Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness

This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of consciousness.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

Why Naturalize Consciousness?

This paper examines the relevance of philosophical work on consciousness to its scientific study. Of particular concern is the debate over whether consciousness can be naturalized, which is typically taken to bear on the prospects for its scientific investigation. It is not at all clear that philosophers of consciousness have properly identified and evaluated the assumptions about scientific activity made by both naturalization and antinaturalization projects. I argue that there is good reason to think that some of the assumptions about physicalism and explanation made by the parties to the debate are open to serious doubt. Thus this paper is an invitation for those inquiring into whether consciousness can be naturalized to more carefully consider the expected payoff of such efforts.     

The flow of anoetic to noetic and autonoetic consciousness: A vision of unknowing (anoetic) and knowing (noetic) consciousness in the remembrance of things past and imagined futures

In recent years there has been an expansion of scientific work on consciousness. However, there is an increasing necessity to integrate evolutionary and interdisciplinary perspectives and to bring affective feelings more centrally into the overall discussion. Pursuant especially to the theorizing of Endel Tulving (1985, 2004, 2005), Panksepp (1998a, 2003, 2005) and Vandekerckhove (2009) we will look at the phenomena starting with primary-process consciousness, namely the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness or unknowing (anoetic) consciousness, with a fundamental form of first-person ‘self-experience’ which relies on affective experiential states and raw sensory and perceptual mental existences, to higher forms of knowing (noetic and autonoetic) and self-aware consciousness. Since current scientific approaches are most concerned with the understanding of higher declarative states of consciousness, we will focus on these vastly underestimated primary forms of consciousness which may be foundational for all forms of higher ‘knowing consciousness’.     

WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS AND HAS IT EVOLVED?

Research into consciousness has now become respectable, and much has been written about it. Is consciousness the exclusive property of human beings, or can it be found also in animals? Can machines become conscious? Is consciousness an illusion, and are all mental states ultimately reducible to the movement of molecules? If consciousness is other than matter, what connection does it have with matter? These and others like them are now serious scientific questions in the West. This article discusses consciousness within the frame of the following assertions: Consciousness has evolved from earlier states of awareness to be found in lower forms of life. The current scientific method is too restrictive for the study of conscience and its evolution. In particular classical logic leads scientists to ignore or reject consciousness as a legitimate field of study. Mind and matter, generalized as knowing and being, have equal status.     

Lehrer on consciousness

Keith Lehrer distinguishes three kinds of questions about consciousness: scientific questions, metaphysical questions, and epistemological questions. He leaves the scientific questions to the scientists. He articulates and answers the peculiar epistemological questions posed by consciousness. And he boldly contends that no metaphysical questions about consciousness remain, once the epistemological questions have been answered. This is an astonishing claim. What happened to the metaphysical questions? Were they pseudo-questions? Were they epistemological questions masquerading as metaphysical ones? And isn??t it possible that Lehrer??s epistemological account of consciousness raises metaphysical questions of its own? I will argue that Lehrer??s account of consciousness does leave a metaphysical remainder. To deal with this remainder, Lehrer could try to expand his explanatory framework??but this would involve to a substantial revision of his current views. I end with a speculative proposal that might allow Lehrer acknowledge all the points raised in this paper, but without forcing him to revise his account of consciousness in a substantial way.     

Dissecting Intentionality in the Lab: Meinong’s Theory

Besides presenting a phenomenological-experimental analysis of consciousness, Meinong challenged one of the major indisputable axioms of current scientific research, i.e. that perception in awareness has to be veridical on the stimulus. Meinong’s analysis of consciousness, which he conducted through a kind of dissection of its structures from a systematic and an experimental viewpoint, offers relevant insights to contemporary consciousness studies.     

Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind

Block's well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual connections between the two. The scientific literature about whether they come apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obstacle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puzzle and attempted to answer it. While the evidence Block points to is relevant and important, this paper puts forward a more systematic framework for addressing the puzzle. To give it a label, the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. The approach allows consciousness studies to move beyond initial means of identifying instances of the kind like verbal report, and to find its underlying nature. It is well-recognised that facts about an underlying kind may allow identification of instances of the kind that do not match the initial means of identification (cp. non-liquid samples of water). This paper shows that the same method can be deployed to investigate phenomenal consciousness independently of access consciousness.     

Conscious behavior explained.

