Unconscious influences on direct-test performance

From intense interest in implicit memory there have evolved various methods for separating the respective influence of implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) processes on performance of various tasks. Two experiments are reported, utilizing a levels-of-processing (LOP) approach to manipulate encoding level and comparable indirect (word-stem completion) and direct (cued-completion) retention tests. Confidence ratings of recollection were taken for each direct test response. The aim of these experiments was to explore the role that guessing plays in direct-test performance (Experiments 1 and 2) and to contrast this with performance in a comparable indirect test (Experiment 2). Analysis of correctly guessed responses showed that direct-test performance was reliably influenced by unconscious processes, but differently as a function of LOP. Guessing stems of nonsemantically processed words was found to enhance performance, whereas guessing stems of semantically processed words had no effect on performance. Results are discussed in terms of the similarity between guessing in a direct test and engaging in an indirect test, and subjects' unwitting resourcefulness at being able to retrieve words they cannot explicitly remember.     

Attention, awareness of contingencies, and control in spatial localization: a qualitative difference approach

The qualitative difference method for distinguishing between aware and unaware processes was applied here to a spatial priming task. Participants were asked simply to locate a target stimulus that appeared in one of four locations, and this target stimulus was preceded by a prime in one of the same four locations. The prime location predicted the location of the target with high probability (p = .75), but prime and target mismatched on a task-relevant feature (identity, color). Across 5 experiments, we observed repetition costs in the absence of awareness of the contingency, and repetition benefits in the presence of awareness of the contingency. These results were particularly clear-cut in Experiment 4, in which awareness was defined by reference to self-reported strategy use. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that frequency-based implicit learning effects were present in our experiments but that these implicit learning effects were not strong enough to override repetition costs that pushed performance in the opposite direction. The results of these experiments constitute a novel application of the qualitative difference method to the study of awareness, learning of contingencies, and strategic control.     

Attention and awareness in synchrony

Interactions between functional areas are often considered to account for subtle aspects of cognitive functions, although direct experimental evidence is scarce. A recent study by Gross et al. relates the strength of synchrony between human parietal, frontal and occipital regions to the availability of attentional resources. These results support the current view that attention and awareness emerge from dynamic interactions in distributed networks.     

Attention, not anxiety, influences pain

Four hypotheses about the influences of anxiety and attention on pain impact were tested in a critical experiment: (1) anxiety increases pain; (2) anxiety decreases pain; (3) attention to pain increases pain; (4) only the combination of anxiety and attention to pain increases pain (interaction hypothesis). In a 2 x 2 design, anxiety (low vs high) and attention (attention vs distraction from the pain) were experimentally manipulated. Subjects received 20 electrically produced painful stimuli. Subjective pain experiences, skin conductance responses and heart rate responses gave no support for a pain impact increasing effect of anxiety. The anxiety-attention interaction hypothesis did not receive any support either. There was some support, only from the heart rate responses, that anxiety reduces pain impact. The critical factor appeared to be attention. Attention to the pain stimulus was related to a stronger pain impact (indicated by all measures) and to less subjective habituation, compared to distraction.     

Unconscious semantic priming in the absence of partial awareness

In a recent paper in Psychological Science, Kouider and Dupoux reported obtaining unconscious Stroop priming only when subjects had partial awareness of the masked distractor words (i.e., could consciously perceive subword features that enabled reconstruction of whole words). Kouider and Dupoux conjectured that semantic priming occurs only when such partial awareness is present. The present experiments tested this conjecture in an affective categorization priming task that differed from Kouider and Dupoux’s in using masked distractors that subjects had practiced earlier as visible words. Experiment 1 showed priming from practiced words when subjects had no partial awareness of those words. Experiment 2 showed that, in the absence of partial awareness, practiced words yielded priming but not-practiced words did not. Experiment 3 corroborated Experiment 1 and 2s results using a different test of partial awareness. These results suggest that unconscious processing (rather than partial awareness) of subword elements drives masked semantic priming by practiced words.     

At the crossroads: Attention,contingency awareness,and evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to changes in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its repeated pairing with an unconditioned stimulus (US). One of the most debated topics in EC research is whether or not EC is dependent on contingency awareness. In this study, we go beyond this debate by examining whether contingency awareness mediates the impact of attentional resources and goal-directed attention on EC. Attentional resources were manipulated by presenting CSs and USs either within the same modality or in different modalities. Goal-directed attention was manipulated by asking participants to respond to the CSs or to the USs. Results indicate that the effect of goal-directed attention on EC is mediated by contingency awareness, whereas the effect of attentional resources on EC is not.     

