Markets,Choice and Agency

John Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness (2012) introduces several powerful arguments in favour of a novel and surprising thesis: the best way to realize Rawls’s principles of justice is a free market society, rather than the arrangements that Rawls himself believed would best promote justice. In this paper, I adduce three arguments against Tomasi. First, I suggest that his view rests on a faulty understanding of what constitutes conventional property rights. Second, I argue that many market solutions generate choices which are not valuable ones for the agent to have to make. Third, I show that many choices created by the market systems Tomasi favours create the illusion that citizens are making their own choices when in fact they are not. I suggest that taken together these three arguments are sufficient to defend Rawlsian institutional arrangements against Tomasi’s challenge.     

The Cards that are Dealt You

Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsible. I follow Feinberg in rejecting various "inflated' demands on "origination,' "initiation,' or ultimate sourcehood.     

Getting Out of Our Own Way

This paper, a follow-up from a 2009 panel discussion at ABCT's Annual Convention, focuses on the choices that women make (or don't make) that can affect their careers. Women are particularly prone to feeling guilty about their choices, and while a few decades ago there was a great deal of sexism in the workplace, at this point in time, I believe that we are more likely to make assumptions that impede our careers rather than face external barriers. The paper covers some “stuck points” that stop women from advocating for themselves or results in guilt regardless of their choice.     

Rawls,Sartre, and the Question of Camaraderie

In his classic text, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the structural principles of a society are just when they issue from a procedure that is fair. One crucial feature that makes the procedure fair is that the persons who will be subjected to these principles choose them after they have deliberated together in a condition marked by a certain balance of knowledge and ignorance. In particular, these people know enough to consider principles that are workable, yet converse behind a “veil of ignorance,” unable to predict what their place in society will be and hence discouraged from slanting the principles toward any preferential interests. My paper questions whether this attempt to ensure the disinterestedness of the conversation of justice is feasible. I worry that when we approach this question practically, we discover that the education that furnishes us with the knowledge necessary to choose viable principles must at the same time preclude genuine ignorance about our social position and interests. As an alternative, I suggest that we convene the conversation of justice behind a “veil of existence.” In this condition, people possess knowledge about how their society works and even about their places in it; however, this knowledge does not foster preferential interests because all interests are subjected to the question of their existential meaning. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” for our interests to be truly meaningful, they must be affirmed as free responses to our thrownness into existence. Yet how do we find the wherewithal to make such responsible choices rather than lapse into paralysis before their essentially arbitrary differences? My positive thesis is that we may do so by acknowledging how all of us in this existential predicament critically and mutually provoke each to commit oneself to depart from the others in specific ways. This process of provocation is thus educational. It broaches a conception of non-instrumental, non-mimetic, liberal study, one which I try to enact in a writing that employs direct address, regular returns to questions that put discourse at a loss, and expanding webs of association. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that liberal study may deepen our appreciation of our communal nature, our camaraderie, and thus motivate us to participate unselfishly in the conversation of justice.     

Neoliberal Beliefs and Perceptions of Unintended Adolescent Pregnancy after Consensual or Forced Sex

From a neoliberal perspective, young women are free to make autonomous choices and are personally responsible for the outcomes of these choices. Neoliberal ideals may appear to empower women as free sexual agents; however, an individualistic focus on self-sufficiency and personal responsibility may lead to harsh, decontextualized responses to those who experience unintended outcomes. We hypothesized that observers with stronger neoliberal beliefs would show more stigmatizing responses to an unintentionally pregnant adolescent. We also explored whether these expected associations would be moderated by whether or not the young woman chose to consent to sex. U.S. undergraduate students (n = 200) completed a measure of neoliberal beliefs and were randomly assigned to read one of two scenarios in which an adolescent became pregnant after either consensual or forced sex. As expected, participants with stronger neoliberal beliefs were more blaming toward the adolescent for becoming pregnant, felt less sympathy toward her, and had less positive attitudes about her receiving help. These associations remained after controlling for general political ideology and regardless of whether the pregnancy was due to consensual or forced sex. Our results suggest that, for the neoliberal observer, young women are held personally responsible for even uncontrollable sexual and reproductive outcomes.     

Con-reasons and the causal theory of action

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.     

Is this America? Unfinished business with the U.S. national imaginary,religion and violence

This article first proposes definitions and raises questions about what it means to be a nation. I then analyze the national imaginary of the United States, and suggest that at its deepest core we find “substitute ultimates” regarding America's sacrificial war‐culture. This cultural violence perpetuates destructive consequences, including the phenomena of “U.S. war‐culture,” and “moral injury” among military servicemembers and veterans. But widespread legitimation of the imaginary largely inhibits citizens from awareness about their own reality. Lastly, I inquire about the role of prophetic public theology to address nationalism, and engage in a thought experiment with an imagined community of diverse partners.     

