The weak Borda effect and plurality–majority disagreement

The weak Borda effect indicates a failure on the part of the plurality voting procedure to satisfy a criterion of reasonableness according to which none of the losers should be preferred to the winner by a majority of the voters. Contrary to the interpretation of a recent critic, it is not claimed that the weak Borda effect necessarily indicates plurality–majority disagreement. To minimize future misunderstanding, formal definitions of the plurality procedure, the weak Borda effect, and plurality–majority disagreement are given, and a simple method is derived for evaluating the exact probability of plurality–majority disagreement in small decision-making committees.     

The robust beauty of majority rules in group decisions

How should groups make decisions? The authors provide an original evaluation of 9 group decision rules based on their adaptive success in a simulated test bed environment. When the adaptive success standard is applied, the majority and plurality rules fare quite well, performing at levels comparable to much more resource-demanding rules such as an individual judgment averaging rule. The plurality rule matches the computationally demanding Condorcet majority winner that is standard in evaluations of preferential choice. The authors also test the results from their theoretical analysis in a behavioral study of nominal human group decisions, and the essential findings are confirmed empirically. The conclusions of the present analysis support the popularity of majority and plurality rules in truth-seeking group decisions.     

Discussion and Decision: The Interrelationship between Initial Preference Distribution and Group Discussion Content

Data from an earlier published study were used to test the social decision scheme (SDS) proposition that initial distribution of preferences within a group influences the nature of subsequent discussion. Four-person groups confronted with a three-option decision task began discussion with an initial plurality, majority, or unanimity. We found that the prediscussion distribution of preferences was predictive of eventual group choice; plurality groups introduced the greatest number of facts, followed by majority, and then unanimity; minute-by-minute patterns of discussion were very different across the three initial distributions; dominant factions contributed the most to discussion; and under initial plurality, one minority preference was discussed significantly more heavily than the other. Discussion focuses on the possible role of preference orders in group decision-making processes and on possible explanations for why groups with different intitial preference distributions show different discussion patterns across time.     

Improving the Accuracy of Eyewitnesses in the Presence of Misinformation with the Plurality Option

Misinformation has negative effects in the accuracy of eyewitnesses' reports. We investigated whether those negative effects could be reduced when participants are allowed to decide how many answers to include in their answers, that is, to regulate the plurality option. Participants watched a slideshow and received misinformation through a narrative. In the recognition memory test, participants had to select, out of five alternatives, one (single) and then three alternatives (plural answer) and to indicate which one they preferred to report if they were in a courtroom. Perceived likelihood ratings were also collected. Results showed that the regulation of the plurality option increased accuracy even in the presence of misinformation and highlighted the importance of the perceived likelihood ratings in the decision to select a single or plural answer. In general, the results suggest that better testimonies could be obtained if witnesses are given some control over their answers. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is God an Adaptation?

In this critical notice to Robert Wright’s The Evolution of God, we focus on the question of whether Wright’s God is one which can be said to be an adaptation in a well defined sense. Thus we evaluate the likelihood of different models of adaptive evolution of cultural ideas in their different levels of selection. Our result is an emphasis on the plurality of mechanisms that may lead to adaptation. By way of conclusion we assess epistemologically some of Wright’s more controversial claims concerning the directionality of evolution and moral progress.     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

Recollection is a continuous process: Evidence from plurality memory receiver operating characteristics

Is recollection a continuous/graded process or a threshold/all-or-none process? Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis can answer this question as the continuous model and the threshold model predict curved and linear recollection ROCs, respectively. As memory for plurality, an item's previous singular or plural form, is assumed to rely on recollection, the nature of recollection can be investigated by evaluating plurality memory ROCs. The present study consisted of four experiments. During encoding, words (singular or plural) or objects (single/singular or duplicate/plural) were presented. During retrieval, old items with the same plurality or different plurality were presented. For each item, participants made a confidence rating ranging from “very sure old”, which was correct for same plurality items, to “very sure new”, which was correct for different plurality items. Each plurality memory ROC was the proportion of same versus different plurality items classified as “old” (i.e., hits versus false alarms). Chi-squared analysis revealed that all of the plurality memory ROCs were adequately fit by the continuous unequal variance model, whereas none of the ROCs were adequately fit by the two-high threshold model. These plurality memory ROC results indicate recollection is a continuous process, which complements previous source memory and associative memory ROC findings.     

