How should we revise diagnostic criteria for substance use disorders in the DSM-V?

This article reviews literature on the validity and performance characteristics of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) diagnostic criteria for substance use disorders (SUDs) and recommends changes in these criteria that should be considered for the next edition of the DSM (DSM-V). Substantial data indicate that DSM-IV substance abuse and substance dependence are not distinct categories and that SUD criteria are best modeled as reflecting a unidimensional continuum of substance-problem severity. The conceptually and empirically problematic substance abuse diagnosis should be abandoned in the DSM-V, with substance dependence defined by a single set of criteria. Data also indicate that various individual SUD criteria should be revised, dropped, or considered for inclusion in the DSM-V. The DSM-V should provide a framework that allows the integration of categorical and dimensional approaches to diagnosis. Important areas for further research are noted.     

Information on the Internet: How selective should we be?

Vast amounts of information are available on the Internet, and programs such as Mosaic provide users with easy access to text and multimedia files. Once a user has set up a host system, consideration must be given to what information will be made available. In addition to legal restrictions, the interests of potential users (those accessing the host system) should be considered when determining the kinds of information to be made available. If those maintaining these host systems are somewhat selective when making information availability decisions, the potential information “glut” may be attenuated.     

Refining the blank line-up procedure: How should we instruct eyewitnesses?

Presenting a blank line-up—containing only fillers—to witnesses prior to showing a real line-up might be useful for screening out those who pick from the blank line-up as unreliable witnesses. We show that the effectiveness of this procedure varies depending on instructions given to witnesses. Participants (N = 462) viewed a simulated crime and attempted to identify the perpetrator from a line-up approximately 1 week later. Rejecting a blank line-up was associated with greater identification accuracy and greater diagnosticity of suspect identifications, but only when witnesses were instructed prior to the blank line-up that they would view a series of line-ups; the procedure was ineffective for screening when witnesses were advised they would view two line-ups or received no instruction. These results highlight the importance of instructions used in the blank line-up procedure, and the need for better understanding of how to interpret choosing patterns in this paradigm.     

How should utilitarians think about the future?

Abstract

Utilitarians must think collectively about the future because many contemporary moral issues require collective responses to avoid possible future harms. But current rule utilitarianism does not accommodate the distant future. Drawing on my recent books Future People and Ethics for a Broken World, I defend a new utilitarianism whose central ethical question is: What moral code should we teach the next generation? This new theory honours utilitarianism’s past and provides the flexibility to adapt to the full range of credible futures – from futures broken by climate change to the digital, virtual and predictable futures produced by various possible technologies.     

What should we expect after the next attack?

A test of any science is its ability to predict events under specified conditions. A test for the psychology represented in this special issue of the American Psychologist is its ability to predict individual and social behavior in the aftermath of a next terror attack. This article draws on that science to make such predictions. These predictions are conditioned on both the nature of the attack and our institutional preparations for it. Some attacks will test our resilience more than others. Whatever the attack, we will reduce its impacts if our institutions take advantage of psychological science. That science can reduce the scope of attacks by limiting terrorists' ability to organize their operations and by enhancing our ability to restrain them. It can reduce the impacts of any attacks that do occur by strengthening the institutions and civil society that must respond to them. Realizing these possibilities will require our social institutions to rely on science, rather than intuition, in dealing with these threats. It will require our profession to provide psychologists with rewards for public service, applied research, and interdisciplinary collaboration, as demanded by complex problems. Responding to these challenges could strengthen society and psychology.     

What should we expect from a dual-process theory of preference construction in choice?

Dhar and Gorlin (2013) proposed a dual-process framework for understanding the effects of preference construction in choice. Drawing on the distinction operating principles and operating conditions, it is argued that their emphasis on cognitive elaboration fails to specify the mental operations involved in preference construction. This limitation makes their dual-process framework circular and susceptible to the criticism of single-process alternatives. The distinction between associative and propositional processes has the potential to fill this conceptual gap, thereby providing a more thorough understanding of preference construction effects in choice.     

Why should medicine consider a theory of practice? Introduction to the issue

In reference to historical developments, this article introduces the topic of this special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, that is, the relationship(s) between theory and practice. The authors emphasize the need for scientific research in this neglected area for the sake of both clinical practice and medical education.     

How do we know that we are unique?

This paper aims to examine the notion of uniqueness as one aspect of the self that is taken for granted in psychotherapy. This paper attempts to address the question 'how do we know that we are unique individuals?' and in so doing, points out some difficulties. One plausible, but not problem-free answer is the notion of privileged access. Some of the problems will be briefly outlined.     

How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?

Libertarianism has, seemingly, always been in disrepute among philosophers. While throughout history philosophers have offered different reasons for their dissatisfaction with libertarianism, one worry is recurring: namely a worry about luck. To many, it seems that if our choices and actions are undetermined, then we cannot control them in a way that allows for freedom and responsibility. My fundamental aim in this paper is to place libertarians on a more promising track for formulating a defensible libertarian theory. I begin by arguing that Robert Kane's influential formulation of libertarianism actually generates an acute worry about luck, showing specifically that Kane's recipe for solving the problem of luck and his attendant conception of the location and role of indeterminism derived from it are deeply problematic. I then offer a reformulation of libertarianism – particularly a new conception of the location and role of indeterminism – that is capable of avoiding the problems that beset Kane's theory and that, I argue, places libertarians on a more promising track for formulating a defensible theory.     

The computer psychiatrist: How far have we come? Where are we heading? How far dare we go?

The use of computers in psychiatry and psychology is reviewed. It is noted that computers are already being used successfully for consultation, interviewing, and continuing education. Issues related to the usage of computers in mental health are discussed. Guidelines for future work in the area are suggested.     

On schizophrenic experiences of the neutron or why we should believe in the many‐worlds interpretation of quantum theory

This is a philosophical paper in favor of the many‐worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum theory. The necessity of introducing many worlds is explained by analyzing a neutron interference experiment. The concept of the “measure of existence of a world” is introduced and some difficulties with the issue of probability in the framework of the MWI are resolved.     

How well can the theory of planned behavior account for occupational intentions?

We tested the capacity of an extended version of the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to account for intentions to work for the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) as a nurse, physiotherapist or radiographer amongst three groups: professionally unqualified (N = 507), in professional training (N = 244), and professionally qualified (N = 227). We found strong support for the three core TPB variables attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control as predictors of behavioral intention, and limited support for two additional variables: moral obligation and identification. There were some differences in the relative importance of TPB variables between groups. We conclude that the TPB has utility for more complex behaviors as well as simpler ones that are more frequently researched. However, more attention should be paid to differences in people’s circumstances, particularly regarding past vocational decisions and behavior, and to obstacles to implementing an intention.