Current neurobiological research on temporal binding in binocular rivalry settings contributes to a better understanding of the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness. This research can easily be integrated into a theory of conscious behavior, but if it is meant to promote a naturalistic theory of perceptual consciousness itself, it is confronted with the notorious explanatory gap argument according to which any statement of psychophysical correlations (and their interpretation) leaves the phenomenal character of, e.g., states of perceptual consciousness open. It is argued that research on temporal binding plays no role in a naturalistic theory of consciousness if the gap argument can be solved on internal philosophical grounds or if it turns out to be unsolvable at the time being. But there may be a way to dissolve or deconstruct it, and the accessibility of this way may well depend on scientific progress, including neurobiological research on the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness.     

Being Conscious of Marc Bekoff: Thinking of Animal Self-Consciousness

The preceding article by Marc Bekoff reveals much about our current understanding of animal self‐consciousness and its implications. It also reveals how much more there is to be said and considered. This response briefly examines animal self‐consciousness from scientific, moral, and theological perspectives. As Bekoff emphasizes, self‐consciousness is not one thing but many. Consequently, our moral relationship to animals is not simply one based on a graded hierarchy of abilities. Furthermore, the complexity of animal self‐awareness can serve as stimulus for thinking about issues of theodicy and soteriology in a broader sense.     

Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes

The close relationship between attention and consciousness has led many scholars to conflate these processes. This article summarizes psychophysical evidence, arguing that top-down attention and consciousness are distinct phenomena that need not occur together and that can be manipulated using distinct paradigms. Subjects can become conscious of an isolated object or the gist of a scene despite the near absence of top-down attention; conversely, subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. Furthermore, top-down attention and consciousness can have opposing effects. Such dissociations are easier to understand when the different functions of these two processes are considered. Untangling their tight relationship is necessary for the scientific elucidation of consciousness and its material substrate.     

意识和无意识的关系--实证的视角

意识和无意识的相互关系曾经是纯粹的哲学问题,科学心理学的诞生促进了对这一问题的实证视角考察。实证取向认为,意识和无意识同属人类心理的机能,并能够在外在的任务操作中表现出来。现代认知心理学发现了对应意识机能的外显过程和对应无意识机能的内隐过程,两者相对独立又共生共存。任何认知过程都是意识和无意识共同作用的产物,两者之间存在复杂的相互作用,并表现出权衡的特点。神经生理学的研究揭示了意识和无意识在发生学意义上可能的先后关系。无意识在心理过程中起的作用是普遍的、抽象的、抗干扰的,而意识则建筑在无意识的基础之上,有着更大的变异性。     

Phenomenology-first versus third-person approaches in the science of consciousness: the case of the integrated information theory and the unfolding argument

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Assessing the scientific status of theories of consciousness is often a difficult task. In this paper, I explore the dialectic between the Integrated...     

A dyadic model of consciousness

The proposed model for consciousness, called a dyadic model, is based upon reexamination of traditional thought structures in the light of modern experimental evidence from a number of scientific fields. It is an evolutionary cosmological model using energy and information as fundamental concepts. It proposes that the antecedent attributes of anthropic consciousness find their roots in the field of zero point quantum potential which gave rise to the Big Bang. In this model consciousness has both a fundamental aspect and an evolutionary aspect in the same sense that quantized energy manifests fundamentally as wave/particles and is observed in more complex form as molecular matter. Physical existence evolved through natural process into ever more complex organizations of matter; so also must anthropic consciousness have evolved from more fundamental antecedent characteristics. The dyadic model proposes a scenario for this evolution that corresponds to the appearance of the universe we seem to inhabit.     

基层医院年轻医生临床素质现状分析及培养对策

本文对基层医院年轻医生临床素质的现状进行分析,指出了文化层次、福利待遇、带教培养、质控意识、科研热情、人文修养和医疗环境等方面存在的缺陷和不足是导致基层医院年轻医生临床素质低的重要原因。同时呼吁政府加大投入和确保医疗环境安全,加强年轻医生政治思想教育,树立正确的人生观和良好的医德医风,具备良好的心理素质、较好的人文修养和过硬的沟通能力,强化质控意识,引导和培养年轻医生加强临床知识积累,掌握科学的思维方法,从而促进科研水平的提高。     

Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon

The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.     

诺贝尔医学奖获得者的人文底蕴思考

科学家成功之处在于科技创新和人文底蕴的融合.目前的研究欠缺对科学家人文底蕴深入系统的探讨.科学家人文底蕴的基础是科学自觉,是真;人文底蕴的彰显是人文自觉,是善;人文底蕴的内核是人文价值,是美.人文价值是科学与人文的融合点,体现了二者在追求真善美的人生价值最高境界上的相通.人文底蕴的培养必须贯穿人文价值,养成科学自觉和人文自觉.