论知识经济与"人的全面而自由的发展"间关系的复杂性

目前学术界在关于知识经济与“人的全面而自由的发展”间关系的研究中,有两种代表性的观点:一是认为知识经济为人的全面而自由的发展创设了条件,并使之成为可能”。我以为这种观点值得推敲。从“人的全面而自由的发展”的共时性来看,迄今为止,没有任何充足的根据可以说明知识经济使“人的全面而自由的发展成为可能”。因为,当一些人举出许多知识经济有助于“人的全面而自由的发展”例证的同时,另一些人也可以信手拈来与此相悖的例证。从“人的全面而自由的发展”的历时性来看,我们也只能说知识经济使“人的全面而自由的发展”的一些因素和前…     

正确认识个性的发展

马克思主义承认不承认个性?承认不承认个性的发展?回答是肯定的。《共产党宣言》里说:“代替那存在着阶级和阶级对立的资产阶级旧社会的,将是这样一个联合体,在那里,每个人的自由发展是一切人的自由发展的条件。”(《马恩选集》第1卷第273页)马克思在《资本论》里也指出,未来社会是“以每个人的全面而自由的发展为基本原则的社会形式”(《马恩全集》第23卷第649页),还指出真     

培育“四有”新人、人的全面自由发展与提高人的素质

邓小平同志明确提出:“建设社会主义的精神文明,最根本的是要使广大人民有共产主义的理想,有道德,有文化,守纪律。《邓小平文选》第3卷,第28页)即是说社会主义精神文明建设的根本目标是培育“四有”新人;而马克思则认为,共产主义是以“每个人的全面自由的发展为基本原则的社会形式”(《马克思恩格斯全集》第23卷,第649页)。“四有”新人与人的“全面     

建设和谐美丽乡村家园——乡村振兴视域下“和谐思想”漫谈

<正>建设美好家园,每个人都能得到自由而又全面的发展,始终是我国各族人民孜孜以求的理想目标。我国已经实现了现行标准下9899万农村贫困人口全面脱贫,832个贫困县全部摘帽,并且正朝着“乡村振兴”战略目标不断地奋进。在“乡村振兴战略”背景下,努力构建和谐美丽的乡村,以和谐思想为引领,以之推动乡村振兴进一步升级。一、中国古代“和谐思想”是中国特色社会主义“和谐思想”的根1.“和为贵”思想。     

社会主义和个性

本文对现代修正主义所鼓吹的“纯粹的个性”、“抽象的个性”、“个性的绝对自由”等谬论进行了批判,指出这些谬论是以资产阶级的个性论为基础、用以腐蚀劳动人民的思想,为资产阶级服务的。作者说,一个人的个性不是单纯由人的生理方面的种种特征所决定,而是由种种社会特征所决定的,是由社会关系的总和决定的。在阶级社会里,每个人的阶级意识是决定个性的所有因素中最本质的东西,起着规定和制约其他因素的作用。在阶级性的基础上,每个人的个性有差别,这种差别,到了共产主义社会也还仍然存在。但任何时候,个性总是复杂的客观世界的产物,决不是抽象的、一成不变的东西。从原始社会到封建社会,人的个性的发展都是受到束缚的。资产阶级在反封建的革命时期提出的个性自由和解放的口号,虽然曾起过一定的进步作用,但是在资本主义制度下,劳动人民的个性却得不到发展。只有推翻资本主义制度,建立起社会主义和共产主义社会,个性才能解放。作者批判了现代修正主义所鼓吹的“全人类的爱”、“全人类的道德”等口号的虚伪性,指出这些口号所隐藏的企图是要使劳动人民放下武器,停止阶级斗争。作者阐述了建设社会主义、共产主义和全面地发展个性的辩证关系。他说,建设社会主义、共产主义的主要任务之一就是全面地发展个性,而个性的全面发展则会加速社会主义、共产主义建设的发展。作者指出,只有社会主义的集体主义才能保证个性的全面发展。在集体主义制度下,每个人享有真正的人的待遇,可以过真正的人的生活。“人人为我,我为人人”这句口号就是集体主义的实质。作者强调党的领导、无产阶级专政同个性自由之间毫无矛盾,反对个人主义和不守纪律的无政府状态。作者最后说,在朝鲜人民民主主义共和国,劳动人民在党的领导下广泛地开展了群众性的千里马作业班运动,这个运动是全面发展个性的最好方法。     

关于马克恩“人的全面发展”涵义的商榷

“人的全面发展”是马克思十分关注的根本问题之一,许多学者对此都作了解释和发挥。赵卫关于理解马克思“人的全面发展”之涵义的论文(载《哲学研究》1990年第4期,以下简称“赵文”),在前人研究成果的基础上,对涉及到马克思关于人的全面发展思想体系的关键性概念之含义(如全面、自由人联合体、劳动工具的发展、自由地发展和自由等)的理解有独到之处,而且从马克思关于人的全面发展的多种表述中概括出的一般含义也有新意,其中有的含义较接近于马克思关于“人的全面发展”的本来含义,但其中也暴露出一些值得商榷的问题。     

