What's My Motivation? Video Games and Interpretative Performance

The interpretation of character motivations is a crucial part of the understanding of many narratives, including those found in video games. This interpretation can be complicated in video games by the player performing the role of a player‐character within the game narrative. Such performance finds the player making choices for the character and also interpreting the resulting character actions and their effect on the game's narrative. This can lead to interpretative difficulties for game narratives and their players: if a decision to act is made by the player, is it that the player's own imaginative reasons for acting warrant some narrative interpretations and exclude others? To answer this I argue that we need to investigate (a) the interactive ontology of video game narratives, (b) the notion of game playing as interpretative performance, and (c) the player‐character, an artifact through which performance is focused in narrative games. Doing so shows there to be at least two problems with the notion of the correct interpretation of narrative games. Neither of these problems entirely negates the normativity of game narratives, however, and so players are left with the problem of how they might decide which of the possible playings are warranted. I end by making some practical suggestions for the thoughtful and narratively interested game player.     

Subgames within Large Games and the Heuristic of Imitation

We study repeated normal form games where the number of players is large. We argue that it is interesting to look at such games as being divided into subgames, each of which we call a neighbourhood. The structure of such a game is given by a graph G whose nodes are players and edges denote visibility. The neighbourhoods are maximal cliques in G. The game proceeds in rounds where in each round the players of every clique X of G play a strategic form game among each other. A player at a node v strategises based on what she can observe, i.e., the strategies and the outcomes in the previous round of the players at vertices adjacent to v. Based on this, the player may switch strategies in the same neighbourhood, or migrate to another neighbourhood. We are interested in addressing questions regarding the eventual stability of such games. We incrementally impose constraints on the ‘types’ of the players. First, we look at players who are unconstrained in their strategising abilities, in that, players who may use unbounded memory. We then consider the case of memoryless players. We show that in both these cases the eventual stability of the game can be characterised in terms of potentials. We then introduce a simple modal logic in which the types of the players can be specified. We show that when the players play according to these specified types, it can be effectively decided whether the game stabilises. Finally, we look at the important heuristic of imitation. Simple imitative strategies can be specified in the logic introduced by us. We show that in a population of optimisers and imitators, we can decide how ‘worse-off’ the imitators are by playing imitative strategies rather than optimal ones.     

多值逻辑与语义赋值博弈

文章在扩展博弈上,给出了多值逻辑的语义赋值博弈的一般框架,避免了博弈者在多值逻辑的语义博弈中声明无穷对象的问题;然后通过Eloise赢的策略定义博弈的语义概念——赋值,证明了多值逻辑的博弈语义与Tarski语义是等价的;最后,根据语义赋值博弈框架对经典逻辑进行了博弈化。     

Why are online games so self‐involving: A social identity analysis of massively multiplayer online role‐playing games

This article investigates the ways in which players of massively multiplayer online role‐playing games (MMORPGs) internalize being a player into their self‐concept. In accordance with the social identity framework, we assume that being a player and being a member of a guild within the game can both shape the social identity of members. In two studies, we survey players inside or outside the MMORPG. Players are interviewed either at an interguild comparison level or at the more inclusive level of MMORPG players. Study 1 (n = 84) reveals favoritism for the in‐group guild in a within‐game context, and Study 2 (n = 200) shows that valuation of and identification with the in‐group are moderated by the interview context and the level of category inclusion: Inside the game, the guild is more valued and identification is emphasized. In contrast, valuation of and identification with MMORPG players is not influenced by the interview context. Together, by examining both valuation and identification processes, this research reveals that playing online games may be self‐involving because being a player, but also being a member of a guild, directly contribute to the social identity. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From reasonable preferences,via argumentation,to logic

This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.     

Socially Constructed Technology

The concepts of omniscience and omnipotence are defined in 2 × 2 ordinal games, and implications for the optimal play of these games, when one player is omniscient or omnipotent and the other player is aware of his omniscience or omnipotence, are derived. Intuitively, omniscience allows a player to predict the strategy choice of an opponent in advance of play, and omnipotence allows a player, after initial strategy choices are made, to continue to move after the other player is forced to stop. Omniscience and its awareness by an opponent may hurt both players, but this problem can always be rectified if the other player is omniscient. This pathology can also be rectified if at least one of the two players is omnipotent, which can override the effects of omniscience. In some games, one player's omnipotence ‐ versus the other's ‐ helps him, whereas in other games the outcome induced does not depend on which player is omnipotent. Deducing whether a player is superior (omniscient or omnipotent) from the nature of his game playing alone raises several problems, however, suggesting the difficulty of devising tests for detecting superior ability in games.     

