共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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How, from a scientific standpoint, should we understand mystical experiences? On the one hand such experiences are obviously capable of being studied scientifically. Nevertheless there is a sense in which such experiences often seem strongly opposed to our ordinary scientific views of reality, for they often seem to point to a domain quite outside that examined by naturalistic empirical science. Indeed, this is often precisely what seems to be ‘mystical’ about them. The present essay takes a hard look at specific question of the possible significance of these experiences for scientific naturalism. 相似文献
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The radical forms of naturalistic epistemology look more like revolutionary manifestos than a reasonable alternatives. A modest
form of naturalism is worth promoting. This modest form can cooperate with hermeneutics to solve epistemic problems, and therefore
wins the title of cooperative naturalism, and benefits from the hermeneutic account of experience. Cooperative naturalism
somewhat bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy.
Translated by Wang Huaping from Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun 自然辩证法通讯 (Journal of Dialectics of Nature), 2006, (4): 31–36 相似文献
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Synthese - I provide two arguments against value-free naturalism. Both are based on considerations concerning biological teleology. Value-free naturalism is the thesis that both (1) everything is,... 相似文献
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Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and
some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist
theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology,
which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really
does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with
both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist
aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods.
This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve
epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational
concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology. 相似文献
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Kathleen Lennon 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):138-151
Abstract Normative links have been considered a problem for reductionist theories of mind, primarily because of lack of isomorphism between intentional and non‐intentional conceptual schemes. The paper suggests a more radical tension between normative rationality and scientific naturalism. Normative explanations involve the recognition that agents are also subjects of experience. The distinctive form of intelligibility they bestow requires engagement with such subjectivity. 相似文献
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Janet Levin 《Synthese》2013,190(18):4117-4136
In traditional armchair methodology, philosophers attempt to challenge a thesis of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’ by describing a scenario that elicits the intuition that what has been described is an F that isn’t G. If they succeed, then the judgment that there is, or could be, an F that is not G counts as good prima facie evidence against the target thesis. Moreover, if these intuitions remain compelling after further (good faith) reflection, then traditional armchair methodology takes the judgment to be serious (though not infallible) evidence against the target thesis—call it secunda facie evidence—that should not be discounted as long as those intuitions retain their force. Some philosophers, however, suggest that this methodology is incompatible with epistemological naturalism, the view that philosophical inquiry should be sensitive to empirical observations, and argue that traditional armchair methodology must deemphasize the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. In my view, however, this would be a mistake: as I will argue, the most effective way to promote philosophical progress is to treat intuitions as having the (prima and secunda) evidential status I’ve described. But I will also argue that philosophical inquiry can produce a theory that is sensitive to empirical observations and the growth of empirical knowledge, even if it gives intuitions the prima- and secunda-facie evidential status that traditional armchair methodology demands—and thus that traditional armchair methodology, if properly practiced, need not be abandoned by naturalists, or even (except for a few exceptions) be much revised. 相似文献
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Tiddy Smith 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2017,82(3):321-336
Methodological naturalism has been defended on both intrinsic and pragmatic grounds. Both of these defenses agree that methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which the scientist ought to eschew talk of causally efficacious disembodied minds. I argue that this is the wrong interpretation of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism does not constrain the theories that scientists may conjecture, but how those theories may be justified. On this view, methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which supernatural methods of justification, such as faith, are eschewed. 相似文献
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History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism” that disregards
talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible
bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical commitment is naturalistic, but is both a posteriori and provisional, arising from the fact that for more than 400 years no proposed theistic explanation has been shown capable
of meeting the procedural requirement. I argue that there is nothing to prevent religious thinkers from seeking to overturn
this metaphysically naturalistic stance. But in order to do so they would need to show that their proposed theistic explanations
are the best available explanations of a range of phenomena. Until this has been done, the metaphysical naturalism of history
and the sciences remains defensible. 相似文献
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Jeffrey W. Roland 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):481-497
This paper argues that Philip Kitcher's epistemology of mathematics, codified in his Naturalistic Constructivism, is not naturalistic on Kitcher's own conception of naturalism. Kitcher's conception of naturalism is committed to (i) explaining the correctness of belief-regulating norms and (ii) a realist notion of truth. Naturalistic Constructivism is unable to simultaneously meet both of these commitments. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - This paper raises an objection to two important arguments for reductive ethical naturalism. Reductive ethical naturalism is the view that ethical properties reduce to the... 相似文献
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Kai Nielsen 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):313-317
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Robert Smithson 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2019,62(5):504-526
ABSTRACTAccording to many naturalists, our ordinary conception of the world is in tension with the scientific image: the conception of the world provided by the natural sciences. But in this paper, I present a critique of naturalism with precedents in the post-Kantian idealist tradition. I argue that, when we consider our actual linguistic behavior, there is no evidence that the truth of our ordinary judgments hinges on what the scientific image turns out to be like. I then argue that the best explanation of this result is that the norms and presuppositions operating in ordinary discourse are different from the norms and presuppositions operating in scientific discourse. So naturalistic attempts to undermine the manifest image are illegitimate attempts to critique a practice ‘from the outside’. 相似文献
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