Virtue and the Good Life in the Early Confucian Tradition

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non‐moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non‐moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self‐sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non‐moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non‐moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non‐moral goods in human life.     

孔子与亚里士多德的朋友观之比较

Before and during the times of Confucius and Aristotle, the concept of friendship had very different implications. This paper compares Confucius’ with Aristotle’s thoughts on friendship from two perspectives: xin 信 (fidelity, faithfulness) and le 乐 (joy). The Analects emphasizes the xin as the basis of friendship. Aristotle holds that there are three kinds of friends and corresponding to them are three types of friendship. In the friendship for the sake of pleasure, there is no xin; in the legal form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by law; and in the moral form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by morality; in the friendship for the sake of virtue, xin is an indispensable part. Both thinkers believe friends can bring joy to human life. According to Confucius, it is the joy of rendao 仁道 (benevolence), whereas for Aristotle, it is the joy of Reason. There are many commonalities and differences between the two. The commonalities reveal some inner links between Confucian rendao and Aristotelian Reason. It seems that the differences between rendao and Reason are the differences between moral reason and logical reason. The comparative study is helpful for us to understand the two masters’ ethics, politics and philosophy. Translated from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Research in Ethics), 2006, (1): 47–52     

Friendship, Justice, and Aristotle: Some Reasons to Be Sceptical

It is sometimes held that modern institutionally-focussed conceptions of social justice are lacking in one essential respect: they ignore the importance of civic friendship or solidarity. It is also, typically simultaneously, held that Aristotle’s thought provides a fertile ground for elucidating an account of civic friendship. I argue, first, that Aristotle is no help on this score: he has no conception of distinctively civic friendship. I then go on to argue that the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is more useful than talk of civic friendship in capturing the non-institutional demands of social justice.     

The Friendship Model of Filial Obligations

ABSTRACT This paper [1] is a defence of a modified version of Jane English's model of filial obligations based on adult children's friendship with their parents. (I) Unlike the more traditional view that filial obligations are a repayment for parental sacrifices, the friendship model puts filial duties in the appealing context of voluntary, loving relationships. (II) Contrary to English's original statement of this view, which is open to the charge of tolerating filial ingratitude, the friendship model can generate obligations to help our parents even if we are no longer friendly with them. (III) Joseph Kupfer has pointed out several ways in which parent-child relationships differ from peer friendships; but his arguments do not preclude our enjoying a type of friendship with our parents. (IV) In response to Christina Hoff Sommers, who objects that feelings of friendship toward our parents are too flimsy a ground for filial duties, the friendship model can provide a plausible, robust account of filial obligations. (V) As for adult children who have never formed friendships with their loving, caring parents, and refuse to give them much-needed assistance, they can be criticised by moral considerations independent of but compatible with the friendship model .     

Friendship Values and Cross-Category Friendships: Understanding Adult Friendship Patterns Across Gender, Sexual Orientation and Race

The present research used an intersectional analysis in examining whether women and men who have, versus do not have, cross-category friendships differ in what they value as important in a close friendship. Parallel analyses were conducted to examine cross-orientation and cross-race friendships across gender and identity status (minority and majority), with age as a covariate for all analyses. Participants were 1415 adult women and men, ranging in age from 18-80, residing in the United States, who completed a friendship profile questionnaire by reporting basic demographic information about themselves and their close friends. Participants’ importance ratings of six different friendship values were utilized to interrogate existing friendship patterns. Three general friendship values (trust and honesty, respect friend as person, there when needed) and three cross-identity salient friendship values (similar lives & experiences, similar values, nonjudgmental) were considered. Individuals with and without cross-category friendships did not significantly differ in their ratings for any of the three general friendship values. Individuals with cross-orientation and cross-race friendships placed less importance on similar lives & experiences than those with no such friendships. Other cross-identity salient friendship values were uniquely related to cross-orientation and cross-race friendship patterns. Although women rated all six friendship values as more important than did men, women and men displayed similar friendship value patterns across cross-category friendships and identity. These findings are discussed in the context of feminist intersectional theory.     

Hsun Tzu on Family and Familial Relations

The Confucian tradition is often held to have accorded the family a prominent place in their ethics. This paper distinguishes three different senses in which the family is held to be primary in Confucian morality. It then explores Hsun Tzu's views on the family and familial relations. I argue that, while other early Confucians such as Confucius and Mencius would have held the family to be primary in all three senses, Hsun Tzu held the family to be primary in only one of the three senses. In particular, there is textual evidence that Hsun Tzu holds that one's primary obligation is to the ruler of the state, rather than to the immediate family.     

Between friends: Making emotions intersubjectively

Analysing qualitative interview material from a project on friendship and spatiality, this article examines the relationship between friendship, emotions and context. In the project's data the workplace emerged as a key site in which people meet new friends and practice friendships. Using the workplace as a case study, the article analyses how context can shape friendships, how emotions are woven throughout the very constitution of friendships, and how friendships can impact upon people's emotional experience of workplaces. Further, I analyse how emotions are actively generated between friends. In this understanding, emotions are not pre-existing states that are located in individuals; rather, emotions are created intersubjectively between friends and in specific contexts.     

