The wall and the shield K-K reconsidered

With apologies to Professor Sosa. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eastern Division Meetings of the APA held in Washington, D.C., December 27 through December 30, 1988. I would like to thank my commentator Professor Gary Gleb of Rutgers University for his thoughtful comments, I also wish to thank Glenn Ross, Steven Davis and Arthur Ripstein for their sound advice.     

Individualism,causal powers,and explanation

Versions of this paper were presented at the 17th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in June 1991, at Cornell University in October 1991, and at Queen's University in January 1992; I thank Terence Horgan and Carl Ginet, respectively, for their comments on the first two of these occasions. I would also like to thank Terence Irwin, Sydney Shoemaker, Bob Stalnaker, Ed Stein, and J. D. Trout for comments on earlier versions of the paper, and Joe Moore, Dave Robb and Sergio Sismondo for useful discussion.     

Time and modality in the logic of agency

Recent theories of agency (sees to it that) of Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff are examined, particularly in the context of an early proposal of the author.Elements of this paper formed the contents of lectures I gave in New Zealand and Australia in 1989. I would like again to thank Graham Oddie at Massey University, in Palmerston North, Jack Copeland at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, John Bacon at the University of Sydney, and Graham Priest at the University of Queensland for their kindness and the gracious receptions they and their colleagues gave me. My thanks go to Graham Oddie and Krister Segerberg, who organized a workshop on Events, Processes, Actions at Lake Taupo, New Zealand, in November 1989, and invited me to participate with a preliminary version of this paper. In June 1990, I presented a fuller specimen at the annual meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, in Wakulla Springs, Florida. Bob Beard at Florida State University organized that splendid gathering, and I am grateful to him for the opportunity to speak at it.For the past several years, Nuel Belnap has sent me copies and updates of his and Michael Perloff's papers. I would like to record my gratitude to him for this and also, especially, for extended comments on the penultimate draft of the present paper. With a few exceptions, I have not tried to take these into account here; I hope that discussions of points on which we disagree will find their way into print in due course.I would also like to acknowledge and thank a referee for a number of helpful suggestions.My largest debt is to Krister Segerberg, who as professor and head of the philosophy department at the University of Auckland invited me to spend a sabbatical autumn (antipodal spring) with him in 1989. It was he who suggested — and then insisted — that I contribute to his seminar on modal logic and agency a session or two on Belnap and Perloff's theories, and then he encouraged me to write this paper. I would like to express my deep gratitude as well to Krister and Anita Segerberg for their hospitality and companionship during my stay in New Zealand.     

On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological,psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception

Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology.I would like to express my gratitude to Bill McKenna for his help with the English text and his critical remarks. This paper was presented in the Cork Roundtable for Philosophy in March 2003, at University College, Cork, and I would like to thank Julia Jansen, Tony O’Connor and the other participants for their constructive critique.     

Persistence,change, and explanation

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to George Myro for his wonderful insight, advice, and support, in writing this paper. I would also like to thank Ermanno Bencivenga, John Broome, Janet Broughton, Alan Code, Paul Grice, Mark Johnston, David Lewis, Paul Kube, Dugald Owen, Steve Yablo, and Colloquium participants at University of Virginia and Ohio State University for their very helpful discussions.     

Reflections on the state of polish-Jewish historical study

An earlier version of this paper was presented in July 1987 at a seminar of the University of Michigan's Center for Russian and East European Studies. This version was prepared during my tenure as a visitor at the university's history department. I would like to express my gratitude to the center, the department, and the university for their hospitality.     

Male and female responses to ambiguous instructor behaviors

Sexual harassment is widely prevalent within academic environments. Yet, many implicit harassing behaviors bear resemblance to instructor immediacy behaviors (i.e., behaviors intended to reduce relational distance). Since females are largely the targets of sexual harassment, it was proposed that they would rate immediacy behaviors to be less appropriate and would experience less comfort with these behaviors than their male counterparts. Three-hundred-fifty-four students (approximately 70% of whom were European-American) were asked to rate 19 ambiguous instructor behaviors for appropriateness. Participants were also asked to indicate how personally comfortable they would be with the described behaviors. Results indicated males rated 12 of 19 behaviors to be significantly more appropriate than females and indicated significantly greater comfort with 14 of 19 behaviors.The author would like to thank Dr. Paul Mongeau, Dr. Joseph Walther, and Jan Toth for assistance with this article. He would also like to thank the department chairs and instructors at DePaul University for their assistance in data collection.     

