Over-valued ideas: a conceptual analysis

Over-valued ideas are truly a neglected area of psychopathology with few experimental studies published. There is a different emphasis in the USA and Europe regarding their definition. For authors in the USA an over-valued idea has become shorthand for 'poor insight' in the middle of a continuum of obsessional doubts to delusional certainty. Compared to negative thoughts, obsessions and delusions, they are often more resistant to any treatment. A better understanding of over-valued ideas is required if advances are to be made in therapy and for the development of appropriate measures to evaluate the efficacy of novel treatments. A cognitive behavioural model of over-valued ideas is presented which draws upon the philosophical distinction between beliefs and values. It is argued that over-valued ideas are associated with idealised values, which have developed into such an over-riding importance, that they totally define the 'self' or identity of the individual. Idealised values are also characterised by the rigidity with which they are held. Such patients are unable to adapt to different circumstances and ignore the consequences of acting on their value. This analysis leads to a discussion of predictions that can be tested and various strategies that can be used in cognitive behaviour therapy.     

Automaticity: a theoretical and conceptual analysis

Several theoretical views of automaticity are discussed. Most of these suggest that automaticity should be diagnosed by looking at the presence of features such as unintentional, uncontrolled/uncontrollable, goal independent, autonomous, purely stimulus driven, unconscious, efficient, and fast. Contemporary views further suggest that these features should be investigated separately. The authors examine whether features of automaticity can be disentangled on a conceptual level, because only then is the separate investigation of them worth the effort. They conclude that the conceptual analysis of features is to a large extent feasible. Not all researchers agree with this position, however. The authors show that assumptions of overlap among features are determined by the other researchers' views of automaticity and by the models they endorse for information processing in general.     

Science and Human Behavior: a tutorial in behavior analysis

B. F. Skinner's Science and Human Behavior (1953) became the main source of my understanding of behavior during my first semester as a college professor in 1955 at Kansas University. It has continued to exert a major influence throughout my career as the basis for a completely deterministic science of behavior, as a handbook to be consulted as a first step in dealing with any issue in behavior analysis, and as a tutorial in behavioral interpretive analysis--in the use of a small number of behavioral concepts and principles to understand behavior of all degrees of complexity. I describe four general interpretive orientations or maxims that are of broad significance for behavior analysis, and also two underappreciated major theoretical contributions.     

Recurrence in major depression: a conceptual analysis

Theory and research on major depression have increasingly assumed a recurrent and chronic disease model. Yet not all people who become depressed suffer recurrences, suggesting that depression is also an acute, time-limited condition. However, few if any risk indicators are available to forecast which of the initially depressed will or will not recur. This prognostic impasse may be a result of problems in conceptualizing the nature of recurrence in depression. In the current paper we first provide a conceptual analysis of the assumptions and theoretical systems that presently structure thinking on recurrence. This analysis reveals key concerns that have distorted views about the long-term course of depression. Second, as a consequence of these theoretical problems we suggest that investigative attention has been biased toward recurrent forms of depression and away from acute, time-limited conditions. Third, an analysis of how these theoretical problems have influenced research practices reveals that an essential comparison group has been omitted from research on recurrence: people with a single lifetime episode of depression. We suggest that this startling omission may explain why so few predictors of recurrence have as yet been found. Finally, we examine the reasons for this oversight, document the validity of depression as an acute, time-limited disorder, and provide suggestions for future research with the goal of discovering early risk indicators for recurrent depression.     

Dynamics of choice: a tutorial

Choice may be defined as the allocation of behavior among activities. Since all activities take up time, choice is conveniently thought of as the allocation of time among activities, even if activities like pecking are most easily measured by counting. Since dynamics refers to change through time, the dynamics of choice refers to change of allocation through time. In the dynamics of choice, as in other dynamical systems that include feedback, change is away from perturbation and toward a steady state. Steady state or equilibrium is assessed on a longer time scale than change because change is only visible on a smaller time scale. When we compare laws of equilibrium, such as the matching law with laws of dynamics, two possibilities emerge. Self-similarity occurs when the same law can be seen across smaller time scales, with the result that the law at longer time scales may be understood as the expression of its application at smaller time scales. Reduction occurs when the dynamics at a small time scale are incommensurate with the dynamics at longer time scales. Then the process at the longer time scale is reduced to a qualitatively different process at the smaller time scale, as when choice is reduced to switching patterns. When reduction occurs, the dynamics at the longer time scale may be derived from the process at the smaller time scale, but not the other way around. Research at different time scales is facilitated by the molar view of behavior.     

Defining disease beyond conceptual analysis: an analysis of conceptual analysis in philosophy of medicine

Conceptual analysis of health and disease is portrayed as consisting in the confrontation of a set of criteria—a “definition”—with a set of cases, called instances of either “health” or “disease.” Apart from logical counter-arguments, there is no other way to refute an opponent’s definition than by providing counter-cases. As resorting to intensional stipulation (stipulation of meaning) is not forbidden, several contenders can therefore be deemed to have succeeded. This implies that conceptual analysis alone is not likely to decide between naturalism and normativism. An alternative to this approach would be to examine whether the concept of disease can be naturalized.     