Does reflection lead to wise choices?

Does conscious reflection lead to good decision-making? Whereas engaging in reflection is traditionally thought to be the best way to make wise choices, recent psychological evidence undermines the role of reflection in lay and expert judgement. The literature suggests that thinking about reasons does not improve the choices people make, and that experts do not engage in reflection, but base their judgements on intuition, often shaped by extensive previous experience. Can we square the traditional accounts of wisdom with the results of these empirical studies? Should we even attempt to? I shall defend the view that philosophy and cognitive sciences genuinely interact in tackling questions such as whether reflection leads to making wise choices.     

Attentional inhibition has social-emotional consequences for unfamiliar faces

Visual attention studies often rely on response time measures to show the impact of attentional facilitation and inhibition. Here we extend the investigation of the effects of attention on behavior and show that prior attentional states associated with unfamiliar faces can influence subsequent social-emotional judgments about those faces. Participants were shown pairs of face images and were asked to withhold a response if a transparent stop-signal cue appeared over one of the faces. This served to associate the cued face with an inhibitory state. Later, when asked to make social-emotional choices about these face pairs, participants chose uncued faces more often than cued faces as "more trustworthy" and chose cued faces more often than uncued faces as "less trustworthy." For perceptual choices, there was no effect of how the question was framed (which face is "on a lighter background" vs. "on a darker background"). These results suggest that attentional inhibition can be associated with socially relevant stimuli, such as faces, and can have specific, deleterious effects on social-emotional judgments.     

Transformative Choice,Practical Reasons and Trust

Abstract

In this article I reflect on the question of whether we can have reason to make transformative choices. In attempting to answer it, I do three things. First, I bring forward an internalist account of practical reasons which entails the idea that agents should deliberate to the best of their ability. Second, I discuss L.A. Paul’s views on transformative choice, arguing that, although they present a real problem, the problem is not as profound as she believes it is. Third, I argue that, given the situation in which we face transformative choices (a situation of principled uncertainty though not cluelessness), trust is an appropriate response to transformative choices, and that when one’s trust that one’s current desires will be fulfilled in making a transformative choice is reasonable, one has a reason to make it. Thus, trust turns out to be a crucial response to a profound problem each of us will face during our lives.     

Cultures of Exile: Diasporic Identities and the "Imaginations" of Africa and India in the Caribbean

In this article, I explore the similarities and differences in the way Africa and India were constructed, or how the notion of an idealized "home" as part of the diasporic imagination was "imagined" by peoples of African and Indian origins in the Caribbean. How do diaspora discourses construct homes away from homes in the context of cultural dislocation and displacement? How were imagined Africa and imagined India constructed, and who were the constructors of these two imagined communities? I argue that the "ideologies of return" that were articulated in these two movements were fundamentally different. Whereas the attempt to embrace a "lost" Africa was premised on physical repatriation and cultural return, the attempt to reconnect with a lost India was based essentially on symbolic projections, which saw Indian Caribbean peoples taking pride in being part of a great civilization and culture but not wanting to go back to India.     

Does imagery reduce stigma against depression? Testing the efficacy of imagined contact and perspective‐taking

While the stigma surrounding mental illness has been well‐established, less is known about methods for reducing that bias. In both laboratory (Study 1) and community (Study 2) samples, we tested the efficacy of imagined contact and perspective‐taking for reducing stigma against depression. Participants first read a vignette about an individual with depression and then imagined either interacting with the individual (imagined contact), putting themselves in the individual's shoes (perspective‐taking) or a neutral scene (control). In both samples, imagined contact was more effective in reducing stigma against depression than perspective‐taking. The findings suggest that different prejudice reduction strategies should be used for different stigmatized groups.     

Interfering with nature

ABSTRACT Certain kinds of medical treatment are often held to be morally unacceptable because they are an 'interference with nature'. I suggest a way in which we can make sense of such ideas. We can make significant choices only against a background of conditions which we regard as 'natural', and these will typically include such facts as those of birth and death, of youth and age, and of sexual relations. I argue, however, that such ideas, though intelligible, do not establish any valid moral objection to, for instance, the use of ovarian tissue for assisted conception.     

Effects of self-other decision making on regulatory focus and choice overload

A growing stream of research is investigating how choices people make for themselves are different from choices people make for others. In this paper, I propose that these choices vary according to regulatory focus, such that people who make choices for themselves are prevention focused, whereas people who make choices for others are promotion focused. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, in particular work on errors of omission and commission, I hypothesize that people who make choices for others experience a reversal of the choice overload effect. In 6 studies, including a field study, I found that people who make choices for themselves are less satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options, yet, people who make choices for others are more satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options. Implications and suggestions for other differences in self-other decision making are discussed.     