“以人为本”的经济伦理价值

1.“以人为本”确立了经济发展的终极价值目标:人的全面发展坚持“以人为本”,就是要关心每个人的利益要求,体现社会主义的人道主义和人文关怀,满足人们的发展愿望和多样性需求,尊重和保障人权;就是要关注人的价值、权益和自由,关注人的生活质量、发展潜能和幸福指数,最终实现人的全面发展。由此而论,“以人为本”为我们确立了经济发展的终极价值目标:人的全面发展。“以人为本”包含着两个层次的问题:第一层次是真理问题,第二层次是价值问题(参见姜志保)。“以人为本”的第一层次问题(真理问题)即人是什么的问题。马克思主义哲学所理解的人…     

对“人的全面发展”学说的不同理解

近年来,我国教育界结合社会主义教育的目的和方针问题,对马克思主义关于人的全面发展学说进行了研究和讨论。在讨论中,对于“人的全面发展”的涵义、实现“人的全面发展”的条件以及“人的全面发展”学说和“全面发展教育”的关系等问题,都存在着不同的理解。现将几种不同意见简介如下: 一种意见认为:马克思主义关于人的全面发展的涵义,指的是人(生产者)的“能力”方面的“全面发展”,即人的智力和体力方面广泛的、充分自由的发展。而长期以来,国内     

何以致“善”?

本文反思如下问题:设定社会主义的目的为“善”,我们怎样达致“善”?所以作此反思,主要因为“真”与“善”的关系在历史发展中呈现出复杂性,而在过去的实践诉求和当下有关效率与公平的讨论中,这种复杂性并不为人们所特别经意。一、两条致“善”路向唯物史观有两个思想要点,一是人类解放或每个人的自由而全面的发展;二是探索和揭示历史发展的规律。前者是目的,显现为一种价值取向,马克思一生都在为实现这个目的而奋斗;后者是途径,显现为一种方法论意义上的科学态度,马克思一生都在为发现揭示这个途径而工作。我们用两个概念浓缩唯物史观的这…     

“每个人”和“一切人”的自由发展——《共产党宣言》中一段论述的理解

在《共产党宣言》中,马克思和思格斯谈到将要用以代替资本主义社会的社会主义社会时,曾经说过这样一段话:代替那存在着阶级和阶级对立的资产阶级旧社会的,将是这样一个联合体,“在那里,每个人的自由发展是一切人的自由发展的条件”(《马克思恩格斯选集》第一卷,第273页)。 “每个人的自由发展是一切人的自由发展的条件”这个深刻论断,时常引来歧义的解释。有的人以此作为说明必须优先发展个人利益的依据,其理     

罗尔斯“分配的正义观”与诺齐克“持有的正义观”对照研究

分配正当性的根据是什么 ?人的基本权利与平等的要件如何分配才是符合正义的 ?罗尔斯和诺齐克从两个向度上对此作了深入研究。罗尔斯从平等的权利出发 ,主张用“公平正义的两个原则”来取代功利主义 ,认为除非有充足理由证明应当不平等 ,否则就应当平等。并要求依据“公平的正义原则”分配公共资源和自由体系 ;诺齐克从人的不可剥夺的权利出发 ,认为除非有充足理由证明应当平等 ,否则就应当不平等 ,通过“资格”理论确立“持有”的正当性。在功利主义、财产权、国家的作用、自由平等、分配模式和社会稳定的意义等方面 ,罗尔斯与诺齐克的观点也各有契合与对立。     

Drugs, Morality and the Law

Arguments for and against the legal prohibition of drugs are surveyed. Various kinds of argument are identified and analysed: arguments against prohibition from a moral right to personal liberty; utilitarian and contractualist arguments for a right to personal liberty; arguments for prohibition from liberty–limiting principles (the harm principle, legal paternalism, legal moralism, Kantian duties to oneself, legal perfectionism, traditional conservatism, and communitarianism); utilitarian argument for prohibition; utilitarian argument against prohibition. It is concluded that none of the arguments for drug prohibition is convincing.     

Is Standards-based School Reform Consistent with Schooling for Personal Liberty?

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether standards-based school reform is an acceptable strategy for achieving a politically legitimate school system according to a principle of personal liberty. First, it briefly describes the purpose and implementation of standards-based school reform in the U.S. It then considers the ramifications of the principle of personal liberty for the conduct of public schooling, arguing that it requires children’s access to and appreciation of a variety of liberty-consistent cultures in their society coupled with the development of children’s ability to think critically about those cultures and their meaning as possibilities for their own lives. Third, it considers whether some standards for public education might be consistent with this purpose of education and finds that certain outcome and process standards may be appropriate. Finally, it considers whether these kinds of standards are included in standards-based reform as it is currently practiced or proposed in the U.S. and concludes that they are not. Barry Bull is a professor of philosophy of Education at Indiana. His research focuses on the moral and political justification of education policies.     