Three ancient problems solved by using the game theory logic based on the Shapley value

The ancient problems of bankruptcy, contested garment, and rights arbitration have generated many studies, debates, and controversy. The objective of this paper is to show that the Shapley value from game theory, measuring the power of each player in a game, may be consistently applied for getting the general one-step solution of all these three problems viewed as n-person games. The decision making is based on the same tool, namely the game theory logic based on the use of the Shapley value, but the specific games involved are slightly different in each problem. The kind of claims of the players, the relationship between the given claims and the given resources available, and the particular way of calculating the generalized characteristic function of the game determine the specific type of game which has to be solved in each of the three ancient problems mentioned. The iterative use of the Shapley value may also justify the well-known Aumann–Maschler step-by-step procedure for solving the bankruptcy problem.

     

Real brands in imaginary worlds: investigating players' experiences of brand placement in digital games

• This paper explores the development of brand placement in digital games using focus groups with game‐players. Growth in in‐game brand placement is explained by game developers' financial and creative priorities and experimentation in marketerss' use of media. The external context of game‐play is then examined based on explanations of the non‐material aspects of consumer behaviour. Internal game processes are also reviewed, including psychological processes that are likely to be of interest to marketers. The reported experiences of players are then considered in terms of these processes. Findings seem to support the use of brand placement in games. Players easily recall encounters with brands during game‐play and are generally positive about these experiences, suggesting that brands increase realism because it allows individuals to create and explore consumption‐based daydreams. However, some players reject brand placement, preferring in‐game fantasies that are independent of mundane commodities. The findings also raise issues related to the ways in which individuals may use digital games to reflect on our consumer society and this raises a question of the degree to which digital games may support or oppose existing consumer cultures. Other problems for managers wishing to use this technique were revealed by the repetitive nature of games which may cause message wear‐out, and by playerss' frustration with aspects of a game which may lead to negative evaluations of in‐game brands.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reflections on Ethics and Game Theory

Applications of game theory to moral philosophy are impededby foundational issues and troublesome examples. In the first part of this paper,questions are raised about the appropriate game-theoretical frameworks for applications to moralphilosophy and about the proper interpretations of the theoretical devices employed inthese frameworks. In the second part, five examples that should be of particular interest to thoseinterested in the connections between ethics and game theory are delineated and discussed. Thefirst example comprises games in which there is an outcome unanimously preferred to the``solution' of the game, appropriately defined. The second comprises games whose solution callsfor different players to employ different strategies. The third comprises games whosesolution calls for players to adopt mixed strategies. The fourth comprises games whose solutionrequires players to cycle among a variety of strategies. The fifth comprises games whose solutionrequires players to discriminate in morally inappropriate ways.     

Logic Games are Complete for Game Logics

Game logics describe general games through powers of players for forcing outcomes. In particular, they encode an algebra of sequential game operations such as choice, dual and composition. Logic games are special games for specific purposes such as proof or semantical evaluation for first-order or modal languages. We show that the general algebra of game operations coincides with that over just logical evaluation games, whence the latter are quite general after all. The main tool in proving this is a representation of arbitrary games as modal or first-order evaluation games. We probe how far our analysis extends to product operations on games. We also discuss some more general consequences of this new perspective for standard logic.     

National security games

Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which each player can threaten to retaliate — and carry out this threat in the second stage — if its opponent chose noncooperation in the first stage.Conditions for the existence of different pure-strategy Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are found, and these results are extended to situations in which the players can select mixed strategies (i.e., make probabilistic threats or choices). Although the Conflict Game sheds light on the rational foundations underlying arms races, nuclear deterrence, and other strategic situations, more detailed assumptions are required to tie this generic game to specific conflicts.Steven J. Brams gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES85-20154, the Sloan Foundation, and the Guggenheim Foundation.D. Marc Kilgour gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada under Grant No. A8974.     

Decisions of timing in bipolarized conflict situations with complete information

Games of timing constitute a sub-class of two-person, constant-sum, infinite games, where the problem facing each player is not what action to take, but rather when he should take action. The theoretical structure of games of timing with complete information and equal accuracy functions is described. An experimental paradigm of such games is presented by a computer-controlled, two-person, infinite game that simulates the Western-style duel.Ten pairs of male subjects participated in three sessions each in a duel experiment. Each pair played 420 duels in which both players had the same accuracy function, but the starting number of bullets available to each player in the dyad was varied systematically. The results of this experiment are analyzed and discussed in terms of variables that relate to predictions arising from the mathematical theory of duels.     

A New Game Equivalence,its Logic and Algebra

We present a new notion of game equivalence that captures basic powers of interacting players. We provide a representation theorem, a complete logic, and a new game algebra for basic powers. In doing so, we establish connections with imperfect information games and epistemic logic. We also identify some new open problems concerning logic and games.