Is space-time discrete or continuous? — An empirical question

In this paper I present the Discrete Space-Time Thesis, in a way which enables me to defend it against various well-known objections, and which extends to the discrete versions of Special and General Relativity with only minor difficulties. The point of this presentation is not to convince readers that space-time really is discrete but rather to convince them that we do not yet know whether or not it is. Having argued that it is an open question whether or not space-time is discrete, I then turn to some possible empirical evidence, which we do not yet have. This evidence is based on some slight differences between commonly occurring differential equations and their discrete analogs.I would like to express my thanks to John McKie with whom I have had several inspiring conversations about discrete space. I would also like to thank the audience of a paper on this topic which I read in October 1991 at the College Park campus of the University of Maryland. Finally I would like to thank the referees ofSynthese for their comments. One of them, in particular, should be thanked especially for help in improving Appendix Two.     

Semantics and supervenience

I have presented much of this research in talks at the University of Costa Rica and the University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to my audiences for their comments and advice. I would like especially to thank Luis Camacho, Nicholas Asher, and Robert Koons. Many of the ideas in the paper stem from an informal seminar on type-free theories held at the University of Texas's Center for Cognitive Science from 1984 to 1987. I am grateful to the participants in that seminar — Ignacio Angelelli, Nicholas Asher, Herbert Hochberg, Hans Kamp, Frederick Kronz, Per Lindström and Mark Sainsbury — for their many insights into type-free semantics, and to the Center for Cognitive Science for providing such a hospitable environment for this work. I have also profited from the criticisms of two anonymous referees. Finally, I am indebted to the University of Texas's University Research Institute and to the National Science Foundation's Information Science and History and Philosophy of Science programs for grant support.     

The self in Kierkegaard's pseudonyms

Conclusion This is essentially what I take to be Kierkegaard's ontological foundation of human existence. It is the structure which both makes possible and unifies the different modes of existing which he so fully describes in his pseudonyms. The further task is one of demonstrating concretely the relation of these modes (stages) of existing to his ontology.This essay will appear in my book, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms, to be published by Princeton University Press in 1975. I would like to thank the Princeton University Pres for permission to publish a portion of the book in this journal. I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues' helpful criticisms of the original draft of this paper which I read in a departmental seminar at Iowa State University last fall. Some of their suggestions were incorporated in the final draft.     

Towards a phenomenology of ethical expertise

This paper was presented as the Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 1989. We would like to thank Drew Cross, David Greenbaum, Wayne Martin, Charles Spinosa, Charles Taylor and Kailey Vernallis for their helpful comments.     

Art therapy in transcultural family therapy

The increased existence of foreign culture patterns in the child population calls for transcultural comprehension in child psychiatry. This case report describes transcultural aspects in the therapy of an 11 year-old Moslem girl admitted to a child psychiatric department. Her symptoms were abdominal pain, headache, anxiety, and pretended fever. A family therapeutic approach was used together with elements of art therapy and individual therapy in a successful treatment. The family therapeutic approach was based on art therapy as a part of the communication where cultural symbols were an important part. An interpreter was not used. The cultural context where it is acceptable to overstep the borderline between reality and fantasy is seen as an important healing capacity.I would like to acknowledge my debt and my appreciation to Ebba Ernst, psychologist of the department and supervisor in the therapy of the S. family. I would also like to thank professor Kai Tolstrup and child psychiatrist Torben Marner for stimulating support in the process of writing the article. A grant from Enkefrue Hermansens Mindelegat made the participation in the Krakow Congress possible.     

Antigone's Dilemma: A Problem in Political Membership

I would like to thank Donna Haraway, Barrie Thome, Daniel Scripture and, especially, Peter Euben for their many helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Thelma Francis for her generous support and encouragement.     

