21世纪医学教育的知识结构初探

在知识爆炸的今天,个人全面系统掌握医学基础知识只能是一个幻想,新世纪要求有关教育知识结构的变革。继续延用经典医学学科多平层型知识结构进行21世纪医学教育已不适应,可满足需求的应是以可持续发展的新知识为核心的核心－壳层型新知识结构。目前似应以细胞知识为核心重组医学教育知识结构体系,按应用基础、临床等知识壳层对冗杂的经典学科知识进行精炼与重组。     

LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND GETTIER CASES

Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is that it is grounded in semantic or conceptual understanding. However, I show that this cannot be the correct account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic, because it is open to Gettier-style counter-examples.     

Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?

If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism—the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in which knowledge has to be robust . Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology's supposed conceptual core is not as epistemically unchallengeable as we might have assumed to be the case.     

IV—Knowledge of Meaning

The paper is sympathetic to the idea that speakers have implicit knowledge of the semantics of sub-sentential elements of language, loosely, of words. Implicit knowledge is knowledge which the subject need not be capable of articulating yet which is a genuine propositional attitude and it is to be contrasted with tacit knowledge which refers to an information-bearing state which, however, is not a genuine propositional attitude. ¹ I begin by defending the implicit knowledge conception of speakers' knowledge of the meanings of words from a challenge articulated by Evans and then go on the offensive against positions which attempt to replace the notion of implicit knowledge in semantic theory by that of tacit knowledge.     

Reframing the question of forbidden knowledge for modern science

In this paper I use the concept of forbidden knowledge to explore questions about putting limits on science. Science has generally been understood to seek and produce objective truth, and this understanding of science has grounded its claim to freedom of inquiry. What happens to decision making about science when this claim to objective, disinterested truth is rejected? There are two changes that must be made to update the idea of forbidden knowledge for modern science. The first is to shift from presuming that decisions to constrain or even forbid knowledge can be made from a position of omniscience (perfect knowledge) to recognizing that such decisions made by human beings are made from a position of limited or partial knowledge. The second is to reject the idea that knowledge is objective and disinterested and accept that knowledge (even scientific knowledge) is interested. In particular, choices about what knowledge gets created are normative, value choices. When these two changes are made to the idea of forbidden knowledge, questions about limiting or forbidding lines of inquiry are shown to distract attention from the more important matters of who makes and how decisions are made about what knowledge is produced. Much more attention should be focused on choosing directions in science, and as this is done, the matter of whether constraints should be placed on science will fall into place.     

NON‐CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

The paper is an investigation into the prospects of an epistemology of non‐conceptual knowledge. According to the orthodox view, knowledge requires concepts and belief. I present several arguments to the effect that there is non‐conceptual, non‐doxastic knowledge, the obvious candidate for such knowledge being non‐conceptual perception. Non‐conceptual perception seems to be allowed for by cognitive scientists and it exhibits the central role features of knowledge—it plays the knowledge role: it respects an anti‐luck condition, it is an achievement, it enables one to act for a reason, and it provides justification. Furthermore, it makes a straightforward and elegant explanation of (doxastic) perceptual knowledge possible: doxastic perceptual knowledge builds on non‐conceptual perception as non‐conceptual knowledge. Three objections that might naturally arise will be discussed and answered. Thus, the prospects of an epistemology without belief seem to be much better than the orthodoxy wants to have it. We can extend knowledge into the non‐conceptual realm.     

知识差异和知识冲突对团队创新的影响

通过情景模拟实验比较了高低知识差异和有无知识冲突两个变量四个水平下的团队创新度。结果表明,知识差异和知识冲突存在着交互作用;当知识差异较小时,知识冲突对于团队创新度具有积极作用;当知识差异较大时,知识冲突所起的是一种震荡作用;当团队不存在知识冲突时,较高的知识差异对团队创新度具有积极作用;存在知识冲突时,高知识差异团队和低知识差异团队的创新度没有显著差异     

Context-gated knowledge partitioning in categorization

According to the knowledge partitioning framework, people sometimes master complex tasks by creating multiple independent parcels of partial knowledge. Research has shown that knowledge parcels may contain mutually contradictory information, and that each parcel may be used without regard to knowledge that is demonstrably present in other parcels. This article reports 4 experiments that investigated knowledge partitioning in categorization. When component boundaries of a complex categorization were identified by a context cue, a significant proportion of participants learned partial and independent categorization strategies that were chosen on the basis of context. For those participants, a strategy used in one context was unaffected by knowledge demonstrably present in other contexts, suggesting that knowledge partitioning in categorization can be complete.     

Justification as the appearance of knowledge

Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed.     

Learning volleyball serves: a preliminary study of the effects of knowledge of performance and of results.

Recently, doubts have begun to surface about the emphasis that for years has been given to the variable knowledge of results in motor learning, and a view has been expressed that information on how an action has been made (knowledge of performance) may be of more use. This study compared the two types of information in learning a volleyball serve by eight subjects, who were given the two kinds of feedback at various points in the process. Analysis seems to show that knowledge of performance tends to be more effective for learning and that there may be interference across information if knowledge of results is provided after knowledge of performance.     

