The folk psychology of souls

The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is "like" to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive "system" dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.     

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.     

You can do it if you really try: The effects of motivation on thinking for pleasure

People find it difficult to enjoy their own thoughts when asked to do so, but what happens when they are asked to think about whatever they want? Do they find thinking more or less enjoyable? In the present studies, we show that people are more successful in enjoying their thoughts when instructed to do so. We present evidence in support of four reasons why this is: without instructions people do not realize how enjoyable it will be to think for pleasure, they do not realize how personally meaningful it will be to do so, they believe that thinking for pleasure will be effortful, and they believe it would be more worthwhile to engage in planning than to try to enjoy their thoughts. We discuss the practical implications of thinking for pleasure for promoting alternatives to the use of technology.     

The Assessment of Values in Schools

Schools in liberal democratic societies face a dilemma. On the one hand their role is to prepare students to make rationally autonomous choices, within prescribed limits, as to what kind of good life they will pursue. On the other hand, liberal democratic societies depend on common adherence to liberal democratic values, such as respect for truth, fairness and social justice, and schools need to teach these values. If schools are to include the teaching of such values among their aims, how should they assess them? The assessment of values is problematical for liberal democrats. School educators are willing and able to assess students' knowledge and skills (i.e. what students know and can do) but to assess their values implies that students are being assessed for what they are and this offends against a deeply ingrained belief that all persons in a liberal democracy have an intrinsic worth. This article will explore the problem of the assessment of values with particular reference to schooling in Australia.     

Framing how we think about disagreement

Disagreement is a hot topic right now in epistemology, where there is spirited debate between epistemologists who argue that we should be moved by the fact that we disagree and those who argue that we need not. Both sides to this debate often use what is commonly called “the method of cases,” designing hypothetical cases involving peer disagreement and using what we think about those cases as evidence that specific normative theories are true or false, and as reasons for believing as such. With so much weight being given in the epistemology of disagreement to what people think about cases of peer disagreement, our goal in this paper is to examine what kinds of things might shape how people think about these kinds of cases. We will show that two different kinds of framing effect shape how people think about cases of peer disagreement, and examine both what this means for how the method of cases is used in the epistemology of disagreement and what this might tell us about the role that motivated cognition is playing in debates about which normative positions about peer disagreement are right and wrong.     

Taboo Trade‐Offs,Relational Framing,and the Acceptability of Exchanges

This article reports 4 experiments demonstrating the power of social‐relational framing to complicate superficially straightforward economic exchanges of goods and services. Drawing from Alan Fiske's theoretical framework as well as Tetlock's sacred value protection model, the experiments demonstrate (a) pricing distortions and refusals to answer certain questions when people contemplate buying or selling objects endowed with special relational significance; (b) moral outrage and cognitive confusion when people are asked whether they would allow market‐pricing norms to influence decisions that fall under the normative purview of communal‐sharing, authority‐ranking, and equality‐matching relationships; and (c) elements of tactical flexibility in how people respond to breaches of relational boundaries (a willingness to turn a blind eye to taboo trade‐offs when it is in their interest to do so). An agenda for future work is offered that explores how pragmatic, economic interests are balanced against the desire to be (or appear to be) the type of person who honors social–relational constraints on what should be considered fungible.     

Adolescents' perceptions of aloneness and loneliness

It is theorized that we are born with the need both to be alone and to be connected with others. Aloneness, like attachment, is seen as necessary for human growth, with loneliness being the negative extreme. Yet, can feelings of loneliness be distinguished from the need to be alone? To answer this question, the present paper reviews theories and research on loneliness and aloneness. In addition, the perceptions of adolescents are presented. They were found to be able to distinguish between the two states. Loneliness, as anticipated, was viewed negatively, being coupled with sadness and hopelessness. Aloneness was viewed as a neutral state. It is recommended that future research explore the positive dimensions of aloneness, including when adolescents choose to be alone, what they do while alone, and how they feel after being alone.     

Meta-insight: do people really know how others see them?

Although people can accurately guess how others see them, many studies have suggested that this may only be because people generally assume that others see them as they see themselves. These findings raise the question: In their everyday lives, do people understand the distinction between how they see their own personality and how others see their personality? We examined whether people make this distinction, or whether people possess what we call meta-insight. In 3 studies, we assessed meta-insight for a broad range of traits (e.g., Big Five, intelligent, funny) across several naturalistic social contexts (e.g., first impression, friends). Our findings suggest that people can make valid distinctions between how they see themselves and how others see them. Thus, people seem to have some genuine insight into their reputation and do not achieve meta-accuracy only by capitalizing on the fact that others see them similarly to how they see themselves.     

When Whites' Attempts to Be Multicultural Backfire in Intergroup Interactions

Whites' attempts to enact multicultural ideals in intergroup interactions can sometimes have negative interpersonal consequences. This paper reviews the instances when Whites' efforts to acknowledge, appreciate, and learn about racial and ethnic differences can make people of color's group identity uncomfortably salient (minority spotlight effect), make people of color feel that certain attributes are being imposed onto their group identity (positive stereotyping), or make people of color feel precluded from another group identity (identity denial). Each of these situations introduces a hurtful discrepancy between how people of color are seen by others and how they wish to be seen. Suggestions for how to “do” multiculturalism in ways that avoid creating this discrepancy are discussed.     