The moral limits of Feinberg's liberalism

This essay explores Joel Feinberg's conception of liberalism and the moral limits of the criminal law. Feinberg identifies liberty with the absence of law. He defends a strong liberal presumption against law, except where it is necessary to prevent wrongful harm or offense to others. Drawing on Rawlsian, Marxian, and feminist standpoints, I argue that there are injuries to individual liberty rooted not in law, but in civil society. Against Feinberg, I defend a richer account of liberalism and liberty, linking them to human dignity, and a more positive role for law. Feinberg justifies liberty as an instrumental welfare‐interest, valuable in virtue of the way it serves the individual's ulterior goals. Drawing on the example of racism and civil rights, I argue that the value of equal liberty stems from its social role in constituting persons’ sense of their own worth and dignity. Against Feinberg, I claim that liberty's value is grounded in a shared historical ideal of personhood, not in the individual's goals or desires. Feinberg also links liberalism with an extreme anti‐paternalist position, on which individuals should be at liberty to alienate their very own right of personal autonomy. Drawing on the examples of slavery and drug addiction, I argue against this liberty, and the conception of liberalism and paternalism in Feinberg which leads to it. A liberalism founded upon an ideal of human dignity allows, even requires, a use of law to prevent persons from destroying the very conditions of their own autonomy and dignity.     

Critical notice of On the people's terms: a Republican theory and model of democracy,by Philip Pettit,Cambridge University Press, 2012, xii+333pp.

This paper is a critical notice of Philip Pettit's On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Pettit argues that only Republicanism can respond appropriately to the ‘evil of subjection to another's will – particularly in important areas of personal choice’ because its ideal of liberty – freedom as non-domination – both captures better than liberalism our commitment to individual liberty and explains better our commitment to the legitimacy of democratic decision-making than standard democrat accounts. If this argument succeeds, it demonstrates that there is no real tension between the liberal thought that justice provides a standard for evaluating public decisions independent of the fact that they are taken democratically and the democratic thought that the fact that a decision is democratic suffices to make it legitimate. I argue, however, that Pettit finds himself caught between two contradictory positions: a version of Isaiah Berlin's negative concept of liberty and a positive liberty account of democracy. And I show that his attempt to resolve the tension fails because it requires him to embrace the positive liberty account he is committed to rejecting.     

Ontological difference,anthropological difference,and equal liberty

In this lecture, the author seeks to articulate in a systematic manner, although still tentative, the three ideas about which he has been developing his personal philosophy in the last period: “Ontological difference”, which after Heidegger and Derrida needs to become redefined in terms of a quasi‐transcendental problematic of alterity; “anthropological difference”, which covers the wholerange of oppositions which at the same time are inseparable from a representation of the “human” and impossible to define as invariable binaries; “equal liberty”, the combination of heterogeneous values which, since Ancient democracies and Modern republican insurrections, has installed the tension of emancipation at the heart of the political institution.     

Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro’s interpretation, I question his conclusion that self-control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for ‘moral heroes.’ I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury’s concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self-mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty.     

Révision de la loi bioéthique : les dangers de l’autoconservation des ovocytes pour convenance personnelle

Legalization of self-conservation of ovocytes for personal convenience is considered by the second article of the bioethics legislative proposal, adopted by French National Assembly. This practice is aiming to allow men and women to keep their gametes for the purpose of a subsequent medically assisted procreation. Does this new liberty risks to take away a human's individual liberty and more specifically a women's one? Indeed, to legalize self-conservation of ovocytes for personal convenience means to extend the message whereby a woman could delay her maternity. The result would be an implicit pressure: as it becomes medically possible to privilege first of all a career and then to envisage maternity, woman seeking high performance must necessarily choose it. This technique could therefore hide a clear-cut decline for women's rights, again confronted with a cornelian choice, a family or a career.     

The Cookie Paradox

We’ve all been at parties where there's one cookie left on what was once a plate full of cookies, a cookie no one will eat simply because everyone is following a rule of etiquette, according to which you’re not supposed to eat the last cookie. Or at least we think everyone is following this rule, but maybe not. In this paper I present a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox, which is an argument that seems to prove that in any situation in which everyone is truly following the rule, no one eats any cookies at all, no matter how many there are to be eaten. The ‘Cookie Argument’ resembles the more familiar argument that surprise exams are impossible, but it's not exactly the same. I argue that the biggest difference is that, unlike the surprise exam argument, the Cookie Argument is actually sound! I conclude the paper by explaining how it could be possible for a group of people to engage in behavior (eating cookies) that guarantees that at least one of the members of the group will violate a rule, even when it's common knowledge in the group that everyone is committed to following that very rule.

Sometimes me think, “What is friend?” and then me say, “Friend is someone to share the last cookie with.” ‐ Cookie Monster, http://youtu.be/LHh0A_bH5ig 1 1 I’m grateful to Eric Carter for this quote.

     

A JEWISH CONCEPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY

This paper depicts the meanings of human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the Halakhah. I posit that three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity. First, the original source of human dignity is not intrinsic to the human being but extrinsic, namely in God. Second, it is argued that the “dignity of the people” has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty, which are core liberal pillars. The third characteristic pertains to the potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God's commandments. The theoretical analysis of human dignity is then examined in light of several Supreme Court decisions in Israel during the 1990s. I illustrate that Jewish religious and secular‐liberal conceptions pull in different directions in the rulings of liberal and religious Justices in Israel.