Can people strategically control the encoding and retrieval of some morphologic and typographic details of words?

This study investigated whether the encoding and retrieval of plurality information and letter-case information of words in recognition memory can be inhibited. Response-deadline experiments (Hintzman & Curran, 1994) using single words have indicted a controlled processing mode, whereas studies using meaningful sentences (e.g., Jou & Harris, 1991) have indicated an automatic mode of processing plurality information. Two similar opposing views have existed on the processing of letter-case information. The abstractionist view contends that we retain the abstract lexical information and discard the superficial perceptual case information. The proceduralist view holds that perceptual details cannot be separated from the lexical information. Using an intentional and an attention-diverted learning procedure and instructions to ignore plurality and case, we found that subjects experienced a consistent interference effect of changed plurality from study to test but slightly less interference from changed case, suggesting strong automaticity for plurality, and comparatively less automaticity, for case processing.     

The dialectic of Australian Catholic education

Australian Catholic schools are enjoying extensive popularity, with schools in general experiencing maximum enrolment capacities. The irony in this phenomenon is that Catholics are being attracted to non‐Catholic schools, and many non‐Catholics are seeking enrolment in Catholic schools. Moreover, the vast majority of Catholics in Catholic schools (parents, students, teachers) are not practising and those that do often hold a plurality of views in faith and morals that are inconsistent with Church teaching. Given this reality, the aims of the Australian Catholic school need to be re‐examined.     

Behind, Between, and Beyond Anthropomorphic Models of Ultimate Reality

The plurality of models of ultimate reality is a central problem for religious philosophy. This essay sketches what is involved in mounting comparative inquiries across the plurality of models. In order to illustrate what advance would look like in such a comparative inquiry, an argument is presented to show that highly anthropomorphic models of ultimate reality are inferior to a number of competitors. This paper was delivered as a keynote address during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Educating Beyond Cultural Diversity: Redrawing the Boundaries of a Democratic Plurality

In this paper I draw some distinctions between the terms “cultural diversity” and “plurality” and argue that a radical conception of plurality is needed in order both to re-imagine the boundaries of democratic education and to address more fully the political aspects of conflict that plurality gives rise to. This paper begins with a brief exploration of the usages of the term diversity in European documents that promote intercultural education as a democratic vehicle for overcoming social conflict between different cultural groups. In contradistinction to these usages, this paper calls for a more robust conception of plurality, one that does not simply denote membership in different cultural groupings but is rooted in the human condition and based on a conception of uniqueness. Following the work of Hannah Arendt and feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero, I explore how the appearance of unique beings in specific contexts can be understood as an eminently political act and I contend that such a view leads to a better educational understanding of conflict and contestation. The paper sketches the contours of democratic plurality along this line of thought and discusses how these new boundaries have implications for education’s relation to democracy.     

The role of familiarity in item recognition, associative recognition, and plurality recognition on self-paced and speeded tests

Four experiments compare the effect of familiarity on item, associative, and plurality recognition on self-paced and speeded tests. The familiarity of test items was enhanced by presenting a prime that matched the subsequent test item. On item and plurality recognition tests, participants were more likely to respond "old" to primed than to unprimed test items. In associative recognition, priming increased the proportion of old responses on a speeded test, but not on a self-paced test. This suggests that familiarity plays a larger role in item and plurality recognition than in associative recognition on self-paced tests. On speeded tests, priming has a similar effect on item, associative, and plurality recognition. Results suggest that item and associative recognition rely differentially on familiarity and recollection. They are also consistent with recent evidence suggesting that different processes underlie plurality and associative recognition.     