Attention without awareness: Attentional modulation of perceptual grouping without awareness

Perceptual grouping is the process through which the perceptual system combines local stimuli into a more global perceptual unit. Previous studies have shown attention to be a modulatory factor for perceptual grouping. However, these studies mainly used explicit measurements, and, thus, whether attention can modulate perceptual grouping without awareness is still relatively unexplored. To clarify the relationship between attention and perceptual grouping, the present study aims to explore how attention interacts with perceptual grouping without awareness. The task was to judge the relative lengths of two centrally presented horizontal bars while a railway-shaped pattern defined by color similarity was presented in the background. Although the observers were unaware of the railway-shaped pattern, their line-length judgment was biased by that pattern, which induced a Ponzo illusion, indicating grouping without awareness. More importantly, an attentional modulatory effect without awareness was manifested as evident by the observer’s performance being more often biased when the railway-shaped pattern was formed by an attended color than when it was formed by an unattended one. Also, the attentional modulation effect was shown to be dynamic, being more pronounced with a short presentation time than a longer one. The results of the present study not only clarify the relationship between attention and perceptual grouping but also further contribute to our understanding of attention and awareness by corroborating the dissociation between attention and awareness.

     

Attention allocation policy influences prospective timing

The role of attention allocation policy control in prospective duration judgments was tested in two experiments. In the first experiment, it was demonstrated that prospective duration judgments of same clock durations are longer when timing is treated as a primary task than when it is treated as a secondary task, regardless of the difficulty of the nontemporal task filling the to-be-judged interval. In the second experiment, this finding was replicated. Additionally, it was demonstrated that when prospective timing is not preassigned a specific priority, duration judgments are longer than those obtained under secondary-task conditions, but shorter than those obtained under primary-task conditions. It was also revealed that when attention is distracted from timing, prospective duration judgments become shorter than when attention is not distracted. These findings support the notion that prospective timing creates a dual-task condition in which magnitude of duration judgments reflects the amount of attentional resources allocated for temporal information processing.     

Folk-Psychology,Psychopathology, and the Unconscious

Abstract

There is a ‘philosophers’ assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such an explanation. Notoriously this concept brings with it a further puzzle: it looks as though repression serves a purpose, and so requires an agent to execute this purpose, a repressor. Paradox is avoided only if repression is viewed in biologicalfunctional terms.The result is that the notion of the unconscious is saved from the a priori objections often levelled at it by philosophers.This still leaves considerable theoretical work to be done by psychological science.     

Affective influences on the attentional dynamics supporting awareness

Identification of a 1st target stimulus in a rapid serial visual presentation sequence leads to transient impairment in report for a 2nd target; this is known as the attentional blink (AB). This AB impairment was substantially alleviated for emotionally significant target words. AB sparing was not attributable to a variety of nonaffective stimulus factors that could result in augmented distinctiveness. Arousal value, not the valence of stimulus events, was found to be responsible for AB sparing. These results suggest that arousal is associated with decreased attentional prerequisites for awareness, enabling emotional significance to shape perceptual experience.     

Affect, Religion, and Unconscious Processes

After a brief review of the central and organizing role of affect in both personality and religion, the bridge between psychoanalytic and contemporary cognitive perspectives of the unconscious is investigated, with a special focus on an affectively based experiential component as outlined in Epstein's (1973, 1993, 1994) Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) model. Four basic needs postulated by CEST are applied to religious experience: the need to manage pleasure and pain, the need for a coherent conceptual system, the need for self-esteem, and the need for relatedness. The last of these four needs is explored in detail from an object relations perspective that expands Freud's religion-as-illusion concept. It is maintained that an object relations approach contributes much to an understanding of a process-oriented spirituality, though it cannot appropriately speak to religious truth claims.     

Cognitive control: dynamic, sustained, and voluntary influences

The cost of incongruent stimuli is reduced when conflict is expected. This series of experiments tested whether this improved performance is due to repetition priming or to enhanced cognitive control. Using a paradigm in which Word and Number Stroop alternated every trial, Experiment 1 assessed dynamic trial-to-trial changes. Incongruent trials led to task-specific reduction of conflict (trial n + 2) without cross-task modulation (trial n + 1), but this was fully explained by repetition priming. In contrast, an increased ratio of incongruent words did lead to sustained task-specific enhancement, above and beyond repetition priming (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the voluntary modulation of cognitive control: A cue predicted the congruency of the incoming trial, allowing participants to establish the correct mindset (Word Stroop in Experiment 3, Flanker task in Experiment 4). Preparing oneself to process an incongruent word (or flanker) enhanced conflict resolution in the subsequent Number Stroop, an example of cross-task modulation. Taken together, these experiments reveal the multifaceted aspects of conflict resolution: Trial-to-trial changes are often due to repetition priming; sustained modulations brought about by task demands are task specific; and voluntary modulations are task general.     

Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary control

How does the brain generate our experience of being in control over our actions and their effects? Here, we argue that the perception of events as self-caused emerges from a comparison between anticipated and actual action-effects: if the representation of an event that follows an action is activated before the action, the event is experienced as caused by one's own action, whereas in the case of a mismatch it will be attributed to an external cause rather than to the self. In a subliminal priming paradigm we show that participants overestimated how much control they had over objectively uncontrollable stimuli, which appeared after free- or forced-choice actions, when a masked prime activated a representation of the stimuli immediately before each action. This prime-induced control-illusion was independent from whether primes were consciously perceived. Results indicate that the conscious experience of control is modulated by unconscious anticipations of action-effects.     

