Unconscious influences on direct-test performance

From intense interest in implicit memory there have evolved various methods for separating the respective influence of implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) processes on performance of various tasks. Two experiments are reported, utilizing a levels-of-processing (LOP) approach to manipulate encoding level and comparable indirect (word-stem completion) and direct (cued-completion) retention tests. Confidence ratings of recollection were taken for each direct test response. The aim of these experiments was to explore the role that guessing plays in direct-test performance (Experiments 1 and 2) and to contrast this with performance in a comparable indirect test (Experiment 2). Analysis of correctly guessed responses showed that direct-test performance was reliably influenced by unconscious processes, but differently as a function of LOP. Guessing stems of nonsemantically processed words was found to enhance performance, whereas guessing stems of semantically processed words had no effect on performance. Results are discussed in terms of the similarity between guessing in a direct test and engaging in an indirect test, and subjects' unwitting resourcefulness at being able to retrieve words they cannot explicitly remember.     

Attention, awareness of contingencies, and control in spatial localization: a qualitative difference approach

The qualitative difference method for distinguishing between aware and unaware processes was applied here to a spatial priming task. Participants were asked simply to locate a target stimulus that appeared in one of four locations, and this target stimulus was preceded by a prime in one of the same four locations. The prime location predicted the location of the target with high probability (p = .75), but prime and target mismatched on a task-relevant feature (identity, color). Across 5 experiments, we observed repetition costs in the absence of awareness of the contingency, and repetition benefits in the presence of awareness of the contingency. These results were particularly clear-cut in Experiment 4, in which awareness was defined by reference to self-reported strategy use. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that frequency-based implicit learning effects were present in our experiments but that these implicit learning effects were not strong enough to override repetition costs that pushed performance in the opposite direction. The results of these experiments constitute a novel application of the qualitative difference method to the study of awareness, learning of contingencies, and strategic control.     

Attention, not anxiety, influences pain

Four hypotheses about the influences of anxiety and attention on pain impact were tested in a critical experiment: (1) anxiety increases pain; (2) anxiety decreases pain; (3) attention to pain increases pain; (4) only the combination of anxiety and attention to pain increases pain (interaction hypothesis). In a 2 x 2 design, anxiety (low vs high) and attention (attention vs distraction from the pain) were experimentally manipulated. Subjects received 20 electrically produced painful stimuli. Subjective pain experiences, skin conductance responses and heart rate responses gave no support for a pain impact increasing effect of anxiety. The anxiety-attention interaction hypothesis did not receive any support either. There was some support, only from the heart rate responses, that anxiety reduces pain impact. The critical factor appeared to be attention. Attention to the pain stimulus was related to a stronger pain impact (indicated by all measures) and to less subjective habituation, compared to distraction.     

Attention and awareness in synchrony

Interactions between functional areas are often considered to account for subtle aspects of cognitive functions, although direct experimental evidence is scarce. A recent study by Gross et al. relates the strength of synchrony between human parietal, frontal and occipital regions to the availability of attentional resources. These results support the current view that attention and awareness emerge from dynamic interactions in distributed networks.     

Unconscious semantic priming in the absence of partial awareness

In a recent paper in Psychological Science, Kouider and Dupoux reported obtaining unconscious Stroop priming only when subjects had partial awareness of the masked distractor words (i.e., could consciously perceive subword features that enabled reconstruction of whole words). Kouider and Dupoux conjectured that semantic priming occurs only when such partial awareness is present. The present experiments tested this conjecture in an affective categorization priming task that differed from Kouider and Dupoux’s in using masked distractors that subjects had practiced earlier as visible words. Experiment 1 showed priming from practiced words when subjects had no partial awareness of those words. Experiment 2 showed that, in the absence of partial awareness, practiced words yielded priming but not-practiced words did not. Experiment 3 corroborated Experiment 1 and 2s results using a different test of partial awareness. These results suggest that unconscious processing (rather than partial awareness) of subword elements drives masked semantic priming by practiced words.     

At the crossroads: Attention,contingency awareness,and evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to changes in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its repeated pairing with an unconditioned stimulus (US). One of the most debated topics in EC research is whether or not EC is dependent on contingency awareness. In this study, we go beyond this debate by examining whether contingency awareness mediates the impact of attentional resources and goal-directed attention on EC. Attentional resources were manipulated by presenting CSs and USs either within the same modality or in different modalities. Goal-directed attention was manipulated by asking participants to respond to the CSs or to the USs. Results indicate that the effect of goal-directed attention on EC is mediated by contingency awareness, whereas the effect of attentional resources on EC is not.     