Unity,Plurality, and Hylomorphic Composition in Aristotle's Metaphysics

How should we understand the relationship, for Aristotle, between matter, form, and hylomorphic composite? Are matter and form distinct from each other, so that each hylomorphic unity harbours a plurality within it, or would such a plurality undermine the unity of the composite? A recent strand of argument in both Aristotelian and contemporary literature on hylomorphism has concluded that no genuine unity can be composed of a plurality. I will argue that the objection motivating this conclusion falls away as improperly formulated in light of Aristotle's metaontology—in particular, his thesis that unity (and therefore also plurality) is indeterminate. The genuine objection threatening hylomorphic unity is one that Aristotle himself formulates as a central concern in his Metaphysics: no substance can be composed of substances. He answers this genuine objection in his appeal to the actuality/potentiality distinction, and in Metaphysics VIII.6 he reminds us why no more basic problem of hylomorphic unity arises. Against the backdrop of Aristotle's metaontology, hylomorphic unity cannot be undermined by the plurality, just as such, of matter and form.     

Response to Commentators on Existential Flourishing

ABSTRACT

In this piece I respond to questions and criticisms raised by commentators on my recent book, Existential Flourishing: A Phenomenology of the Virtues (Cambridge University Press, 2019). I argue for an irreducible normative plurality governing our struggle to lead good human lives, and address questions about how to decide what to do in the face of such plurality.     

Constructive Dialogical Pluralism: A Context of Interreligious Relations

This article presents current philosophical reflections on religious diversity and concomitant attitudes towards the interreligious situation. The motive behind this presentation is to show that in order to deal more efficiently with the phenomenon of religious plurality, there is a need for a development of the philosophy of religion, where new perspectives are opened up and explored. The very concept of religion as a belief system is put into question, since it has caused philosophical reflections on religious diversity to be confined to certain metaphysical and epistemological concerns. Instead of focusing on the noun ‘religion’, the article suggests a way to understand the adjective ‘religious’ and view religious plurality as a plurality of ways of being religious. This opens up a certain context of interreligious relations and interreligious dialogue, where this very dialogue itself can contribute to the development of philosophical tools, concepts and categories for dealing with the fact of plurality. I call this context constructive dialogical pluralism.     

Playfulness, “World”-Travelling,and Loving Perception

A paper about cross-cultural and cross-racial loving that emphasizes the need to understand and affirm the plurality in and among women as central to feminist ontology and epistemology. Love is seen not as fusion and erasure of difference but as incompatible with them. Love reveals plurality. Unityndashnot to be confused with solidarityndashis understood as conceptually tied to domination.     

Over-Determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities

A popular strategy for meeting over-determination and pre-emption challenges to the comparative counterfactual conception of harm is Derek Parfit’s suggestion, more recently defended by Neil Feit, that a plurality of events harms A if and only if that plurality is the smallest plurality of events such that, if none of them had occurred, A would have been better off. This analysis of ‘harm’ rests on a simple but natural mistake about the relevant counterfactual comparison. Pluralities fulfilling these conditions make no difference to the worse for anyone in the over-determination cases that prompted the need for revising the comparative conception of harm to begin with. We may choose to call them harmful anyway, but then we must abandon the idea that making a difference to the worse for someone is essential to harming. I argue that we should hold on to the difference-making criterion and give up the plural harm principle. I offer an explanation of why Parfit’s and Feit’s plural harm approach seems attractive. Finally, I argue that the consequences of giving up the plural harm principle and holding on to the simple comparative counterfactual analysis of harm are less radical than we may think, in relation to questions about wrongness and responsibility.     

交流 诠释 求同尊异——关于生命伦理学的跨文化研究

生命伦理学的跨文化研究,重在诠释不同文化传统伦理观念的历史轨迹,尊重道德的多元性,同时寻求共同点,以促进人类之间的合作和交流。不同伦理思想的交流中形成的某种共识和趋同,是社会共荣和医学发展的需要。否定伦理观念的多元和把伦理观念多元绝对化,都无益于人类健康事业的繁荣。     

Practical rationality for pluralists about the good

I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism.     

Inter-species variation in colour perception

Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, objects simultaneously instantiate a plurality of colours, all of them genuinely mind-independent, and subjects select from amongst this plurality which colours they perceive. I contrast selectionist views with relationalist views that deny the mind-independence of colour, and consider some general objections to this strategy.