Is more similar,better? Interacting effect of the cognitive‐style congruency and tacitness of knowledge on knowledge transfer in the mentor–protégé dyad

This study explored the effects of cognitive‐style congruency on knowledge transfer in the mentor–protégé dyadic relationship and the moderating effect of tacitness of knowledge in this relationship. Using data from 148 sales personnel dyads, we found that the more congruent the cognitive style between a mentor and a protégé, the more effective the knowledge transfer between them. Moreover, the tacitness of knowledge moderated this association as expected. When the knowledge to be transferred was organized, systematic, and clear, this positive relationship was weakened. This relationship was particularly strong when the knowledge to be transferred was tacit, ambiguous, and unclear.     

Unpriming: the deactivation of thoughts through expression

Unpriming is a decrease in the influence of primed knowledge following a behavior expressing that knowledge. The authors investigated strategies for unpriming the knowledge of an answer that is activated when people are asked to consider a simple question. Experiment 1 found that prior correct answering eliminated the bias people normally show toward correct responding when asked to answer yes-no questions randomly. Experiment 2 revealed that prior answering intended to be random did not unprime knowledge on subsequent attempts to answer randomly. Experiment 3 found that exposure to the correct answer did not influence the knowledge bias but that exposure to the incorrect answer increased bias. Experiment 4 revealed that merely expressing the answer for oneself was sufficient to unprime knowledge. Experiment 5 found that each item of activated knowledge needs to be unprimed specifically, in that correctly answering 1 question does not reduce the knowledge bias in randomly answering another.     

Knowing and Seeing: Responding to Stroud's Dilemma

Abstract: Barry Stroud suggests that when we want to explain a certain kind of knowledge philosophically we feel we must explain it on the basis of another, prior kind of knowledge that does not imply or presuppose any of the knowledge we are trying to explain. If we accept this epistemic priority requirement (EPR) we find that we cannot explain our knowledge of the world in a way that satisfies it. If we reject EPR then we will be failing to make all of our knowledge of the world intelligible all at once. I respond to this dilemma by questioning EPR and arguing that it is, in any case, a requirement that is satisfied by explanations of our knowledge in terms of non‐epistemic seeing. Since non‐epistemic seeing is not a form of knowing, such explanations show how knowledge of the world can come to be out of something that is not knowledge of the world.     

On the factivity of implicit intersubjective knowledge

The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly known by using a certain set of logical rules, the concept of implicit knowledge is definable on the basis of the concept of explicit knowledge. In any case, both implicit and explicit knowledge are typically characterized as factive, i.e. such that it is always the case that what is known is also true. The aim of the present paper is twofold: first, we will develop a dynamic system of explicit intersubjective knowledge that allows us to introduce the operator of implicit knowledge by definition; secondly, we will show that it is not possible to hold together the following two theses: (1) the concept of implicit knowledge is definable along the lines indicated above and (2) the concept of implicit knowledge is factive.     

Changing the Academic Integrity Climate on Campus Using a Technology-Based Intervention

This article focuses on the use of a technology-based intervention to change academic integrity (AI) knowledge and attitudes. Using a sample of more than 5,000 freshman students drawn from two major midwestern universities in the United States over a 3-year period, an online intervention was used to determine whether AI knowledge and attitudes could be changed. Based the results of this study, AI knowledge and attitudes can be improved using an online intervention. These results contribute to a better understanding of the AI climate on campus and suggest that technology-based interventions can be used to enhance knowledge and change attitudes toward AI on campus.     

Individual differences in preschool children's knowledge of superordinate categories

The present study assesses intensional knowledge of superordinate categories in preschool children. This assessment is part of a larger programmatic research effort aimed at the development of a cognitive preschool screening test to detect learning problems prior to their manifestation in school failure. Necessary prerequisites for including intensional superordinate category knowledge as a potential component of this screening test are addressed: (a) Are there substantial variations in this knowledge across preschool children? (b) Can the knowledge be measured reliably using game-like picture tasks? (c) Do individual differences in this knowledge relate to the child's current level of intellectual functioning? An underlying assumption for the development of this screening test is that assessing gradually emerging abstract knowledge that develops through active, ongoing processing is more likely to predict learning problems than assessing knowledge that develops through rote associative learning. Consistent with this approach was the prediction that one component of intension, knowledge of differences, would be a better predictor of current functioning than knowledge of similarities. The data support this contention. Although both knowledge of similarities and differences was stable within an individual, variable among individuals and highly correlated with each other, only knowledge of differences related to the child's concurrent level of intellectual functioning.     

A procedure for the incremental construction of a knowledge space

Knowledge spaces are structures for the efficient assessment of the knowledge state of a student in a given field of knowledge. Existing procedures for constructing a knowledge space by querying an expert assume that the domain of questions is known in advance, and that it is fixed during the whole query process. The outcome of these procedures is a knowledge space on the questions in that domain. If the original domain is extended with new questions, a new knowledge space on the extended domain can be produced by expert query. Since in this case a knowledge space for the original domain already exists, the available information can be used to extend the existing space in an efficient way, thus avoiding to apply expert query from scratch. Existing procedures do not provide an explicit way to use such information. Although these procedures can be adapted to this purpose, in this paper a new query algorithm that is specifically tailored for the problem above mentioned is presented.