Attention to action and awareness of other minds

We have only limited awareness of the system by which we control our actions and this limited awareness does not seem to be concerned with the control of action. Awareness of choosing one action rather than another comes after the choice has been made, while awareness of initiating an action occurs before the movement has begun. These temporal differences bind together in consciousness the intention to act and the consequences of the action. This creates our sense of agency. Activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex is associated with awareness of our own actions and also occurs when we think about the actions of others. I propose that the mechanism underlying awareness of how our own intentions lead to actions can also be used to represent the intentions that underlie the actions of others. This common system enables us to communicate mental states and thereby share our experiences.     

Attention without awareness: Attentional modulation of perceptual grouping without awareness

Perceptual grouping is the process through which the perceptual system combines local stimuli into a more global perceptual unit. Previous studies have shown attention to be a modulatory factor for perceptual grouping. However, these studies mainly used explicit measurements, and, thus, whether attention can modulate perceptual grouping without awareness is still relatively unexplored. To clarify the relationship between attention and perceptual grouping, the present study aims to explore how attention interacts with perceptual grouping without awareness. The task was to judge the relative lengths of two centrally presented horizontal bars while a railway-shaped pattern defined by color similarity was presented in the background. Although the observers were unaware of the railway-shaped pattern, their line-length judgment was biased by that pattern, which induced a Ponzo illusion, indicating grouping without awareness. More importantly, an attentional modulatory effect without awareness was manifested as evident by the observer’s performance being more often biased when the railway-shaped pattern was formed by an attended color than when it was formed by an unattended one. Also, the attentional modulation effect was shown to be dynamic, being more pronounced with a short presentation time than a longer one. The results of the present study not only clarify the relationship between attention and perceptual grouping but also further contribute to our understanding of attention and awareness by corroborating the dissociation between attention and awareness.

     

Motor response influences perceptual awareness judgements

What is the relation between perceptual awareness and action? In this study we tested the hypothesis that motor response influences perceptual awareness judgements. We used a perceptual discrimination task in which presentation of the stimulus was immediately followed by a cue requiring a motor response that was irrelevant to the task but could be the same, opposite, or neutral to the correct response to the stimulus. After responding to the cue, participants rated their stimulus awareness using the Perceptual Awareness Scale, and then carried out their discrimination response. Participants reported a higher level of stimulus awareness after carrying out responses that were either congruent or incongruent with the response required by the stimulus, compared to the neutral condition. The results suggest that the motor response overlapping with a potential response to the stimulus provides information about the outcome of decision process and increases the reported awareness of stimuli.     

Attention allocation policy influences prospective timing

The role of attention allocation policy control in prospective duration judgments was tested in two experiments. In the first experiment, it was demonstrated that prospective duration judgments of same clock durations are longer when timing is treated as a primary task than when it is treated as a secondary task, regardless of the difficulty of the nontemporal task filling the to-be-judged interval. In the second experiment, this finding was replicated. Additionally, it was demonstrated that when prospective timing is not preassigned a specific priority, duration judgments are longer than those obtained under secondary-task conditions, but shorter than those obtained under primary-task conditions. It was also revealed that when attention is distracted from timing, prospective duration judgments become shorter than when attention is not distracted. These findings support the notion that prospective timing creates a dual-task condition in which magnitude of duration judgments reflects the amount of attentional resources allocated for temporal information processing.     

Affective influences on the attentional dynamics supporting awareness

Identification of a 1st target stimulus in a rapid serial visual presentation sequence leads to transient impairment in report for a 2nd target; this is known as the attentional blink (AB). This AB impairment was substantially alleviated for emotionally significant target words. AB sparing was not attributable to a variety of nonaffective stimulus factors that could result in augmented distinctiveness. Arousal value, not the valence of stimulus events, was found to be responsible for AB sparing. These results suggest that arousal is associated with decreased attentional prerequisites for awareness, enabling emotional significance to shape perceptual experience.     

Adaptation of Reactive Saccades is Influenced by Unconscious Priming of the Attention Focus

The authors investigated whether the size of the attention focus can influence saccadic adaptation, and whether this influence changes in older age. Using the scrambled sentence task, young and older participants were either primed for a wide attention focus, or primed of a narrow attention focus, or were not primed for any specific attention focus. Subsequently, all participants underwent a double-step saccadic adaptation paradigm aimed at changing the direction of reflexive saccades. The authors found that compared to the nonprimed control group, priming for a wide attention focus enhanced saccadic adaptation in both age groups by a similar amount; the benefit persisted throughout the adaptation phase, but was absent during the deadaptation phase. In contrast, the authors found no effects of priming with a narrow attention focus on saccadic adaptation. From this the authors conclude that a wide attention focus is beneficial for workaround strategies but not for adaptive recalibration, and that those benefits are similar in young and older persons.     