Young children's comprehension of similarities underlying metaphor

The comprehension of similarity by forty-eight 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds was investigated using a set of binary choice tasks. These tasks were composed of contrasting concepts that were to be matched to conceptually related target stimuli on the basis of relationships underlying object/personality metaphor, color/personality metaphor, concrete metaphor, taxonomic similarity, and functional association. The youngest children were able to comprehend each of the metaphoric and nonmetaphoric relationships, and this ability improved with age.This article is based on the doctoral dissertation of Victor Broderick (Broderick, 1985),The Development of Metaphor Comprehension in Preschool Children, at the Pennsylvania State University. The author would like to thank the directors and instructors of the Child Development Council of Center County, Childspace, OEO, Punkin Patch, Garden of Children, the Jewish Community Center, Our Children's Center, and Parkforest Montessori School for their cooperation and helpful assistance in recruiting subjects and collecting data on the premises. I would also like to thank David Palermo, Keith Nelson, Robert Seibel, Donka Farkas, Philip Prinz, and Francis Whaley for their input and advice. Finally, I would like to thank those 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds who sat patiently for as much as 60 min, answering unusual questions about monkeys, chocolate, and burned out light bulbs.     

Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason. I would like to thank John Broome, Stewart Cohen, Roger Crisp, Jonathan Dancy, Brie Gertler, and Iwao Hirose for their comments on earlier versions of this material. A number of revisions have also been made as a result of helpful questions raised during presentations of this paper at Arizona State University, McGill University, and the University of Virginia.     

Parameters in the theory of sentence processing: Minimal Commitment theory goes east

This paper introduces the Minimal Commitment theory. This theory is a subspecies of deterministic parsers. The theory builds representations where immediate dominance and precedence relations are unspecified. Justification that this approach is psycholinguistically justified comes from its ability to provide a cross-linguistically valid theory of Garden path sentences in English and Japanese.I would lide to thank audiences at CUNY (1990) and (1991) for valuable comments and the chance to present this work. Parts of this paper were also presented at the Duke Symposium on Natural Language Processing, and at the Workshop on Japanese Sentence Processing held at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. I thank these audiences for valuable comments as well. Robert Berwick, Janet Fodor, Ted Gibson, Paul Gorrell, Norbert Hornstein, David Lightfoot, and Juan Uriagereka along with the University of Maryland NLP working group provided valuable assistance on this and earlier drafts.This work was supported by BNS902154-02 from the NSF.     

Skepticism and legal interpretation

For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Kendall Walton, Edward Averill, Marcia Baron, Richard Brandt, and Walter Schaller. This paper was first developed while in residence as a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. I wish to thank both that institution for making its resources available to me during the 1986–87 academic year, and my home institution for granting me the Developmental Leave that permitted me to pursue my research. Finally, I wish to thank Thomas W. Pogge for helping me to make several substantive clarifications in the final version of this paper.     

A formal framework for quantum non-individuality

H. Post's conception of quantal particles as non-individuals is set in a formal logico-mathematical framework. By means of this approach certain metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics can be further explored.The authors would like to thank Prof. Newton C. A. da Costa and the anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions. S. French would also to thank his colleagues at Southeast Missouri State University for their support during the preparation of this work.     

Intuition and the socratic method: Two opposed ways of knowing?

Socratic method and intuition are two ways of knowing commonly thought as opposed. The author shows how both ways of knowing can be linked in an education that has philosophy as its armature.An earlier version of this paper was presented at theWays of Knowing conference at Appalachian State University, and published in the proceedings of that conference. Lee S. Shulman's helpful comments at that time led to this revised version. I would like to thank Jim Garrison for comments and conversation on this topic. Any errors remain my own.     

Mind,consciousness, and cognition: Phenomenology vs. cognitive science

I would like to thank Steven Crowell from Rice University (Philosophy Department) for helpful comments and suggestions about my discussion of Husserl and other phenomenologists, and Edouard Philippe, also from Rice University (Electrical Engineering Department), for offering me the opportunity to formulate my views on cognitive science and artificial intelligence.