     

Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality

We observed the behaviors of the same people across five games – two prisoner’s dilemma games, a trust game (in which the subject took on the role of both truster and trustee), a dictator game, and a faith game – any pair of which was separated by an interval of several months to reduce potential carry-over effects, and found strong consistency in behaviors among these games. We also found consistency between the expectations of other players’ behaviors and the player’s own behavior across games. We further found that the consistent behavioral pro-sociality observed across different games was related to the general measures of pro-social value orientation and perceiving the game situations. These findings suggest that individual and cultural differences in game behaviors can reflect both the ways in which people perceive game situations and their general social preferences.     

An empirical analysis of online gamers' perceptions of game items: modified theory of consumption values approach

The aims of this article are (1) to propose a modified theory of consumption values (MTCV) for investigation of online gamer perceptions of the value of purchasable game items and (2) to apply the developed MTCV to multiple game genres and player age groups. To address these aims, 327 valid questionnaires were obtained and analyzed. The original theory of consumption values (TCV) was modified to apply to the specific characteristics of online games. The original TCV specifies five types of consumption values: functional value, social value, emotional value, conditional value, and epistemic value. After revising the TCV to apply to the examination of online games, we proposed that the MTCV be composed of character competency value, enjoyment value, visual authority value, and monetary value. The validity of the MTCV was proven by statistically analyzing the responses provided by the 327 valid questionnaires. To examine the second aim, experiments were conducted to examine the MTCV in three online game genres-massive multiplayer online role-playing games, first-person shooters games, and casual games. The second aim was also studied via questionnaires that examined the ages of online gamers. It was determined that massive multiplayer online role-playing games players regard visual authority value and monetary value as more important than do casual gamers. It was also determined that younger gamers tend to be more interested in visual authority, whereas older gamers tend to be more interested in character competency. This research provides a foundation for future studies to extend the MTCV to consider other user factors, such as cultural effects.     

Hard and Soft Preparation Sets in Boolean Games

A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to avoid such undesirable properties, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a bargaining phase before their decision. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players control propositional variables that they can set to true or false, and are primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of some goal formula, while secondarily motivated to minimise the costs of their actions. We adopt (pure) preparation sets (prep sets) as our basic solution concept. A preparation set is a set of outcomes that contains for every player at least one best response to every outcome in the set. Prep sets are well-suited to the analysis of Boolean games, because we can naturally represent prep sets as propositional formulas, which in turn allows us to refer to prep formulas. The preference structure of Boolean games with costs makes it possible to distinguish between hard and soft prep sets. The hard prep sets of a game are sets of valuations that would be prep sets in that game no matter what the cost function of the game was. The properties defined by hard prep sets typically relate to goal-seeking behaviour, and as such these properties cannot be eliminated from games by, for example, taxation or subsidies. In contrast, soft prep sets can be eliminated by an appropriate system of incentives. Besides considering what can happen in a game by unrestricted manipulation of players’ cost function, we also investigate several mechanisms that allow groups of players to form coalitions and eliminate undesirable outcomes from the game, even when taxes or subsidies are not a possibility.     

On the logic of informational independence and its applications

We shall introduce in this paper a language whose formulas will be interpreted by games of imperfect information. Such games will be defined in the same way as the games for first-order formulas except that the players do not have complete information of the earlier course of the game. Some simple logical properties of these games will be stated together with the relation of such games of imperfect information to higher-order logic. Finally, a set of applications will be outlined.     

Play as co‐created narrative in computer game consumption: The hero's journey in Warcraft III

Computer games are now a significant consumption activity in consumer culture. Informed by interdisciplinary studies and drawing on data from in‐depth interviews with players of the Warcraft III computer game, we explore the relationship between play and storytelling during digital play. Understanding that such play is determined by systems of game rules and that computer game characters and settings are capable of conveying cultural meanings to players, we found that the rules of play in computer games can be designed in ways that encourage consumers to co‐create meaningful story plots derived from their knowledge of myth and fiction. In the case of Warcraft, these plots resembled the archetypal plot of the hero's journey. We conclude that computer games immerse consumers in a form of playful consumption that engages them in memorialised, co‐authored storytelling. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Role Asymmetry and Code Transmission in Signaling Games: An Experimental and Computational Investigation

In signaling games, a sender has private access to a state of affairs and uses a signal to inform a receiver about that state. If no common association of signals and states is initially available, sender and receiver must coordinate to develop one. How do players divide coordination labor? We show experimentally that, if players switch roles at each communication round, coordination labor is shared. However, in games with fixed roles, coordination labor is divided: Receivers adjust their mappings more frequently, whereas senders maintain the initial code, which is transmitted to receivers and becomes the common code. In a series of computer simulations, player and role asymmetry as observed experimentally were accounted for by a model in which the receiver in the first signaling round has a higher chance of adjusting its code than its partner. From this basic division of labor among players, certain properties of role asymmetry, in particular correlations with game complexity, are seen to follow.