Attention control and susceptibility to hypnosis

The present work aimed at assessing whether the interference exerted by task-irrelevant spatial information is comparable in high- and low-susceptible individuals and whether it may be eliminated by means of a specific posthypnotic suggestion. To this purpose high- and low-susceptible participants were tested using a Simon-like interference task after the administration of a suggestion aimed at preventing the processing of the irrelevant spatial information conveyed by the stimuli. The suggestion could be administered either in the absence or following a standard hypnotic induction. We showed that, outside from the hypnotic context, the Simon effect was similar in high and low-susceptible participants and it was significantly reduced following the posthypnotic suggestion in high-susceptible participants only. These results show that a specific posthypnotic suggestion can alter information processing in high-susceptible individuals and reduce the interfering effect exerted by arrow stimuli.     

Peer influences on body dissatisfaction and dieting awareness in young girls

Aim. This study aimed to explore the role of peer influences in the development of body dissatisfaction and dieting awareness in young girls. Method. A sample of 81 girls (aged 5–8 years) were recruited from the first 3 years of formal schooling. Girls were individually interviewed. Body dissatisfaction was assessed by means of figure rating preferences, and dieting awareness by responses to a brief scenario. A number of sources of peer influence were also assessed. Results. Year 2 girls were found to display significantly greater body dissatisfaction than younger girls. All girls, irrespective of age, preferred a similar thin ideal figure. Year level constituted the only significant predictor of dieting awareness, with older girls demonstrating a greater understanding of dieting than younger girls. Importantly, girls' perception of their peers' body dissatisfaction emerged as the strongest predictor of their own level of body dissatisfaction. Conclusions. Body dissatisfaction in girls first emerges during the junior primary school years, between ages 5 and 7 years, and appears to be a function of shared peer norms for thinness.     

Unconscious processing of facial expression as revealed by affective priming under continuous flash suppression

Whether emotional information from facial expressions can be processed unconsciously is still controversial; this debate is partially due to ambiguities in distinguishing the unconscious–conscious boundary and to possible contributions from low-level (rather than emotional) properties. To avoid these possible confounding factors, we adopted an affective-priming paradigm with the continuous flash suppression (CFS) method in order to render an emotional face invisible. After presenting an invisible face (prime) with either positive or negative valence under CFS, a visible word (target) with an emotionally congruent or incongruent valence was presented. The participants were required to judge the emotional valence (positive or negative) of the target. The face prime was presented for either a short (200 ms, Exp. 1) or a long (1,000 ms, Exp. 2) duration in order to test whether the priming effect would vary with the prime duration. The consistent priming effects across the two priming durations showed that, as compared to their incongruent counterparts, congruent facial expressions can facilitate emotional judgments of subsequent words. These results suggest that the emotional information from facial expressions can be processed unconsciously.     

Attention control, memory updating, and emotion regulation temporarily reduce the capacity for executive control

This research tested the hypothesis that initial efforts at executive control temporarily undermine subsequent efforts at executive control. Four experiments revealed that controlling the focus of visual attention (Experiment 1), inhibiting predominant writing tendencies (Experiment 2), taking a working memory test (Experiment 3), or exaggerating emotional expressions (Experiment 4) undermined performance on subsequent tests of working memory span, reverse digit span, and response inhibition, respectively. The results supported a limited resource model of executive control and cast doubt on competing accounts based on mood, motivation, or task difficulty. Prior efforts at executive control are a significant contextual determinant of the operation of executive processes.     

Attention, Joint Attention, and Social Cognition

ABSTRACT— Before social cognition there is joint processing of information about the attention of self and others. This joint attention requires the integrated activation of a distributed cortical network involving the anterior and posterior attention systems. In infancy, practice with the integrated activation of this distributed attention network is a major contributor to the development of social cognition. Thus, the functional neuroanatomies of social cognition and the anterior–posterior attention systems have much in common. These propositions have implications for understanding joint attention, social cognition, and autism.     

Temporal dynamics of awareness for facial identity revealed with ERP

In this study, we investigated the scalp recorded event-related potential (ERP) responses related to visual awareness. A backward masking procedure was performed while high-density EEG recordings were carried out. Subjects were asked to detect a familiar face, presented at durations that varied parametrically between 16 and 266 ms. ERPs were computed and awareness was assessed using a sensitivity measure from signal detection theory (d'). Modifications in the electrical scalp topographies were found to reflect visual awareness of the stimulus. In particular, an early map topography was found to emerge progressively around 230 ms, showing a pattern of increase similar to the measure of visual awareness. This was followed by an increase in duration of a second, P300-like map. Source localisation for the early awareness-related topography revealed the activation of a distributed network of brain areas including frontal and temporo-occipital regions. Our results suggest that conscious experience emerges in parallel with the activation of a specific neural network that occurs in a time window beginning from about 200 ms.