Justice and Civic Friendship： An Aristotelian Critique of Modern Citizenry

Modem moral and political theorists make a sharp separation between justice and civic friendship, arguing that justice deals with the fair terms of co-operation in the social sphere whereas civic friendship is about an individual＇s contingent affections in the political domain. In addition, they also argue that the principles of justice must determine the nature and function of civic friendship in modem liberal society. Even though the historical origin of the above view can be traced to the writings of Immanuel Kant （2007）, John Rawls provides us with its most cogent formulation in recent times. In his book A Theory of Justice （1971）, Rawls argues that the considerations of right are prior to the considerations of good; therefore the principles of justice must determine the limits of civic friendship. Against RaMs, I argue that justice and civic friendship are intrinsically connected and that they cannot be separated in experience. I draw upon Aristotle＇s theory of virtue to strengthen my arguments. Following Aristotle, I show that both justice and friendship are virtues and that all virtues hold together. The Aristotelian coherence of virtues, I argue, can be useful in redefining the obligations of justice and civic friendship in contemporary liberal democracies.     

Love Life: Aristotle on Living Together with Friends

According to Aristotle, the most characteristic activity of friendship is “living together” [to suzên]. This paper seeks to understand living together in the light of his famous, foundational claim that humans are social by nature. Based on an interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics 9.9, I explain our need for friends in terms of a more fundamental human need to appreciate one's life as a whole. I then argue that friendship is built into the very structure of human life itself such that human living is living together.     

Can we be (and stay) friends? Remaining friends after dissolution of a romantic relationship

Although many individuals report being friends with their ex-romantic partners (Wilmot, Carbaugh, & Baxter, 1985), the literature regarding post-romantic friendships is very limited. We investigated whether satisfaction in the dissolved romantic relationship could predict post-romantic friendships and friendship maintenance. We found that the more satisfied individuals were during the dissolved romance, the more likely they were to remain friends and the more likely they were to engage in friendship maintenance behaviors. We also found that friendship maintenance fully mediated the association between past romantic satisfaction and current friendship satisfaction.     

Artifice and virtue in the<Emphasis Type="Italic">Xunzi</Emphasis>

Xunzi was chronologically the third of the three great Confucian thinkers of China’s classical period, after Confucius and Mencius. Having produced the most comprehensive philosophical system of that period, he occupies a place in the development of Chinese philosophy comparable to that of Aristotle in the Western philosophical tradition. This essay reveals how Xunzi’s understanding of virtue and moral development dovetailed with his positions on ritual propriety, the attunement of names, the relation betweenli (patterns) andlei (categories), and his view ofdao (the way) in general. I have argued for a “constructivist” understanding of each of these aspects of Xunzi’s philosophy in some detail elsewhere (see Hagen 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), and so here I will just briefly review a few key points before addressing their relation to moral development.     

Looking to happy tomorrows with friends: Best and close friendships as they predict happiness

Friendships are an important source of happiness. The present study (n = 280) investigated the role of friendship quality and conflict in happiness and examined the feature of friendship that best predicted happiness. Information was gathered about the quality and conflict of the best, first and second close friendships of the individual. Results revealed that best friendship quality was the only significant predictor of happiness; however, individuals were happier when they experienced high quality first close friendships in conjunction with a high quality best friendship. Results also revealed that first close friendship quality buffered the negative impact of first close friendship conflict. The companionship feature of the best and first close friendship appeared as the strongest predictor of happiness. Findings were discussed in light of the literature and suggestions for future research were made.     

The Source and Robustness of Duties of Friendship

Abstract

Certain relationships generate associative duties that exhibit robustness across change. It seems insufficient for friendship, for example, if I am only disposed to fulfil duties of friendship towards you as things stand here and now. However, robustness is not required across all variations. Were you to become monstrously cruel towards me, we might expect that my duties of friendship towards you would not be robust across that kind of change. The question then is this: is there any principled way of distinguishing those variations across which robustness of the disposition to fulfil duties of friendship is required from those across which it isn’t? In this paper I propose a way of answering this question that invokes distinctions concerning how we value friends and friendships, and how persons and friendships possess value – distinctions that are central to the project of specifying not only the limits of robustness, but also the source of duties of friendship and associative duties more generally.     

Civic Friendship and Thin Citizenship

Contemporary appeals for a deepening of civic friendship in liberal democracies often draw on Aristotle. This paper warns against a certain kind of attempt to use Aristotle in our own theorising, namely accounts of civic friendship that characterise it as similar in some way to Aristotelian virtue friendship. The most prominent of these attempts have focused on disinterested mutual regard as a basic ingredient in all Aristotelian forms of friendship. The argument against this is that it inadequately accounts for the idea of a virtue friend as another self, which we find in Aristotle’s thought. When we attend closely to that, we see that civic friendship is different in a fundamental way from virtue friendship because virtue friends are keenly committed to the moral improvement of one another. It is argued that Aristotle does not see civic friendship in the same way. However, if this argument about the differences between the forms of friendship cannot be accepted, the paper argues that we should not draw on Aristotle for an understanding of civic friendship because any similarity it might have to virtue friendship would license illiberal interventions in the lives of citizens in service of some idea of moral improvement. A seeming connection between Aristotelian civic friendship and thick conceptions of citizenship is replaced with a connection between it and thinner conceptions.     