Understanding team adaptation: a conceptual analysis and model

This endeavor provides a multidisciplinary, multilevel, and multiphasic conceptualization of team adaptation with theoretical roots in the cognitive, human factors, and industrial-organizational psychology literature. Team adaptation and the emergent nature of adaptive team performance are defined from a multilevel, theoretical standpoint. An input-throughput-output model is advanced to illustrate a series of phases unfolding over time that constitute the core processes and emergent states underlying adaptive team performance and contributing to team adaptation. The cross-level mixed-determinants model highlights team adaptation in a nomological network of lawful relations. Testable propositions, practical implications, and directions for further research in this area are also advanced.     

Just teasing: a conceptual analysis and empirical review

Drawing on E. Goffman's concepts of face and strategic interaction, the authors define a tease as a playful provocation in which one person comments on something relevant to the target. This approach encompasses the diverse behaviors labeled teasing, clarifies previous ambiguities, differentiates teasing from related practices, and suggests how teasing can lead to hostile or affiliative outcomes. The authors then integrate studies of the content of teasing. Studies indicate that norm violations and conflict prompt teasing. With development, children tease in playful ways, particularly around the ages of 11 and 12 years, and understand and enjoy teasing more. Finally, consistent with hypotheses concerning contextual variation in face concerns, teasing is more frequent and hostile when initiated by high-status and familiar others and men, although gender differences are smaller than assumed. The authors conclude by discussing how teasing varies according to individual differences and culture.     

Professional ethics and collective professional autonomy: a conceptual analysis

In the first section, it is argued that a professional activity involves systematic knowledge and proficiency, a form of continuous improvement of the related bodies of knowledge and proficiency, as well as two levels of understanding: a local one, which is the ability to justify and explain professional acts, and a global one, which involves a conception of the whole profession and its ethical principles. The second section is devoted to a conceptual analysis of professional ethics. It is argued that it consists of a general conception of professionality, a particular conception of the profession under consideration, and a conception of the normative requirements made by the societal envelope of the professional activity, in particular basic norms of democracy. The third section draws conclusions with respect to the nature and limits of professional autonomy. It is shown that such autonomy is much more restricted than its apparent extent. Examples from engineering and other professions are provided.     

Employee commitment and motivation: a conceptual analysis and integrative model

Theorists and researchers interested in employee commitment and motivation have not made optimal use of each other's work. Commitment researchers seldom address the motivational processes through which commitment affects behavior, and motivation researchers have not recognized important distinctions in the forms, foci, and bases of commitment. To encourage greater cross-fertilization, the authors present an integrative framework in which commitment is presented as one of several energizing forces for motivated behavior. E. A. Locke's (1997) model of the work motivation process and J. P. Meyer and L. Herscovitch's (2001) model of workplace commitments serve as the foundation for the development of this new framework. To facilitate the merger, a new concept, goal regulation, is derived from self-determination theory (E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan, 1985) and regulatory focus theory (E. I. Higgins, 1997). By including goal regulation, it is acknowledged that motivated behavior can be accompanied by different mindsets that have particularly important implications for the explanation and prediction of discretionary work behavior.     

Towards a postconscious processes model of mental control: A conceptual analysis

A new perspective on mental control is proposed that conceptually links conscious and automatic processes through a complementary postconscious activity that is rooted in the cognitive mechanism of priming. It is argued that the alterable structure of underlying mental representations connects these processes to produce a level of intentional regulation that would normally prove beneficial but in a few rare cases could prove detrimental. This hypothetical process is reflected in our empirical knowledge of mental control and related phenomena such as prospective memory. The new perspective maintains the traditional models' structure of conscious and automatic processing but, in an effort to expand our knowledge in the field, it redefines the relationship between these two processes so that it fits into a more accountable theoretical framework.     

Prototypes and conceptual analysis

In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which conceptual analysis might be altered to accord better with the empirical work.Thanks are due to John Bickle, Marian David, Terence Horgan, Stephen Stich, John Tienson, Paul Weithman and an anonymous referee for several helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Central Michigan University, The University of Memphis, The University of Mississipi and The Second International Conference on Cognitive Science at San Sebastian, Spain. A great deal of useful feedback was provided by these audiences.     

Mathematics and conceptual analysis

Gödel argued that intuition has an important role to play in mathematical epistemology, and despite the infamy of his own position, this opinion still has much to recommend it. Intuitions and folk platitudes play a central role in philosophical enquiry too, and have recently been elevated to a central position in one project for understanding philosophical methodology: the so-called ‘Canberra Plan’. This philosophical role for intuitions suggests an analogous epistemology for some fundamental parts of mathematics, which casts a number of themes in recent philosophy of mathematics (concerning a priority and fictionalism, for example) in revealing new light.