Affect, Religion, and Unconscious Processes

After a brief review of the central and organizing role of affect in both personality and religion, the bridge between psychoanalytic and contemporary cognitive perspectives of the unconscious is investigated, with a special focus on an affectively based experiential component as outlined in Epstein's (1973, 1993, 1994) Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) model. Four basic needs postulated by CEST are applied to religious experience: the need to manage pleasure and pain, the need for a coherent conceptual system, the need for self-esteem, and the need for relatedness. The last of these four needs is explored in detail from an object relations perspective that expands Freud's religion-as-illusion concept. It is maintained that an object relations approach contributes much to an understanding of a process-oriented spirituality, though it cannot appropriately speak to religious truth claims.     

Folk-Psychology,Psychopathology, and the Unconscious

Abstract

There is a ‘philosophers’ assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such an explanation. Notoriously this concept brings with it a further puzzle: it looks as though repression serves a purpose, and so requires an agent to execute this purpose, a repressor. Paradox is avoided only if repression is viewed in biologicalfunctional terms.The result is that the notion of the unconscious is saved from the a priori objections often levelled at it by philosophers.This still leaves considerable theoretical work to be done by psychological science.     

Attention capture without awareness in a non-spatial selection task

Distractors presented prior to a critical target in a rapid sequence of visually-presented items induce a lag-dependent deficit in target identification, particularly when the distractor shares a task-relevant feature of the target. Presumably, such capture of central attention is important for bringing a target into awareness. The results of the present investigation suggest that greater capture of attention by a distractor is not accompanied by greater awareness of it. Moreover, awareness tends to be limited to superficial characteristics of the target such as colour. The findings are interpreted within the context of a model that assumes sudden increases in arousal trigger selection of information for consolidation in working memory. In this conceptualization, prolonged analysis of distractor items sharing task-relevant features leads to larger target identification deficits (i.e., greater capture) but no increase in awareness.     

Cognitive control: dynamic, sustained, and voluntary influences

The cost of incongruent stimuli is reduced when conflict is expected. This series of experiments tested whether this improved performance is due to repetition priming or to enhanced cognitive control. Using a paradigm in which Word and Number Stroop alternated every trial, Experiment 1 assessed dynamic trial-to-trial changes. Incongruent trials led to task-specific reduction of conflict (trial n + 2) without cross-task modulation (trial n + 1), but this was fully explained by repetition priming. In contrast, an increased ratio of incongruent words did lead to sustained task-specific enhancement, above and beyond repetition priming (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the voluntary modulation of cognitive control: A cue predicted the congruency of the incoming trial, allowing participants to establish the correct mindset (Word Stroop in Experiment 3, Flanker task in Experiment 4). Preparing oneself to process an incongruent word (or flanker) enhanced conflict resolution in the subsequent Number Stroop, an example of cross-task modulation. Taken together, these experiments reveal the multifaceted aspects of conflict resolution: Trial-to-trial changes are often due to repetition priming; sustained modulations brought about by task demands are task specific; and voluntary modulations are task general.     

Attention modulates somatosensory influences in passive speech listening

Previous studies showed that manipulating the speech production system influenced speech perception. This influence was mediated by task difficulty, listening conditions, and attention. In the present study we investigated the specificity of a somatosensory manipulation – a spoon over the tongue – in passive listening. We measured the mismatch negativity (MMN) while participants listened to vowels that differ in their articulation – the tongue height – and familiarity – native and unknown vowels. The same participants heard the vowels in a spoon and no-spoon block. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Results showed no effect of the spoon. Instead, starting with the spoon enhanced the MMN amplitude. A second experiment showed the same MMN enhancement for starting with a somatosensory manipulation applied to a non-articulator – the hand. This result suggests that starting a study with a somatosensory manipulation raises attention to the task.     

Unconscious vision and executive control: How unconscious processing and conscious action control interact

Research on unconscious or unaware vision has demonstrated that unconscious processing can be flexibly adapted to the current goals of human agents. The present review focuses on one area of research, masked visual priming. This method uses visual stimuli presented in a temporal sequence to lower the visibility of one of these stimuli. In this way, a stimulus can be masked and even rendered invisible. Despite its invisibility, a masked stimulus if used as a prime can influence a variety of executive functions, such as response activation, semantic processing, or attention shifting. There are also limitations on the processing of masked primes. While masked priming research demonstrates the top-down dependent usage of unconscious vision during task-set execution it also highlights that the set-up of a new task-set depends on conscious vision as its input. This basic distinction captures a major qualitative difference between conscious and unconscious vision.