Social Exclusion and the Desire to Reconnect

People have a fundamental need to belong that, when satisfied, is linked to a variety of indicators of well‐being. The current article discusses what happens when social relationships go awry, namely through social exclusion. It seeks to resolve discrepancies in the literature by proposing that responses to social exclusion depend primarily on the prospect of social acceptance. When people feel socially excluded, they want to regain acceptance and thus may respond in ways that can help them do so. When the possibility of acceptance is not forthcoming, however, socially excluded people become selfish and antisocial. Evidence for this pattern was found at behavioral, cognitive, and biological levels. The motivation to gain acceptance may drive people to engage in negative health behaviors, such as smoking. Thus, excluded people demonstrate sensitivity to possible social acceptance, but they can exude an air of selfishness and hostility when there is no possibility of satisfying their need to belong.     

The perception of self and others: acquaintanceship, affect, and actor-observer differences.

Three studies were designed to examine how people perceive themselves versus others. The main finding was that people were seen as causing positive behaviors, and situational factors were regarded as causing negative behaviors (positivity effect). This positivity effect was found to operate most strongly for perceptions of intimate others, such as spouse and friends, and less strongly for strangers and liked and disliked acquaintances. There was little support for the actor-observer difference that people view their own behavior more situationally than they do other people's behavior. It was concluded that both cognitive and motivational factors must be considered in predicting how people perceive and describe others.     

Assessing Advocacies for Forcibly Displaced People: A Comprehensive Approach

This article assesses various advocacy practices for forcibly displaced people (FDP) through the analysis of advocacy networks, the examination of the goals that they pursue, and their ways of working. Three basic approaches, the welfare-based, the legal-based, and the capability-based approaches, are assessed. From this assessment, this study suggests the recognition of shared humanity as an entry point for advocacy, which offers a cosmopolitan understanding of rights and duties, and the most comprehensive protection for FDP. The main argument of this study is that if the demand for recognition is not heard, relief for refugees and other displaced people will lack an essential dimension. It is the demand to be recognized as human beings that engenders responsibility for forced migrants. Instead of prescribing a list of what to do, or not to do, this reflection has rather suggested a way of being and dealing with the forcibly displaced. This stance goes beyond the facility of typical responses that are known in advance.     

Unpacking cognitive reappraisal: goals, tactics, and outcomes

Studies of emotion regulation typically contrast two or more strategies (e.g., reappraisal vs. suppression) and ignore variation within each strategy. To address such variation, we focused on cognitive reappraisal and considered the effects of goals (i.e., what people are trying to achieve) and tactics (i.e., what people actually do) on outcomes (i.e., how affective responses change). To examine goals, we randomly assigned participants to either increase positive emotion or decrease negative emotion to a negative stimulus. To examine tactics, we categorized participants' reports of how they reappraised. To examine reappraisal outcomes, we measured experience and electrodermal responding. Findings indicated that (a) the goal of increasing positive emotion led to greater increases in positive affect and smaller decreases in skin conductance than the goal of decreasing negative emotion, and (b) use of the reality challenge tactic was associated with smaller increases in positive affect during reappraisal. These findings suggest that reappraisal can be implemented in the service of different emotion goals, using different tactics. Such differences are associated with different outcomes, and they should be considered in future research and applied attempts to maximize reappraisal success.     

IX—On Being Bored Out of Your Mind

The contemporary philosophical debate over practical reasoning—over how one ought to figure out what to do—has been almost entirely focused on whether there is more to it than means-ends reasoning. But a prior and very difficult question has to do with why instrumental deliberation is so important an aspect of our cognitive life (regardless of whether there is anything else). I consider an answer broached by Harry Frankfurt, that having ends is the alternative to being literally bored out of one's mind, and adapt an argument from John Stuart Mill's political and psychological writings to show what more there is to not being bored than just having something to aim for.     

Consuming experience: Why affective forecasters overestimate comparative value

The hedonic value of an outcome can be influenced by the alternatives to which it is compared, which is why people expect to be happier with outcomes that maximize comparative value (e.g., the best of several mediocre alternatives) than with outcomes that maximize absolute value (e.g., the worst of several excellent alternatives). The results of five experiments suggest that affective forecasters overestimate the importance of comparative value because forecasters do not realize that comparison requires cognitive resources, and that experiences consume more cognitive resources than do forecasts. In other words, because forecasters overestimate the extent to which they will be able to think about what they did not get while experiencing what they got.     

Classroom discourse analysis and educational outcomes in the era of education reform

Background In the era of education reform when new teaching approaches are being advocated, it is important to investigate how different classroom discourse patterns are related to different educational outcomes. Aim The purpose of the study was to analyse the whole classroom discourse of two teacher interns' writing classes. It was conducted against a background of education reform in which teachers were being encouraged to make major changes in their teaching approaches. We investigated what approaches were adopted and what discourse patterns were related to better educational outcomes. Sample The participants were two teacher interns and their 61 students in Hong Kong. The students (35 boys, 26 girls) were seventh graders from two classes in the same secondary school. Method An instruction unit of each teacher intern on expository writing (120 min) was video‐recorded and analysed. Discourse analysis of the whole classroom interaction was supplemented by the students' perceptions and independent observers' evaluations of the instruction. Results The results indicated that both teacher interns adopted a traditional direct instruction although student‐centred approaches were being recommended in the education reform. The effectiveness of the instruction was associated with certain features of the classroom discourse patterns. Better educational outcomes were associated positively with utterances of high cognitive demand but negatively with utterances related to discipline. Students tended to have better performances in writing when they and the independent observers perceived that the teachers used more motivating strategies. Conclusions The effectiveness of instruction is a complicated phenomenon that involves a myriad of interrelated factors. Teacher‐ or student‐centred approaches are only part of these diverse factors.     

Closing the gap? Some questions for neurophenomenology

In his 1996 paper “Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem,” Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela's call hasn't gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To what extent is neurophenomenology a distinctive and unified research programme? In this paper I attempt to shed some light on these questions.