Preference for Same‐ Versus Cross‐Sex Friendships1

How is preferring same‐ vs. cross‐sex friendships related to one's perceptions of these friendships? In Phase 1, college students (N = 122) listed qualities they valued in their same‐ and cross‐sex friends. In Phase 2, survey items constructed from the responses were administered to 231 students who indicated a preference for same‐ vs. cross‐sex friendship. Those who reported a preference for opposite‐sex friends rated these friendships as higher in closeness, trust, caring, having common interests, and providing narcissistic benefits, compared to those who reported a preference for same‐sex friends. Results demonstrate that gender differences often associated with close friendships are greatly attenuated and sometimes reversed when preference for same‐ vs. cross‐sex friendship is included as a moderating variable.     

Can men and women be just friends?

We tested evolution‐based hypotheses about (1) sex differences in perceived benefits and costs of opposite‐sex friendship and (2) differences in perceived benefits of same‐sex friendships and opposite‐sex friendships. In the Preliminary Study (N= 400), an act nomination procedure was used to identify the benefits and costs of same‐sex friendships and opposite‐sex friendships. In Study 1, a total of 231 participants (100 men, 131 women) evaluated the frequency of occurrence of 100 benefits and costs in their closest same‐sex friendship or opposite‐sex friendship. In Study 2, a total of 229 participants (92 men, 137 women) evaluated how beneficial and how costly each would be if it were to occur in their closest same‐sex friendship or opposite‐sex friendship. Results supported several key hypotheses. Men perceived sex with their opposite‐sex friends as more beneficial than did women. Women reported receiving protection from their opposite‐sex friends more often than did men, and they perceived the protection as highly beneficial. Both men and women reported receiving information from opposite‐sex friends about how to attract mates, and they perceived this information as beneficial. The discussion focuses on whether these benefits reflect an evolved psychology of opposite‐sex friendship, or instead are incidental by‐products.     

Why Bad People Can't be Good Friends

Must the best friends necessarily be good people? On the one hand, as Aristotle puts it, ‘people think that the same people are good and also friends’. But on the other hand, friendship sometimes seems to require that one behave badly. For example, a normally honest person might lie to corroborate a friend's story. What I will call closeness, which I take to include sensitivity to friends' subjective values and concerns as well as an inclination to take their subjective interests as reasons for action, is characteristic of friendship. But this seems to require that good friends should be morally flexible, more so than is compatible with a virtuous character. This would imply tension between ideals of friendship and ideals of character. But there is an important connection between virtue and friendship which arises precisely from friends' closeness, when concern for wellbeing, another important feature of friendship, is also taken into account. This helps mitigate the tension and shows how friendship and virtue are interconnected. The connection in turn provides friendship‐based reason to think the best friends must be good people, even though concerns of friendship may occasionally clash with other moral concerns.     

Spinoza on Friendship

Friendships have always been one of the most valuable assets in the lives of human beings, and friendships were of utmost importance to Spinoza. There are different kinds of friendship but for Spinoza genuine friendship can only occur among those who pursue the truth. In this paper I will (1) point out what Spinoza means by the truth, (2) show how friendships are possible even though there is tension in our lives between our desire to preserve ourselves and our desire to preserve others, (3) differentiate two kinds of friendship, and (4) see what if anything is missing from his account of friendship.     

Captured in Time: Friendship and Aging

This essay explores the general issues of aging—loneliness, vulnerability, dispossession, disempowerment, fear of death—from a Christian perspective. Drawing on Aristotle and Aelred of Rievaulx, we argue first that Christian stories transform these issues such that we see aging as a gift rather than a threat. Second, friendships among the elderly, and between the elderly and the young, are essential to the church; we need the elderly to tell the Christian stories, to embody the church's memory, and to teach the young how to grow old and die. Finally, we make a few suggestions about how churches can approximate more closely Aelred's vision of a community of friendship.     

Friendship stability and change in childhood and adolescence

The objective of this review is to focus on a neglected aspect of children’s and adolescents’ friendships: the level of temporal stability. First, a rationale for examining stability as a distinct friendship dimension is presented. Next, the different levels of friendship experiences are distinguished. Friendship stability is also discussed across developmental periods. Factors affecting friendships stability and individual correlates associated with friendship stability are then covered. Finally, the methodological issues pertaining to the study of friendship stability are addressed. The authors conclude by emphasizing the importance of pursuing future research that aims to demonstrate the pertinence of the friendship stability construct as an individual difference variable. Further, on a methodological level, the assessment of stability needs to be based on longitudinal designs that include multiple measurement waves. Ultimately, such detailed analysis of stability will allow a better understanding of the dynamic processes by which friendships change over time and affect children’s and adolescents’ psychosocial development.