmas. Product-moment correlations and a multiple-regression analysis evaluated the relationship. When the self-concept and moral-judgment scores were collapsed, all of the moral-judgment factors correlated significantly with at least one self-concept factor. A second experiment tested the implications of the first. Eighty-five children between the ages of 5–11 and 8–4 were given the self-concept and moral-judgment measures. An eight-week communications-training session for randomly selected parents of children scoring below the mean on the self-concept measure was held. Posttesting showed no improvement in self-concept for the experimental group. Implications of these experiments are discussed.     

Independence and Property in Kant's Rechtslehre

I argue that the freedom which is to coexist with the freedom of choice of others in accordance with a universal law mentioned in Kant's Rechtslehre is not itself freedom of choice. Rather, it is the independence which is a condition of being able to exercise genuine free choice by not having to act in accordance with the choices of others. Kant's distinction between active and passive citizenship appears, however, to undermine this idea of independence, because the possession of a certain type of property right on the part of some citizens makes it possible for them to dominate others. Kant's account of property in this way turns out to be central to the question as to whether his Rechtslehre represents an internally consistent account of how freedom can be guaranteed within a legal and political community. I go on to argue that Kant's attempt to justify a pre-political right of property cannot be viewed as a successful justification of private property, and that he should have abandoned the notion of such a right together with any presumption in favour of private property.     

Independence in Information Spaces

Three different types of interdependence between pieces of information, or ??secrets??, are discussed and compared. Two of them, functional dependence and nondeducibility, have been studied and axiomatized before. This article introduces a third type of interdependence and provides a complete and decidable axiomatization of this new relation.     

Peer Disagreement and Independence Preservation

It has often been recommended that the differing probability distributions of a group of experts should be reconciled in such a way as to preserve each instance of independence common to all of their distributions. When probability pooling is subject to a universal domain condition, along with state-wise aggregation, there are severe limitations on implementing this recommendation. In particular, when the individuals are epistemic peers whose probability assessments are to be accorded equal weight, universal preservation of independence is, with a few exceptions, impossible. Under more reasonable restrictions on pooling, however, there is a natural method of preserving the independence of any fixed finite family of countable partitions, and hence of any fixed finite family of discrete random variables.     

Independence of first- and second-order memories in newborn rabbits

The mammary pheromone promotes the acquisition of novel odorants (CS1) in newborn rabbits. Here, experiments pinpoint that CS1 becomes able to support neonatal learning of other odorants (CS2). We therefore evaluated whether these first- and second-order memories remained dependent after reactivation. Amnesia induced after CS2 recall selectively blocked this memory, when recall and amnesia of CS1 left the souvenir of CS2 safe; this finding partially differed from results obtained in adult mammals. Thus, in this model of neonatal appetitive odor learning, second-order memory seems to depend on first-order memory for its formation but not for its maintenance.