Loving-kindness language exposure leads to changes in sensitivity to imagined pain

To better understand the cultivation of positive intra- and interpersonal emotions, we examined an argument that some effects of contemplative training result from language processing. We presented participants with loving-kindness language used in kindness-meditation training studies and asked them to rate imagined pain. If loving-kindness language processing is responsible for some effects recently reported we expected this language could affect intra- and interpersonal sensitivity. Loving-kindness-language participants rated imagined other-pain significantly higher and imagined self-pain significantly lower than closely matched control participants. As a result of this interaction, the loving-kindness-language group showed no significant difference between self-pain and other-pain, whereas controls rated self-pain significantly higher than other-pain. These results suggest that exposure to loving-kindness-language in Loving-Kindness Meditation leads to changes in sensitivity to own and vicarious distress without explicit training. These findings underscore that meditation-like effects may be easily induced. Further research is needed to determine duration and degree of effect.     

Promiscuity in the practice of family therapy

Family therapy has continually confronted choices between polarized positions, each one taken up with zeal because it solved an old dilemma but eventually encountering its own limitations. In this article I suggest that we have evolved to a point where, instead of deciding which is better, we can focus on how to use theories, models and techniques as fluid and flexible resources for action in the therapeutic conversation. Doing so focuses our attention on how we can move in and out of various positions, including those that simplify issues and those that embrace complexity. In addition, our attention is drawn to the ways in which we can make choices between following a model as opposed to engaging in spontaneous dialogue. This promiscuous stance can help trainers and therapists answer questions concerning how we make decisions in therapy. Such promiscuity also positions us to confront our images and expectations of what it means to be a professional.     

Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? Making Choices for Non‐Human Animals

Animals are usually considered to lack the status of autonomous agents. Nevertheless, they do appear to make ostensible choices. This article considers whether, and how, I should respect animals' choices. I propose a concept of volitionality which can be respected if, and insofar as, doing so is in the best interests of the animal. Applying that concept, I (we) will argue that an animals' choices be respected when the relevant human decision maker's capacities to decide are potentially challenged or compromised. For example, it will be best to respect the animals' choice when the human decision maker: (1) lacks accurate knowledge of the animal's subjective experiences; (2) does not know what will lead to desirable experiences or allow for the avoidance of undesirable ones; (3) is biased; (4) is less aware of the animal's specific situation; (5) cannot appreciate all elements comprehensively, including considering any (content‐neutral) value to the animal being allowed to make and implement a choice, such as where a lack of control or liberty would be unpleasant or where an animal would usefully learn from the process of choice‐making; and (6) when the animal's choice is achievable. This additionally suggests that we may often beneficially choose to set up situations that empower animals to make better choices.     

Temporal discounting for monetary and close relationship outcomes

The present study extended research on intertemporal choice—in which individuals choose between outcomes that may be received immediately or after a delay—to close relationships. In Experiment 1, New Zealand university students aged 18 to 25 made decisions about hypothetical monetary and relationship outcomes, and in Experiment 2, about relationship outcomes which emphasized companionate or sexual aspects (Ns = 64). Both experiments found effects of delay and magnitude on temporal discounting rates, and domain independence for choices about close relationships, similar to previous studies with monetary outcomes. There were no significant gender differences. Overall, results suggest that people make intertemporal choices about relationships according to a similar process used to make decisions involving other types of outcomes.     

Choices,Consequences and Desert

It is a commonly held position in the literature on distributive justice that choices individuals make from an equalized background may lead to inequalities of outcome. This raises the question of how to assign consequences to particular types of behaviour. Theories of justice based on the concept of moral responsibility offer considerable guidance as to how society should be structured, but they rarely address the question of what the consequences of making a particular choice should be. To fill this lacuna, these theories must rely on a theory of consequences. I argue that the most plausible theories of consequences are substantive rather than procedural in nature. Such theories of consequences are inherently based on the concept of desert. By evaluating individuals' choices society may determine the appropriate consequences of choices for which they are responsible.     

Commitment and Reasons – A Comment on Ruth Chang, ‘Three Dogmas of Normativity’

Ruth Chang has argued convincingly that we must recognize that some choices will not involve strict, univocal comparison of options. How, then, can such choices be made well? Chang suggests that commitment is a fundamental way of ‘putting one's very self’ behind a normative consideration, thereby ‘endow[ing] that consideration with the normativity of a reason’. This view challenges what Chang deems to be three dogmas of normativity, and the current comment critically assesses the relation of her view to the first and third of these dogmas. I suggest some alternative ways of thinking about these dogmas, which enable us to see how her work might uncover a fourth dogma, and which can, I believe, lend strength to a position very close to Chang's.